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c h a p t e r  
Monica Tennberg, Larissa Riabova and Aileen A. Espiritu
introduCtion to poLitiCs of
deveLopMent in the Barents region
sustainable development in the Barents region 
The goal of this book, “Politics of Development in the Barents Region”, is 
to raise and support further debate on sustainable development in the Barents 
Region. The concept of sustainable development, based on the idea of fulfilling 
the needs of both current and future generations, is deeply embedded in global 
“developmentalism”, which emerged after the Second World War as a dominant 
mode of governance (World Commission on Environment and Development 
; Sachs ; Death ). Accordingly, development is often understood in 
terms of economic growth and welfarism: economic growth is needed to alleviate 
various social ills such as poverty, unemployment and other social concerns. 
Region-building in the Barents Region is connected to global efforts to advance 
sustainable development—a topic which is once again on the global agenda: the 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio +) will be 
held this year to assess the progress since the United Nations Conference on 
Development and Environment (UNCED) held in  in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
  The Barents Euro-Arctic Region was established in the early s 
to advance the political reconstruction of Northern Europe and support 
sustainable development in the region (Tunander and Stokke 4; Dellenbrant 
and Olsson 4; Pettersen ; Brynstad et al. 4). The aim of this book is go 
beyond the study of regional institution-building for sustainable development. 
The book does not address how the regional potential has been turned into an 
“acting subject with a distinct identity, actor capability, legitimacy and structure 
of decision-making” (Larner and Walters , ) to advance sustainable 
development in the region. Instead this collection of chapters studies how 
the region has become “governmentalized” as a site of competing political, 
economic and legal rationalities and practices (Larner and Walters , 4). A 
region from the perspective of governmentality emerges as a site of competing 
political strategies for sustainability and an instrument of government. 
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  The Barents Region covers the northernmost parts of Sweden, Norway 
and Finland and Northwest Russia (see the Map .) with some 5. million 
inhabitants altogether. In many respects, from the developmentalist point of view, 
the region has not reached its full development potential based on its natural and 
human resources and their exploitation (Lausala and Valkonen ; Statistics 
Finland and Goskomstat of Russia ; Brynstad et al. ; Siuruainen ). 
There has been, and still is, a considerable gap in human development across 
the borders in the Barents Region in terms of life expectancy, social security 
and various social concerns (Aarsaether et al. 4; Duhaime ; Heleniak 
; Riabova ). Natural resource-based development has several important 
consequences, both potentially positive and negative, for local communities and 
regional development. The challenge in the region is to find a balance between 
economic growth, human development and environmental considerations. 
Various development projects in the region could turn local communities into 
resource centres, “new frontiers” for mining, the oil and gas industry, and other 
industrially intensive ways of using natural resources (see Megatrends ).
  The Barents Region is well known for its rich natural resources such as 
minerals, energy resources, timber and fish, which it provides to European 
markets. The region and its member-states are major trade partners of the 
European Union as a whole, but it is increasingly also seen as a gateway to 
global markets (Arctic Marine Assessment Report , ). The Barents 
Region is most often depicted as “a rich resource region” serving European 
and global markets, making this particular feature of the region a regional 
marker (see Larner and Walters , 4). Developing regional governance 
– that is, political cooperation and regional networks – is important in terms 
of supporting economic growth, regional integration and investment in the 
region (see Nygaard ; Koleshnikov ; Svensson ). The region could 
develop into a more economically integrated region, for example, if Russian 
accession to the World Trade Organization finally becomes a reality (European 
Council on Foreign Relations ).
  Despite almost  years of efforts of regional governance, the Barents 
Region has not yet emerged as a “transregion” (Wiberg ; see also Castberg 
4; Rautajoki ) – a functional economic region with internal relations 
that are stronger and more intensive than its external relations. Economic ties 
within the region remain weak, but they are much stronger to the European 
markets (Albu and Wiberg ; Wiberg ; Wiberg ). One of the 
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challenges for regional integration is that the current regional transportation 
system is deemed to be under-developed and in need of heavy investment 
to serve increasing international demands for the region’s natural resources. 
Furthermore, the fact that transportation routes run mainly from North to 
South means that they serve local needs and regional cooperation poorly 
(Kazantseva and Westin 4; Nijkamp and Rodenburg ; Nielsen ).
  From a regional perspective, sustainable development may have different 
meanings. Tackling past, current and future development in the region is a 
question of governance with multiple spatial linkages: local, sub-regional, 
national, European and global. Governance, in its broadest sense, is understood 
as the management of societal affairs by state and non-state actors together. 
Governmentality refers to the study of political rationalities, practices and 
the effects of governing as tactics of state power (Foucault ; Dean ). 
Regionalism, from this perspective, is an emergent art of international 
governance based on multiple, co-existing spatialisations, such as in Northern 
Europe (Larner and Walters , 4; Adams ; Lehtinen ). Such 
regions are made up of visions of diverse and fragmented peoples and territories 
linked by multiple, often asymmetric, economic flows and networks (Larner 
and Walters , 4). Regionalism is, in particular, a very limited mode of 
governance, based on governing through freedom. It sees regions as part of a 
global economic space: it aims at freeing the mobility of goods, capital and people 
in a region. Such regions govern themselves by interaction, communication 
and reform within and between authorities, companies and non-governmental 
organisations from a distance. From this perspective, a major threat is that 
sustainable development will be appropriated by economic rationalities, and 
specifically those of neoliberal doctrines of governance (Reid ).
politics of development
Scholars of governmentality ask questions such as: What are the political 
rationalities driving the region-building? What kind of strategies and techniques 
of regional governance are used? What are the effects of power in region-
building? The political aspect of governmentality is to problematize regional 
governance and its strategies for development. Politics and resistance are not 
the same: “politics is no more or less than that which is born with resistance to 
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governmentality”, but it is not resistance per se (Foucault , ). Politics 
from this perspective is to ask “How to govern?” – a question both for those who 
govern and for those who are governed (Cadman ), not only as a question 
of effective governing but also as a fundamental question concerning the nature 
of governance. To answer these questions the book is divided into three parts: 
Rationalities of governing, Governance in practice, and Governing everyday 
life. The chapters analyse various regional rationalities, governance practices 
and their multiple effects on local and regional subjectivities. The contributing 
authors are specialized in regional studies, including both senior researchers and 
doctoral students; they represent different fields of expertise – international law, 
political science, and sociology – and thus offer diverse viewpoints on decision-
making to resolve the social, economic, political and cultural challenges salient 
in the process of creating a region based on political will.
part 1 rationalities of governing
Chapter  by Larissa Riabova discusses Russian state northern policy, its 
transformations from the Soviet era to the present, and its possible implications 
for the Barents Euro-Arctic region cooperation. Riabova’s analytical focus is 
on social outcomes for people living and working in the Russian North vis-
à-vis Russia’s northern policies. Such an approach gives an important people-
oriented perspective on Russia’s northern policy, as well as on its repercussions 
for the Barents Region cooperation, where the human dimension is one of the 
prioritized areas and, as it is claimed in the paper, forms the key driving force 
for Barents cooperation. The chapter presents shortcomings and criticism of 
the current Russian northern policy and suggests priorities and tasks for more 
systematic, socially oriented governance of the Russian North and promotion 
of cross-border cooperation in the Barents Region.
  Chapter  by Md. Waliul Hasanat studies governance in the Barents Euro-
Arctic Region (BEAR) from a legal perspective. The two bodies of cooperation 
in the BEAR, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Barents 
Regional Council (BRC), were not conceived as the result of an international 
treaty, nor are they covered by the law of international organisations. These two 
entities have been closely connected since the beginning of regional cooperation 
and perform many activities together. The regional structure of governance has 
created a distinct situation in global governance. The chapter examines the 
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types of individual aims that the two bodies have in light of international law. 
The author suggests as a conclusion that these bodies form “a hybrid soft-law 
mechanism” for regional cooperation on sustainable development.
  Chapter 4 by Anna-Maija Matilainen examines corporate social 
responsibility as a mode of governance, particularly in the forest sector in the 
Russian part of the Barents Region. Traditionally, the nation state has claimed 
to be the only source of law, but nowadays, various privately-established rules 
have started to govern the behavior of companies operating in the forest sector 
in Russia. The author studies the regulatory capacity of the forest companies 
and how the forest companies have promoted private regulation in the Russian 
forest sector. From a theoretical point of view, the chapter is linked to the 
discussion on legal pluralism, which challenges the perceived monopoly of the 
state in making and administering law. Instead, legal pluralism recognises the 
regulatory capacity of various non-state actors. According to the theory of legal 
pluralism, there may be several co-existing legal orders in the same social field. 
  In chapter 5, Stefan Walter presents climate change as a complex regional 
problem and aims to shed light on the processes that guide governance on 
climate change. The complexity of climate change governance is shown by 
introducing differing positions – including general governmental, legal, political, 
economic and scientific positions – and by contrasting varying expectations. 
This provides an opportunity to comprehend the rationality of politics as well 
as answer broader questions concerning scientific approaches which may lead 
to misunderstandings. The chapter is based on a logical approach in science 
which is somewhat in contrast to an empirical approach and which differs 
fundamentally from a critical approach, which is the usual basis for normative 
studies. Thus, the author seeks to correct the picture that emerges when political 
rationality enters as a norm in research thinking.
part ii governance in practice
Chapter  by Vladimir Didyk explores the relations between local government 
and sustainable development in the Russian part of the Barents Region. The 
Kirkenes Declaration of the Foreign Ministers’ Conference () promoted 
sustainable development and stressed the importance of local institutions in the 
Barents Region. Nowadays, after almost two decades of reforming processes 
in Russia, one of the key institutions of democracy and national governance 
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systems – local self-government – is still in the process of formation. Moreover, 
the institution of local self-government in Russia is still the weakest link in 
the national governance system. The author discusses the characteristics of the 
formation process of local self-government in Russia and some of its specificities 
in the territories of the Russian part of the Barents Region, and estimates the 
current state and potential of local communities to realize the principles of 
sustainable development and participate in the Barents cooperation.
  Chapter  by Eini Laaksonen aims at identifying the key challenges 
of Finnish business projects in the Murmansk region. The chapter takes the 
form of a literature review, first by discussing the economic development of 
the Murmansk region, secondly by investigating the theoretical literature 
concerning international project marketing, and thirdly by analysing earlier 
studies on business experiences in Russia and particularly in the Murmansk 
region. Supporting international business cooperation and the presence of 
foreign companies in Murmansk in the fields of environmental technology, 
waste treatment, and heat and electricity distribution could not only 
increase the region’s economic activity but also contribute to its sustainable 
development through knowledge transfer and joint innovation creation. The 
conclusions of this review create a basis for deeper empirical studies concerning 
the perspectives particularly of Finnish companies in the Murmansk region.
  Chapter , by Luc Ampleman, deals with transportation planning in 
the Far North, aiming to identify the main challenges of sustainable mobility 
planning in the Arctic. The author identifies some of the main barriers and 
avenues in regional transport planning. According to the author, the most 
common indicators developed to assess and monitor sustainable mobility 
remain car-centric, south-oriented and frequently do not fit the Arctic context. 
Secondly, transport plans, strategies and policies are in many cases structured like 
narratives, and more precisely like “fairy tales”, but pragmatic, future-oriented 
narratives by various stakeholders help to develop “Arctic region-building” 
around concrete Northern transportation issues. Thirdly, Arctic transport 
planning must be undertaken by more elaborated and specially adapted “Arctic 
sustainable transport indicators” and by facilitating the broad participation 
of all stakeholders concerned by transportation. The Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region constitutes a good laboratory to build consensus around “the mobility 
narration” and “sustainable indicators”.
  In chapter  Maria Tysiachniouk examines the certification systems 
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in the supply chain from Russia to European paper markets that ensure 
consumer confidence in the production processes. The chapter studies different 
understandings of trust by managers, buyers and consumers. The author claims 
that the lower the unit is in the chain of custody and the closer it is situated 
to the logging sites, the more the managers’ construction of trust is narrow, 
minimal, and ultimately reduced to ensure “normal” business. The differences 
observed in the constructs of trust in various units of the chain can be explained 
by two reasons: first, the challenges faced by each individual unit, and second, 
the value system of managers at every level. Therefore, at logging sites in Russia, 
intangible values – such as environmental friendliness and social responsibility, 
which are the most important for the end users – do not appear in the narratives, 
being replaced by a purely instrumental approach in which trust is equivalent to 
the national standards and requirements of the process of production.
  In chapter  Karolina Banul analyses renewable energy policies in 
the Barents Region. Investment in research, technology development and 
commercial projects related to renewable energy has been growing gradually 
in the Barents Region during the last decade. This chapter analyses the 
development of renewable energy policy measures in the context of national 
energy and climate policies by studying official documents, statistics and media 
material. The results of the analysis demonstrate a complicated structure of 
policies that involve various agencies within the public sector, business, and 
civil society in regional energy governance. These findings imply that the 
development of renewable energy sources at regional level is determined by 
national politics and interests, as well as by pressure from international or 
super-national organizations. Nevertheless, configurations of interest, practices, 
political engagement and the capacity to influence the development of 
renewable energy vary across the cases studied in the Barents Region.
part iii governing everyday life
Chapter  by Nils-Gustav Lundgren focuses on globalization in everyday 
life in Northern Sweden. The author investigates the actual “degree of 
globalization” among the citizens of Northern Sweden at the individual level. 
The questions to be answered are the frequency of travel abroad, contacts with 
people from other countries, and the use of other languages than Swedish 
at work as well as at home. Are there obvious differences in globalisation 
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between the genders, people from towns and villages of different sizes, people 
with different educational backgrounds and different occupations? A final 
question is what individual attributes characterise the positive or negative 
values of globalization for the northern Swede. The study is based on data 
from a questionnaire answered by almost 5 individuals living in the four 
northernmost counties of Sweden in  and .
  In chapter  Soili Nystén-Haarala and Antonina Kulyasova study 
traditional Pomor communities that are dependent on fishing in the Arkhangelsk 
region, near the White Sea. Although fish resources have for centuries been 
owned by the state, fishing has, in practice, been quite free for people who live 
in the countryside and who are dependent on natural resources. The market 
economy has, however, introduced changes which have brought more users of 
natural resources to remote areas and pushed local people who are dependent 
on fishing out of the group of legal users of local natural resources. The case 
study shows that changes in legislation and intensified use of natural resources 
threaten the traditional livelihood of the Pomors and have transformed them 
from traditional users of natural resources into poachers. This clash of traditional 
rights and new legislation has stimulated Pomor ethnic identity and led to a 
political movement of Pomors to struggle for their lost fishing rights, as well as 
informal resistance against formal legislation.
  Chapter  by Nafisa Yeasmin focuses on immigrants and their experiences 
in everyday life in Northern Finland. First, the author presents some statistical 
information on the growth of immigrants in the city of Rovaniemi, Finland. 
Then she discusses local attitudes toward immigrants and the challenges faced 
by immigrants in coping in a new environment. The chapter is based on a 
review of literature, participant observation and the personal experiences of the 
author, who has lived and worked as an immigrant in the city of Rovaniemi 
for almost a decade.
  In chapter 4 Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen studies the connections between 
development, economy and gender in the Barents Region. Environmental 
changes, new economic opportunities and changes in social and demographic 
structures in the region also have gendered implications for the future of the 
Barents Region. This chapter aims at illuminating and discussing, through 
political statements and administrative plans and strategies, how the North and the 
Barents Region are perceived and hoped to be from a gender perspective. What 
is the relationship between the aims of achieving sustainability (development), 
26
prosperity (economy), and social equality (gender)? The chapter also engages 
in feminist and development discussions emphasising especially questions of 
(gendered) agents in development, the economy and intersectional analysis.
  The final chapter, by Monica Tennberg,  Aileen A. Espiritu, Larissa 
Riabova and Julian Reid, draws together some general findings of the chapters 
and proposes some directions for future research concerning the region and its 
development.
the background of the book 
The book is based on multidisciplinary research cooperation between Nordic 
and Russian researchers. The collaboration took place in four workshops in 
Rovaniemi, Finland ( and ), Kirkenes, Norway (), and Apatity, 
Russia (). In addition, some researchers from the network participated in two 
international conferences “Complex Gaze at a Complex World: Challenges of 
Comparison in Social Research” held in St. Petersburg in  and “The North 
and the Arctic in the new paradigm of world development; Luzin Readings - 
” in Apatity. The partners in the researcher network are: the Barents Institute, 
University of Tromsø, Norway (Aileen A. Espiritu); the Centre for Regional 
Studies, University of Umeå, Sweden; the University of Technology in Luleå, 
Sweden (Nils-Gustav Lundgren); the University of Eastern Finland (Soili 
Nystén-Haarala); and the Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Finland (Monica 
Tennberg). Research professor Monica Tennberg, from the Arctic Centre, was the 
coordinator of the network. The Russian experts came from the Luzin Institute 
for Economic Studies, Kola Science Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
(Larissa Riabova and Vladimir Didyk), and the Centre for Independent Social 
Research in St. Petersburg (Maria Tysiachniouk). The researcher network was 
funded by Nordforsk (-). This book is the main result of the researcher 
network and its activities. Especially, the book presents a new generation of young 
researchers and their interests in studying the Barents Region and its development. 
An editorial team was responsible for the reviewing and editing process. The 
members of the editorial team were Monica Tennberg, Larissa Riabova, Maria 
Tysiachniouk, Nils-Gustav Lundgren and Soili Nystén-Haarala.
27
references
a a L B u , h . &  W i B e r g , u .  (). How may institutional regionalisation 
promote regional development? In J.A. Dellenbrant & U. Wiberg (Eds.), Euro-
Arctic curtains, pp. 77-104. Umeå: CERUM.
a a r s a e t h e r  n . ,  r i a B ova  L . &  B a r e n h o L d t, J . o .  (4). 
Chapter . Community viability. In Arctic Human Development Report, pp. -
54. Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute.
a d a M s , p. C .  (). Multilayered regionalization in Northern Europe. 
GeoJournal. DOI ./s--4-.
a r C t i C  M a r i n e  s h i p p i n g  a s s e s s M e n t  r e p o r t  (). 
Retrieved April 4, , from http://arcticportal.org/uploads/4v/
cb/4vcbFSnnKFTAB5lXZ_TQ/AMSAReport.pdf.
B r u n s ta d, B . ,  M a g n u s , e . ,  s Wa n s o n , p. ,  h ø n n e L a n d, 
g . a n d  ø v e r L a n d, i .  (4), Big oil playground, Russian bear reserve or 
European periphery? The Russian Barents Sea Region towards 2015. Delft: Eburon.
C a d M a n , L . (). How (not) to be governed: Foucault, critique and 
the political. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space , 5-55. 
DOI:./d45.
C a s t B e r g , r .  (4). Economic cooperation: Potentials and problems in 
Northwest Russia. In O. Tunander & O.S. Stokke (Eds.), The Barents Region: 
Regional Cooperation in Arctic Europe, pp. -4. London: Sage. 
d e at h , C .  (). Governing Sustainable Development: Partnerships, Protests and 
Power at the World Summit. London: Routledge.
d e a n , M . (). Governmentality. Power and rule in modern society. London: 
Sage. 
d e L L e n B r a n t, J . a . &  o L s s o n  M . - o . (Eds.) (4). The Barents 
Region. Security and Economic Development in the European North. CERUM: 
Umeå. 
d u h a i M e , g .  (). Economic and social conditions in the Arctic. In 
S. Glomsrød & I. Aslaksen (Eds.), The Economy of the North 2008, pp. -. 
Retrieved April , , from http://www.chaireconditionautochtone.fss.
ulaval.ca/documents/pdf/ECONOR-.pdf.
e u r o p e a n  C o u n C i L  o n  f o r e i g n  r e L at i o n s  (). Trade 
liberalisation with Russia. Retrieved April , , from http://www.ecfr.eu/
scorecard//russia/.
f o u C a u Lt, M . (). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon and 
28
f o u C a u Lt, M . (). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. 
Miller (Eds.), The Foucault effect. Studies in governmentality, pp. -4. With two 
lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press.
h e L e n i a K , t. (). Changing Settlement Patterns across the Russian 
North at the Turn of the Millennium. In Russia’s Northern Regions on the edge: 
Communities, industries and populations from Murmansk to Magadan. Helsinki, 
Finland: University of Finland Press.
K a z a n t s e va , n . &  W e s t i n , L .  (4). Missing Networks in 
“the missing region” - The challenge of infrastructure development. In J.A. 
Dellenbrant & M.-O. Olsson (Eds.), The Barents Region. Security and economic 
eevelopment in the European North, pp. 5-4. Umeå: CERUM.
Ko L e s n i Kov, n . (). Foreign investment as an indicator of economic 
cooperation in the Arctic Region: Case of the Russian North. Retrieved April , 
, from http://www.nrf.is/images/stories/presentations/calotte_/
nikolai_kolesnikovforeign_investement_as_an_indicator_of_economic_
cooperation_in_the_arctic_region.pdf.
L a r n e r , W. &  Wa Lt e r s , W.  (). The political rationality of “new 
regionalism”:Toward a genealogy of the region. Theory and Society (), -
4. DOI: ./A:55.
L a u s a L a , t. &  va L Ko n e n , L . (). Economic geography and structure of 
the Russian territories of the Barents Region. Rovaniemi: Arctic Centre.
L e h t i n e n , a . a .  (). Mnemonic North: Multilayered geographies 
of the Barents Region. In F. Möller & S. Pehkonen (Eds.), Encountering the 
North: Cultural geography, international relations and Northern landscapes, pp. -5. 
Aldershot: Ashgate.
n i J K a M p, p. &  r o d e n B u r g , C .  (). Mainports and gateways in 
Europe: A comparative contrast analysis for the Nordic area. Retrieved April , , 
from http://www.geo.ut.ee/nbc/paper/nijkamp_rodenburg.htm.
n i e L s e n , t.  (). Border crossing exercises. In A. Staalesen (Ed.), Talking 
Barents. People, borders and regional cooperation, pp. 4-. Kirkenes: International 
Barents Secretariat.
n y g a a r d, v.  (). Foreign trade in the Barents Region. Experienced by 
Russian companies in the Murmansk region. NIBR report . Oslo: NIBR.
M e g at r e n d s  (). Stockholm: Nordregio.
p e t t e r s e n , o .  (). The vision that became reality. The Barents regional 
cooperation 1993-2003. Kirkenes: The Barents Secretariat.
29
r a u ta J o K i , t. (). Barents business cooperation. In S. Katila, M. 
Kulmala & L. Päiviö (Eds.), Murmansk. New Possibilities in the Barents Region, pp. 
-. Helsinki: STETE.
r e i d, J .  ().  The debased and politically disastrous subject of resilience. 
Development dialogue 5, -.
r i a B ova  L .  (). Community viability and well-being in the circumpolar 
North. In L. Heininen & C. Southscott (Eds.), Globalization and the Circumpolar 
North. Fairbanks, Alaska: University of Alaska Press.
s a C h s , W. (). The development dictionary. A guide to knowledge as power. 
London: Zed Books.
s i u r u a i n e n , e ,  (). Barentsin alueen uusiutuvat rakenteet. Suomalaisten 
yritysten toimintamahdollisuuksista Luoteis-Venäjällä. Retrieved April , , 
from http://www.tem.fi/files//Barents_web.pdf.
s tat i s t i C s  f i n L a n d  &  g o s Ko M s tat  o f  r u s s i a  (). 
The Arctic Treasure. Facts and figures on the undiscovered Barents Region. Helsinki: 
Statistics Finland.
s v e n s s o n , B .  (). Politics and business in the Barents Region. Stockholm: 
Fritzes. 
t u n a n d e r , o . &  s to K K e , o . s .  (Eds.) (4). The Barents Region: 
Regional Cooperation in Arctic Europe. London: Sage.
W i B e r g , u .  (). From visions to sustainable practices. In O. Pettersen 
(Ed.), The vision that became reality. The regional Barents cooperation 1993-2003. 
Kirkenes: Barents Secretariat.
W i B e r g , u .  (). Outlook on the Barents cooperation. Retrieved April 
, , from http://www.bbsr.bund.de/cln_/nn_4/BBSR/EN/
Publications/IzR//Downloads/DL__Wiberg,templateId=raw,property=
publicationFile.pdf/DL_Wiberg.pdf.
Wo r L d  C o M M i s s i o n  o n  e n v i ro n M e n t  a n d  d e v e L o p M e n t 
(). Our common future. Retrieved April , , from http://www.un-
documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.
30
part i 
Rationalities of governing 
31
c h a p t e r 
Larissa Riabova
state poLiCy in the russian north, 
its soCiaL outCoMes and the Barents 
Cooperation
introduction
Russia is, and has been for centuries, the largest northern country in the world 
in terms of the area of her northern lands. These huge areas have demanded 
special approaches, and the Russian state, during its history, has applied more or 
less specific policies in relation to its northern territories. These policies shifted 
from exploration and colonization in the th-th centuries to conquering the 
North during the early Soviet period and intensive industrialization later in the 
Soviet era, and then to depressing policies in the post-Soviet period of the s 
and subjection of the North to standard federal policies in the s. Nowadays, 
we are witnessing a trend of re-asserting Russian national interests in this vast 
region and the shaping of a new model of northern policy; one of the major 
factors influencing the process is a growing global interest in the North and the 
Arctic, due largely to rich hydrocarbon resources, aqueous biological resources, 
and other forms of strategic raw materials in these territories. 
  The latter shifts in Russia’s policy concerning her northern regions that 
took place after the s occurred against the background of major systemic 
changes in the country. These changes have often been described by political 
economists as a transition from totalitarian socialism with a paternalistic model 
of relations between state and society to a liberal one entailing reduced state 
intervention in the economy and public services, and then in the s to 
neoliberal solutions in some spheres, though this process in Russia has been 
surrounded by controversy (Rasell , ) and obviously is not a clear-cut 
case. In terms of political economy, I consider it appropriate to understand the 
transformations of Russia’s northern policy in post-Soviet times as a transition 
from socialist state paternalism to a mixed model with liberal and neoliberal 
features (Granberg and Riabova , -; Rasell , ). This article 
does not go deeply into the theoretical aspects of the processes which are the 
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theme of the paper, but it is important to keep these considerations in mind as 
a navigational tool to follow through the paper.
  In a geopolitical context, the domestic northern policy of the Russian 
state has a significant effect on international activities in the North and the 
Arctic, including Barents Euro-Arctic region cooperation, which is often 
considered to be one of the most successful international political interactions 
in the Circumpolar North involving Russia. The role of Russia on the global 
Northern and Arctic stage is not minor; moreover, some analysts believe that 
today Russia and energy produced in the Russian North are the central factors 
shaping the geopolitical picture of the Arctic (Geopolitics in the High North 
, ). In this respect, understanding the content of Russia’s current policy 
towards her northern and arctic territories, as well as the direction of potential 
changes, is important for setting political, economic, environmental and social 
priorities for the international agenda in the Circumpolar North, including the 
Barents cooperation, in both the short and long terms.
  This article deals with the transformations of the Russian Federation’s 
state policy towards its northern territories, the latest developments, possible 
implications for the Barents Euro-Arctic region cooperation, and the need 
for change. The paper will not deal with hydrocarbon mega-projects or the 
Northern Sea Route shipping plans of the Russian state. Various aspects of 
the state’s northern policy through different periods are analyzed, but the 
primary focus is on the social outcomes of these policies for the people who 
live and work in the Russian North. This approach gives an important people-
oriented perspective on northern policy transformations in Russia, as well as 
on the repercussions for the Barents Region cooperation, in which the human 
dimension is one of the prioritized areas. This approach suggests that the 
success of any regional policy should not be measured merely by the growth 
of economic activity, nor only by the amount of resources extracted on the 
territory of the region or the trade in other market goods meant to serve 
the needs of the rest of the country. Social outcomes, the development of the 
human potential of the territory which is under the state policy, are measures 
of success that provide better balance, justice and sustainability, and they form 
the core idea and point of departure for this paper. 
  In the first part of the paper, to establish the context, I examine the 
transformations of the state’s northern policy in the socialist era and in post-
Soviet times. In the second part, the current Russian policy towards her 
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northern regions is analyzed, and, as in the previous part, it is done through the 
prism of the effects of the policy on northern residents in terms of demographic 
developments, living standards and the well-being of the population. The most 
acute social problems for inhabitants of the Russian North are identified and 
their causes are indicated. In the third part of the paper the northern policy 
of the Russian state is discussed in relation to the Barents Euro-Arctic region 
cooperation. The idea that human development is the major driving force for 
further progress in the Barents cooperation is discussed and supported. Finally, 
I try to answer the question “What kind of state policy does the Russian 
North need today?” The shortcomings of the current northern policy of the 
Russian state are highlighted and criticism is presented; priorities and tasks are 
suggested for federal and regional authorities that would make state policy in 
the North more systematic, sustainable, socially oriented and promote cross-
border cooperation, including the Barents cooperation. 
  The statistical data used in this article, unless specified otherwise, are 
taken from the official yearbooks of statistics of the Federal Service of State 
Statistics of Russia (Rosstat) and its territorial division in the Murmansk region 
(Murmanskstat).
  Having been a northerner for most of my life, I present opinions from the 
North. My northern perspective was an important factor during the writing of 
this paper, keeping me focused and enthusiastic throughout the process. 
the state northern policy in the socialist era
the russian north - regional structure, 
population and economic significance 
In accordance with federal legislation, the Russian North is perceived as 
the territories belonging to the Far North and territories equivalent to the 
regions of the Far North.1 Its administrative boundaries today encompass  
regions completely and incorporate parts of  other regions, altogether  
administrative regions of the Russian Federation (Severcom ). Russia’s 
northern territories account for more than 5% of her total land area. This vast 
region provides huge economic benefits and considerable strategic advantages 
1  Krainiy Sever i mestnosti, priravnennye k raionam Krainego Severa.
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for Russia. About % of the country’s natural resources – oil and gas, base and 
precious metals, forests, fish, etc. – are concentrated in the North. Mainly on 
the basis of the export of raw material, the northern regions contribute about 
5% of the Russian gross domestic product (GDP) and 5-% of the income 
in the federal budget (Oleinik , 4). It is also a region of great strategic 
importance hosting numerous military bases, including a submarine fleet.
  The population of these  regions – in Russian legislation referred to as 
northern subjects of the Russian Federation – is about 4. million people 
(data from the beginning of ) (Rosstat a), or .% of the total 
population of the country. The Russian North is populated by indigenous 
peoples, old-timers (Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and members of other 
ethnicities who came to the North in early and later waves of colonization 
or who were exiled forcibly and who have lived there for many generations), 
and newcomers: first-, second- and third-generation immigrants. The total 
northern indigenous population is ,, people, or .% of the total 
northern population.2 Among them, forty indigenous groups which have fewer 
than 5, members are recognized by Russian legislation as “indigenous 
small-numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East”; in total these 
groups include 5, people – as much as % of the population of the 
North. It is not possible to count the number of old-timers with total accuracy; 
some studies estimate their number at about . – 4. million people, or -
.5% of the northern population (Zaidfudim , ). Thus, newcomers – 
the first-, second- and third-generation immigrants – form the majority (5%) 
of the population of the Russian North. 
  The group of twelve administrative regions that are fully encompassed by 
Russia’s North includes the Republics of Karelia, Komi, Tyva, Sakha (Yakutia), 
Khanty-Mansi, Chukotskiy and Yamalo-Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrugs (AO), 
the Arkhangelsk region (including Nenetskiy AO), the Murmansk, Magadan and 
Sakhalin regions, and Kamchatskiy krai (Severcom ). The population of these 
twelve “entirely northern” regions is . million people, or 5.5% of the country’s 
population. Among them, some of the regions are considered to have a longer 
history of habitation and development: Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Kamchatka, 
Magadan, the Sakhalin regions, and the Republics of Karelia, Komi and Sakha.3
2  Calculated by the author on the basis of data from Severcom, 2010: http://www.severcom.
ru/nations/.
3   The other eleven regions that have part of their territory in the North are the Republics 
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  With such a small population, this group of twelve regions contributes 
the lion’s share of Russia’s northern GDP and is responsible for more than 
% of the total GDP produced in the Russian Federation. This proves the 
extreme importance of these twelve northern regions for the economy of the 
whole country. It also makes it clear that the comparatively small population of 
these northernmost regions creates tremendous economic benefits for Russia. 
For decades, most of these regions have contributed a per capita input to the 
national GDP that far exceeds the national average, and statistics show that the 
average contribution of one employed person in these northern regions to 
state revenues is almost three times higher than contributions in the rest of the 
country (Oleinik , 5). 
the state northern policy during soviet time – 
from conquering the north to industrialization 
With certain reservations it is possible to say that Russian state policy first 
got a northern dimension in 5, when the colonization of Siberia began. 
After the first wave of colonization, which continued throughout the th-
th centuries, the Russian North remained weakly explored and sparsely 
populated. The second wave of colonization took place in -5, when 
the young Soviet state expanded its administrative and economic power over 
the vast territories of the North, promoting the idea of “the Soviet conquest of 
the North”,  concentrating financial, material, technical and human resources, 
and forcefully directing them to create Soviet industry in the North (Shirokov 
, 5-). In the -s the GULAG structure (the Main Administration 
of Camps) was the primary organizational form of the Soviet state’s northern 
policy. The state granted broad powers in new territories to this institution 
of coercive power. Camp-type organizations based on the forced labor of 
hundreds of thousands of prisoners (Dal’stroy, Noril’lag and others) were the 
main actors realizing the goals of the totalitarian state in the North (Pelyasov 
, 5). For example, on the Kola Peninsula in the s twenty-seven 
camps existed, and the forced labour of more than , prisoners (who 
were often called spetspereselentsy – “forcefully resettled people”) out of a total 
population of about , inhabitants was used to build mines, roads and 
of Altai and Buryatiya; Zabaikal’skiy, Krasnoyarskiy, Permskiy, Primorskiy, Kharbarovskiy krais; 
Amursk, Irkutsk, Tomsk and Tyumen oblasts (Severcom 2010).
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chemical and metallurgical factories (Memorial Chibiny 5, ; Kol’skaya 
Entsyklopedia , -). During this period, especially in the s, the 
state put a remarkable effort into exploratory expeditions and scientific research 
in the North; this period was marked by a general spirit of glorification of the 
North and the Northern hero-explorers: O. Shmidt, I. Papanin, V. Chkalov, and 
V. Gromov. In the s specific policies based on a system of northern benefits 
were introduced by the state to stimulate the flow of a free labor force to the 
northern regions. 
  The third and largest wave of colonization and conquest of the Soviet 
North began in the early 5s. It was extremely industrial in nature and was 
based on the large-scale extraction of “cheap” northern resources. The main 
features of this period were extensive economic development, substantial 
state support for northern industries and regions, the explosive growth of 
industries, intensive labour, and uneven social development throughout 
the northern regions (Vityazeva and Kotyrlo , ). During this period, 
special social policies aimed at attracting people to the North and drawing 
on the recognition of northern specificities were actively introduced by the 
state. These policies included high wages, pensions and stipends for students 
supplemented by the so-called “northern coefficient” (raionnyy koeffitsient) to 
compensate for higher prices and uncomfortable climatic conditions; northern 
wage increments (severnye nadbavki) to motivate workers to stay in the North 
for longer periods; good delivery of consumer goods; and guaranteed northern 
benefits including free annual travel outside the North, longer periods of leave 
from work, improved pension rights, compensation for travel expenses to get 
medical treatment outside the North, and some other benefits.
  State social policy in the North was part of the comprehensive socialist 
welfare system established in the Soviet Union. Going far beyond the standard 
social policy in terms of benefits for the population, the northern social policy 
ensured that living standards, at least in respect of personal income, in the 
North were much higher than in other parts of the Soviet Union, even if 
differences related to types of northern regional and local economies and types 
of settlement structure or levels of remoteness existed: less remote industrial 
and urban areas were better off than remote agricultural rural districts. 
  The s-s can, with certain reservations, be described as the 
“golden age” of the Soviet North. This characterization is based, first of all, 
on the high living standards in terms of income, the comprehensive system of 
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northern social benefits, and substantial and regular – though insufficient – state 
investments in the northern social infrastructure, supplemented by the so-called 
“departmental social infrastructure” (vedomstvennaya infrastructura) that belonged 
to industrial enterprises. During the late Soviet period, in the s, the wage 
level in the North was two to four times higher than in other regions, and 
northern workers, especially in industrially developed regions, were provided 
with necessary public services either in their regions of residence or elsewhere 
(Granberg and Riabova , ). For instance, all northern industrial 
enterprises had health resorts (sanatoriums) for their workers in southern Russia 
where the personnel and family members could stay during the holidays either 
for free or for a very modest sum. Secondly, the “golden age” of the Soviet 
North during this period is also associated with the preservation and taking 
into consideration by state policies of many fundamental characteristics of 
the North as a distinct region, even though in many other cases the Soviet 
state tended to unify and decrease the country’s regional diversity. Thirdly, this 
period was marked by recognition and respect for people living and working 
in the harsh conditions of the North. It is worth mentioning that it was a time 
when the North was romanticized, and many well-known movies, songs and 
poems inspired by Soviet northern romanticism were created during this time. 
One example is the poem “Severnaya nadbavka” by the famous Soviet poet E. 
Evtushenko, which begins with the following lines4: 
What is this high northern wage paid for?
For the indented with the frost eyes,
For the skin scratched with ice,
For an almost empty rucksack, 
For this endless snowy track… (Evtushenko )
Official recognition and state support, along with the societal norm of a 
respectful attitude towards northerners, was regarded as fair by the population 
of the North and those living elsewhere. The underlying narrative in Soviet 
times was that “Russia has benefited from the efforts of northern inhabitants 
and should therefore compensate the hardships that they endured” (Rasell , 
). At the same time, on the other hand, state paternalism, societal respect and 
northern romanticism were whimsically intertwined with colonial attitudes 
4  Translation by L. Riabova.
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in relation to the North. At the state level, the colonial model of thinking, 
which can be summarized as “the North serving the country”, prevailed. This 
means that the extraction of northern natural resources to serve the needs of 
the rest of the country was the primary goal of development in the North. 
N. Thompson describes this model as the “moral economy” of sacrifice and 
entitlement that framed a Northerner’s residence as sacrificial service to the 
country (Thompson 4). 
  Settlement of the North was closely connected with the principal resource 
areas. The majority of new settlements were built in close proximity to major oil 
and gas fields or around a single resource-based enterprise. Thus a considerable 
part of the northern economy was connected with mono-industrial towns. 
The use of natural resources did not meet sustainability principles, and many 
northern areas became extremely polluted and over-harvested, with some 
areas sadly leading the world in this respect. The social infrastructure remained 
under-developed in comparison with that in the central regions since its 
initial level was very low or non-existent, and it was financed in accordance 
with the so-called residual principle (ostatocnhyi printsip), which implied that it 
was secondary in importance to industries. The biggest problem of the state 
northern policy during the Soviet period was the lack of a comprehensive 
multidimensional approach to socio-economic development in the North 
and the prioritization of economic and strategic military functions instead of 
balancing ecological, economic and social goals to make development of the 
northern territories sustainable. 
  In the public consciousness the idea of a temporary stay in the North for 
work dominated. This had an impact on many aspects of northern development. 
The use of natural resources broke the principles of sustainability, and the 
development of social infrastructure lagged behind the realization of industrial 
projects. The provision of goods and services, especially in remote settlements, 
was quite poor, compared with the relatively high northern incomes. So-called 
“delayed consumer demands” (otlozsennyi spros) for goods and services, when a 
large part of the demand for goods and services could be satisfied only outside 
the northern regions during vacation time, occurred. This state of affairs was 
unprofitable, creating an imbalance in interregional exchange, as a large part of 
the money earned in the harsh conditions of the North flowed to the already 
relatively well developed social sphere of the central regions. 
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  However, in other respects the Soviet period of conquering and 
industrializing the North brought mixed but impressive results. In Soviet times 
more than half of the towns in the North were established:  out of 4 
(Trunova 5, ). From 5 to  the population of the entire North and 
Far East increased six times, from 4. million people in 5 to . million in 
. The population of the regions fully encompassed by the North in 5-
 doubled and grew from 5. million people to . million (Zaionchkovskaya 
, ). Thus, judging by the indicator of population growth, the Soviet 
conquest and industrialization of the North may be considered a triumph.
  
post-soviet northern policy of the 1990s – 
powerless ruling, depressing results
In the beginning of the s the government of the Russian Federation 
started market reforms based on price liberalization, the privatization of state 
enterprises and free external trade as part of a general process of liberalization. 
The Russian North began the transition to a market economy as well, and 
the main principle of the federal northern policy was announced as state 
protectionism towards the North during the transition period. To a great extent 
the proclaimed state protectionism was an inert continuation of rhetoric from 
the late Soviet period, the s – s, when the state northern policy was 
characterized by strong state paternalism. The major aim of the policy was 
announced as state support for the dramatically declining living standards of 
the northern population. 
  Trying to resist a break-down of inter-regional coordination and to 
coordinate northern policy in the state, which was almost falling apart, as well 
as to withstand a crisis of fuel and food supplies to the North, the Russian 
government made an important institutional decision: in  a new federal body 
the Goskomsever – the State Committee on Social and Economic Development 
of the Northern Regions – was established in Moscow. Such a special northern 
policy institution (the Committee of the North) had previously existed for a 
brief period in early Soviet times from 4 to 5. The main functions of 
the re-established Goskomsever were the coordination of shipments of fuel 
and goods to the northern regions, indigenous affairs and northern research. Its 
impact on the situation in the northern regions was limited, since it could not 
overcome under-financing, which was the major problem in the s affecting 
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all sectors of the national economy and regions of Russia. However, its existence 
signified governmental recognition that the North required special state policies 
(Rasell , ), and its role in forming a legislative framework for state policy 
in the North in the new market economy was important.
  In the s intensification of the legislative process in relation to the North 
took place due to the necessity of transforming the state northern policy under 
new market conditions. No fewer than 5 governmental lawmaking documents 
on the North were adopted during this decade, with many initiated, worked out 
and supported by the Goskomsever or by its partner organizations: academic 
institutions, parliamentary committees, etc. The most important of them were 
the following Federal Laws: “On the state guarantees and compensations for 
individuals working and living in the regions of the Far North and equivalent 
areas” (), “On fundamentals of the state regulation of socio-economic 
development of the Russian Federation’s North” (), and “Concept of 
state support of economic and social development of the northern regions 
under new economic conditions” (worked out in - and adopted in 
). Due to this work, by the late s the system of state support of the 
North under new market conditions was conceptualized and enshrined in law. 
Its main directions were established as follows: i) re-defining the boundaries 
of the Russian North, ii) state support for northern transport systems and 
principal enterprises, iii) re-consideration of the system of northern benefits, 
iv) social support for the indigenous population, v) financing of programs for 
the resettlement of the northern population in the central regions of Russia. 
  However, despite numerous laws that were intended to stabilize the 
situation in the North, their usefulness was undermined by the non-payment 
crisis. Only a very limited number of legal measures were put into practice 
fully. The proclamations of state protectionism could not be realized due to the 
extraordinarily complicated economic situation in the country, characterized 
by hyperinflation and the collapse of industrial production, which resulted in 
an extreme lack of financial resources at all levels of government and severe 
budget constraints. All parts of the general concept of state support for the 
North under market conditions failed to be realized: the boundaries of the 
Russian North continued to be discussed; the system of northern benefits for 
the population remained almost unchanged, though not fully funded by the 
state; social support for the indigenous population and programs of population 
re-settlement to the central regions, though planned, suffered from a luck 
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of funding. The state northern policy of the s was reactive, tending to 
respond to socio-economic crises by drawing on the old Soviet approaches 
rather than suggesting new solutions, though, of course, it can be questioned 
whether proactive approaches were even possible, given the circumstances of 
systemic crisis in the country. The northern policy of the state mirrored the 
crisis situation in the whole country, and it is no wonder that it failed to provide 
state protection for the northern regions. 
  In addition to the introduction of democracy and a market economy, Russia 
went through rapid decentralization, which was not entirely the product of a 
conscious strategy of devolution of power to the regions, but also the result of 
the declining capabilities of the federal center (Blakkisrud and Honneland , 
4). Many social responsibilities were shifted to the regional and local levels, 
which were not provided with sufficient financial resources. The northern 
regions, being particularly disadvantaged in the transition to a free market due 
to their climatic and socio-economic specificities, could not effectively adapt 
to new conditions in the absence of federal support. In the s the social 
situation in the northern regions worsened sharply. Much has been written 
about the transformational destruction of the s and the dramatic declines 
in living standards across Russia and her northern regions (see, for example, 
Granberg and Riabova ; Thompson 4; Vityazeva and Kotyrlo ; 
Rusell ; Riabova ). Due to the steady reduction of governmental 
allocations and constant under-financing of the North, accompanied by 
enormous rises in prices starting in , the living standards of the northern 
population decreased dramatically, life expectancy fell, and unemployment and 
out-migration to central regions of the country increased considerably.
  The fall in living standards and the deterioration of the demographic 
situation in the North were more extreme than in Russia on the average. For 
example, during the s, in Chukotka real personal incomes dropped by 
5 times and in Kamchatka by 5 times; meanwhile, the most serious drop in 
real incomes in the central regions of Russia was  times (Zaionchkovskaya 
, ). Out-migration started in  in all northern regions, and in the 
s migration losses totaled , people annually (more than % per 
year). In total, from  to , the twelve regions fully encompassed by the 
Russian North lost about ,, people (.5% of the population) (Oleinik 
, 5). The highest migration loss was experienced by the Chukotka 
region, which lost about % of its population; by the end of the decade, 
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the number of inhabitants in the region had dropped to the same level as in 
5. Magadan region lost more than 5% of its population; in the Murmansk 
region, Kamchatka and Sakhalin, population losses were almost 5% of the 
regional population.
  The powerlessness of the government’s policy was devastating: “the 
triumphant Soviet North was abruptly turned into the depressing post-Soviet 
North” (Golovnev -, ). In the interviews I conducted with people 
living in different places in the Russian North, bitter views like the following 
were often expressed: “Northerners who recently were heroes of the country and well-
off winners became forgotten losers.” The end result of the powerless state policy in 
the s was the rapid uncontrolled destruction of human potential in all of 
the northern regions of Russia.
russia’s northern policy in the 2000s 
and the current situation 
standard state policy for the non-standard north 
Since the end of the Soviet era, during the years of market reform, the economic 
and social position of the Russian North has changed considerably. On the one 
hand, its economic importance for the nation has risen due to an increase 
in the role of the fuel and energy complex for the country’s economy; these 
sectors have become extremely important. On the other hand, by the end of 
the s the Russian North had become a land of severe economic, social and 
environmental problems requiring immediate solutions. The general situation 
in the country was close to chaotic with deindustrialization hitting all regions 
of Russia, some regions refusing to pay taxes to the federal budget and some 
threatening to leave the Federation, and enterprises and the population severely 
battered by the financial crisis of . The presidency of Vladimir Putin, which 
started in , began a new stage of national development. The creation of a 
strong “power vertical” and state re-centralization was perceived by many as a 
return to totalitarianism; however, many saw these moves in a more positive 
light as the only way to restore the manageability of the country and keep the 
situation from spinning into chaos. 
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  Together with the increasing role of the state, some neo-liberal decisions 
were made in economic and social policies. At the end of 4, an extremely 
important Federal Law No.  “On changes in legislation of the RF…” was 
adopted. It rejected many social obligations of the state, and the state retreat 
from social policy, which had already been in place since the s, received 
a solid legal foundation. Cutting public expenditures for social services was 
obviously a neoliberal move; another change in line with neoliberal logic was a 
reduction in state protectionism towards the North. 
  In the early days of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, the main principle of the 
federal policy towards the North – state protectionism – shifted to economic 
coordination and self-reliance in the North. The underlying idea of the new 
approach, expressed in the Program of the socio-economic policy of the 
government of the Russian Federation for the period up to  (), 
which was called the “Gref Program” after its main ideologist, German Gref, 
the Minister for Trade and Economic Development of the Russian Federation 
(RF) in -, was the denial of northern specificities and treating the 
North as a subject of standard federal policy (Osnovnye napravleniya… ). 
  Northern specificities were no longer seen as a reason for either special 
policies or a separate institutional body. In  the Goscomsever was 
disbanded; its liquidation was the sign that the North was no longer an arena 
of particular attention and that all its problems should be solved in an ordinary 
way (Blakkisrud and Honneland , 5; Golovnev -, ). The 
functions of the Goscomsever were transferred to other bodies and regular 
ministries: the Council on Northern and Arctic Affairs, which was under 
the authority of the Prime Minister, was established in  and cancelled 
in 4; then in 4 the Department of Northern Affairs at the Ministry of 
Economic Development of the RF was established and soon liquidated. The 
only body in the governmental structure of the RF that dealt with northern 
issues in the s – and continues its activities today – is the Committee of 
Northern Affairs and Indigenous Peoples within the Federal Council under 
the RF Federal Assembly (since 4; the present chairman of this body is 
Aleksandr Matveev) (Severcom ). The Committee has no executive power; 
it deals with issues of legal regulation in the North, works with the parliaments 
of the Northern and Arctic states, as well as international parliamentary and 
intergovernmental organizations. The most important thing is that it cooperates 
closely with the northern regions of the Russian Federation, expressing and 
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defending regional interests; due to this it has gained appreciation and respect 
throughout the Russian North. 
  Recently, in January , this body was deprived of its status of separate 
committee and was incorporated as a sub-committee into the Committee of 
the Federation Council on Federative Arrangements, Regional Policy, Local 
Government and Northern Affairs (Severcom ). I am sure many people 
have seen this change as a lowering of the status of the agency that for almost 
 years has addressed northern issues seriously. 
  The period since the mid s has been marked by the unification of 
northern legislation and erasing the northern specificities in legislative 
documents at the federal level. Among other changes, Federal Law No.  of 
 abolished the Federal Law “On fundamentals of the state regulation of 
socio-economic development of the Russian Federation’s North” of  and 
introduced substantial changes to wages, pensions, student stipends and northern 
benefits. It abolished federal funding for some northern wage supplements 
and travel privileges, cancelled some social benefits for northerners, shifted 
responsibility for providing workers in non-budget organizations with northern 
benefits to private employers. Most private employers – resource corporations 
and small private enterprises – tended not to provide northern benefits and 
travel privileges to workers, economizing on these, and most private-sector 
employees were, in fact, deprived of northern benefits. In addition, since 5 
specifically “northern” articles have been excluded from a number of other 
laws, and the situation for northern residents has worsened further (Riabova 
, -).
  Shifting social responsibilities from the central power to the regional 
and local levels under conditions of reduced federal funding has continued 
in circumstances of increasing centralization. Centralization has led to the 
reshaping of the national tax system so that financial resources are heavily 
concentrated in the hands of the federal center. Since  the financial situation 
of the RF has changed radically and state revenues have started to substantially 
exceed budget spending. In  the budget of the USSR consumed 44.% 
of total revenues, and the budgets of the republics consumed 55.4%. Thus, 
republics and regions had a considerable part of revenues at their own disposal. 
In post-Soviet Russia this ratio has been reversed. Of the total value of taxes 
collected in Russia, the share attributed to the subjects of the RF (regions and 
republics) has steadily declined for the past 5 years. In  it was %, but 
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by  it was only 45% (Matveev ). Under such conditions 4% of the 
subjects of the Russian Federation –  out of  – were subsidized in . 
Paradoxically, many northern regions where gross regional product per capita 
exceeds the Russian average are subsidized from the federal budget. In  
only five northern regions that are extremely profitable for the federal budget 
– Permskiy krai, Tyumen Oblast, Nenetskiy, Khanty-Mansi, Yamalo-Nenetskiy 
Autonomous Okrugs – were not subsidized (Gorod ). 
  Due to the current tax policy, the myth of “the unprofitable North” – 
the expensive North which is a burden to the state – has spread to include 
even profitable northern regions: “Many (northern) regions today are unwittingly 
infected with the psychology of the poor, begging for alms from the Centre for “good 
behavior” (Matveev , ). For example, my own experience shows that 
each new group of students in the course I teach on the Circumpolar North 
is surprised to learn that the Murmansk region, where they live, is not an 
unprofitable region for the country, and that – quite the opposite – for decades 
the region has been among the top group of Russian regions in GDP per 
capita. An important source of financial means for social policies in the North 
could be a rent on northern resources. However, resource corporations that 
have operated in the North since the s tend to register themselves and 
pay taxes outside the regions of extraction, often in off-shore zones, and 
revenue streams from extracting activities are still flowing out of the northern 
regions. Thus, regional and local administrations in the North, which have had 
increased social obligations since the s and especially since , continue 
to execute them not only in a situation of reduced federal funding, but also 
under conditions of inadequate revenues to regional budgets from the use of 
northern natural resources. As a result, in the s living standards and levels of 
social infrastructure development in the majority of the regions of the Russian 
North increasingly lagged behind the Russian average.
  In the late s the federal government announced a shift to more socially 
oriented development. Several nation-wide projects in the social sphere 
were started: health care, housing, education, and agriculture projects. In the 
beginning of  the “Concept of long-term socio-economic development of 
RF for the period up to the year ” (“Strategy ”) was adopted. Its key 
idea was the implementation of innovative socially oriented development in 
Russia. The regions of the RF started to prepare new socially oriented strategic 
plans, and the northern regions became involved in this process, too. 
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  By the mid s some positive trends in the social situation in the North 
appeared to a great extent as a result of the generally improved situation in 
the country. Since -4 decreases in unemployment, increases in living 
standards and life expectancy in the North have been observed. The growth 
of salaries and the general improvement of the social situation has resulted 
in a reduction of out-migration. Migration losses in the twelve regions fully 
encompassed by the Russian North were reduced to 4, people annually; 
in total , people left those regions in - (% of the population). 
  However, the dynamics of social indicators in the northern regions lag 
behind the national average. The most striking fact is that the dynamics of social 
indicators in the northern regions do not correspond to the significant input 
of northern residents into the country’s economy. Out of the twelve regions 
referred to as “fully northern”, ten have indicators of gross regional product 
(GRP) per capita that are higher than the national average levels (Fig. .).
  In fact, the leaders for this indicator are Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-
Nenetskiy AO, but Rosstat does not provide specific data on these territories 
fig. 2.1 Gross regional product per capita in the northern regions of the RF 
and average gross domestic product per capita in the RF, 2010, 1000 RUR
Source: Rosstat (2012).
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since they are part of Tyumen Oblast, which is not considered a “fully northern 
region”, so they are not seen in Fig. ..
  At the same time, paradoxically, only four regions out of twelve have poverty 
levels below the national average: Yamalo-Nenetskiy, Chukotskiy, Khanty-
Mansi AO and Sakhalin region. The other eight regions, consisting mostly of 
regions that are national leaders in terms of the GRP per capita indicator, have 
poverty levels that are higher than the national average (Fig. .). 
  Life expectancy, which is an important indicator reflecting the quality 
of life, is below the national average in ten out of the twelve fully northern 
regions (Fig..). Only in Yamalo-Nenetskiy and Khanty-Mansi AO does life 
expectancy exceed the Russian average.
  With all the new positive shifts in the social policy of the Russian state that 
have had a positive impact on the northern regions, too, it seems that it is still 
not completely understood at the state level that the most important factor for 
the development of the Russian North, its greatest asset, is not natural resources, 
fig. 2.2 Poverty level in the northern regions and the Russian average, 2010, %
Source: Rosstat 2011b.
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but its people. The realization of the national interests of Russia in the North 
and the Arctic and the sustainable development of these huge, unique territories 
are not possible without the preservation and development of its unique human 
potential: people who have adapted to living and working in extreme climatic 
conditions and who possess invaluable knowledge and special “Northern com-
petences” related to living and working in the severe and specific conditions of 
the North. The need for a better state policy for the northern regions of Rus-
sia, one that recognizes northern specificities and the importance of the human 
dimension, is obvious.
geopolitical changes and calls for a new northern policy 
Since the end of the s an increase in the geopolitical ambitions of the 
Russian Federation in the North and in the Arctic (the northernmost part 
of the Russian North) has occurred. To the outer world it became obvious 
in , when Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Naryshkin brought together a 
fig. 2.3 Life expectancy in the northern regions and the Russian average, 
2010, years
Source: Rosstat 2011b.
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group of representatives of ministries and departments, and flew with them to 
Svalbard to show the international community Russia’s commitment to that 
territory and presence on it. It became even more evident when a Russian 
submarine planted the flag of the Russian Federation on the seabed at the 
North Pole in . In September  “The fundamentals of state policy of 
the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the period up to  and beyond” 
(Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki… ), worked out by the Russian Security 
Council – a consultative body to the president – was signed by President D. 
Medvedev and passed. Since then attention to northern and Arctic issues at 
all levels of power and in society in general has increased. Several important 
legislative documents relating in whole or in part to Northern and Arctic issues 
have been adopted. These include:
i) Concept of sustainable development of the small-numbered 
indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East (February, ) 
(Kontseptsiya ustoichivogo… ); 
ii) Strategy of socio-economic development of the Far East and 
Baikal region up to 5 (December, ) (Strategiya sotsial’no-
ekonomicheskogo… );
iii) Strategy of socio-economic development of Siberia up to  
(July, ) (Strategiya sotsial’no-economicheskogo razvitiya Sibiri 
… ); 
iv) Strategy of socio-economic development of North-West Federal 
District up to  (November, ) (Strategiya sotsial’no-
economicheskogo razvitiya Severo-Zapadnogo... ).
Additionally, since the end of , the program on modernization of mono-
industrial towns has been underway; it is conducted by the federal government 
and the state corporation “Bank for Development and Foreign Economic 
Affairs” (Vnesheconombank) and involves many northern single-industry 
towns, supporting the diversification of their economies (Makieva , ). 
Furthermore, the draft of the Strategy of development of the Arctic Zone of 
the Russian Federation and providing national security up to  (Strategiya 
razvitiya Arkticheskoi zony… ) was prepared by the Ministry of Economic 
Development of the RF and is currently under consideration. 
  However, up to now, the only legislative document defining in a more or less 
systemic way the main directions of Russia’s new northern policy that has been 
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enacted is “The fundamentals of state policy of the Russian Federation in the 
Arctic in the period up to  and beyond” (Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki … 
). In this document the national interests of the RF in the Arctic are stated as: 
a)  use of the Arctic zone of the RF as a strategic resource base providing 
solutions to the problems of socio-economic development in the 
country; 
b)  preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation;
c)  preservation of the unique ecological systems of the Arctic; 
d) use of the Northern Sea Route as a nation-wide transport   
  communication system of the RF in the Arctic. 
This document also defines ten major strategic priorities of Russian state policy 
in the Arctic: 
a)  active interaction of the RF with other arctic states, solving the 
problem of demarcating the boundaries of the Russian arctic zone; 
b)  creation of an Arctic-wide rescue system; 
c)  improvement of the Arctic neighborhood relations within the 
framework of activity by the Arctic Council and Barents cooperation, 
the activation of economic, scientific, technological and cultural 
interaction, the development of cross-border cooperation in the 
exploitation of natural resources and nature preservation; 
d)  participation in the development of cross-polar transport 
communications, including the Northern Sea Route; 
e)  more active participation of Russian state agencies and public 
organizations in international forums on Arctic problems, including 
in the framework of partnership with the European Union; 
f) demarcation of marine zones in the high seas and the securing of a 
Russian presence on Svalbard; 
g) improvement of state governance of the socio-economic development 
of the Russian Arctic zone, including the expansion of scientific 
research in the Arctic;
h)  improvement of the life quality of the indigenous population and the 
social conditions for economic activity in the Arctic; 
i) development of a resource base in the Arctic zone on the basis of new 
 technologies;
j) modernization and development of an arctic transport system and 
 the fishing industry.
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The main goal of the policy in the mid-term strategic perspective is “to allow 
Russia to maintain her role of the leading Arctic state” (Osnovy gosudarstvennoi 
politiki … ). 
  In the West the immediate reception of this document focused largely on 
the establishment of a stronger Russian military presence in the Arctic and 
similar issues (Geopolitics in the High North ). However, as Jensen and 
Skedsmo put it, “this is perhaps more telling of how the West still interprets 
Russia’s actions in Cold war terms” (Jensen and Skedsmo , 44), and later 
a significant part of the opinions has shifted in the direction of recognizing the 
strong economic component of Russia’s ambitions in the Arctic, even if the 
creation of an Arctic military group and a coast guard to patrol Russia’s Arctic 
waters and estuaries have been planned to provide security in this region of the 
RF. Hydrocarbon resources and transportation are obviously two main priorities 
of the Russian state in the Arctic today, and the “Fundamentals…” reflects the 
fact that Russia is focusing on the extraction of resources, transportation and 
plans to modernize ports and improve shipping capabilities. 
  While in the international arena political and public views seem to be 
moving to a more or less balanced understanding, domestic debates in the 
country on the “Fundamentals…” seemingly have not reached a consensus. 
On the one hand, the document was positively received both at the federal 
and regional levels since it was a sign of the state’s turn towards the North. On 
the other hand, it was sharply criticized by experts, especially those from the 
northern regions, for its colonial spirit towards the Arctic regions, for treating 
this region first and foremost as a resource base for the rest of the country, and 
for lack of attention to the social aspects of development in the Arctic. Indeed, 
out of seven and a half pages in the document, less than one third of a page 
is devoted to human aspects of the state’s Arctic policy. Ecological aspects are 
included, but the need for the sustainable development of the Arctic territories 
is not clearly declared. The conclusion of the document firmly states that 
during the third stage of the realization of the state policy in the Arctic, in -
, “the transformation of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation into 
a leading strategic resource base of the Russian Federation must be secured” 
(Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki … ). 
  Against the background of insufficient attention to aspects of human 
development in the North, the document creates the impression that at the 
federal level attitudes towards this region continue to be dominated by traditional 
52
Russian northern policy considerations concerning the exploitation of resources 
and that these regions have been given the role of resource appendages of Russia. 
Thus, many practitioners, politicians and scientists in the northern regions are 
dissatisfied with the approach expressed in the document (Matveev ).
  Today some positive shifts can be seen in Russia’s northern policy. For 
example, several formerly cancelled northern benefits were reinstated as 
a reaction to pressure from the northern regions and from the Committee 
of Northern Affairs and Indigenous Peoples of the Federal Council. Active 
development of higher education in some northern regions has begun, as 
manifested by the transformation of some regional universities into high-
status Federal Universities on the basis of their integration with other regional 
institutions of higher education, and substantial federal financial support has 
been secured for them:
•	 in Siberian Federal District – the Siberian Federal University (SibFU) in 
Krasnoyarsk ();
•	 in the Far Eastern Federal District – North-Eastern Federal University 
(NEFU) in Yakutsk (given the status of Federal University in ) and the 
Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU) in Vladivostok ();
•	 in the Northwestern Federal District – the Northern (Arctic) Federal 
University (NArFU) in Archangelsk ();
•	 in Ural Federal District – Ural Federal University in Ekaterinburg ().
The amount of funding received by federal universities from the federal budget 
is quite substantial. For example, NArFU (Archangelsk), in addition to its regular 
financing, received five billion rubles for the first five years of its development 
program (Pravitel’stvo Arkhangel’skoi oblasti ). Today NArFU plays a notable 
role in producing Arctic-oriented education and research and stimulating public 
discourse on the Russian Arctic both in Russia and abroad. During the last few 
years many conferences, two of them with the participation of Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin, “The Arctic – Territory of Dialogue” in Moscow () and 
then in Arkhangelsk (), have been held. An enormous increase in media 
interest and scientific discourse, as well as a boom in publishing activity, on 
Northern and Arctic issues in Russia is taking place.
  Despite some positive shifts, the social situation in the majority of the 
northern regions of Russia remains a complex of problems longing for a 
53
solution. The human potential of the Russian North is under threat. Signs 
of the seriousness of the situation are, first of all, the high rates of natural 
population decline, the low levels of health, high out-migration, and the 
difficult socio-economic situation faced by the indigenous population. The 
standard of living is characterized by high levels of poverty, exceeding the national 
average in the majority of the regions of the North, and by levels of child poverty 
that exceed the national average. Our research shows that while in the Russian 
Federation as a whole the percentage of children living in poverty (provided with 
financial means below the subsistence minimum) is about %, in the northern 
regions it reaches -4%. Wage levels do not compensate for the costs of living in 
the North. For instance, the average wage in the Murmansk region, which is % 
higher than the national average (, rubles and , rubles, respectively, in 
)5 does not cover the difference in the cost of living, which is 5% higher in 
the Murmansk region than in central Russia. There is also a large gap in the salary 
level between the public sector and the industrial spheres. For example, in the 
Murmansk region, people working in industry make - times more than people 
working in the public sector.
  The system of northern guarantees and compensations, which has recently 
undergone significant cuts, is no longer sufficient to counter the cost of living 
in the North; in the non-budget sphere and in private business northern 
guarantees are almost never realized. Due to insufficient funding, and a poor 
understanding of the specifics of life in the high latitudes, social protection 
does not provide the necessary level of protection for the socially vulnerable 
segments of the population. For example, in the Murmansk region the monthly 
child allowance (4. rubles in ) provides only 5% of the child subsistence 
minimum (45 rubles, nd quarter of ). 
  Northern labor markets have high rates of unemployment, which, as a rule, 
exceed the national average. For instance, in the Murmansk region in  the 
total rate of unemployment reached .%, compared to the national average of 
.5%. Remote rural settlements, where the rate of unemployment is - times 
higher than the regional average, are facing an especially complicated situation. In 
single-industry towns the labor markets are unstable and highly dependent on the 
situation of resource markets and the policy of industrial groups and corporations. 
5   The statistical data used in this part of the paper are taken from the official yearbooks of 
statistics of the Federal Service of State Statistics of Russia (Rosstat) and its territorial division in 
the Murmansk region (Murmanskstat).
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The process of diversifying economic activity, which may include a wide variety 
of new activities, including development of small businesses, has been slow; one 
factor, among others, is the increased level of expenditures on the development of 
new business activities in northern conditions. The outflow of the most qualified 
and creative people continues, and new incentives are needed to bring qualified 
young workers to the North.
  One problem that needs to be addressed immediately is the condition 
of the social infrastructure of the northern cities and settlements. In most of 
them the level of social infrastructure development not only falls behind the 
national average but often does not correspond even to minimal social standards. 
According to expert evaluations, we are behind the Scandinavian North by 4-
5 years in this area, for example. Urgent attention should be given to health care 
and housing. While in the regional centers the availability of infrastructure and 
service personnel is comparable to levels achieved in more heavily populated 
regions of the Russian Federation, in remote settlements, in closed administrative-
territorial formations (garrison settlements) and places inhabited by indigenous 
populations the situation is much worse. For instance, in Lovozersky district of 
the Murmansk region, which is inhabited by the Kola Saami, the availability of 
medical personnel is .5 times lower than the regional average; the availability of 
physicians is almost  times lower than the regional average (. physicians per 
, residents vs. 54. on average in the region, ). 
  The optimization of the health care system that is now going on in the 
Russian Federation, leading to the concentration of health services in big inter-
city health centers, is hardly suitable in the Northern regions, especially in remote 
areas. However, the state tends to implement common neo-liberal approaches 
to the North in regard to this issue. The poor accessibility of transportation and 
the isolation of the remote settlements, the reduction in the number of rural 
district hospitals and paramedic stations, as well as the liquidation or insufficient 
provision of mobile forms of service will make medical care inaccessible for 
many local residents. The development of a northern air ambulance service 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, measure to improve the situation, especially 
since, as experience shows, due to the high cost of this kind of transport, the 
decision to use it is usually made only in extreme cases, often when it is already 
difficult to help the patient. It must be remembered that access to the most 
important social services in the place of residence is the main condition for 
the maintenance of the viability and social sustainability of local communities. 
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  Today it is not enough to speak about “pulling” the social infrastructure of the 
North toward the national average, as is often suggested at the state level. The 
increased health costs of the population living in the harsh condition of the 
North must be compensated by higher socio- infrastructural standards. At the 
highest latitudes, where it is not possible to provide the whole range of services, 
the approach may be to minimize the presence of social services personnel on 
the basis of innovative technologies, telemedicine, etc. However, northern areas 
with a longer history of habitation (like the Murmansk region, for instance) 
or regions which are in need of population inflow must become territories 
with higher socio-infrastructural standards, meeting the highest standards of 
comfort of living. Living in the North should be the result of a conscious 
choice that a person makes for a better life, not a forced decision by a hostage 
of circumstances. Only this approach will allow truly sustainable development 
of the Russian North and the possibility to realize the national interests of the 
Russian Federation here.
  The basic reason for the current social situation in the Russian North is 
the lack of a fair tax system and mechanisms for the redistribution of incomes 
derived from the development of Northern and Arctic resources. Economic 
activity in the Russian North and in the Arctic today is more beneficial for the 
regions outside the North. The northern regions, which produce a significant 
share of the national GDP, are deprived of a vital part of the produced wealth 
that otherwise could be directed at improving the standard and quality of living 
of their populations.
  The current social policies of the state in the North do not meet northerners’ 
expectations or their understanding of social justice, and the call for a new, 
more regionally sensitive and socially just northern policy is strong.
the northern policy of the russian state 
and the Barents cooperation
The Barents Euro-Arctic cooperation has been underway for almost two 
decades, with the northern policy of the Russian state remaining a significant 
factor in the cooperation, and vice versa. Because of the structure of the BEAR 
economy, along with cooperative development there is sometimes quite hard 
competition. This is especially true of the fishing industry, transportation and 
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tourist services. However, entering the Barents Region has given the member 
regions the possibility to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in some 
areas, even in those where they have traditionally competed. Within the Barents 
cooperation bilateral and multilateral interactions in the economy, trade, science 
and technology, the environment, infrastructure, educational and cultural 
exchanges, and tourism, as well as projects aimed at improving the situation of 
the indigenous population of the North have been and are being realized. For 
example, while Russia was chairing the BEAR in -, much attention 
was paid to multilateral projects dealing with the liquidation of ecological “hot 
spots”, as well as the “Clean production” program within which industrial and 
communal enterprises in the Russian part of the BEAR were upgraded to 
modern ecological standards (Didyk and Riabova , -). 
  In the very near future several areas of the Barents cooperation are expected 
to be the object of special attention. These include the realization of projects 
connected with cultural cooperation, issues concerning indigenous peoples, 
and the development of the oil industry in the Barents Sea, which will 
influence the whole Barents cooperation in the long term. And finally, the most 
important area – the traditional priority of the BEAR cooperation – is direct 
cooperation among people. The Barents Review, published by the Norwegian 
Barents Secretariat in , states that Barents cooperation involves people, 
politicians and businesses across the East-West borders: “With its prime focus 
on the regional level of power and people-to-people relations, this cooperation 
has a low-level and practical approach” (Staalesen , ). 
  However, there is no consensus today on the extent of the involvement 
of ordinary people in the Barents cooperation. Some believe that it is quite 
low, whereas others are more optimistic, considering that in comparison with 
the times of the Iron Curtain it is even rather high. To estimate the amount of 
real co-operational cross-border activity – by “co-operational activity”, I mean 
joint action among people from different countries – it would be necessary 
to conduct a special study, and since that is not the main theme of this article, 
it is touched upon only lightly here. But living in the border region, I have 
had a chance to observe how people’s contacts across the borders in different 
fields of activities have changed during the years of the Barents cooperation. 
My observations and the results of some interviews I have conducted on this 
topic with my Russian colleagues suggest that the Barents cooperation entered 
a new stage several years ago. There has been a shift from boom contacts of a 
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pioneer nature – mainly between representatives of governments, businessmen, 
journalists, charity organizations, representatives of indigenous populations, and 
scientists – to more ordinary contacts related to institutionalized cooperative 
work among the groups mentioned above and those involved in cross-border 
tourism, trade, culture, education, and research. “Work-related” cooperative 
contacts seem to have stabilized at some point, while the stream of ordinary 
people across the border, mainly from the Russian side, has greatly increased 
in the last couple of years, in comparison with the s. “The Russians are 
coming!” is the title of an article in the Barents Observer describing a sharp 
increase in visas issued to Norway and Finland in the Barents Region and 
the increase in northern border crossers. For instance, in  the number of 
border crossings at Salla checkpoint in Finland exceeded ,, and more 
than 4, people crossed the Russian-Norwegian border at Storskog in 
Norway during a one-year period (BarentsObserver ).
  The Barents Region is the territory where the largest gaps in living 
standards exist in the world, and one of the key factors in the rise in cross-
border activities has been an improvement in the level of material well-being in 
the Russian part of the Barents Region. For example, during the period -
 in the Murmansk region the average monthly salary increased about ten 
times – from  USD to  USD per month. Other, sometimes small but 
important changes, like an increase in the number of travel agencies on the 
Russian side providing visa support and hotel booking in Finland, Norway and 
Sweden, the introduction of the Pomor visa, the rise of possibilities for Internet 
hotel booking, the improvement of road connections across the border, the 
hiring of Russian-speaking shop assistants in Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian 
shops, and other changes have made a big difference, improving the potential 
for cross-border contacts of ordinary citizens. In an interview a young Russian 
couple said: “The cool thing about living in Murmansk is that we can drive from 
home in the early morning, visit both Finland and Norway without any stress, do some 
shopping, visit friends and go to a café or two, before we drive home again in the very 
same day” (BarentsObserver ). At the same time, the number of flights 
across the East-West border in the Barents Region has sharply decreased, and 
the possibilities for air travel in the Barents Region have diminished. This has 
had a negative effect on business, scientific and other kinds of cooperation, 
making cross-border travel expensive and time-consuming since the air 
communication systems in the Barents Region seem to have become even 
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more north-south oriented within the individual countries in comparison 
with the situation in the early s. 
  When talking about the Barents cooperation, it is good to remember that 
even though cross-border cooperation – understood as joint action among 
people from different countries – is normally seen as a good thing, it is too 
optimistic to imagine that today a large number of people living in the Barents 
Region are very interested in it and need it for their everyday lives. Cross-
border cooperation works only if all partners are interested in cooperation, 
have good reasons and strong motivation for cooperation, and, finally, get 
worthwhile results that contribute to their own prosperity. There are still many 
obstacles to the development of Barents cooperation such as cultural differences 
and dissimilarities in values, xenophobia, the absence of interest and need for 
cooperation, bureaucratic and language barriers, and other problems. All these 
aspects are closely connected with the level of human development in the 
partner-regions. I strongly believe that only a human development approach 
that differs from policies focused mainly on economic growth, resource projects 
and diplomacy, that subordinates policy initiatives to the personal development 
of individuals and the social development of communities can promote real 
cooperation in the Barents Region: cooperation that is a day-to-day practice 
of large numbers of people, reducing hostility and xenophobia and producing 
motivation, trust, good faith and cross-border social capital. This is the only way 
to remove barriers, open new perspectives and extend the choices available to 
each person and each community in relation to the Barents cooperation. 
  However, such a human-development approach is especially relevant for the 
Russian side, where the status of the human potential, despite certain positive 
changes, is still under threat, as indicated by the complicated demographic 
situation, which includes high rates of migration and natural population 
decline, low levels of health, the difficulties faced by indigenous minorities 
in the North, and other social problems. The state’s current social policies for 
the North do not meet northerners’ expectations or their understanding of 
social justice. It is essential that the new era in the development of the Russian 
North which has opened today becomes an example of how state government 
and socially-responsible resource corporations can initiate development not by 
focusing solely on industrial imperatives but, first, by helping find solutions 
to entrenched problems faced by people who have long lived and worked in 
northern lands and ensuring a decent living for those who participate in the 
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further development of these territories. Therefore, in strategic documents and 
in practice it is necessary to prioritize the human dimension in the development 
of the Russian North and to make the policy for the Russian North as socially-
oriented as possible.
  I trust that human development is the major driving force for the progress 
in cooperation in the Barents Region, and along with the human dimension 
of Russia’s policy in the North, its northern social policy is a factor of critical 
importance for the future development of the Barents cooperation.
final thoughts: What kind of state policy 
does the russian north need today?
Criticism of the current state northern policy in Russia today is mostly related 
to the following shortcomings: 
•	 the lack of a clearly articulated and executed national northern policy;
•	 the neglect of northern specificities requiring special attention from the state;
•	 insufficient and unclear northern legislation;
•	 the “colonial” spirit of state policy towards the North and the Arctic zone 
of the RF, treating it as a resource base for the rest of the country;
•	 an unfair redistribution of northern resource rent in favor of the federal 
level and resource corporations, a lack of financial resources at the regional 
and local levels;
•	 insufficient compensations to people for the hardships of working and 
living in the North, a weak state social policy for the North.
It is scarcely necessary to mention that this criticism comes first and foremost 
from the northern regions themselves. It is obvious that in Russia today, two 
different, conflicting views on the role of the North and the priorities for its 
development have been formed. One part of society sees the North primarily 
as a storehouse of resources, a region which should provide wealth for the 
rest of the country, and a place where it is too costly and inefficient to create 
conditions for high-level standards of living and quality of life. For the other 
part of society, mainly for the northerners themselves, the North is, first of 
all, a place to live where the need to secure the sustainable development of 
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this unique territory and solve long-lasting, acute social problems and create 
adequate conditions for living that correspond to the people’s significant 
contribution to the country’s economy and the geopolitical position of the 
nation are the most vital tasks. The latter tasks, which are closely associated with 
the issue of justice towards the North, are definitely seen by the northerners as 
tasks of higher priority than the sacrificial work of extracting resources for the 
rest of the country. The conflict between these two views is evident in political 
and economic decisions at the federal and regional levels, in legal practice, in 
scientific discourse, and in practical work at the local level. 
  There is a need to balance these two extremes. Thus, necessary changes 
in the Russian state northern policy, as seen from the point of view of the 
northern regions, can be summarized as follows:
•	 a turn from colonialist thinking to recognition of the specificities and needs 
of the northern regions of Russia;
•	 a shift in the national northern paradigm from the North as a national 
resource base to sustainable development of the North;
•	 a more socially oriented approach in the state northern policy and strict 
adherence to the compensatory principle in the social policy of the state 
towards the North;
•	 the creation of effective northern legislation – first of all, the adoption of 
a new federal law “Fundamentals of state socio-economic policy in the 
Northern and Arctic regions of Russia”;
•	 the establishment of a special federal body on Northern and Arctic Affairs;
•	 the development of new, more just policies of resource management and 
resource rent distribution in the North based on co-management models 
and the redirection of revenue flows towards the northern regions of the RF; 
•	 more partnership between the state and the northern regions with regard 
to strategies for diversification and innovation and social policies in the 
Russian North;
•	 more attention to human development in the northern regions of Russia as 
a driving force of critical importance for the development of international 
partnership in the North, including the Barents cooperation.
The lack of societal consensus on Russia’s northern policy, continued attempts 
to impose on the Russian North the role of a colony of the rest of country, 
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neglecting considerations of social justice with regard to the northern 
population – “justice” implying strict adherence to the principle of adequate 
compensation for the hardships of working and living in the North, neoliberal 
decisions that do not take into consideration northern specificities requiring 
special attention from the state and even, in some cases, new state protectionism 
– all these state northern policy issues, if not dealt with sensitively and sensibly, 
will remain substantial hindrances both for sustainable, diversified, innovative 
development in the Russian North and for real cooperation with Russia’s 
northern neighbors, including those in the Barents Region.
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c h a p t e r  
Md. Waliul Hasanat 
a unique arrangeMent of soft-LaW 
Cooperation in the Barents region
introduction
The governance in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) formally began in 
; it was based on a soft-law model. Soft-law governance includes international 
governance established without the conclusion of a formal international treaty. 
The actors involved in soft-law governance pay more attention to encountering 
transnational challenges in effective ways than focusing on strictly following 
formalities articulated in classical international law. There are some transnational 
challenges (e.g., environmental protection, climate change, sustainable 
development, the wellbeing of the region, and the adaptation of local people to 
changed situations) which state involvement alone is not sufficient to counter; 
they require the participation of non-state actors, including local people, along 
with that of states. Addressing those challenges sometimes requires immediate 
action, and the conclusion of a formal international treaty – which is a lengthy 
process compared with the adoption of a simple declaration – might interfere 
with achieving the main objectives. Soft-law forms of governance allow non-
state actors, working in parallel with states, to address common concerns and 
create mainly voluntary or political commitments rather than imposing legally 
binding obligations on members and other associated entities. The general 
consensus about soft-law forms of governance is that they are flexible, compared 
with classical international organizations, in various ways: e.g., the creation of 
obligations and modes of operation.
  The Barents cooperation (hereinafter “the Governance”) created a 
new region, namely the Barents Region6, an area that had been the scene 
6  The Cooperation introduced the concept of the Barents Region, which initially included 
the county of Lapland in Finland, the counties of Finnmark, Troms and Nordland in Norway, the 
counties of Murmansk and Archangel in Russia, and the county of Norrbotten in Sweden. See 
Kirkenes Declaration, ‘Participation and area of application’. Later the region was expanded 
by the inclusion of the Republic of Karelia, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Kainuu, Oulu and 
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of strategic confrontations during the Cold War. The Governance developed 
in two parallel units: the five Nordic states and Russia, along with the then 
Commission of the European Communities, established the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council (BEAC), while the regional governments (e.g., provincial, 
county and oblast governments) of the region, together with local indigenous 
peoples, set up the Barents Regional Council (BRC). The Governance has 
been developed on the basis of political willingness rather than following the 
typical formalities articulated in international law: e.g., formal endorsement 
of the founding instrument, ratification, reservations, publication, and so on 
(Vienna Convention : arts. -; Vienna Convention ; Klabbers , 
; Kunz 5); it has established strong links between universities, research 
institutes, administrative and other relevant bodies in the region.
  In fact, the Governance was not created as the result of an international 
treaty, whereby it is clear that it is not an international organization in the 
light of international law. The idea of a two-fold governance system has 
created unique traits in international cooperation aimed at the promotion 
of sustainable economic and social development in the Barents Region. The 
BEAC and the BRC have been working so closely since their beginning that 
scholars may wonder whether they have distinct identities or are merely two 
branches of a single entity (Hasanat ). This raises an important question: 
How can these two components of the Governance be seen in comparison 
with other international cooperative forums or be given distinct positions 
within international law?
  Present literature regarding the Governance covers many issues (Young 
; Joenniemi ; Möller and Pehkonen ; Monsma 5; Orvik 4; 
Sergounin ,  4; Wiberg 4; Engstad 4; Eriksson 5), although not 
much scholarly attention has been paid to legal issues during the twenty years of 
its existence (see, however, Hasanat ; Sreejith ). The main focus of this 
chapter is an analysis of the individual legal characteristics of the BEAC and the 
BRC. The following section will provide a brief description of the BEAC from 
legal and organizational perspectives. Section three focuses on the BRC from 
similar points of view. The next section focuses on some needle similarities and 
dissimilarities between the BEAC and the BRC. Section five analyzes the legal 
competence of the Governance. The concluding section tries to determine the 
position of the BEAC and the BRC under international law. 
Västerbotten Regions, and the Republic of Komi.
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the Barents euro-arctic Council
The Kirkenes Declaration (Kirkenes Declaration ) established the Council 
of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, widely known as the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council (BEAC), in  as an intergovernmental cooperative forum aimed at 
supporting and promoting regional cooperation in the Barents Region. The 
BEAC meets at the Foreign Ministerial level, and has also involved meetings 
of the Ministers of Environment in the Barents Region since 4.7 It brought 
together the heads of the national governments of the region at its ten-year 
celebration in , when a declaration was adopted (the Barents Summit 
Declaration ). This section seeks to clarify the organizational and legal 
basics of the BEAC so as to determine its position within international law.
organizational elements of the BeaC
Like most classical international organizations, the BEAC has a clear 
organizational framework which encompasses members, observers and separate 
units functioning in its day-to-day affairs, along with national secretariats. The 
members are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the 
European Commission; membership is also open to other states that wish to take 
an active part in its activities (Kirkenes Declaration , ‘Participation and area 
of application’). The Foreign Ministers from the member states met annually up 
to  and thereafter every other year (BEAC Terms of Reference , section 
5).8 However, the chairmanship, which has a tenure of two years, rotates only 
between states that possess territories in the Barents Region (BEAC Terms of 
Reference , section ).9 Furthermore, a state cannot hold the chairmanship 
of the BEAC at the same time that its region holds the chair of the BRC.
7   The Ministers of the Environment met for the first time in Bodø in 1994, when they 
adopted the Barents Euro-Arctic Council Environmental Action Program, followed thereafter 
by meetings in Rovaniemi in 1995, St. Petersburg in 1997, Umeå in 1999, Kirkenes in 2001, Luleå 
in 2003, Rovaniemi in 2005, and Moscow in 2007. Other ministers responsible for various fields 
(culture, youth and sports, etc.) meet occasionally.
8  The year 1997 was an exception in that there was no Ministerial Meeting.
9  Section 6 states: “The chairmanship of each session will be assumed by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the host country. The chairmanship will initially rotate between Finland, 
Norway, Russia and Sweden.”
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  The BEAC has granted observer status to a number of states in order to 
include states from outside the region in its activities. The observer states are 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America (BEAC n.d.). The central 
functioning unit of the BEAC is the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). 
The CSO consists of ambassadors or officials selected by the member states 
and the EC, although representatives from observer states and indigenous 
peoples regularly participate in CSO meetings. The CSO is in charge of the 
BEAC’s activities during the intervals between Ministerial Meetings. It meets 
on a regular basis usually four to five times a year. It can form new Working 
Groups (WGs) suggested by the BEAC, provides guidance to the WGs, and can 
terminate a working group that has completed its task.
  There are national Barents secretariats in all the main member states except 
Russia. Having a national Barents secretariat is part of the recognition of the 
Governance: the Finnish national Barents secretariat is located in Rovaniemi 
in association with the Regional Council of Lapland; the Norwegian 
Barents secretariat is in Kirkenes, and the Swedish contacts are the County 
Administrative Board of Norrbotten and the County Administrative Board of 
Västerbotten. However, in the case of Russia, there is no permanent national 
secretariat; functions related to the Barents Cooperation are carried out by the 
regional governments (BEAC Report , -).
Legal elements of the BeaC
The BEAC has its own establishing international instrument – the Kirkenes 
Declaration – and has produced several documents since its inception, most 
of which are ambiguous in terms of creating obligations on its members. 
The Kirkenes Declaration is not an international treaty. The Declaration 
states some common problems of the Barents Region and makes general 
promises concerning cooperation rather than creating any legally binding 
obligations. Following the introduction, there are sections on the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council and its objectives: participation and area of application, 
the environment, economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, 
regional infrastructure, indigenous peoples, human contacts and cultural 
relations, and tourism. None of the parts actually creates legal obligations. 
However, in the course of time, the promises contained in the Declaration 
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have become useful to the states of the Barents Region by carrying out mutual 
activities among them under the auspices of the Governance. These activities 
address the challenges caused by the harsh climate and inaccessibility of the 
region, along with compliance with certain international legal instruments: 
for instance, the member states’ commitment to the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (Rio Declaration ), the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg Declaration ), Millennium 
Development Goals, the Convention on Biological Diversity (Convention 
on Biological Diversity ), and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants (Stockholm Convention ).
  The signatories of the declaration affirmed their commitments with respect 
to the declaration on global environment and sustainable development (Rio 
Declaration ) and the rights of indigenous peoples (Agenda  , 
chapter ) articulated in international law (Kirkenes Declaration , ’The 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council and its objectives’ and ‘Indigenous peoples’). 
They have committed themselves to strengthening bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation, as mandated by the OSPAR Convention (Convention on Marine 
Environment ) and the Espoo Convention (Environmental Impact 
Assessment Convention ), to protect the fragile environment of the region 
(Kirkenes Declaration , ’The environment’ and ‘economic cooperation’).
  The BEAC has its Terms of Reference which create obligations on the 
member states to a limited extent. For example, the Terms impose all financial 
responsibilities with respect to the arrangement of meetings of the BEAC on 
the host country (BEAC Terms of Reference , section ), which the states 
have followed up to this day. There is a provision that prevents the members 
from infringing on any international legal or even political obligations by 
participating in the Cooperation; this provision expresses the intention of the 
parties not to breach any binding obligations (BEAC Terms of Reference , 
section ). It provides less authority by using ‘will’ or ‘will not’ in the provisions 
instead of stronger words like ‘shall’ or ‘shall not’. Subsequently, it has included 
words that make the provisions flexible: ‘will normally be conducted’ (BEAC 
Terms of Reference , section ) ‘will normally convene’ (BEAC Terms of 
Reference , section 5). Furthermore, it leaves room for options by using 
terms like ‘may decide’ (BEAC Terms of Reference, section ).10
10  Section 11 reads: “The Council and its working bodies may decide to invite special 
participants, guests or observers to contribute to its work. This may include representatives of 
regions, sub-regions and international organizations.”
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  The BEAC meetings, other than the first one, which drafted the 
constituent declaration, have adopted either a joint communiqué or a report. 
The exception is the Declaration adopted by the Heads of Government at 
BEAC’s ten-year anniversary in  (Barents Summit Declaration ). 
However, the words chosen in phrasing those instruments (the constituent 
declaration, joint statements, joint communiqués and summit declaration) 
may be categorized in three groups in terms of the level of obligation they 
create: simple recognition or appreciation (examples of words in this category 
are ‘recognizes’, ‘takes note of ’, ‘encourages enhanced cooperation’, ‘expresses 
its appreciation’, ‘welcomes’, ‘appreciates the activities’ and ‘notes the active 
role’); serious concern but loose commitment (phrases like ‘continues to pay 
special attention’, ‘underlines the need to address’, ‘emphasizes the importance’, 
‘commends the enhanced cooperation’ and ‘believes that’); and intent to do 
a little (e.g., ‘supports efforts to further improve’, ‘stresses the urgent need to 
affirm’, ‘Parties should’, ‘reaffirms its willingness’ and ‘considers the application 
of ’). In fact, none of the words or phrases used in the instruments is sufficient 
to create real commitments or binding obligations on the member states. The 
BEAC’s commitments and support for certain international legal instruments 
can be evaluated as facilitating compliance with international law.
the Barents regional Council
The regional governments of the Barents Region and the Sami Council 
established the Barents Regional Council (BRC) by signing a co-operational 
protocol (Protocol Agreement ) aimed at promoting basic day-to-day 
cooperation in the region (Kozyrev , 45; Holst 4). In fact, the BRC was 
established at the same place on the same day as the BEAC, and it was created 
with the same aims and objectives. It is true that the absence of participation 
in the BRC by national governments gives it a lower organizational and legal 
standard than the BEAC; however, international cooperation through sub-
national governments is very important in addressing local issues in a region 
where the national capitals are far away in the south.
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organizational elements of the BrC
The organizational framework of the BRC includes members and an Executive 
Regional Committee (and observers to a limited extent). The members of 
the BRC are sub-national governments in the Barents Region: three from 
Norway - Nordland Fylke, Troms Fylke and Finnmark Fylke; two from Sweden 
- Västerbotten Län and Norrbotten Län; three from Finland - Kainuu, Oulu 
and Lapland; and five from Russia - Murmansk Oblast, the Republic of Karelia, 
Arkhangelsk Oblast, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and the Republic of Komi.11 
The seven regional governments12, along with the Sami Council, that adopted 
the statutory protocol are considered to be permanent members of the BRC. 
The chairmanship of the BRC rotates among the member regions every other 
year (Protocol Agreement , section 4). The BRC meets twice a year.
  The idea of observer status, which is fairly new in the BRC, can be seen as a 
way of involving new regions in its activities without granting them membership. 
In fact, the BRC refused to grant membership to North Karelia, having made a 
decision not to include any new members for a five-year period (BEAC Report 
, p. 5), then approved observer status for North Karelia in .
  The BRC has a central functional unit, the Executive Regional Committee 
(RC), which consists of advisors, mainly subordinate officials, from regional 
governments of the member regions along with the Sami Council in order to 
generate new business and follow up approved projects (Protocol Agreement 
, section 4). The region that holds the chairmanship of the BRC also holds 
the chair of the RC at the same time.
Legal elements of the BrC
The BRC has adopted a number of Protocols, Joint Statements and Annual Reports 
along with its founding instrument. The Protocol Agreement, which established 
the BRC, encompasses some sort of commitments; it provides background 
11  The Republic of Karelia joined the BRC in 1993, then Nenets Autonomous Okrug in 1996, 
Kainuu, Oulu and Västerbotten counties in 1998, and the Republic of Komi in 2002.
12  The founding members of the BRC are: Archangelsk County (Oblast), Finnmark County 
Council (Fylkeskommune), Lapland County (Lääni), Murmansk County (Oblast), Nordland 
County Council (Fylkeskommune), Norrbottens County (Län) and Troms County Council 
(Fylkeskommune).
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information and describes its objectives and goals, as well as identifying the 
conditions for the establishment of the BRC and the RC (Protocol Agreement 
, section 4). The Agreement includes authoritative instructions with respect 
to its operational expenditures (Protocol Agreement , section 5).
  The BRC has produced Regional Council Protocols since 4; the 
Protocols are available mainly in Russian and Swedish, and there is a Finnish 
version of some of them. In fact, the Protocols describe the concerns of the 
region along with proposals for establishing necessary working groups through 
means other than obligatory commitments.
  The BRC issues Joint Statements aimed at BEAC meetings of Foreign 
Ministers which mainly reaffirm its support for the activities of the BEAC and 
the International Barents Secretariat (IBS) along with its concerns regarding 
specific issues related to the living situation of local people in particular. A Joint 
Statement may include the future plan of the BRC or its priority projects. 
However, the commitments in the statements do not create any legally binding 
obligations on the member regions. The Annual Reports provide background 
information on the Governance and descriptions of the member regions, 
past activities and future plans of the BRC. They are more in the nature of 
informative statements than obligatory commitments.
indicators of the BeaC and the BrC 
The Governance has introduced a complex system the legal characteristics of 
which are somewhat difficult to determine. However, there are some common 
indicators as well as some that are more individual in nature; they will be 
described below.
Common indicators 
There are a few institutions that provide support for seeing the Governance 
as a single entity rather than as two different units functioning in parallel. The 
International Barents Secretariat (IBS), the Working Group of Indigenous 
Peoples (WGIP), and Joint Working Groups formed by and including the 
participation of both the BEAC and the BRC can be considered as indicators 
of the Governance’s single identity.
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  The states that have territories in the Barents Region created the 
International Barents Secretariat (IBS) in  by concluding an international 
instrument to provide technical support for multilateral coordinated regional 
activities organized by the BEAC together with the BRC (Barents Secretariat 
Agreement ). The International Secretariat is located in Kirkenes, Norway 
and enjoys legal personality under Norwegian national law (Barents Secretariat 
Agreement , arts. -). The IBS provides continuity in the activities of 
the Governance particularly when the chair changes to a new member. The 
Governance’s legal personality and other issues involving Norway and the IBS 
were settled through the conclusion of a bilateral agreement (Host Country 
Agreement ). The Terms of Reference of the IBS (IBS Terms of Reference 
) connect both platforms by providing technical support. Later, a set of 
rules concerning the operation of the secretarial functions was formulated 
in a fashion that can be observed only in well-established international 
organizations (IBS Financial and Staff Rules ). The rules cover many 
essential components, including the appointment of staff and their facilities.
  The idea of establishing a Working Group of Indigenous Peoples (WGIP) 
was already included in the Kirkenes Declaration (Kirkenes Declaration , 
‘Indigenous peoples’). The WGIP, established in 5, consists of six members: 
one Sami representative from each country - Finland, Norway, Russia and 
Sweden – and one Vepsian and one Nenets representative from the Russian 
side (WGIP Terms of Reference n.d., section 4b). There are altogether three 
observers, including one representative from the Sami Council, one from the 
Association of World Reindeer Herders, and one from the Russian Association 
of the Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) (WGIP Terms of Reference 
n.d., section 4c). The WGIP members elect the chair from among themselves 
for a period of two years; a person may be re-elected to the chairmanship 
(WGIP Terms of Reference n.d., section ).
  The distinguishing characteristics of the WGIP are that it was established on 
a permanent basis and plays an advisory role in both units of the Governance 
along with its representation at Ministerial Meetings of the BEAC and the 
Regional Council of the BRC (WGIP n.d.). The Barents Indigenous Peoples 
Office (BIPO), established in Murmansk in  and moved to Lovozero in 
, is responsible for the activities of the WGIP.
  The Governance has established a number of joint working groups, in 
addition to groups that work for one unit or the other. Among the joint groups 
75
are the Joint Working Group on Health and Related Social Issues, the Joint 
Working Group on Education and Research, the Joint Working Group on 
Energy, and the Joint Working Group on Culture. The joint working groups 
have shared co-chairmanship at the national and regional levels. They report 
separately to the BEAC and the BRC concerning their activities.
  The BEAC and the BRC share a similar exception to formal international 
organizations: as a forum of states, the BEAC includes the EC among its 
members, while the BRC has accorded membership to the Sami Council in 
addition to the regional governments. This type of exception is possible within 
soft-law cooperation and is appreciated to some extent in addressing complex 
problems which require contributions from different categories of actors.
individual  indicators
The creation of separate frameworks by the BEAC and the BRC has 
provided each of them with an individual identity even though they are 
closely connected. For instance, in the case of the BEAC, the CSO is in 
charge of activities during the intervals between Ministerial Meetings, may 
form necessary WGs or Task Forces (TF), provides guidance to them, and 
monitors their functions. The subordinate bodies perform the tasks following 
this guidance and report to the CSO. Alternatively, for the BRC the RC 
carries out its functions during the time between Regional Council meetings, 
may form WGs or TF, supplies proper guidance to them, and observes their 
activities, while the WGs and TFs follow the guidance of the RC and report 
to it. The establishing instruments of the BEAC and the BRC are different 
and were concluded by the different forums. The Ministerial Meeting is 
the supreme authority in the BEAC decision making; while, the Regional 
Council makes decision for the BRC. Thus, the two platforms enjoy individual 
organizational merits in terms of their functioning systems. However, the fact 
that they share a common international secretariat and similar objectives 
could be taken as a sign that the two platforms form an associate partnership; 
this creates some complexity and provides scope for new ways of evaluating 
the units’ legal position under international law. Since their creation the two 
individual bodies have never come into conflict with each other within the 
cooperation. As explained in the BEAC Joint Communiqué (BEAC Joint 
Communiqué , paragraph ):
76
The Council underlines that the International Barents Secretariat (IBS) 
should be utilized to improve the coherence, efficiency and the continuity 
of the BEAC and BRC cooperation and strengthen the effectiveness of 
their sectoral and intersectoral work.
Legal analysis 
The agreement regarding the IBS and involving four member states of the 
Governance has created real commitments (Barents Secretariat Agreement 
). The agreement was designed in the same fashion that is usually followed 
in a classical treaty: e.g., the treaty must be accepted, it may be amended, 
parties may withdraw from the agreement, and reports must be made. It can 
be assumed that the parties to the agreement intended to achieve the same 
results that would come from a treaty, subject to keeping the parties outside the 
jurisdiction of international law.
  The IBS has demonstrated its legal competence by concluding an agreement 
with Norway (Host Country Agreement ). This agreement has created real 
obligations and has guaranteed inter alia immunity to the IBS and its properties 
from legal process (Host Country Agreement , art. 5), as well as the 
inviolability of the IBS premises from any kind of legal action. Article () reads:
The premises and the property and assets of the Secretariat in Norway shall 
be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any 
other form of interference whether by executive, administrative, judicial or 
legislative action.
The IBS is also entitled to use its own flag and emblem (Host Country 
Agreement , art. 4). The privileges and immunities provided by the 
agreement are comparable to those enjoyed by a diplomatic mission in a 
foreign state (Vienna Convention ; Vienna Convention ). Recently, 
the same four states in the Barents Region signed an agreement in the Field of 
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response Agreement ) in Moscow; this agreement can 
be seen in many ways as being similar to an international treaty. As declared by 
the Chair of the BEAC (BEAC ):
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In December , the first intergovernmental agreement in the history 
of the BEAC, on cooperation in emergency prevention, preparedness and 
response, was signed in Moscow. As a follow on to it, extensive international 
training exercises, Barents Rescue , were held in the Murmansk 
Region this past September.
The Governance involves non-state actors, in particular groups of indigenous 
peoples, in its activities, an example of the adaptation of the global community 
to the rapid global changes occurring in various areas; this kind of adaptation is 
considered important in new international law. For instance, the International 
Court of Justice adopted Practice Direction XII in 4, allowing the 
participation of non-state actors in the international legal system (ICJ 
Direction 4).13
  Although decisions taken by one unit of the Governance have a huge 
influence on the other, both units create voluntary or moral responsibilities 
generated from political commitments. However, this does not mean that 
the documents produced have no consequences or that they are irrelevant in 
international law (Koivurova , 5). The important fact that the member-
states/regions have followed those documents in their regular practices for two 
decades provides some significance in international law. Moreover, the activities 
of the Governance support compliance with certain international legal 
instruments. The CSO or the RC may be compared, at least to some extent, 
to treaty bodies formed under certain treaties to monitor activities under the 
associated treaty.
  The Governance has established some kind of institutional roles for its 
subordinate bodies. A permanent secretariat with the status of legal personality 
is strong evidence of a separate independent organ within the Governance to 
carry out its particular functions. Moreover, the Governance and its subordinate 
13  The Direction permits an NGO to submit a submission or document on its own initiative 
relating to an advisory proceeding; this document will be placed in a designated location in 
the Peace Palace. According to Steve Charnovitz, this type of paper will be treated as a readily 
available publication and may be referred to by states and international organizations in the same 
manner as publications in the public domain, although they will not be considered as part of the 
case file (Charnovitz 2006, 35). The Union of International Associations (UIA), established in 1907, 
and the International Law Association, founded in 1873, began to promote legal personality for 
International NGOs in 1910 (see Politis 1923; Scott 1923).
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bodies produce mainly persuasive documents which have an influence on 
member states. Thus, there are some features that may cause one to see the 
Governance as being close to an international organization which influences 
the members’ behavior through political commitments.
Conclusion
A formal treaty, where states play the key roles, may ensure legal obligations 
under international law. However, there are some challenges caused by rapid 
global changes which state involvement alone is not sufficient to address. When 
initiatives combating the challenges do not bring rapid visible results, it is 
difficult for national governments to be convinced of the need to create legally 
binding obligations – sacrificing present national interests in order to aim at a 
sound environment in the future – especially when the decisions are made in 
capitals far away in the south.
  The Barents Region is an area with a harsh climate and much diversity, 
which makes it reasonable for the Governance not to create a single international 
legal instrument that is generally applicable to the region. A two-level 
communication has been created which exhibits some special characteristics. 
The separate organizational frameworks and independent decision-making 
bodies of the two units provide them with distinctive identities within the 
Governance. International law should leave some room for this type of forum 
which is able to adapt to new situations caused by rapid changes occurring in 
the region and to adjust to other developing branches of sciences. International 
law should be dynamic enough to meet the needs of present people facing 
the challenges brought on by those changes (ICJ 5a). Judge Alvarez has 
suggested the application of new international law that is perfectly modified 
in order to adapt to changing circumstances in the lives of people (ICJ 5b).
  Following the analysis above, the BEAC can be considered as a ‘soft-law’ 
body under modern international law. However, the situation of the BRC 
is somewhat different: an important element of soft-law cooperation is the 
participation of national governments, which is absent in the BRC. Thus, the 
BRC appears to be a ‘softer than soft-law’ body or close to soft-law.14 The fact 
14  The concept of “close to soft-law” is fairly recent. A group of international law scholars 
coined the term when evaluating the legal status of the Copenhagen Accord (adopted in the 
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that regional governments deal with issues across national borders does not 
seem like a case of ultra vires because the national governments have delegated 
power to them and supported them rather than objecting to such practices 
for the past two decades. I propose to consider the BRC as a ‘hybrid soft-law 
body’ which is a working concept warranting further support and scholarly 
recognition so it can be properly integrated into modern international law.
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c h a p t e r  4 
Anna-Maija Matilainen
forest CoMpanies, Corporate soCiaL
responsiBiLity and LegaL pLuraLisM in
the forest seCtor in russia
introduction
This chapter is devoted to examining the forest sector in Russia, the corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) of the forest companies, and the plurality of 
regulatory instruments that nowadays constrain the behaviour of the forest 
industry companies. In global societies, regulation is not an exclusive domain of 
states. Instead, various private and non-state actors such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and companies have begun to create and foster private 
regulation (see, e.g., Scott et al. ), seeking solutions to serious global 
challenges such as sustainable development. This trend of global governance 
and the requirements of the world market have also entered the Barents 
Region and the Northwest Russian forest sector. Consequently, in the forest 
sector the traditional state governance system is being supplemented by new 
regulatory instruments promoted by the forest companies themselves as well 
as international NGOs (Kotilainen et al. ). Forest certification is a good 
example of non-state or private regulation in the forest sector in Russia.
  The aim of the chapter is to examine forest companies and reasons 
why they can be regarded as powerful actors. In this chapter I examine the 
regulatory capacity of the forest companies and how they have promoted 
private regulation while developing their CSR practices. Therefore, the chapter 
is theoretically linked to the discussion on legal pluralism, which challenges 
a perceived monopoly of the state in making and administering law. Instead, 
legal pluralism recognises the regulatory capacities of various private actors 
such as companies and civil society organisations. In this chapter legal pluralism 
in the forest sector is understood as an increase in private regulation. The 
chapter focuses on the forest sector in the Russian part of the Barents Region. 
Geographically, the Barents Region includes the northernmost parts of Finland, 
Sweden and Norway as well as Northwest Russia. The Russian part of the 
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Barents Region comprises the Republic of Karelia, the Republic of Komi, the 
Arkhangelsk region, the Nenets autonomous area, and the Murmansk region. 
Economically this area is rather heterogeneous, but in most parts of Northwest 
Russia the economic exploitation of forests is important. The forest industry 
plays the most prominent role in the economies of the Republic of Karelia, the 
Arkhangelsk region and the Republic of Komi. It is not very important in the 
economy of the Nenets autonomous area and the Murmansk region mainly 
due to the northern location of these areas. In fact, the Nenets autonomous area 
is almost completely located above the Arctic Circle. The Murmansk region, for 
its part, is less dependent on the forest industry and more dependent on heavy 
industries such as mining, metal and machinery, as well as on sea transportation 
and fishery (Välkky et al. ).
  As a rule, the forest industry in the Barents Region is dominated by 
medium-sized and large-scale companies. Some of the largest pulp and 
paper producers in Europe have production facilities in the northernmost 
counties of Finland and Sweden. The Russian part of the Barents Region 
is also a significant producer of forestry products. Northwest Russia is the 
leading Federal district in the production of pulp and paper as well as in 
cardboard manufacture. Most of the largest production plants are located in 
the Russian part of the Barents Region (Karvinen et al. ; Välkky et al. 
). In fact, there has been a strong tendency toward bigger production units 
in the Northwest Russian forest sector. In the beginning of the s, forest 
companies were shaken up by hostile takeover attempts. The vigorous efforts 
to consolidate the assets of some lucrative pulp and paper mills resulted in 
bitter ownership disputes and long, drawn-out court proceedings. In addition, 
the ownership disputes generated fierce criticism because of the rather crude 
methods used in the takeover attempts. In the mass media the ownership 
disputes were routinely called a “forest wars”, which describes well the difficult 
conditions that prevailed in the forest sector (Matilainen ; Volkov 4). 
However, business consolidation in the Northwest Russian forest sector has 
also proceeded in a more peaceful manner. As a rule, in the forest sector 
business integration has been carried out through the establishment of holding 
companies. In consequence, since the end of s and the beginning of the 
s, holding companies have considerably strengthened their position in 
the Northwest Russian forest sector. Holding companies have expanded their 
business networks and, as a rule, seek to control the whole wood production 
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chain from logging operations to the distribution of end products (e.g., 
Matilainen ; Torniainen et al. ).
  This chapter is based on professional literature and my previous research. 
In the following section, I examine corporate power, concentrating on general 
issues involving CSR as well as CSR in the forest sector specifically. The two 
following sections discuss legal pluralism and the regulatory activities of the 
forest companies. The last section summarises the discussion.
Corporate power
Companies were originally invented at the end of the sixteenth century in order 
to manage colonial trade. Companies were chartered by a number of European 
governments to foster and protect the interests of the state. In the following 
centuries their legal form slowly changed, and they were granted more freedom 
to pursue economic activities of their own choosing (Bendell 4). In Russia, 
on the other hand, the development of companies, the laws that regulate 
them and the role of firms in society have their own special characteristics 
due to Russia’s long socialist past. In the Soviet Union, enterprises were legal 
persons, but in practice they were part of the state bureaucracy. Enterprises 
were governed in an administrative manner and, in fact, the whole economy 
worked like a huge hierarchy. Problems of agency were considerable, since the 
state as owner could not effectively control and monitor the enterprises and the 
activities of company managers (Nystén-Haarala ).
  The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a profound change in the role 
of firms in society. The transition to a market economy created pressure on 
Russian firms to modernise and restructure. Firms that had previously been 
mainly administrative units of the state were supposed to become, as soon 
as possible, economic actors focused on making profits for their owners. A 
great deal of company legislation was developed during this rather chaotic 
period. For instance, the first part of the Civil Code, which regulates different 
forms of companies, was passed on  November 4, and the Law on Joint 
Stock Companies was passed on  December . In the course of the 
privatization period, joint stock companies were the main instrument used 
to privatise and restructure state-owned enterprises (Nystén-Haarala ). 
Holding companies, in particular, were seen as an appropriate instrument 
88
for restructuring large enterprises and industrial complexes inherited from 
the Soviet era. Therefore, during privatisation the main objective of holding 
companies was to prevent the dissolution of the Soviet industrial complex and 
preserve the existing technological and co-operational links between Soviet 
firms. In fact, the holding companies in the forest sector were among the first 
holding companies to be established in Russia (Matilainen ; Shitkina ).
  Legal personality and limited liability are, as a rule, considered to be 
typical features of companies. For instance, in the Russian Law on Joint Stock 
Companies, legal personality and limited liability are mentioned as features of 
joint stock companies. Generally speaking, legal personality implies that a firm 
is a separate entity from its founders and shareholders. It owns its own property, 
and it can sue and be sued in its own name. Limited liability, on the other hand, 
means that the shareholders and founders are not personally responsible for 
the debts of the company and vice versa. Legal personality and limited liability 
are routinely considered as the basis of corporate power (Bendell and Bendell 
; Bendell 4; Villiers ). Nowadays, it is widely acknowledged that 
firms are economic, environmental and cultural forces, and corporate power 
is a significant aspect of contemporary societies (Bendell and Bendell ). 
The dependence of forest industry companies on natural resources binds 
them closely to the localities in which they operate. Since forest companies 
exploit natural resources, their activities may have a considerable impact on 
the environment. Furthermore, the issue of social sustainability is important. 
In the countryside and remote districts, a forest company is often the only 
significant employer in the area. In recent years, for instance, in Finland, the 
closure of some large pulp and paper production units and massive lay-offs have 
generated a lively debate and concern about the power of large companies. 
In , for instance, the closure of the Stora Enso pulp and paper mill in 
Kemijärvi in Finnish Lapland and the resultant lay-offs gained a great deal 
of publicity. The closure of the mill generated a popular movement which, 
through the mass media, sharply criticised the activities of the company Stora 
Enso and its CSR practices. In addition, the state and its ownership policy were 
criticised, since the state owns shares in Stora Enso. The state was expected 
to take action against the social and economic difficulties caused by job loss 
(Helsingin Sanomat a, b, c, ).
  According to recent Russian press reports, the economic and raw material 
problems of the enterprises that are part of the holding company Investlesprom 
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in the Republic of Karelia have generated similar kinds of worries. Investlesprom 
is a huge holding company operating in the Russian part of the Barents Region. 
According to newspaper reports, the temporary closure of the Segezha Pulp 
and Paper mill, an affiliate company of Investlesprom, was expected to lead to 
serious economic and social problems, since there are no significant alternative 
work opportunities in the area. However, according to the most recent press 
reports, the economic conditions of the subsidiary companies of Investlesprom 
have gradually begun to improve (see, e.g., Rossiiskaia Gazeta a, b). 
Thus, in the Russian part of the Barents Region, forest companies can also be 
characterised as important economic, environmental and cultural forces.
  Today many Northwest Russian forest companies are part of holding 
companies. Large holding companies are naturally more capable of exercising 
power than separate small and medium-sized companies. Big production 
plants have traditionally been significant employers. Furthermore, Russia’s 
socialistic past and the weak social and economic conditions in several localities 
increased the importance of the forest industry companies in the Russian 
part of the Barents Region (Nystén-Haarala ; Matilainen ; Välkky et 
al. ). During Soviet times, the provision of many social services, such as 
schools, health care, culture and sports, just to mention a few, and the whole 
infrastructure of towns and villages were based on local enterprises (Kuliasova 
; Kortelainen and Nystén-Haarala, ; Tulaeva ). Nowadays, the 
Soviet traditions have not completely disappeared, although they have been 
undermined (Kuliasova ; Kuliasova ). At the beginning of the free 
market era, municipalities were expected to take more responsibility for 
social services and infrastructure, and firms, in turn, were supposed to focus 
on making profits for their owners. However, despite efforts to develop the 
municipalities, they are still rather backward and lacking in financial resources. 
They turn to local companies for financial help, and, consequently, particularly 
in the countryside, the municipalities and the local companies are still closely 
connected (for more details Nystén-Haarala ). The town of Kondopoga 
in the Republic of Karelia, Northwest Russia, is an extreme example of a 
symbiotic relationship between the local forest company and the town. In 
Kondopoga the local pulp and paper mill continues to provide a wide range of 
social services from health care to culture and sports facilities. Naturally, costly 
social responsibilities impair the competitiveness of forest companies. Therefore, 
nowadays, many forest companies in Northwest Russia are seeking to improve 
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their efficiency, eliminate extra costs and limit their social obligations (Nystén-
Haarala ; Matilainen ; Kortelainen and Nystén-Haarala, ).
  Legal pluralism and the Northwest Russian forest sector will be discussed 
later in this chapter. The regulatory environment in the Russian forest sector 
nowadays is clearly complex, and, in addition to state laws, various private actors 
regulate and constrain the behavior of the forest companies. The increase in 
private regulation has led to the simultaneous existence of several regulatory 
regimes. Legal pluralism highlights the influence and power of forest companies, 
whose rule-creating activities can be regarded as an expression of corporate 
power. In the Northwest Russian forest sector, large forest companies, together 
with NGOs, play a crucial role in introducing private regulation.
  Corporate power and the behaviour of multinational firms, in particular, are 
often discussed when these multinational firms conduct business in developing 
nations whose national governments often have comparatively few economic 
resources and little power. The economic power of multinational firms gives 
them political power, enabling them to influence social and environmental 
policies and regulation. Globalisation has accelerated the debate over corporate 
power on the one hand and the limited possibilities of traditional nation state-
based forms of regulation to govern global corporate activities on the other 
hand. Therefore, civil society organisations have started advising companies on 
best practices, and endorsing and promoting such practices. In the West a turn 
towards companies by civil society groups can be identified as beginning in 
the early s. Codes of conduct and certification schemes such as the FSC 
(Forest Stewardship Council) grew significantly during the s. The FSC was 
a pioneering multi-stakeholder initiative, the objective of which was – and still is 
– to provide a credible guarantee to consumers that wood products come from 
well-managed forests (Bendell and Bendell ; Bendell 4). FSC forest 
certification in Russia will be discussed in the following section. Jennifer Zerk 
() has noted that concerns about the power of multinational corporations 
have developed and changed over time. According to Zerk, historically, the 
implications of corporate power for national sovereignty and culture were the 
main concerns. In recent years, there has been a shift in emphasis away from 
these “state-centred” concerns toward more “people-centred” concerns such as 
the environment and human rights. In this development the CSR movement 
has played a significant role (Zerk ).
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Corporate power and 
corporate social responsibility 
Power and responsibility are closely related concepts. It is argued that power 
can be seen as both a condition for and a cause of responsibility. Increased 
power is generally seen as entailing increased responsibility (Bendell 4; Stahl 
5; Villiers ). Concern about the damage caused to the environment by 
economic activity, globalization, and the growth of the power and influence 
of large transnational companies are some of the factors that have stimulated 
the debate over CSR. Furthermore, social and environmental criteria are 
increasingly affecting the decisions of individuals and institutions both as 
consumers and investors. Business is also more transparent because of the media 
and modern communication technologies (European Commission ). The 
advocates of CSR assert that companies should be made accountable for how 
they exercise their power and use their resources.
  Basically, CSR has two dimensions. It aims to examine the role of business 
in society and to maximise the positive societal outcomes of business activity 
(Ward ). However, definitions of CSR abound, making it a difficult 
concept to grasp. It is routinely suggested that CSR is any behavior by 
business over and above fundamental legal requirements. There is, however, a 
lack of consensus about what role law should play in CSR. This is commonly 
referred to as the “voluntary versus mandatory CSR” debate (see, e.g., Zerk 
; European Commission , , ). Representatives of business 
stress a voluntary approach to CSR and argue that firms should be able to 
develop their own responses to CSR questions (European Commission , 
, ). There has been extensive research concerning the so-called 
“business case” for CSR, seeking to demonstrate that companies which adopt 
responsible business practices are more profitable and attractive to investors, 
employees and consumers (Vogel 5). The European Commission views 
CSR primarily as a voluntary activity. According to the Commission, CSR is 
“a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis” (European Commission ). Furthermore, CSR is described 
as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society” (ibid ). 
Compliance with the law is also understood as part of social responsibility. 
The representatives of many civil society organizations, on the other hand, 
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are unconvinced that voluntary CSR is effective enough to guarantee that 
companies adopt sustainable business practices. They endorse a regulatory 
framework establishing minimum standards and ensuring a level playing field. 
In addition they argue that credible CSR requires that CSR practices cannot 
be developed, implemented and evaluated solely by business, but rather require 
the involvement of all stakeholders (Zerk ; European Commission ).
  Generally speaking, in the Northwest Russian forest sector, CSR is a 
voluntary choice for the forest companies and is nowadays, to a significant 
extent, market-driven. In this context the voluntary nature of CSR means 
that there are no laws obligating the forest companies to follow certain CSR 
practices. However, it should be noted that laws do regulate some important 
dimensions of CSR such as environmental protection and workers’ rights. The 
demands of markets and the need of export-oriented Russian companies to 
safeguard their reputation in Western markets create incentives for the Russian 
forest industry companies to develop their CSR practices. However, CSR 
in the Northwest Russian forest sector is rather challenging, since Soviet 
traditions and the poor social and economic conditions in several localities 
also have an impact on what kind of behavior is considered as responsible in 
the forest industry. Furthermore, nowadays, actors such as international and 
Russian domestic NGOs participate actively in the discussion on CSR and 
seek to simulate the CSR practices of the forest companies (e.g., Matilainen 
; Tysiachniouk a; Kuliasov and Kuliasova ; Kuliasova ).
  Forest certification standards constitute the primary private regulation 
scheme dealing with the CSR practices of forest companies in the Northwest 
Russian forest sector. Since the end of the s, NGOs have actively promoted 
forest certification in Russia. The FSC was originally established in  by 
several international NGOs and forest companies as a response to concerns 
about global deforestation (Cashore ; Cashore et al. ). The FSC system 
of forest certification is by far the most prominent certification regime in the 
Russian forest sector; the first FSC certifications were granted there in . 
The PEFC (Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification), initiated 
by landowners’ associations and forest products corporations, is another 
significant forest certification scheme. The PEFC was founded in  and 
has now become the most widespread forest certification scheme in the world. 
Nevertheless, the PEFC has not been as successful in the Northwest Russian 
forest sector as the FSC. There are both forest management and chain of custody 
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certifications. Forest management certification requirements are concerned 
with the social and environmental impacts of forestry operations, whereas chain 
of custody certification verifies the origins of wood. The FSC has developed 
principles and criteria to describe good forest management. Its goal is to 
promote environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and economically 
viable management of forests in all regions of the world.15 Companies that 
choose to comply with FCS standards are granted a certificate and are allowed 
to use the FSC label in their marketing and market their products as coming 
from appropriately managed forests. The compliance of forest operations with 
FSC standards is monitored by third-party auditors (see, e.g., Maletz and 
Tysiachniouk ). This regulation of the CSR practices of forest companies 
can be seen as a form of private governance. Forest certification does not create 
binding obligations on forest companies – at least, not in a legal sense. However, 
this private regulation is important, since the violation of private rules and loss 
of certification could seriously harm the reputation of a company. The forest 
companies in the Russian part of the Barents Region are export-oriented, which 
further emphasizes the importance of a good reputation. Forest certification has 
been regarded as a mechanism that has brought international CSR principles 
and the principles of sustainable forestry into the forest sector and the local 
communities in Russia (Tysiachniouk a, b; Kuliasova , ). 
In addition, it can be suggested that forest certification has introduced legal 
pluralism in the Northwest Russian forest sector. The emergence of forest 
certification in the Northwest Russian forest sector emphasizes the role of 
private regulation in constraining the behavior of forest companies. Legal 
pluralism will be discussed in the following sections.
some remarks on legal pluralism
The aim of this section is to provide a brief introduction to legal pluralism. The 
traditional concept of legal pluralism became popular in the s and s. It 
was developed within the fields of legal anthropology and sociology to analyse 
co-existing and overlapping normative orders within societies (Michaels ). 
It is frequently suggested that legal pluralism implies that the state is not the 
15  For more details, see www.fsc.org.
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sole source of legal order and that there can be several co-existing legal orders 
in the same field (see, e.g., Griffiths ; Berman ; Michaels ). In this 
way, the idea of legal pluralism challenges legal centralism and the monopoly of 
the state in making and administering law. A legal centralist approach considers 
law as “an exclusive, systematic and unified hierarchical ordering of normative 
propositions depending from the power of the state” (Griffiths ).
  Legal pluralist scholars have argued that law does not reside solely in the 
coercive commands of sovereign states as legal centralists claim and that non-
state communities also create law. Legal pluralism describes hybrid legal spaces 
where more than one legal or quasi-legal regime operates in the same social 
field. It is basically a descriptive framework. Legal pluralists observe that various 
actors create norms, and they analyse the interplay between rules; but legal 
pluralists do not seek to propose a hierarchy of substantive norms and values 
(Berman ).
  Legal pluralism is, however, far from being a clear and unambiguous concept 
(Woodman ). The notion of legal pluralism has been marked by a deep 
conceptual confusion. One reason for the continuing disagreements is that legal 
pluralist scholars come from several disciplines, bringing different concepts and 
orientations to the subject. An international lawyer, for instance, who discusses 
legal pluralism has something very different in mind from a legal anthropologist 
who is studying legal pluralism (Tamanaha ; von Benda-Beckmann ). 
The debate over legal pluralism has raised complex questions such as what law 
is, what criteria should give social phenomena the quality of being legal, what 
type of legal complexity should be called legal pluralism, and what simultaneous 
existence or co-existence of law or legal orders means (Tamanaha ; von 
Benda-Beckmann ; Woodman ). My objective here is not to examine 
the whole extensive debate on legal pluralism in detail. For the purposes of 
this chapter, the key questions are the power of forest companies, their role as 
rule-makers, and the presence of multiple regulatory systems that govern forest 
companies and their CSR, not the formal status of these rules.
  The concept of legal pluralism has gone through several stages in its 
development. In her discussion of the development of legal pluralism, Sally 
Engle Merry () refers to “classical” and “new” legal pluralism. Classical legal 
pluralism focused on analyzing overlapping normative systems created during 
the process of colonisation. Thus, legal pluralist scholars originally focused on 
non-Western societies and their legal systems. Classical anthropology-oriented 
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legal pluralist scholars observed indigenous law among tribes and villages and 
the simultaneous existence of indigenous legal rules and the law of the colonial 
power, analysing the interaction between European law and non-European 
local laws. This co-existence was considered to be quite hierarchical. Classical 
legal pluralist scholars regarded these rather different legal orders as being 
separate systems layered one on top of the other. The indigenous non-state law 
was treated as subordinate to the official state law introduced by the colonising 
power (Merry ; Berman ; Michaels ).
  New legal pluralism, on the other hand, extended the concept of legal 
pluralism to the advanced industrial countries of Europe and the United States. 
It was recognized that normative plurality existed in virtually all societies. 
Merry () stresses that this was an extraordinarily powerful conceptual 
move, in that it placed ”at the center of investigation the relationship between 
the official legal system and other forms of ordering that connect with but 
are in some ways separate from and dependent on it. The new legal pluralism 
moves away from questions about the effect of law on society or even the 
effect of society on law toward conceptualizing a more complex and interactive 
relationship between official and unofficial forms of ordering”.
  More recently, globalisation has shaped the idea of legal pluralism. The 
development of global communication technologies, the rise of multinational 
corporations, and the mobility of capital and people across borders mean that 
many jurisdictions feel the effects of activities taking place around the globe. 
Inevitably this leads to multiple assertions of legal authority over the same act 
without regard to territorial location. Globalisation has given rise to another 
wave of legal pluralism. Scholars of legal pluralism have seen globalisation as 
a new field in which to apply their expertise (Michaels ; Berman ; 
Tamanaha ; Teubner ). According to Gunther Teubner (), “global 
law will grow mainly from the social peripheries, not from the political centres 
of nation states and international institutions”. Different non-state actors play 
roles, such as law-making, that were traditionally reserved to the state. This 
development can also be identified in the forest sector in the Russian part 
of the Barents Region. In the next section I will examine the rule-creating 
activities of one these private actors: forest companies.
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forest industry companies 
as promoters of private regulation
This section is concerned with the regulatory capacity of the forest companies 
and how the forest companies have introduced private regulation in the 
Northwest Russian forest sector. As previously mentioned, legal personality and 
limited liability are usually regarded as characteristic features of companies, and 
because of these features companies are powerful actors. Furthermore, as the idea 
of legal pluralism stresses, companies are important rule-creating communities 
– another thing that makes them powerful. Generally speaking, there are key 
differences in regulatory capacities between businesses. Large affluent companies 
generally have better capacities to participate in discussions concerning private 
regulation, whereas small and medium-sized enterprises often struggle to keep 
up with development (Hutter ). The forest sector in the Russian part of 
the Barents Region is nowadays dominated by large companies, and many small 
forest companies have become affiliates of large holding companies (see, e.g., 
Matilainen ; Torniainen et. al ). Undoubtedly, this consolidation of the 
forest industry is a significant factor enhancing the regulatory capacity of the 
forest companies.
  Private regulation established by companies themselves or by the industry 
is routinely called self-regulation. This is a broad concept that covers a wide 
range of arrangements. There are also hybrid forms of self-regulation such 
as enforced self-regulation, which involves a mix of state and corporate 
regulatory efforts. Furthermore, sometimes self-regulation is meditated 
through trade associations (Hutter ). Civil regulation and soft law are 
also frequently used concepts in discussions about private regulation. The 
term “civil regulation” covers a wide range of arrangements such as various 
standards and certification regimes set by NGOs. It does not derive its authority 
from governments, but, instead, the advocates of civil regulation turn to the 
market’s supply chains to create incentives and force companies to comply. 
In the forest industry, forest certification regimes are a significant example of 
civil regulation. Forestry standards have been studied rather extensively (Vogel 
5, ; Cashore et al. ; Cashore ). Civil regulation is a form of 
soft law, a term that refers to regimes that are not based on state authority. 
Voluntariness and consensus-based decision making are central features of soft 
law regimes (Kirton and Trebilcock 4). Soft law instruments can have a 
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variety of titles such as “codes of practice”, “guidelines”, “recommendations”, 
or “declarations” (Zerk ).
  Company legislation establishes a framework for the rule-creating efforts 
of companies. Apart from company legislation, companies are regulated by 
bylaws, which are important regulatory documents in any company that address 
issues such as the company’s administration, decision-making procedures, and 
the relationship between the company and its shareholders. The Russian Law 
on Joint Stock Companies, for instance, stipulates the contents of bylaws in 
detail, listing all the information bylaws must include. The list is rather long 
but not exhaustive. According to the Law, other requirements which are not 
contradictory to the Law on Joint Stock Companies or other laws of the Russian 
Federation can be included. In the Finnish Law on Joint Stock Companies, on 
the other hand, there are only a few mandatory requirements for the content of 
bylaws. According to the Finnish law, the name of the company, the registered 
office, and the field of business must be mentioned in the bylaws. Consequently, 
it seems that in this respect Finnish companies have more leeway. However, 
before the Russian Federal Law on Joint Stock Companies, which was passed 
on  December , bylaws were quite important regulatory instruments in 
Russia. Russian companies routinely used their bylaws as a tool to supplement 
inadequate company legislation (Lehtinen ).
  Bylaws are, however, just one expression of the regulatory activities of 
companies. CSR regimes involve self-regulation, since CSR is regarded as 
a voluntary commitment of companies and a business activity that exceeds 
the requirements of state laws (Scott et al. ). CSR practices are routinely 
defined and regulated by companies in documents called “the codes of 
conduct”, “CSR principles” or “ethical codes”, just to mention a few examples 
of terminology used by companies. In addition, these CSR principles and codes 
of conduct are often published, for instance, on the company’s web page. Thus, 
self-regulation is undoubtedly a tool to show stakeholders that the company is 
committed to certain CSR practices. In the Northwest Russian forest sector, 
large international companies have engaged in self-regulation concerning their 
CSR. Furthermore, foreign forest companies that operate in Russia usually 
bring with them their own CSR principles (Matilainen ). As a rule, large 
global companies have common CSR principles, which are implemented 
coherently in every country in which the company has business operations. 
Therefore, when a foreign company acquires a Russian subsidiary company, 
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this ownership change usually leads to important changes in the CSR practices 
of the subsidiary company. In consequence, the ownership change also reshapes 
the relations between the forest company and the community in which the 
company operates (for more details, see Kuliasova , ).
  As we have already shown in this article, FSC (Forest Stewardship Council) 
forest certification is a prominent civil regulation regime in the Northwest 
Russian forest sector. Other forestry standards such as the PEFC (Programme 
for Endorsement of Forest Certification) have not been as successful as the 
FSC, although efforts have been made to introduce the PEFC in Russia. 
The FCS forest certification standards have been so actively and purposefully 
promoted in Russia by influential NGOs and large forest companies that efforts 
to introduce the PEFC in Russia have been undermined (Nystén-Haarala 
). Both international and Russian domestic NGOs have been active in 
raising consumers’ awareness of irresponsible forestry practices and pressuring 
companies to be more responsible (Tysiachniouk ). Environmental 
NGOs, in particular, have been active in promoting FSC standards in Russia. 
In consequence, in the Northwest Russian forest sector, forest certification is 
strongly biased toward environmental issues, although the FSC also includes 
requirements concerning economic and social sustainability. However, an 
emphasis on environmental questions is a general tendency in FSC certification 
(Kotilainen et al. ; Kuliasova ; Tulaeva ).
  Essentially, the FSC establishes a framework for collaboration and 
negotiations among retailers, civil society organizations and forestry companies 
(Vogel 5). The support of large forest companies for FSC forest certification 
standards and their willingness to co-operate in the certification process are 
crucial for the success of the FSC in the forest sector in Russia. Naturally, 
it is the forest company that makes the ultimate decision whether or not 
to certify its operations. In fact, the forest companies in Northwest Russia 
have adopted FSC standards relatively quickly. Many, if not all, of the leading 
companies have adopted a policy of certifying their forest operations. Forest 
certification requires co-operation and dialogue between forest companies 
and various groups such as NGOs, local communities and certification experts 
(Maletz and Tysiachniouk ). During the actual process of certification, the 
interpretation of rather general FSC principles is the result of dialogue between 
the forest companies and the NGOs. Certification specialists play a crucial role in 
interpreting forestry standards and adjusting them to local conditions (Nystén-
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Haarala ; Maletz and Tysiachniouk ). Furthermore, it should be noted 
that companies also have to negotiate with the Russian forest authorities, since 
FSC standards sometimes conflict with Russian forest legislation and forestry 
practice (Nystén-Haarala ; Pappila ).
  Since participation in FSC forest certification is a voluntary choice for 
forest companies, they will engage in it to the extent that it makes business 
sense for them to do so (Vogel 5). There are several studies showing that 
in Russia the demand for participation in FCS forest certification has come 
from Western markets and customers, as well as from foreign or Russian parent 
companies. As a rule, in Western markets customers expect forest products to be 
produced in an economically, environmentally and socially sustainable manner. 
These market demands have created serious pressures on the forest companies 
to apply more sophisticated and reliable CSR practices. Active participation 
in FCS forest certification by many Northwest Russian forest companies is a 
mechanism to safeguard sales in Western markets. In addition, both Russian and 
foreign holding companies have fostered FSC certification as they have adopted 
the policy of certifying their forest operations. In consequence, they also 
require their subsidiary companies to certify their forest operations (Kotilainen 
et al. ; Kuliasova ; Tysiachniouk a, b; Kuliasov and Kuliasova 
; Tulaeva ). Studies also show that for foreign forest companies, forest 
certification and close cooperation with well-known international NGOs 
and other stakeholders are mechanisms for adjusting to the Russian business 
environment (Tysiachniouk a).
Concluding remarks
Northern forests have traditionally played a considerable role in the economies, 
livelihood and way of life in the north. The small number of tree species, large forest 
areas, and slowly maturing, high-quality wood are often regarded as advantages of 
the northern areas, providing a good environment for the economic exploitation 
of forests. The Barents Region plays an important role in the production of 
chemical forest industry products in Russia (Välkky et al. ).
  Forest companies are clearly, in many ways, an important force in the Russian 
part of the Barents Region, making considerable contributions to the overall 
living conditions of the area (e.g., Rossiiskaia Gazeta a, b). Given the 
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importance of the forest industry in the economy of Northwest Russia, there is 
significant economic power in the hands of the forest companies. However, the 
issue of social sustainability is also extremely significant. In the Russian part of 
the Barents Region, the CSR practices of the forest companies are important 
not only for the forest companies themselves, but also for the local communities 
and the people who inhabit them. Russia’s socialistic past and the weak social 
and economic conditions in many localities have strengthened the powerful 
role of the forest industry in the Russian part of the Barents Region.  However, 
the dependence of local communities on local firms makes the localities rather 
vulnerable, and sudden changes in the global forest industry can have a serious 
impact on them. Furthermore, there is no doubt that social responsibilities 
lead to extra costs and impair the competitiveness of the forest companies. In a 
market economy, extensive social tasks and responsibility for the well-being of 
local people are clearly burdensome for companies.
  In accordance with the concept of legal pluralism, the contemporary 
CSR in the forest sector in Northwest Russia is certainly a field in which 
several regulatory systems co-exist. Naturally state legislation establishes a 
basic framework that defines what companies can do and what they cannot 
do. In addition, the CSR practices of the forest companies are governed by 
private regulation. The FSC forest certification standards that have emerged 
in the forest sector in the Russian part of the Barents Region are a good 
example of private regulation. Legal pluralism stresses the rule-creating role 
of private actors such as companies. The forest companies in the Russian part 
of the Barents Region can be regarded as powerful actors in part because of 
their rule-creating activities. In fact, it seems that the rule-creating capacity 
of the forest companies has increased and improved. The forest sector in 
Northwest Russia is dominated by large companies. These companies have 
adopted alternative regulatory instruments such as FSC standards to govern 
their behavior, while developing their CSR practices. Furthermore, NGOs 
participate vigorously in discussions concerning responsible behaviour in the 
forest industry. Therefore, the CSR of the forest companies is not solely in the 
hands of the forest companies themselves.
  However, the complexity and plurality of the regulatory environment 
also creates challenges for the companies (Hutter ). The requirements 
of different regulatory systems, which sometimes conflict with each other, 
allow for multiple interpretations (Michaels 5). Companies have to learn 
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how to cooperate with various stakeholders and find ways to navigate in 
multiple regulatory regimes. In Russia, for instance, differences between forest 
certification criteria and forest legislation have created tensions between the 
forest companies and the authorities. Forest companies have been forced to 
make special arrangements to fulfil certification criteria and to find a balance 
between different requirements (Pappila ).
  This chapter has evaluated CSR in the forest sector in the Russian part 
of the Barents Region. For lawyers and legal studies, CSR is a rather difficult 
topic to deal with, since CSR is routinely considered to be something that goes 
beyond the requirements of law. The “voluntary versus mandatory CSR” debate 
emphasizes the problematic relationship between law and CSR. However, it 
has been suggested that the whole debate whether CSR should be voluntary 
or mandatory is misguided (Zerk ). It overlooks the fact that in many 
jurisdictions, CSR-related issues – like workplace health and safety, consumer 
and environmental protection, just to mention a few – are already regulated by 
law. On the other hand, the voluntary versus mandatory CSR debate reflects a 
simplistic view of what law is and how it guides human behaviour. Regulatory 
regimes are not bullet-proof; there are grey areas and loopholes. In these 
situations the socially responsible response may well be to comply with the 
spirit of the law rather than to try to avoid it (Zerk ). Thus, a forest company 
cannot claim to be responsible while at the same time logging valuable forest 
areas, even if, due to some loopholes in legislation, it may have the right to do 
so. CSR and law are not separate but, in reality, closely intertwined.
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c h a p t e r  5
Stefan Walter
CLiMate Change in the north – 
a CoMpLexity proBLeM
introduction
Climate change is widely considered to be a complex problem. This is reflected 
in the literature dealing with climate change and its potential impact. For 
example, O’Brien and Leichenko () consider that climate change, coupled 
with economic globalisation, produces a complex regime and creates a double 
exposure: one stemming from climate change, the other from globalisation. 
Although there is great uncertainty, the authors agree that this regime will 
create both winners and losers due to the unequal development of climate 
change and the process of globalisation.
  Related to the exposure to climate change, and coupled with other social 
processes, is the assessment of the capacity to mitigate and adapt. On the basis of 
common scenarios, dynamic changes over time, and risk assessments, van Vuuren 
et al. () conclude that no optimal mitigation, adaptation or combination 
of the two can be pursued in reality. This is due to large uncertainties in data, 
methods and models. While van Vuuren et al. acknowledge the complex 
nature of climate change and its social linkages, they nevertheless point out 
the usefulness of ‘mathematical’ scenarios to get an idea of future evolution. 
It may be argued that they confuse complicatedness with complexity, a not 
uncommon mistake. Van Vuuren et al. do realise, however, that whenever human 
action is concerned, the prescribed scenarios seem to lose their significance.
  This estimation is confirmed by Anisimov et al. (), who authored the 
chapter on polar regions in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) Climate 
Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. While they agree that the 
impact of climate change in the polar regions will exceed the forecasted 
impact on other regions, they also argue that the regions show an enormous 
complexity in their interactions. Furthermore, the responses of biological and 
human systems are equally highly complex. Thus, the future impact of climate 
change is very difficult to predict.
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  In climate governance this complexity is acknowledged. As an object of 
analysis in terms of policy recommendations, however, climate governance 
is difficult to assess, given the complexity of adaptation measures. This is 
exacerbated by the uncertainties surrounding climate change and its impact 
(Smit et al. ). Nevertheless, governance efforts are continuing.
  This raises the question of why the situation is as it is. Apparently, agencies 
that govern have a particular understanding of complexity, one which 
seemingly ignores some of the scientific views that have been presented. It is 
also true that scientists can likewise be the victims of misunderstandings, as van 
Vuuren et al. show.
  This chapter aims to shed light on the process that guides governance 
on climate change. In particular, the author will show examples of policies 
or political initiatives on combating climate change in the North, notably – 
but not exclusively – concerning the Barents Region. This will provide the 
opportunity of comprehending the rationality of politics as well as answering 
broader questions of scientific approaches which may lead to misunderstandings. 
The complexity of climate change governance is shown by introducing various 
positions, including general governmental, legal, political, economic and 
scientific positions and contrasting their expectations.
  The chapter is based on a logical scientific approach that is somewhat in 
contrast to an empirical approach and that differs fundamentally from a critical 
approach, which forms the basis for normative studies. The chapter, thus, 
aims to correct the picture that emerges when political rationality enters into 
research thinking as a norm.
Climate governance in the north
The contemporary concept of governance is largely concerned with the 
integration of a variety of social interests, ranging from cultural, economic and 
public to ecological aspects, reflecting the diversity of interest groups seeking 
power. Governance seeks to integrate these interests so as to create a common 
regime through which control of a planned outcome is possible. Because of 
this, it is closely related to the concept of sustainable development, in which 
different dimensions of our social existence ought to be incorporated into a 
common effort, such as the environment and the economy, in order to produce 
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social well-being. As is well known, this concept takes into consideration not 
only the present generation but also generations not yet born so that the present 
does not overexploit and threaten the regenerative capacity of certain resource 
ecologies (cf. World Commission on Environment and Development ). 
Hence, sustainability has a strong future orientation.
  The persistent orientation of governance – and, particularly, of the 
governance of sustainability – towards the future is likely to result in the 
conclusion that integration is never sufficient. This is particularly visible in 
political theories on the resolution of conflicts – be they political, judicial, 
economic, or environmental – which commonly suggest stronger integration 
and cooperation to overcome disagreements (cf., e.g., Heininen ). However, 
it is important to remember that there is not just one rationality, not just one 
‘global’ value to follow in society. For example, in Niklas Luhmann’s theory of 
social systems, social systems as agents of control are self-organising. Systems 
define the criteria according to which they control. Thus, the method of 
cognition of one system differs from the method of another system. Perception 
and knowledge are transformed from absolute to relative (cf. Luhmann 4).
  A social system observes and thereby applies its own logic of distinction 
that separates the system from its environment (Luhmann 4, ). The 
logic is based on a binary code, which makes it possible to filter stimuli from 
the environment in order to organize them in a way that is acceptable to 
the system. Most notably, society includes functional systems such as politics 
(which distinguishes itself according to the logic coded as power/opposition), 
economy (solvency/insolvency), science (true/untrue), education (being better/
being worse), law (legal/illegal) and religion (immanence/transcendence) (cf. 
Luhmann 4, ).
  Governance in the struggle against climate change, however, is in opposition 
to this theory of social systems. It follows, rather, the rationale of politics. 
Generally, climate governance aims broadly at the implementation of two 
different strategies, namely mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation is particularly 
well known in the context of climate change and is concerned with stabilising 
and reducing carbon dioxide emissions in the atmosphere so as to slow down 
or stop global climate change. Thus, mitigation has attracted a great deal of 
attention, particularly in political agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol.
  Adaptation, however, has become increasingly important due to the 
assumption that the environment and global climate will continue to change 
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even under the strictest of emission control regimes (see, e.g., Solomon 
et al. ). In addition, adaptation is said already to be occurring in areas 
where climate change leaves people particularly vulnerable, especially in the 
Arctic regions, where a changing climate is projected to have greater effect 
than in the temperate regions of the earth. As an object of analysis in terms 
of policy recommendations, adaptation is, however, difficult to assess, given 
the complexity of adaptation measures. This difficulty is exacerbated by the 
uncertainties surrounding climate change and its impact (Smit et al. ).
  Even though there is uncertainty, it appears that we must continue 
governing in any case in order to combat climate change. This reflects the 
common position of governance as described above, which is to suggest 
continuity and more integration to solve problems. This continuity is reflected, 
for example, in the following quotation from the Commission of the European 
Communities (), which is typical of governance efforts to comply with 
sustainability goals by trying to counteract climate change:
The EU is already at the forefront of approaches to decouple economic 
growth from increasing energy consumption. Its action has combined 
robust legislative initiatives and energy efficiency programmes with 
encouragement to competitive and effective renewable energy. However, 
the EU’s commitment to fighting climate change is a long-term one. 
(Commission of the European Communities , )  
Furthermore, present levels of commitment, integration and cooperation are 
never sufficient in governance. They can always be increased, as shown by the 
following quotation:
Although Europe is already one of the world’s most energy efficient regions, 
it can go much further. In its 5 Green Paper on Energy Efficiency, the 
Commission showed that up to % of EU energy use could be saved: 
equivalent to spending as much as €  billion less on energy, as well as 
making a major contribution to energy security and creating up to a 
million new jobs in the sectors directly concerned. (Commission of the 
European Communities , ) 
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As stated above, governance appears to be superficially interested in building 
up platforms for conflict resolution. According to Koivurova (), dispute 
mechanisms are either political or legal in nature. Governance processes in 
combating climate change can therefore be said to include both. I will introduce 
examples of both political and legal governance efforts in the North, starting 
with a political effort: the Barents Euro-Arctic Council.
political climate governance: the Barents euro-arctic Council
The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) was established in  as a security 
organisation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. Sreejith () explains that 
the BEAC’s rationale concerning environmental and particularly climate 
protection is based on the understanding of their region as a fragile area. This 
general outlook is appropriate for the BEAC, given the artificial structure 
of the modern Barents Region and the peculiar approach through which 
climate change is addressed as an issue. Sreejith (, ff.) calls this approach 
“subjective environmentalism”.
  Thus, the BEAC’s general strategic outlook on environmental issues is that 
of environmental security. While the environment was important from early 
on, climate change emerged as a priority area of the BEAC only as late as 
. Through the scientific expertise of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
(ACIA), the BEAC was able to form, as Sreejith puts it, “a ghastly picture of the 
threats of climate change and its impacts on the region” (Sreejith , ). 
Strategic cooperation in the Barents Region was reformed as climate change 
cooperation. Organisationally, this required extensive cooperation across 
different sectors and work groups of the BEAC. Following the theoretical 
explorations on the concept of governance, these decisions make cooperation 
much easier. Sreejith himself confesses as well that the raising of fear unites the 
region and helps governments gain power.
  The BEAC acts predominantly through its working groups, including the 
Working Group on Economic Cooperation, the Working Group on Energy 
and Research, and the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. The first group, 
the Working Group on Economic Cooperation, is naturally concerned with 
economic development in the Barents Region. Thus, its views on environmental 
protection and measures to combat climate change are rather limited. However, 
its main cooperation on climate change comes about through its Forest Sector 
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Task Force, which is primarily concerned with forestry development. A 
priority for forestry development is the construction of a model forest which 
not only has an economic function but also provides an ecological function. 
Furthermore, it is expected to act as a forum for social interaction, both at the 
local and regional levels (Sreejith ).
  Sreejith explains that since climate change is expected to have an impact 
on the balance of such a model forest with corresponding consequences 
for economic welfare, the Task Force focuses on market-based mechanisms, 
including financial mechanisms and types of management that favour carbon 
storage. This is in line with other programmes that support environmentally 
sound investment projects. It must be said, however, that any model, even a 
model forest, is an ideal. In other words, it is a construction which has no 
correspondence in the real world. It is, after all, due to the invention of an 
ideal type that a disruption can be identified, which then calls for a governance 
intervention. Furthermore, financial development tools, even if they are 
market-based and environmentally sound investments generally, only lead to 
greater inefficiencies in the use of available resources. The implementation of 
those measures will lead to a lower level of social welfare. These are, thus, good 
examples where the rationalities of politics, economy and science collide.
  The Working Group on Energy has a number of focal points in its work, 
among others energy efficiency, project financing and bioenergy. Its priority is 
to promote the adoption of strategies and goals in order to make exploration, 
production and transmission of energy in the Barents Region more sustainable. 
The Group also pushes for broad acceptance and implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol for the limitation of carbon dioxide. Immediate measures include the 
reduction of energy consumption in the Barents Region and general energy 
savings. In connection with those goals energy efficiency should be enhanced. 
Furthermore, the Group envisions the region having an investor-friendly 
energy market (Sreejith ). It is important to understand here that energy 
is not actually produced. Neither can energy be destroyed. The emphasis from a 
physical point of view is on transformation, which is the process by which energy 
achieves different forms for use. Sustainability, from this perspective, acquires a 
rather different meaning, one which is best served through the market, where 
energy is transformed in the most efficient and effective ways. In addition, energy 
taxation as part of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, subsidies and the 
creation of an investor-friendly market may turn out to be incompatible goals.
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  The Working Group on Indigenous Peoples generally advises the BEAC 
regarding the indigenous peoples in the Barents Region. The environment has 
been a priority area for a decade, with a particular focus on threats of security 
and accessibility with regard to natural resources. Pollution of the environment, 
unprofitable development and climate change, which have serious consequences 
for the lives of indigenous peoples, are the special areas that the Group addresses. 
Ideally, the group supports the development of optimal conditions so that the 
uniqueness of indigenous cultures can be protected (Sreejith ). Of course, 
it can be conceded that pollution is connected with unprofitable development. 
Projects which prove to be unprofitable tend to grow in number with 
government subsidies. Hence, goals laid down may be contradictory in practice.
  While generally the issue of climate change is multidimensional (a factor that 
makes it complex), the BEAC has incorporated the issue of climate change on 
the basis of its being a threat to security. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, 
the BEAC supports the fight against climate change through an approach 
called subjective environmentalism. There is an economic impulse which is 
particularly represented by the Working Groups on Economic Cooperation 
and Energy, and which suggests that environmental solutions on their own are 
not economical. However, the BEAC, with its overarching umbrella approach, 
does not address climate change separately. Rather, the BEAC “becomes an 
example for how global issues such as climate change are contextually altered 
and subjectively dealt with”, as Sreejith (, 5) describes it. The importance 
of this particular contextualisation and its consequences will become clear in a 
later section on complexity.
  By choosing not to address climate change outside the notion of climate 
change as a security threat, the BEAC keeps its options open. The issue of threats 
is especially significant when one keeps in mind that fear creates unification, 
a particularly clever method of region building. This is especially significant 
in the context of globalisation, where regions are counter-concepts in a way, 
but also, through regional integration, offer combined economic infrastructures 
with heightened appeal for investors (Sreejith ). Thus, it is not climate 
change as, say, scientific concept that counts. Rather, the BEAC’s efforts are 
fully in line with the theoretical explorations done on the nature of governance, 
leading to increasing cooperation and integration over time.
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Legal climate governance: the inuit petition
The Inuit do not, arguably, inhabit the Barents Region. However, the governing 
effort undertaken by the international community in the context of combating 
climate change and its impact on Arctic indigenous peoples is rather unique. 
Therefore, I will describe it briefly. 
  At present the only initiative by an indigenous people to actively petition 
against a major emitter of carbon dioxide is the petition of the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council (ICC) against the United States on the grounds that the country is 
violating the human rights of the Inuit (Koivurova ).
  Remarkably, this case recognises the connection between human rights and 
environmental quality. Hence, if climate change affects environmental quality 
in a negative way, human rights are violated. This is the case even though the 
complexity of the matter concerning the impact of climate change does not 
allow for a clear picture with regard to concrete causes and impacts.
  The Inuit petition incorporates many different sources of scientific evidence 
which are intended to prove that climate change is the result of human activity 
and also that the impacts of climate change are indeed taking place (Koivurova 
). While there are many uncertainties regarding cause and effect, and the 
existence of many sources appears to resemble – following system thinking 
– a worldview where different rationalities co-exist side by side, the process 
of governance continues to proceed seemingly undisturbed towards greater 
control through integration, confirming the political rationality of gaining or 
maintaining power.
  Nevertheless, the Inuit petition represents a significant effort towards 
creating a perception of climate change as a human rights problem (Koivurova 
). The question is, however, to what extent any other environmental 
change can be considered a human rights problem. By extension, even social 
change could be seen as a human rights problem if it has a negative impact on 
particular cultures. Koivurova sheds light on the actual intention of governance 
efforts to combat climate change. The aim is to enact a more efficient and 
long-term climate policy. While implementation is national and regional, as in 
the case of Arctic climate governance, the regime as such, in any case, is ‘global’. 
The global regime presses for the implementation of a universal standard of 
what is considered just and efficient. This omits the fact that value judgements 
(what is seen as just and efficient) are always subjective. Human action exists 
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on the basis of subjective decision-making. Goal seeking, again, occurs on the 
basis of subjective estimates of costs and gains. Thus, values are subjective (cf., 
e.g., Brownstein ). There is, effectively, no way of defining a collective 
social problem. This fits the variety of rationalities present in society and which 
ultimately constitute the climate change discourse.
political climate governance ii: sami concerns
With regard to the Barents Region, the most important among its indigenous 
peoples are the Sami. The efforts of the Sami in relation to climate change 
concentrate on political influence. Within the boundaries of these efforts, the 
focus is especially on aspects of traditional knowledge and age-old ways of 
adaptation and living and the right to practice them.
  Retter () writes that climate change is a problem particularly because 
it occurs in combination with increasing development in the Sami area and 
globalisation. This confirms the assessment by O’Brien and Leichenko (). 
A great concern is increased access to non-renewable resources. Equally 
important, however, is the fact that general governmental efforts to mitigate 
the effects of climate change are causing big problems for the Sami, due to 
the accelerating interest in renewable resources. Thus, the Sami are said already 
to be suffering from the impact of climate change, recognising that the actual 
impact of climate change is in the form of changing governmental plans to 
adapt to and mitigate the impact of climate change.
  While the Sami consider themselves to have the capacity to adapt 
successfully to environmental changes, climate change poses a challenge which 
the Sami have not faced before. As a result, decision-making ought to be based 
on the best available knowledge (Retter ). While this may be the case in 
general, there is a call to value traditional and scientific knowledge equally, with 
the objective of merging them in order to create new and better knowledge 
to deal with climate change. Although this may sound like a useful aim and, 
consequently, there are policies demanding just that, knowledge is rather 
personal. Values are likewise personal. A value cannot be extracted and formed 
to become someone else’s knowledge. Therefore, on the basis of the writing of 
Brownstein (), as explored earlier, I assert that different people’s knowledge 
cannot be valued equally. This exemplifies a range of expectations, many of 
which incorporate contradictions when looked at from a logical point of view.
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nordic industrial policy for climate change
Highlighting industrial policy for climate change makes for an interesting 
case. To some extent, it challenges or even contradicts mainstream views that 
combating climate change and its impact is in strict opposition with industrial 
activities.
  In any case, the Nordic business sector shows great engagement and 
determination in the formulation of policy positions for the governance of 
climate change in the North. A report published by the confederations of 
Nordic industries, enterprises and employers makes it clear that action is 
needed to combat climate change in the North (Juhler-Kristoffersen ).
  In the context of mitigation and adaptation, Nordic business is particularly 
interested in fair and equal chances. Thus, all large emitters of greenhouse gases 
should be involved in making significant contributions to combating the global 
challenge of climate change. There is also, however, in this statement a clearly 
expressed fear of losing out if everyone is not involved. Nevertheless, business 
has to thrive. Thus, welfare expectations have to be met so that sustainable 
economic growth can take place. Therefore, climate change needs to be 
addressed in the most cost-effective way so that business competitiveness can 
be maintained within the Nordic region and the wider European theatre.
  According to the confederations, there is no apparent contradiction 
between economic growth and reduction of emissions. Both are necessities 
for sustainable development, but they need to be appropriately coordinated. 
In particular, the importance of the European Union (EU) as an example on 
the forefront of combating climate change is emphasised. The EU’s goal is to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions within its territory by at least  percent by 
 (Juhler-Kristoffersen ). Remarkably, and displaying a rare feeling in 
favour of the abolition of the market, the EU is associated with implementing 
appropriate rules and also technology for energy efficiency in order to reduce 
energy consumption to the planned level. This is even more astonishing as it is 
rare for a political agent to be the one implementing the desired changes.
  The business sector acknowledges political leadership in setting goals and 
implementing concrete policies. It is feared, however, that competitiveness will 
suffer when companies can invest more cheaply outside the EU. Hence, a global 
regime which ensures fair competition is desirable (Juhler-Kristoffersen ). 
Rothbard (5, 4) remarks, in such a context: 
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[W]hen businessmen talk of ‘fair trade’ or ‘fair competition’, it means 
that they are pressuring the government to use coercion to cartelize their 
industry, to restrict production, raise prices, and allow the flourishing of 
inefficient and uncompetitive practices.
While energy efficiency is the goal, inefficiency is the rule. Nevertheless, it is 
recommended that the focus of policy making should be on energy supply 
and energy demand. A trading mechanism should be established for renewable 
energy technology. However, this trading mechanism should not distort 
competition (Juhler-Kristoffersen ). To some extent, this expectation 
reflects the one mentioned above, where industry advocates a ‘plan’ at the 
expense of the market. Arguably, while trade is the best way of allocating 
resources in the most efficient and effective way, trade through a mechanism 
that does not distort competition is called a “market”.
  The Nordic business sector is naturally concerned with how to share the 
burden of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Juhler-Kristoffersen ). 
This position is clear when one keeps in mind the industry’s position that 
competitiveness would suffer if there was no equal burden. Eventually, however, 
sharing the burden means that most notably the tax payer has to suffer.
  The confederations of Nordic industries, enterprises and employers are, 
like some of the holders of the scientific positions presented earlier, victims 
of misunderstandings. The association recognises that from a historical 
perspective economic growth has gradually implied the development and 
introduction of new technology which has made industrial processes more 
energy efficient. The significant rise of energy prices is also seen as an 
important factor supporting the adoption of energy efficient technologies 
in order to curb emissions (Juhler-Kristoffersen ). It is remarkable, 
however, that economic growth in the past has been due to real increases in 
productivity. Higher prices of energy due to, for example, increased taxation 
on energy consumption, did not lead to economic growth. On the contrary, 
growth generally leads to lower energy prices.
  The Nordic business sector does not seem to believe in its own ability 
to finance innovation. Therefore, the promotion of better technologies to 
adapt to climate change will also require state aid (Juhler-Kristoffersen ). 
This removes the entrepreneurial risk of investment and socialises it, so that 
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eventually the taxpayer bears the risk for the planned investment in particular 
technologies. This demand is even more remarkable since, at the same time, the 
arrangements that are made are not supposed to distort competition.
  Moreover, by suggesting that climate change initiatives should be 
implemented so that they allow for flexibility in the way companies meet the 
 target of the EU, the confederations of Nordic industries, enterprises 
and employers acknowledge in effect that a planned economy is needed (cf. 
Juhler-Kristoffersen ). This is in accordance with the Green Paper, which 
the European Commission developed to outline several different areas of 
possible future action so that the challenges ahead can be addressed, among 
other areas sustainable development as a strategy combining climate change 
and energy policies:
How can a common European energy strategy best address climate change, 
balancing the objectives of environmental protection, competitiveness and 
security of supply? What further action is required at Community level to 
achieve existing targets? Are further targets appropriate? How should we 
provide a longer term secure and predictable investment framework for the 
further development of clean and renewable energy sources in the EU? 
(Commission of the European Communities , 5)
What is complexity anyway? 
Macdonald et al. (5), realizing that the human factor removes the ability 
to model predictions – like van Vuuren et al. () a few years later – give 
a hint of what complexity means for the empirical analysis of environmental 
impacts exacerbated by global and climate change when they write about the 
interaction of physical and biological, but also social, systems in the Arctic. 
Concentrating on the pathways of contaminants, Macdonald et al. realise the 
high degree of complexity of the factors involved when attempting to model 
such integrated systemic regimes. The complexity of modelling the pathway of 
contaminants is true for both the biological systems affected by contaminants 
and the human emitters of contaminants.
  Arguably, political agencies – but also many scientists, as demonstrated 
here and previously in the introduction – have a peculiar understanding of 
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complexity. It appears that complexity is taken for complicatedness. But how 
can those concepts be distinguished? Generally, governance has a strictly linear 
outlook. Governance exists at many different levels: governmental as well as 
personal, familial and corporate as well as regional and intergovernmental 
(Sovacool ). While it has the afore-mentioned orientation towards the 
future, independent of who is governing, governance assumes that different 
factors can be aligned so as to control a particularly desired outcome. 
Governance thus attempts to establish hierarchical structures or systems of 
control. Goldammer and Kaehr () show the problematics of using concepts 
like linearity and complexity without establishing an explanatory framework 
first: problems which occur likewise when applying the rationality of politics to 
scientific research. Goldammer and Kaehr begin by introducing the concepts 
of complicatedness and hierarchy and contrast them with their equivalents, 
complexity and heterarchy.
  The concept of the complex system refers to the degree of complexity of its 
description. Complex systems consist of hierarchically and heterarchically – i.e., 
superordinated and coordinated – organised structures. A hierarchy is described 
using a single-value logic, which in the case of governance, which has a linear 
outlook, translates as: ‘Government wants to control, therefore government can’. 
Heterarchy, in contrast, implies a multitude of logics. In the case of governance, 
this translates as: ‘Government wants to control. However, there are also other 
rationalities besides the political’. Thus, complexity describes the measure of 
the number of logics placed in a certain setting (cf. Goldammer & Kaehr ). 
This corresponds to Casti’s thesis:
How many inequivalent descriptions of N can our observer generate? The 
complexity of a system N as seen by an observer is directly proportional to 
the number of such descriptions. (Casti cited in Dijkum , ) 
Complicated systems should be seen as complementary to complex systems. 
Complicatedness refers to the parameter structure to describe a system. A 
machine may be very complicated in this respect, but the machine is not complex; 
it is engineered, after all. A description of amoebae in the Arctic, themselves 
uni-cellular systems of relatively low complicatedness that continuously change 
shape, is, on the other hand, of comparatively high complexity (cf. Beyens & 
Chardez 5; Goldammer & Kaehr ).
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  This insight into complexity arguably affects the scientific understanding 
of climate change and its impact in the Arctic and beyond. The insight leads 
to diversity in understanding, assumptions and expectations ranging from, for 
example, the positions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) (e.g., Anisimov et al. ; Solomon et al. ; Smit et al. ) and the 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 5) to 
assessments such as that of Gerlich (). Following are a number of statements 
comprising observations and proposed actions which are particularly relevant 
for a better understanding of the complexity of climate change:
In order to limit the forthcoming rise of global temperatures at the 
agreed target of maximum of  degrees above pre-industrial levels, global 
greenhouse gas emissions should peak no later than 5, and then be 
reduced by at least 5%, but perhaps as much as 5% compared to  
levels. Act now, in particular on energy efficiency and renewable energy. 
(Commission of the European Communities ) 
At the heart of the problem is the production and use of fossil fuel – 
particularly the emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of coal, 
oil and gas. There are laws in place now that can address this; encourage 
the enforcement of the law to combat climate change. (Climate Justice 
Programme ) 
Climate change impacts on everyday life by changing expectations. 
Indigenous peoples request empowerment to cope with changes. (Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment 5)
There is no global radiation budget. Local temperatures determine heat 
radiation, not vice versa. The application of physical principles will correct 
incorrect assumptions. (Gerlich )
Thus, we can observe diversity, which leads to the formation of complexity. 
This complexity in climate change is also mirrored in recent reflections even on 
the validity of climate change and its impact. Those who doubt the seriousness 
of climate change are called sceptics. The sceptical group has increased in size 
sufficiently to generate serious resistance to plans to implement mitigation and 
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adaptation measures. Hence, there is even a growing body of scientific and 
popular literature that is sceptical about climate change. This body reflects how 
climate change research is observed, by scientists and laypeople alike. Examples 
include Rahmstorf (4), who divides sceptics into three different groups, 
namely trend sceptics (arguments against the warming trend), attribution sceptics 
(arguments against the human contribution to climate change), and impact 
sceptics (arguments against the negative impact of climate change). Poortinga 
et al. () found in a corresponding study that climate change scepticism is 
currently not very widespread. Although uncertainty and scepticism about the 
potential impact of climate change are rather common, trend and attribution 
scepticism are far less widespread. Their conclusions seem, in any case, somewhat 
cliché-like, stating, for example, that climate scepticism appears to be especially 
common among older individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds 
who are politically conservative and who have traditional values. On the 
other hand, climate scepticism is far less common among younger individuals 
from higher socio-economic backgrounds who have self-transcendental and 
environmental values.
arguing for a logical reality
How can we now conceptualise our newly gained understanding of complexity 
and its implications? In the introduction I made it clear that the paper is 
founded on a logical scientific approach which is in contrast to purely empirical 
research and particularly critical analysis. The logical approach implies that the 
concept of complexity, as a consequence of many different descriptions of the 
phenomenon of climate change and its impact, should be incorporated into 
any governance considerations. This offsets classical logic and revolutionises 
governance and requires some explorations in theory.
  Generally, discussions of the topic of political control and governance 
eventually lead to the emergence of the reality/normativity dichotomy. Thus, 
some scholars maintain that the purpose of scientific research should be 
founded on the moral position that favours the improvement of society and 
its living conditions, creating a normative outlook. On the other hand, other 
scholars support the function of science as providing a descriptive reality based 
on logical argumentation, culminating in the reality approach in science.
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  It is, of course, in the nature of politics to have a normative outlook. After 
all, it aims at making changes within the existing social configuration. This 
aim is associated with a kind of wishful thinking about steering development 
in society, and society is often connected with the image of a ‘better’ future, a 
futurist utopia.
  However, theorising about climate change and its ecological and social 
consequences means theorising about reality. Theorising about reality, thus, 
has to do with what is actually happening, not what ought to be done. With 
respect to the governance of society for the purpose of dealing with the 
aforementioned consequences, the future has not happened yet. It actually 
never happens: since resource management always takes place in real time, it is 
always occurring in the present.
  The reality approach essentially questions the very basis of policy making, 
its effectiveness. Given that governance takes place in the present only, it is 
actually not possible to know how the future is going to look. Thus, in terms 
of predicting outcomes, which is the nature of policy making, governance is 
largely a process of trial-and-error. This fits the following quotation:
Politics [as a system] is only possible because nobody knows what the future 
holds. Hence, politics contains and enables exchangeable programmes. The 
programmes are as diverse as their possible (indeterminable) consequences. 
(Bolz 4, ) 
The studies undertaken by Juhler-Kristoffersen (), Koivurova () and 
Sreejith () on the political role of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in 
combating climate change, the initiatives in the international sphere to assist the 
Inuit in their effort to mitigate the impact of climate change, and the Nordic 
industry confederations’ admission of particularly European politics in taking 
the lead on climate change governance, show that the ideas in the quotation 
above have not yet entered our consciousness.
  More scientifically, reality can be understood through an analysis based on 
system theory. System theory is frequently misunderstood due to misconceptions 
about its apparent radical constructivism. System theory is the outcome of our 
awareness that logic matters in science (and science can stand here for the way 
we derive information). There is a tradition, however, of analysing reality as if 
it were a ‘dead’ object or a set of dead objects. The general goal in mainstream 
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research is not to understand reality as a living reality, but the analysis commonly 
assumes that life takes place outside the scientific observation.
  As soon as humans or any other form of life are involved in the analysis 
and description, we are no longer dealing with dead objects. And here it does 
not matter whether the “observing organism is part, partner, [and] ... participant in 
its world of observation” (Foerster, cited in Goldammer and Kaehr , ). Thus, 
reality is always a process for which the conventional ways, the single-value 
logic, of observation and measuring seem ill-suited. Consequently, a theory of 
reality must be concerned with life and the consequences for logical analysis. 
The explorations of O’Brien and Leichenko (), Macdonald et al. (5), 
Anisimov et al. () and van Vuuren et al. () on climate change and its 
impacts in the North have shown this.
  Life is considered to be a cognitive process; thus living systems are cognitive 
systems. Cognition refers to the ability to draw a distinction between oneself and 
one’s environment. It is a process of self-referentiality, a form of consciousness 
where, with the capacity to make a decision, choices can be made based on 
self-generated alternatives. These alternatives use a system’s internal image of 
the system itself and the system’s environment. This is a significant statement, 
implying that a living, cognitive system makes its own choices and does not 
act upon decisions made in its environment. The system is, thus, autonomous.
  Organisational autonomy also implies a process of self-organisation. This 
refers to the system’s self-regulation, involving the reproduction of the systems 
through the system’s elements. Through willful decisions the system structures 
its environment in so far as it determines what is relevant to the system and what 
is not. As a consequence, the system produces the very context within which the 
system observes. Moreover, if we assume that all such cognitive systems possess 
their own context within which meaning is generated, we will correspondingly 
get a reality that contains a multiplicity of values, logics and knowledges. The 
presence of autonomous cognitive systems leads to the above-mentioned 
complexity, the amalgamation of hierarchical and heterarchical orders.
  Given now the parallel existence of many cognitive systems in reality, a 
simple subject-object relationship where the object is generalised as being 
independent of the subject is not sufficient. This single-value, monocontextural 
logic is not applicable at all. Monocontexturality implies that there is only one 
context of observation that is applicable to reality, one context that would 
provide an objective view of what is true and what is false. Incidentally, the 
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classical perspective of the so-called hard sciences, the natural sciences, is one 
where object and subject can be separated, conveying the idea that all things 
in nature constitute an objective truth. It is also the perspective of the critical 
approach, involving much of classical political rationality, where, through 
careful study, any phenomenon or process can potentially be controlled. In 
reality, however, this viewpoint does not hold up. It is logically incorrect.
  Consequently, reality can then only be understood by what would be called 
a network of parallel-organised multi-value calculi (sets of rules), involving 
the interaction of many contexts with many logics. This represents wholeness 
(holism), which, in contrast to a reductionist (as by applying an unrealistic 
single-value logic) world view, is needed to describe reality. Philosopher and 
logician Gotthard Günther called the theory that is founded on a multi-
value reality “polycontexturality theory”; it was developed between the 5s 
and s. The focus of analysis turns from the independent object to the 
relation between subject and object, or, in other words, the relation between 
the observer and the observed. Thus, polycontexturality theory as a theory of 
reality describes how the world is conceived as a whole (cf. Günther 5).
the climate regime
How are the explorations in climate governance in the North, complexity and 
scientific theory related to each other? What general conclusions can we make 
concerning climate change on the basis of these insights? The answers lie in a 
formulation which we may call the climate regime.
  As part of this regime the climate is considered as a physical system 
whose boundaries are defined by a (human) observer. This makes the climate 
an anthropogenic object; the climate is not natural if this implies a possible 
existence outside of human existence.
  Physical systems like the climate as an object of analysis are open systems 
and engage in energy exchange. Also, physical systems change, for otherwise 
they could not be observed. Thus, change and observation enter into mutual 
dependency, leading to the emergence of the described climate regime. 
Incidentally, this means that anthropogenic climate change is normal. Moreover, 
only living systems transform energy; they do so through their own capacity 
(cf. Heylighen ). Unless the climate was itself a living system, it could 
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not produce physical change on its own. A purely physical system is always 
observer-made.
  There are potentially countless observations of the climate system, not just 
one. Thus, different conclusions about the climate are possible, which might 
appear contradictory, but might equally be complementary in a description of 
climate. Furthermore, the projected climate regime does not exist in isolation. 
The climate regime likewise exchanges energy with other systems. Here, it is 
useful to look at Luhmann’s (4) description of functional social systems to 
understand in what ways the climate regime might interact with other parts of 
society, say, economy, politics, other areas of science, law, etc. It must be kept in 
mind that while there is an energy exchange, there is no information exchange; 
communication in society always refers to the continuation of the internal 
process of social systems. Hence, responses to the observation of the climate 
system are varied.
  Viewpoints which are not compatible can nevertheless be true in their 
own right: that is to say, based on their respective frame of reference, their 
own peculiar logic. What is interesting here, however, is the consequence for 
the understanding of climate, climate change and its potential impact when 
considering the diversity of descriptions of the climate system. The climate 
regime which results from the observation of the climate can be understood 
as a structural coupling of different logics, that is to say, structural couplings of 
the social systems of science, politics, the economy and others. These systems 
advance in their own peculiar ways at the emergence of the climate regime.
  In accordance with systemic and evolutionary principles the climate regime 
evolves likewise, exhibiting progress towards higher complexity in accordance 
with Casti’s assertion (Dijkum , ) that the complexity of a system as 
seen by an observer is directly proportional to the number of such descriptions. 
The growth of complexity makes it less possible to predict how the climate 
regime is going to evolve, that is to say, how the meaning for society will change. 
Thus, deciding on climate change as a phenomenon which is characterised, for 
instance, as global warming or global cooling becomes a speculative endeavour.
Consequences of integration
Realising that from the perspective of governance mechanisms to combat climate 
change integration is never sufficient raises the question of the consequence of 
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further and increasing integration. The logical approach in science implies reliance 
on the concept of the complex system. From this perspective it is interesting to 
understand the consequences of the existing and increasing integration in society 
in terms of possible feedback affecting the afore-mentioned couplings of social 
and physical systems such as the climate regime.
  Analysing the consequence of the increasing integration in society can 
be done by referring to the phenomenon of acceleration, which reflects the 
continuous progress in society during its further historical development (Walter 
). Acceleration – achieving more in less time – has led to an increasing 
utilisation of energy. Political agencies are well aware of this, as the following 
quotation from the Commission of the European Communities shows:
Global demand for energy is increasing. World energy demand – and  
emissions – is expected to rise by some % by . Global oil consumption 
has increased by % since 4, and global oil demand is projected to grow 
by .% per year. (Commission of the European Communities , ) 
Not surprisingly, but in line with the rationale of governance for climate change, 
further enhancement of this situation is underway. Thus, accelerating measures 
are widely proposed. For example, the Development of an Action Plan on Climate 
Change in the Barents Region, which was published by the International Barents 
Secretariat, and which has been developed as a follow-up to the declaration of 
the th Meeting of the Ministers of Environment of the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council in Tromsø, Norway, in , suggests “expedient implementation of 
energy efficiency measures, incl. accelerated development of alternative sources 
of energy and cleaner production strategies” (Lindgren , ).
  This is consistent with other policies for combating climate change, including 
the energy policy. Thus, the Commission of the European Communities is eager to 
propose to make “more from less: leading on energy efficiency”. As a consequence, 
it is promised that “an effective energy efficiency policy does not mean sacrificing 
comfort or convenience. Nor does it mean reducing competitiveness. In fact an 
effective policy in this area means the opposite; making cost-effective investments 
in order to reduce the waste of energy, thereby increasing standards of living 
and saving money, and using price signals, that would lead to more responsible, 
economical and rational use of energy. Market-based instruments, including the 
Community energy tax framework, can be a very efficient tool in this respect” 
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(Commission of the European Communities , ). These policies imply that 
an acceleration of energy use can be mitigated by an increase in energy efficiency. 
Once more, it is a good example of why the discourse on climate change, its 
causes and impacts exhibits a high degree of complexity.
  Furthermore, the explorations in the section on the climate regime suggest 
that the regime can be understood as a structural coupling of observer and 
observed or social and physical systems. Thus, the evolving regime is a model 
of social-physical change. This means that any consequence of climate change, 
its impact on a variety of physical systems, is a correspondent to social change. 
This must be perceived in the sense that global climate change, as well as local 
and regional impacts, are not independent of social change. In the following 
quotations, a number of examples from the Arctic indicate accelerating changes 
as corresponding events of accelerating measures in society:
The loss of glacial mass through melting is very likely to accelerate 
throughout the Arctic, with the Greenland Ice Sheet also starting to melt. 
These changes will tend to increase the rate of sea-level rise. (Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment 5, ; emphasis added here and in the following 
quotations) 
Ongoing or accelerated coastal-erosion trends are likely to lead to further 
relocations of coastal communities in the Arctic. (Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment 5, ) 
Increased freshwater input into the coastal zone is likely to accelerate the 
degradation of coastal permafrost. (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
5, ) 
Finally, the following quotations present some examples of ‘feedback’ effects on 
Northern cultural aspects:
Hunter mobility and safety and the ability to move with changing 
distribution of resources, particularly on sea ice, are likely to decrease, 
leading to less hunting success. Similarly, access to caribou by hunters 
following changed snow and river-ice conditions is likely to become more 
difficult. Harvesting the threatened remaining populations of some marine 
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mammals could accelerate their demise. (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
5, )
Changes in diet, nutritional health, and exposure to air-, water-, and food-
borne contaminants are also likely. Adjustments in the balance between the 
‘two economies’ of rural areas (traditional and wage) will be accelerated by 
climate change. This suite of changes will be complex and largely indirect 
because of the mediating influences of market trends, the regulatory 
environment, and the pace and direction of rural development. (Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment 5, ) 
Thus, as a final point, it has become clear that governance efforts to combat 
climate change follow the rationale of all governance efforts and reflect the 
recurring process of responding to increasing complexity. This conforms to the 
ideas of Heylighen (), who confirms the accelerating effect of sustaining 
governance structures over time.
  The consequences of this phenomenon for the North have additionally been 
illuminated by Walter ( and ), in which the impacts of acceleration are 
emphasised, including, for example, the need for shorter innovation cycles in 
the Nordic and Northwest Russian forestry industry and continuing efficient 
investments to create a structure for sustainable development.
Conclusion
Contemporary climate and energy policies, which are currently having a 
significant impact on socio-economic development in the North, exhibit 
a strong hierarchical set up in the sense that such policies are based on a 
monocontextural outlook. As such, these policies are founded on a reductionist 
viewpoint, which does not correspond to the real world.
  The logical approach which has been presented in this paper, in turn, leads to 
the understanding that there are, in fact, a potentially large number of observers 
and systems involved, which makes the described climate regime a reality. 
Consequently, not just one viewpoint is true, but always the complementary 
picture as well, which incorporates all viewpoints on the subject matter. This 
conflicts with political wishes.
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  The outcome of this process is great complexity. Complexity in climate 
change means that we lack knowledge of the individual futures of each of 
the observers/systems involved in the regime. After all, people have personal 
preferences which change continuously. This is also reflected in the lack of 
predictability of the future of any social system. Thus, in terms of predicting and 
establishing goals, governance is largely a process of trial-and-error. However, 
changes leave room for surprise and interpretation, which is indispensable for 
the indeterminacy and contingency of the future.
  The persistence of governance in pressing forcefully for an increase in 
energy efficiency and the introduction of new alternative energy technologies 
may lead to rather indeterminable effects. From the examples provided in the 
paper, it seems that governance efforts do not mitigate the acceleration of 
energy use in order to curb emissions that lead to climate change. Rather, the 
efforts may, in fact, only redistribute the burden and the risk of climate change 
impact in the North.
  The structural coupling of social and physical systems leads to mutually 
dependent social and physical changes. This coupling connects efforts to combat 
climate change in the North, together with socio-economic development, to 
actual physical consequences. The coupling itself is evolving in a complex 
fashion and, therefore, is not predictable using a simple linear outlook. The 
coupling remains a subject that has not been studied sufficiently and is not well 
understood, especially from the rationale of climate politics.
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sustainaBLe deveLopMent and 
LoCaL seLf-governMent in the russian
part of the Barents region
introduction
The Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) is a geopolitical area established by a 
Norwegian initiative in  to promote international regional cooperation. It 
was necessitated mainly by changes in the international political and economic 
situation in Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, accompanied 
by profound transformational processes and a crisis in the Russian Federation 
and other countries of the former USSR. The need for a new platform for 
international regional cooperation in Northern Europe to overcome the tension 
in relationships of the Cold War period, maintain political stability, and create 
preconditions for the sustainable development of the region had appeared. The 
Declaration on Cooperation in the BEAR (Kirkenes, January th, ), which 
was signed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Finland, Russia and 
Sweden, as well as by representatives of Denmark, Iceland and the European 
Commission, was the official document calling for the establishment of the 
organization. In the Kirkenes Declaration () the objective of Barents-Euro 
Arctic Cooperation (BEAC) work was formulated as follows: 
…to promote sustainable development in the Region,bearing in mind 
the principles and recommendations set out in the Rio Declaration and 
Agenda  of UNCED. 
The same document also expressed “support for the ongoing process of reform 
in Russia which aims, inter alia, at strengthening democracy, market reforms, 
and local institutions, and which is therefore important for closer regional 
co-operation.”
  Thus, sustainable development issues, the successful implementation of 
reforms in Russia, and the strengthening of local institutions can be considered 
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among the priorities of Barents cooperation. In this connection, it is interesting 
to consider how, during the nineteen years since the foundation of the Barents 
Region, the process of reform in Russia has progressed in the direction of the 
formation of the institution of local self-government, which plays (or must 
play) a significant role in sustainable development. Such a role was underlined 
in Agenda  (). Namely, chapter  of the Agenda, in connection with the 
role of the local level and local authorities, notes: 
As the level of governance closest to the people, they [local authorities] 
play a vital role in educating, mobilizing and responding to the public to 
promote sustainable development. 
In order to realize the principles of sustainable development it was recommended 
that all local authorities enter into a dialogue with citizens, local organizations 
and private enterprises in order to achieve consensus in the adoption of “a local 
Agenda ”, as a strategy of sustainable development in their settlements. 
  The observance of the principles of sustainable development in the Russian 
part of the BEAR is important because of its prevalence in both area and 
population in the Barents Region. Of the Region’s total area of . million sq. 
km. and population of approximately 5.5 million people, two-thirds of both the 
area and the population are located within the Russian Federation (Soppela 
et al. , ). The Russian part of the BEAR includes such administrative 
territories (subjects or constituent entities of the Russian Federation) as 
Murmansk Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast, the Republic of Karelia, the Republic 
of Komi, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (AO). The latter is part of 
Arkhangelsk Oblast, but simultaneously it possesses the status of a subject of 
the Russian Federation.
formation of the institution of 
local self-government in russia
The institution of local self-government is one of the most significant 
foundations of any democratic regime. As a primary element of democracy, 
local self-government protects the citizens’ interests, which are determined by 
their living jointly on a certain territory. The European Charter on Local Self-
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Government, which was ratified by the Russian Federation in , defines the 
concept of local self-government as follows:
Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, 
within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of 
public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local 
population. (European Charter 5, Article )
The essence of local self-government determines such inalienable principles as 
local democracy and local autonomy. The observance of these principles creates 
favorable conditions for the formation of the local civil community, giving the 
inhabitants a sense of belonging to their place of residence, an awareness of 
their rights, and the ability to influence the course of life in the community and 
assume responsibility for it. Such conditions allow for a better use of untapped 
local resources and contribute to the achievement of sustainable development.
  To what extent does the newly formed institution of local self-government 
fulfill the above-mentioned role in Russian regions as a whole and those that 
are part of the BEAR in particular? Historically, the institution of local self-
government in Russia is a relatively new phenomenon with no long-standing 
traditions. The pre-revolutionary experience of local self-government, which 
began following the abolition of serfdom in , was interrupted by the 
period of soviet power, when the local administrations, together with formally 
elected representative bodies - local soviets (councils) of people’s deputies - 
were state authorities and there was a rigid subordination of local councils to 
higher state bodies. The stereotype formed during this period of state power as a 
“monocentric” system with hierarchical co-subordination of all levels, down to 
the local, has remained to the present day not only among some members of the 
population, but also among some heads of the local authorities (Report ).
  The first attempts to legitimize local self-government as an independent 
institution of democracy were undertaken in the final years of the USSR. But 
only the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted in , created 
guarantees and basic principles of local self-government. In chapter , article 
 of the Constitution (“Fundamentals of the Constitutional System”), the 
independence of local self-government within the limits of its authority is 
guaranteed. It is also stated that “the bodies of local self-government shall not 
be part of the system of bodies of state authority” (Constitution ). Along 
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with the basic provisions, there are some other legal foundations of local self-
government in chapter  of the Constitution. In particular, article  states that 
“Local self-government in the Russian Federation shall ensure the independent 
solution by the population of the issues of local importance” (ibid).
  The provisions of the Russian Constitution on local self-government incline 
to the ideology of the so-called “Anglo-Saxon” model, which is characterized 
by a maximum level of autonomy of the local self-government. This initial 
phase of transformation in the municipal sphere is often called “the municipal 
revolution”. However, concrete legal forms of local self-government were not 
set forth in the Constitution; they were to be established later.
  The launch of local self-government in Russia took place in the midst of the 
profound crisis associated with the transition to a market economy and socio-
political transformations. The first law regulating the organization of local self-
government - Federal Law No. 54-FZ “On general principles of organization 
of local self-government in the Russian Federation” (adopted in 5) - provided 
broad powers to regions in choosing the forms of local self-government. It 
caused not only a great diversity of the institution in different regions but even 
an absence of local self-government in a large part of the country. Nevertheless, 
in those regions where bodies of local self-government were created, as a rule, the 
most democratic way of electing heads of local administration – direct universal 
suffrage – was used. This order, along with other requirements of the law on 
municipal autonomy, formed the conditions for the creation of independent 
structures of local authorities. However, this independence often generated 
confrontation with new regional elites, which sought power and property, 
including expansion to the municipal level. As a result, such factors as () the 
broad powers of regional authorities to regulate local issues, which were provided 
by Federal Law No. 54-FZ, and () the lack of federal protection of local self-
government, allowed significant restrictions on – and even, in some cases, the 
elimination of – the municipal authorities by the end of the s, replacing 
them by territorial structures of regional administrations (Gel’man et al. ; 
Puzanov and Ragozina ; Report ). 
  Taking into account the above-mentioned problems concerning the 
implementation of constitutional guarantees of local self-government, as 
well as the urgent necessity of legally establishing the new order of power 
distribution between federal, regional and municipal authorities, in , after 
major work carried out by a specially established State commission and wide-
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ranging discussions, a new Federal Law No. -FZ “On general principles of 
organization of local self-government in the Russian Federation” was adopted, 
marking the beginning of the current stage of municipal reform in Russia. The 
law foresaw a transitional period for its implementation up to the beginning of 
; the transitional period was later prolonged to .
  The new law, in contrast to the previous one, established unified regulation 
of forms of local self-government, substantially limiting the rights of regional 
authorities. In particular, the following new important provisions were added: 
-	 the introduction of three types of municipalities - the rural or urban 
commune (poselenie), the municipal district (munitsipalnyi raion), and the 
urban district (gorodskoi okrug) - and a clear distinction in powers between 
the three types of local authority. Municipal districts and communes are 
two-level municipalities, whereas the urban district is a one-level type;
-	 new territorial structures and clear requirements for setting the boundaries 
of municipalities: the entire territory of Russia must be divided into 
municipalities; settlements with a population of more than  people 
should have the status of a municipality (rural commune, etc.);
-	 the determination of “issues of local significance”, specified for each type 
of municipality16, in which the principle of freedom from supervision is 
applied; these issues are distinct from delegated functions, which may be 
financed and supervised by the central bodies delegating them. 
Among the above-mentioned types of municipalities, urban districts possess the 
broadest range of power and resources because they combine the functions and 
sources of revenue shared by municipal communes and districts. Data on the 
distribution of different types of municipalities in the regions of the Russian 
part of the BEAR, along with some other characteristics of the territories, are 
presented in Table ..
16    “Issues of local significance” are issues that are connected with the everyday needs of the 
local population and financed, as a rule, from the local budget. The number of “issues of local 
significance” increased from about 20 for various types of municipalities according to the initial 
version of the law, which was adopted in 2003, to about 40 in the current version, following the 
introduction of a large number of amendments.
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table 6.1 Populations and types of municipalities by region in the Russian part of the BEAR
Source: Rosstat (2010).
As can be seen from the data, the regions of the Russian part of the BEAR 
have a higher level of urbanization, especially Murmansk Oblast, than the 
average in Russia. Despite the fact that most of the population is concentrated 
in urban settlements, the dominant type of municipalities by number is the 
rural commune. In the regions of the Russian part of the BEAR, almost all 
rural communes were established following the adoption of Federal Law No. 
-FZ, and their bodies of local self-government were formed by early . 
It is mainly due to the newly established rural communes that the total number 
of municipalities has increased since  in Arkhangelsk Oblast by a factor 
of ., . in the Komi Republic, . in the Republic of Karelia, and .5 in 
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Murmansk Oblast. However, the acquisition by rural settlements of the new 
status of municipalities and the formation of local self-government bodies has 
not improved their socio-economic situation. The majority of rural communes 
in the Russian part of the BEAR are in a difficult, often crisis, situation, far 
from conditions of sustainable development. Since the beginning of market 
reforms, due to the severe downturn in agricultural production as well as in 
the forestry and timber industries, which provided the economic basis of most 
villages’ existence in the Russian part of the BEAR, their decline, which began 
in the Soviet period, has accelerated. For example, in the beginning of  in 
Arkhangelsk Oblast, 5 rural settlements out of a total number of ,5 did 
not have a permanent population. Since  the number of villages which 
have lost their resident population has almost doubled. Approximately % of 
the total number of rural settlements in Arkhangelsk Oblast had a population 
of fewer than 5 people, and only in 5 villages did the population exceed 
 people (Konstantinov ). Accordingly, the majority of the  rural 
municipalities that currently exist in the region are formed by the territorial 
principle (comprising a group of small villages) and do not have a proper 
economic base for self-governance.
  The sharp rise in the number of municipalities through the formation 
of a large number of rural communes has led to contradictory results. On 
the one hand, the creation of the primary level of local self-governance and 
closer interaction of the government with the population can, in principle, be 
regarded as a positive result of the adoption of the new Federal Law No. -
FZ. For the populations of rural settlements a new tool has been created which 
has the potential to express and protect their socio-economic interests. On the 
other hand, an acute shortage of resources (human, financial, material) to carry 
out their functions and powers, in fact, discredits the role of the majority of 
rural communes and their local authorities. 
  Similarly, there is a more general contradiction regarding the new stage of 
municipal reform associated with the introduction of Federal Law No. -
FZ. It concerns the declared and actual implementation of the principles of 
local autonomy and local democracy. On the one hand, the concept of the law 
declares the autonomization of local governments from state authorities. On 
the other hand, the policy of centralization (recentralization) of state power, 
which has simultaneously been implemented in the country, includes, to a large 
extent, the local level as well. The latter circumstance has given grounds for 
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some experts to consider this stage of reform a “municipal counter-revolution” 
(see Kynev ; Puzanov and Ragozina ; Gel’man and Lankina ). The 
reason for centralization was explained as a desire to raise the efficiency of state 
governance. The principal means of achieving the goal was the construction of 
two hierarchies: () the administrative “power vertical”, according to the logic 
of which direct elections of the governors of the regions were abolished in 
4, and () the party system, with the dominance of the “party of power”, 
United Russia (Gel’man ). The policy of power centralization has also been 
apparent in attempts to embed local governments in the chain of command. 
For example, in April  many branches of the United Russia party initiated 
a bill which would allow a unilateral transfer of certain local government 
powers to regional administrations, but the bill was postponed. In October 
, following the defeat of a United Russia candidate in a mayoral election 
in a large Russian city (Samara, a regional capital), the party proposed a new bill 
that would lead to the abolition of local self-government as such in the regional 
capitals. It was suggested that the authorities of these cities could acquire the 
status of state bodies, whereas local self-governments could be formed at the 
intra-urban level, following the model of Moscow and St. Petersburg. 
  Although many of the most radical attempts to limit the power of local 
self-government have not been legalized, from the adoption of Law No.-FZ 
in  to the end of , more than  amendments to the law’s original 
edition were introduced.17 Such a large amount of amendments is a reflection 
of the enormous difficulties (institutional, legal, economic, personnel-related) 
hindering the implementation of the law. On the one hand, amendments to a 
law regulating such a complex area as the formation of local self-government 
in Russia were inevitable. On the other hand, the amendments introduced 
were often chaotic, intended largely to ensure control of regional and federal 
authorities over the municipalities, which were the weakest link in the hierarchy 
of the executive “power vertical” (Gel’man ,; Report ).
  The greatest complaints from representatives of local self-government 
bodies and criticism from experts who have studied the problems of local 
self-government address the growing lack of financial resources necessary to 
carry out the legally determined functions and powers of local authorities. The 
tendency to expand the list of “issues of local significance”, which led to the 
17  These amendments were contained in 43 laws on amendments and changes to Federal 
Law No. 131-FZ.
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growth of expenditure commitments by local governments, was not supported 
by sufficient sources of revenue for the local budgets. In fact, there has been an 
opposite process of concentrating financial flows in favor of the federal budget, 
accompanied by declining revenues for municipal budgets. Table . presents 
data on the distribution of primary revenues at different levels of the budget 
system of the Russian Federation (excluding transfers to other budgets), as well 
as the proportions of expenditure of the budgets, illustrating that it is local 
budgets that experienced the brunt of the increase in the negative imbalance 
during the s.
table 6.2 Shares of revenues and expenses by different levels of budgets in the Russian budget 
system (before financial transfers to other budgets), %
Source: Valentey and Khabrieva 2008, 51.
A sharp drop in the share of revenues for local budgets in  occurred after 
changes in tax and budget legislation. The number of local taxes was reduced 
from five to two.18 Several statutory transfers and fees paid to local budgets 
from federal and regional taxes were abolished or reduced. For example, fees 
for local budget revenues from taxes on corporate profits (a federal tax) and 
from property tax (a regional tax) were abolished, and statutory transfers from 
18   Tax on land and tax on personal property were defined as local taxes.
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personal income tax were reduced from 5% to %. As a result, the need 
for financial aid to local budgets has increased. This means that the ability of 
municipalities to fulfill their functions depends mainly on financial transfers 
from the regional budgets, rather than the efforts of local authorities to expand 
the economic potential of the territory, which determines the tax base. Thus, 
the share of local taxes in local budget revenues, which performs not only a 
fiscal but also a regulatory function, was reduced to the insignificant level of 
.5% (Valentey and Khabrieva , 5-5).
  A high degree of dependence on external financial assistance is typical of 
rural communes. In  the share of budgetary transfers in the structure of 
their budget revenues varied from 5% to almost % in 5% of the rural 
communes in the country. Urban districts are relatively better provided with 
their own sources of funding. However, in most of the urban districts the share 
of financial assistance from the regional budget is comparable to or greater than 
the share of tax and non-tax revenues of local budgets. 
  A similar or even worse situation of local budgets being dependent on 
financial aid from regional governments exists in the regions of the Russian 
part of the BEAR. For example, in Murmansk Oblast in  the share of 
intergovernmental transfers in the revenue structure of the budget of all 
fourteen urban districts exceeded 5%, and in seven of them the share was more 
than %.19 It should be noted that, in accordance with the amendments to the 
Budget Code of the Russian Federation adopted in , the conditions for 
granting financial assistance to local budgets were tightened. Certain restrictions 
on the use of funds were set for municipalities in which the share of transfers 
in the revenues structure ranged from  to %, and in cases where the share 
exceeded % a maximum list of restrictions and control measures was imposed 
by the regional financial bodies. 
  It is obvious that with local authorities highly dependent on financial 
assistance, as one of the consequences of the reduction of local autonomy, it is 
impossible to stimulate initiatives of local communities that would form and 
implement their own socio-economic policies. Given the above-mentioned 
problems and other difficulties faced by local self-government in Russia, the 
priorities of the majority of municipalities, especially small peripheral ones, are 
mainly related to solving urgent problems concerning the current livelihood and 
19  Data from the Ministry of Finance of the Murmansk region: http://budget.gov-murman.
ru/2010/mbud.shtml .
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even survival of their settlements. Accordingly, special strategies for sustainable 
development based on the principles of Local Agenda  are very rare in Russian 
municipalities, including those of the BEAR. One reason for this is that, as the 
analysis by Riabova () shows, the policy of the government of the Russian 
Federation was not designed to work out and promote special strategies for 
sustainable development. The only direct response of Russia to the appeal of the 
Rio Conference and «Agenda » for governments to develop national strategies 
for sustainable development was the adoption of the “Concept of Transition of 
the Russian Federation to sustainable development”, approved by presidential 
decree in April . A subsequently developed draft containing a national 
strategy for sustainable development was not, in fact, adopted. This situation 
did not favor the dissemination and implementation of the ideas of sustainable 
development in the country, including appropriate strategic plans at the regional 
and municipal levels. Rare examples of the working out and adoption of such 
documents in Russia are related to the implementation of development projects 
supported by international organizations and foundations.20
some indicators of sustainable development 
in the russian part of the Bear
Despite the lack of special strategies for sustainable development, at present 
virtually all subjects of the Russian Federation have long-term strategies for 
socio-economic development, which, to varying degrees, implement the 
principles and objectives of sustainable development. Regional strategies 
provide a basis for strategic and/or medium-term development plans and 
programs of municipalities that most urban districts and municipal districts 
currently have and are realizing.
  A general understanding of the intermediate results of the implementation 
of strategies and plans by joint efforts of regional and municipal bodies in the 
Russian part of the BEAR can be obtained by considering the dynamics Table 
of some indicators of socio-economic development which are often used as 
20  For example, projects under the UN Development Programme “Foundation for 
Sustainable Development “, implemented in 2006-2009, to promote the development of 
municipalities in the territory of the Russian Federation with financial support from the U.S. 
Agency for International Development and others. 
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indicators of sustainable development. Table . presents data on the Human 
Development Index (HDI). Such data are published in the National Human 
Development Reports for the Russian Federation, which are regularly 
produced by an independent team of experts sponsored by the United Nations 
Population Fund. In the  NHDR was devoted to the theme “Millennium 
Development Goals in Russia: Looking into the Future” (NHDR ), 
and HDI values were calculated taking into account the available statistical 
information for . 
  The UN methodology of calculating the HDI consists of the following 
components:
- income, measured by gross domestic product (GDP) or gross regional 
product (GRP) per capita;
-  an education index, measured by special methods;
-  life expectancy, measured at birth.
In Table . along with indicators of the HDI, the data on life expectancy 
in the regions of the Russian part of the BEAR are given. The latter figures, 
table 6.3 Indicators of human development in the regions of the Russian part of the BEAR 
Source: NHDR (2005); NHDR (2010).
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although taken into account in the HDI, have great independent significance as 
an indicator of the quality of life and sustainable development.
  The data in the table show that all regions of the Russian part of the BEAR 
improved their HDI during the period from  to  both by absolute 
value and by position in the national rankings among the  regions of Russia 
that were included in the study. However, the index values are below the 
Russian average, and in two regions the values are below the level which is 
considered the lower level for developed countries (.). In none of the regions 
did life expectancy reach the “threshold” (critical) level used as a criterion for 
estimations of sustainability.21 Moreover, none of the BEAR regions reached 
the national average level of life expectancy.
  One of the general indicators of economic development which indirectly 
determines the level of income and is taken into account in the HDI is the 
gross regional product (GRP) per capita. A comparison of this indicator value 
by regions (Table .4) gives some idea of the differences in the regions’ ability 
to realize their economic potential.
  As could be seen from the data of Table .4 the Republic of Komi has the 
highest value of per capita GRP. Obviously 
this explains the leadership of the Republic 
among the examined regions by HDI level 
(see Table .).
  Despite the substantial differences 
between the GRPs of the regions, it 
should be noted that the ability of local 
governments to influence this indicator 
and its dynamics are probably minimal. 
This is due to the limited powers of local 
governments in the economic sphere in 
general and their low capacity due to the 
above-mentioned problems in functioning 
at the present stage of reform in Russia. An 
additional factor reducing the role of local 
governments in the economic performance 
of the regions in the Russian part of the
21  For such criteria, the values of the indicators reached in developed countries are used. 
For life expectancy, it is more than 75 years.
table 6.4 Gross regional product per 
capita of the regions of the Russian part 
of the BEAR in 2008  
Source: Rosstat (2010)
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BEAR is the fact that the economic results here are determined primarily by 
large corporations of a national or transnational nature. The ability of local 
authorities to influence them is very small. A separate problem is the fact that 
the economic benefits from the activities of these large corporations are not 
always used in the interests of the local population.
  An important indicator of the conditions of life of a population is the 
poverty level. To evaluate this level the share of the population with incomes 
below the subsistence minimum is used in Russian statistics. The subsistence 
minimum is regulated by law and is determined in each region on a quarterly 
basis for the main socio-demographic groups.22 The subsistence minimum is 
regarded as the poverty line, and the percentage of the population living below 
the line is considered one of the indicators of sustainable development. The 
specialists consider % to be the threshold (maximum critical) value for this 
indicator; beyond this level there is the threat of devastating trends that are 
not compatible with sustainable development. (see Riabova et al. , -). 
Table .5 (see next page) shows the dynamics of the values for this indicator in 
the regions of the Russian part of the BEAR in recent years.
  As can be seen from the data presented above, only in the Nenets AO did 
the value of this indicator not exceed the “threshold” level when estimated 
in terms of the criteria for sustainable development. In the other regions, as 
well as in Russia on average, the poverty rate is substantially higher than the 
acceptable values, and the positive trend of improvement observed prior to 
 was interrupted in most regions due to the negative impact of the global 
financial crisis.
  One of the important indicators of the standard of life that reveals population 
income inequality is the “decile ratio”: the ratio of the income share of the top 
% of the population to that of the bottom %. The threshold value for this 
indicator in terms of the criteria for sustainable development is considered to 
be ten: i.e., an income gap between the afore-mentioned population groups 
22  In accordance with Federal Law 134-FZ of 24.10.1997 “On Subsistence Minimum in the 
Russian Federation” (in ed. Federal Laws No. 75-FZ  of 27.05.2000 and No. 122-FZ of 22.08.2004), 
the cost of living is an evaluation of the consumer basket, which includes the minimum food 
products, consumer goods and services necessary for ensuring human health and livelihood, 
as well as mandatory fees and charges. The consumer basket in the Russian Federation was 
established by the legislative (representative) bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian 
Federation.
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that is more than tenfold is a sign of a dangerous degree of income inequality. 
In all of the regions of the Russian part of the BEAR, this threshold is exceeded 
to varying degrees (see Table .). 
table 6.5 Level of poverty: share of population with incomes below the subsistence 
minimum, % Source: Rosstat (2010).
table 6.6 Population income inequality: ratio of income share of the top 10% to that of 
the bottom 10%, times Source: Rosstat (2010).
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The situation is the worst in the Nenets AO and the Republic of Komi, where 
the degree of differentiation in income is above the average level for the 
country. This is due to the influence of industries with high wage rates (oil and 
gas industries in the Nenets AO and coal industries in the Republic of Komi) 
and simultaneously the presence of a low-income population. 
  The role of local authorities in reducing the degree of income differentiation 
consists mainly of providing wage growth for employees in the public sector 
funded from local budgets: the organizations of education, health, culture and 
others in which wages are traditionally lower than the average for the region. 
At the same time, this aim is generally difficult to achieve because of the afore-
mentioned problems involving the sources of local budgets revenues.
  Demographic indicators can also be regarded from the perspective of 
sustainable development. In particular, indicators of population migration are 
evidence of how people assess the living conditions in a settlement. In the 
regions of the Russian part of the BEAR the situation is relatively better in the 
Republic of Karelia and the Nenets AO, and worst in the Republic of Komi 
and Murmansk Oblast (see Table .).
It should be noted that Table . shows only data on interregional migration. 
Municipalities are also greatly influenced by intraregional migration. The 
table 6.7 Net migration increase (or decrease “-“) per 10,000 population
Source: Rosstat (2010).
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prevailing trend is the movement of the population to cities, mainly to regional 
capitals, although due to natural decrease and decrease due to migration the 
population of most northern cities is also dwindling. 
  The analysis of vital statistics indicators – in particular, comparison of the 
level of fertility and mortality in the regions – reveals the following trends. 
Only in the Nenets AO in the last decade has stable natural population growth 
been achieved. In all other regions of the Russian part of the BEAR the average 
death rate exceeds the birth rate, leading to the natural population decline 
(depopulation) that has been observed. However, the speed of this decrease has 
declined. For example, the indicator of natural population decline per mille 
(per  people of the population) in Karelia, where the values were the 
highest, fell from . in  to 4. in . In Komi, where the lowest rate 
of depopulation in the period was recorded, it has decreased from 4. to .4. 
It should be noted that in all regions except Murmansk Oblast, the level of 
depopulation in rural areas, though it decreased, was significantly higher than in 
urban areas, reflecting the depressed state of most rural settlements. 
  Within the constraints of this article it is not possible to cite a wide range 
of indicators to measure sustainable development in regions and municipalities. 
But by considering the given general indicators, it is in general clear that, 
although some positive trends can be seen, the situation in the Russian parts of 
the BEAR does not meet the criteria for sustainable development. Moreover, it 
is well known that in many municipalities, especially in rural areas, the situation 
can be characterized as a crisis, given the high rate of unemployment, low 
access to social services, poor housing conditions and other problems. The 
municipalities’ inability to solve such problems causes the population to be 
dissatisfied with local authorities, undermining the credibility of the institution 
of local self-government at the very beginning of its formation. This is 
confirmed by sociological surveys of public opinion. Some polls have revealed 
that, with respect to the attitude towards existing institutions of authority at 
different levels, for instance, respondents in Murmansk Oblast gave the worst 
evaluation to the bodies of local self-government.23 It might seem paradoxical 
23  The results are according to data in an unpublished survey by sociologists of the Institute 
for Economic Studies of the Kola Science Centre. The following options were provided for 
respondents to express their attitude towards authorities at different levels, including bodies of 
local-self government: “trust completely”, “trust basically”, “basically do not trust”, “do not trust 
at all”, and “difficult to answer”.
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that people have less confidence in bodies of local self-government, which 
should be under their control, than in regional and federal authorities, but the 
share of respondents who did not trust the bodies of local self-government (“at 
all” or “basically”) consistently outnumbered those who did trust them: in  
by 4.5 percentage points (p.p.) (4. - .4), in  by  p.p. (. – 4.), and 
in  by .4 p.p. (4.-.). As a rule, the share of respondents who trust 
federal and regional authorities is higher.
examples of positive practices
Despite all the difficulties in forming local self-governments in Russia as a 
whole and in the Russian part of the BEAR in particular, there are examples 
of positive developments and good practices of individual municipalities. A 
positive process contributing to the strengthening of local self-government in 
the Russian regions of the BEAR is the establishment and development of 
cooperation with neighboring municipalities in Finland and Norway. 
  A good example is the activity of the Local Federation of East Lapland24, 
which actively collaborates with the neighboring municipalities of Murmansk 
Oblast. Networking started with the project “Barents Learning” (-), 
which was supported by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and which was 
introductory in nature. These initial contacts showed the urgent need for the 
establishment of a new border crossing station to improve accessibility in order 
to develop closer ties. Thanks to the efforts of the Local Federation of East 
Lapland, funding from a program of the European Union (EU) was received 
for the construction of a border-crossing station in Salla (-), which 
opened in , creating favorable conditions for cross-border cooperation.
  Since 4, again on the initiative of the Local Federation of East Lapland, 
the project “Development of local self-government in the South of the Kola 
Peninsula” has started with the sponsorship of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The aim of the project is to facilitate the implementation of new forms 
of work for local self-government in the cities of the southern Kola Peninsula, 
drawing on the experience and competence of Finnish municipalities. One of 
24  The Local Federation is an intermunicipal, cooperative organization which unites four 
municipalities in Eastern Lapland and deals with the interaction of these municipalities, represents 
their interests, and contributes to the development of cross-border cooperation.
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the first useful results of the project was the creation in 5 of a non-profit 
partnership “Union of Cities of the Southern Kola Peninsula”, an organization 
of inter-municipal cooperation based on the Finnish model. During the 
implementation of the project, which is ongoing, its scope and objectives 
have expanded. In order to continue the project, funds from a EU program 
to promote cross-border cooperation were raised. The new objectives of the 
project include the economic development of the municipalities, investment 
policy, the creation of a favorable climate for entrepreneurship, the development 
of tourism infrastructure, raising the competence of local government, strategic 
planning, environmental protection, and waste disposal. Evaluating the results of 
one stage of the project, the Chairman of the Union of Cities of the Southern 
Kola Peninsula, the head of the municipality of Polar Zory, drew the following 
conclusions: “) the project provides real support to the municipalities of the 
southern Kola Peninsula in the organization of local self-government of the 
European type. ) While implementing the project, cross-border contacts and 
international cooperation between municipalities, as well as contacts of citizens, 
have been enhanced” (Goldobin ).
  Municipalities in the northern part of Murmansk Oblast are developing 
cooperation with neighboring municipalities in Norway. Here in , a 
network of bilateral cooperation of municipalities was created. The Norwegian 
Barents Secretariat supports individual projects, for instance, a project for the 
environmentally safe disposal of household wastes in the Pechenga district and the 
commune of Sor-Varanger. With the participation of the Norwegian communes 
of Batsfjord, Sor-Varanger and Hammerfest a program of development in the 
rural commune of Teriberka in Murmansk Oblast is being conducted.
  In general, all projects of cross-border cooperation in the Barents Region 
have a positive, indirect effect on the strengthening of local self-government in 
Russian municipalities. The number of projects is quite large. The Norwegian 
Barents Secretariat alone, since , when it became active, has invested nearly 
5 million NOK through more than , grants and cooperative programs 
in the Norwegian and Russian parts of the Barents Region.25 There are 
other possibilities for financial support for cooperation projects. During the 
period - a EU program of cross-border cooperation, the “European 
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument for Cross Border Cooperation 
(ENPI CPC) - Kolarctic”, has been operating. Co-financing for this program is 
25  For more information see http://www.barents.no/granted-by-us.292852.html .
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also supplied by the Russian Federation. However, despite the benefits of such 
programs and projects, the scale of their influence is limited, and the situation 
in the region and even in individual municipalities could hardly be said to 
have changed significantly. Nevertheless, it seems possible that the joint and 
coordinated efforts of all interacting parties – government, businesses, NGOs, 
international organizations and various community groups – can create a 
synergistic effect that significantly changes the situation and finally ensures the 
transition to sustainable development.
  The city of Kostomuksha (Republic of Karelia) can be considered as an 
example of local authorities successfully organizing a constructive engagement 
of major groups of interests and opportunities for international cooperation 
in order to stimulate local development. The city grew with the construction 
in the late s - early s of a large iron ore and processing enterprise 
(now JSC “Karelski okatysh”). The construction of the enterprise and the 
city was based on an intergovernmental Soviet-Finnish treaty and involved 
Finnish contractors of the construction consortium Finn-Stroi (Tykkylainen 
, ). The cooperation led to the use of Finnish technologies and urban 
planning, which were a favorable factor for the development of the city. Despite 
this, the effects of the crisis of the s were as severe for the city as for 
other Russian territories. Moreover, the situation was exacerbated by the city’s 
mono-industrial economic specialization (ferrous metallurgy), which made 
problems of unemployment and falling standards of living more pressing. In 
the early s the new city administration initiated the development of the 
Strategic Plan of the city’s socio-economic development26, which was adopted 
and launched in 4. In , the first phase of this strategic plan was summed 
up and adjustments for its subsequent implementation were made. The revised 
version emphasized that the first phase of the strategy had been completed 
successfully. Significant progress was made in achieving one of the main strategic 
goals: to diversify the economy, reorienting its single-industry specialization to 
the development of other promising industries, transport, trade and services. A 
policy of attracting investments also brought good results. During the period 
 – , the annual investment in the city’s economy grew by almost six 
times. Due to the attraction of domestic and foreign investment, a number of 
competitive new enterprises in the global market have been created. Among 
26  Available at: http://www.kostomuksha-city.ru/main.phtml?m=38&lang=ru&path_link=plan_
town.phtml .
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them are plants of the international company PCS Group for the production 
of components for the automobile industry, a furniture factory of the Swedish 
company IKEA, and others. As a result the city’s economic dependence on 
the mining and metallurgical enterprise has decreased significantly: the share 
of its employees in the city fell from 4% in  to % in , which 
greatly reduced the risk of a rise in unemployment during the recession of 
metallurgical production in - influenced by the global financial crisis. 
  Intensive international relations, including Barents cooperation, of local 
organizations have also contributed to the improvement of the socio-economic 
situation of the city. For instance, in  a modern office building for the 
international EU-funded27 project “Barents Link Forum”, was built; the building 
also serves as the city’s business centre. An agreement on cooperation between 
three twinning cities – Kostomuksha, Kuhmo (Finland) and Robertforse 
(Sweden) – for the years -5 is currently operating.
  One sign of increasing social sustainability in the city is the improvement of 
indicators of vital statistics. Kostomuksha is the only town in Karelia where birth 
rates exceed death rates (Shapovalov ). For its success, the city was awarded 
the Diploma of the Congress of Municipalities of the Russian Federation “for 
the complex and dynamic development of the municipality using benefits of 
cross-border cooperation”.
Conclusion 
Today, nearly two decades since the formation of the BEAR, such principal 
aims as the promotion of sustainable development and support for reforms 
and local institutions in Russia continue to be important for the Russian 
participants in the Barents cooperation. Despite the fact that the principal 
difficulties associated with the market transformations of the period of price 
liberalization, privatization, declining productivity and living standards have 
been overcome, the troublesome process of forming and simultaneously 
reforming such an important institution as local self-government continues. 
The key role of local institutions in promoting sustainable development was 
highlighted at the historic UN Conference in Rio de Janeiro (), where 
the adoption of «Local Agenda ” in local communities was recommended.
27  For more information, see http://www.barentslink.com/eng/gallery01.php .
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  Analysis of the situation, taking into account the above-mentioned role of 
local governments in Russia, shows that in most cases the achievements have 
been rather limited. In other words, though the role of local government in 
achieving sustainable development at the local level is potentially high, its actual 
implementation in the Russian regions in general, including the regions of the 
BEAR, is weak. The main factors contributing to this situation are the following. 
First, there is the weakness of the institution of local self-government because 
of various difficulties (legal, institutional, economic and human) during the 
initial period of its development. A second factor it is the absence of a national 
strategy for sustainable development and policies to stimulate the development 
and implementation of appropriate strategies at the local level. A third factor is 
the weakness of civil society: the lack of a tradition of public participation in 
projects and programs of community development. 
  The implementation of certain programs and projects of the Barents 
cooperation has had a positive impact on strengthening local self-government, 
enhancing its role as a resource in achieving the sustainable development of local 
communities. However, the scale of this effect is rather limited even in border 
regions (Murmansk and Karelia), which have more favorable conditions for such 
cooperation. A radical change in the situation is only possible through joint and 
coordinated actions of the Russian federal, regional and local authorities aimed 
at strengthening the institution of local self-government, as well as through 
the development of constructive cooperation between all the interest groups – 
government bodies, local communities, businesses, political parties, NGOs and 
international organizations – to achieve the goal of sustainable development.
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c h a p t e r  
Eini Laaksonen
hoW to suCCeed in internationaL
proJeCt MarKeting: identifying 
the ChaLLenges for finnish proJeCts 
in the MurMansK region
introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the key challenges for Finnish project 
exports in the Murmansk region. The chapter is mainly a literature review. 
After first discussing the economic development of the Murmansk region, it 
investigates the theoretical literature on international project marketing and 
analyses earlier studies on business experiences in Russia, and Murmansk in 
particular. The conclusions of the review create a basis for deeper empirical 
studies on the prospects of Finnish companies where the Murmansk region is 
concerned.
Business opportunities and finnish operations in
the Murmansk region
Largely due to climate change and the melting of Arctic permafrost, the natural 
resources and sea routes in the High North are becoming increasingly accessible. 
As a result, economic activity geared to exploiting these resources is increasing: for 
instance, the short-term investment plans for the Barents Sea region now exceed 
EUR  billion. In addition to Russia, Norway, Sweden and Finland, countries 
such as the USA, Canada and China have expressed interest in the area (Siuruainen 
, ). In the Russian North this development creates opportunities for not only 
Russian but also foreign businesses. For instance, the development of hydrocarbon 
resources, marine industries and the accompanying general infrastructure will 
attract and require foreign investments in the Murmansk region. 
  As can be seen in Fig. ., following the crisis of , the inflow of foreign
direct investments (FDI) to the Murmansk region is again reaching a billion USD
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 per year (MurmanskStat ). Of the 
industries most attractive for foreign 
investors, mining received one-third 
of the total foreign investments in the 
period –. Retail trade and 
repair services received the second 
largest share, 4%. The following 
sectors in this regard are fishing (%), 
operations involving real estate and ren-
ting ( %), manufacturing (%), and tra-
nsport and communications (%). (MurmanskStat) Clearly, natural 
resources play a significant role in the region’s economy, but several supporting 
industries and service sectors are growing apace, creating a range of business 
opportunities in the region by improving general economic development.
  As regards the division of FDI to the Murmansk region by the country of 
origin, Fig. . (see next page) shows that one quarter of the total accumulated 
FDI in the period – came from Cyprus and the second largest share, 
%, from Germany. Those countries are followed by Norway (%), Belgium 
(%), Sweden (%), and the Virgin Islands (4%). (Murmansk Stat , author’s 
calculations). Norway, Belgium and Sweden are thus actively participating in 
the region’s development, whereas the investments from neighbouring Finland 
have been rather modest. In 4, the share of Finnish investments reached 
approximately  % of total foreign investment, but since then the country’s 
share has not exceeded  % (Didyk et al. , MurmanskStat ). 
  Yet, Finland has a noticeable position in the Murmansk regional market in 
terms of international trade. Figures . and .4 show the development of the 
share of imports from Finland: in , Finland was the second largest source 
of imported goods to the Murmansk region, with a share of %, but in  it 
had fallen to fifth place, with a share half that recorded for . 
  At the same time, however, the absolute value of total imports to Murmansk 
has grown from USD  million in  to USD  million in . Thus 
Finnish imports to the Murmansk region have not necessarily decreased, but 
rather other countries, such as Norway, Ireland, Belarus and Germany, have 
increased their trade with Murmansk in comparison to Finland. 
  It has been widely recognised (e.g. Didyk et al. ; BSFE ; Siuruainen 
) that Finnish companies have participated rather modestly in the current 
fig. 7.1 FDI  inflow to the Murmansk region 
(million USD) Source: MurmanskStat 2011
160
fig. 7.2 Total FDI by
countries in the period
2006–2010 
Source: MurmanskStat 
2011
fig. 7.3 Imports of goods
to Murmansk by source
country (2006)
Source: MurmanskStat 
2011
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development of the Murmansk region  - despite the country’s geographic 
proximity and the project opportunities in which Finnish companies, even small 
ones, might have expertise to offer. It seems that contacts at the state, municipal 
and NGO level, as well as joint projects in education, science and culture, have 
developed favourably, but business cooperation with Finnish companies has 
been minimal. This can be attributed to the economic crises of  and  
as well as to the fact that St. Petersburg, the Leningrad region and Karelia are 
often viewed as more attractive for FDI than Murmansk (Didyk et al. ). 
  In Finland the situation has been acknowledged at the state level, and 
Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic region (FSAR ) states that developments 
in the Barents Sea region affect not only Northern Finland but the entire 
country. There is potential for utilising Finnish expertise in many sectors, such 
as offshore industries and shipbuilding, infrastructure construction, machinery 
and equipment, logistics, knowledge of Arctic conditions, and environmental 
know-how. However, the strategy underlines that in order to improve the 
fig. 7.4 Imports of goods
 to Murmansk by source 
country (2010) Source: 
MurmanskStat 2011
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opportunities of Finnish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to benefit 
from the large projects undertaken in the Barents Region, Finland must improve 
its logistical networks in the North, make the border formalities more efficient, 
develop its Arctic know-how, improve networking possibilities and strengthen 
the investment support organisations for its SMEs. For instance, Siuruainen 
(, ) emphasises the increasing importance of investment promotion 
organisations, such as Finpro, Finnvera, Tekes, VTT and MEK, in helping 
Finnish SMEs find their way to the Murmansk region. Also meriting mention 
in this regard is the Barents Strategy for the Advancement of Finnish Enterprise 
in the Russian Barents Region (BSFE ). The strategy assesses the business 
opportunities of Finnish companies in the region and presents strategic goals 
for the Finnish government, cities, universities and research centres, among 
other interested parties, that serve to support Finnish involvement  in the 
region’s economic development.
  At the moment, several large-scale projects are under way in the Murmansk 
region. Perhaps the best known is the Shtokman gas field project, which is to be 
implemented by Shtokman Development AG, a company owned by Russian 
Gazprom (5%), French Total (5%) and Norwegian Statoil (4%). The full 
development of Shtokman is envisioned in three stages at four-year intervals, 
with the first phase producing up to . billion cubic metres of natural gas 
per year. The total costs of the project are expected to reach USD  billion, 
with USD 5 billion required already during the first phase, that is, the first 
5 years of implementation. Shtokman Development AG will develop and 
operate the field’s infrastructure during this first phase, after which everything 
will be handed over to Gazprom (Shtokman ; Moe , ). With the 
field’s peak production of . billion cubic metres per year not expected to 
be reached for 5 years (Shtokman ; Moe , ),  foreign investors’ 
source of revenue in this significant investment project still remains uncertain, 
at least to the public. In any event, Russia needs foreign expertise and capital to 
develop its Arctic natural resources, and foreign companies find these emerging 
opportunities attractive.
  The Murmansk region also has a number of large projects in the offing 
outside of the oil and gas sector. For instance, developing Murmansk into 
a transportation hub is a part of Russia’s transport strategy and will require 
huge investments, particularly in the port of Murmansk and related services. 
The renovation of the electricity transmission network, improvement of the 
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road network, and house building will also be among the most investment-
intensive sectors of the economy in the near future. Finnish companies are 
not likely to have significant possibilities to participate in the core operations 
of these megaprojects, but the related subcontracting will provide numerous 
business opportunities for Finnish SMEs. In light of the statements in the 
Barents Strategy for the Advancement of Finnish Enterprise  in the Russian 
Barents region (), Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (), the 
report by Siuruainen (), and the range of on-going research projects in 
the Murmansk region, the sectors with the best economic potential include 
the mining industry, forest industry, metal refinement industry, energy industry, 
heat and electricity production, shipbuilding, port development, navigation 
infrastructure, environmental technology, waste treatment, general infrastructure, 
transportation logistics and public services, house building, information and 
communications technology, and tourism services.
  Some Finnish companies have recognised these opportunities and succeeded 
in becoming involved in the economic development of the Murmansk region. 
Examples of Finnish companies operating there include Aker Arctic Technology 
Inc (design and testing of icebreakers and other ice-going vessels as well as 
structures for Arctic oil and gas field operations), Eurotiivi (a window factory, 
currently owned by the Swedish Inwido Group), Oy SteelDone Group Ltd 
(steel structures for oil rigs in the Shtokman gas field), Lemcon Networks Ltd 
(road construction projects, member of Lemminkäinen Group), and Wärtsilä 
Oyj (a service centre in Murmansk for vessels in northern waters). 
  In an interview in spring , Managing Director of Aker Arctic 
Technology, Mikko Niini, emphasised the need for nationally significant pace-
setting companies and competitive clusters in increasing the activity of Finnish 
companies in the Russian High North. He noted that Finnish companies with 
suitable know-how have a large number of business opportunities in the region, 
particularly in cases where Russia is not capable of developing its industries 
without international cooperation. Russia sees Finland as a favourable partner 
in this development, but further activity is required from the Finnish side. In 
this regard, Niini pointed up the price competitiveness of Finnish companies as 
a challenging issue: Russian business people know the world market prices and 
the competitiveness of Asian industries. (Taivanen )
  Managing Director of Oy SteelDone Group Ltd, Martti Saarela, has 
underlined the importance of creating an extensive cooperation network 
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in the Russian market. The company has been active in that market since 
its establishment and has consciously invested in developing its contact base 
with the help of Finnvera, Finpro and Tekes. A case in point can be seen in 
Russian oil and gas projects, where the involvement of local companies and the 
transfer of technology from Western companies are increasingly stressed and 
joint ventures and partnerships have become the principal operation modes for 
foreign companies striving to enter the Barents market. According to Saarela, 
patient efforts have finally borne fruit and high-quality deliveries are expected 
to generate further business opportunities in the Murmansk region and other 
parts of Russia. (SDG ; SDG )
  Yet, the number of Finnish success stories is rather modest in relation to the 
potential and proximity of the Murmansk region. The next section examines 
the theoretical literature in an attempt to ascertain the preconditions of success 
in international projects.
project exports
Characteristics of international projects
Project business refers to the process of developing, marketing and implementing 
technical-economic solutions to the buyer’s needs (Owusu , 5). There 
are various definitions of the concept of project, and the project marketing 
literature understands projects as being sold between organisations, whereas 
the project management literature views projects as taking place also within an 
organisation (Skaates et al. ). This study adheres to the former conception, 
which, in fact, has developed into a sub-field of the discipline of marketing 
(Skaates et al. ). Following the definition of Cova et al. (, ), a project 
is a “complex transaction covering a package of products, services and work, 
specifically designed to create capital assets that produce benefits for a buyer 
over an extended period of time”. The creation of human assets, that is, 
knowledge and skills, is also an important complementary goal in most projects 
(Welch et al. ). 
  In the globalised world, projects are increasingly implemented in 
international environments, where gaps in knowledge, culture and technology 
between the project marketer and purchaser are often wide. In fact, about half 
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of the value of the international trade in many developed countries today is in 
the form of project business. (Owusu et al. , 5–) At the same time, the 
products offered by industrial companies have become increasingly complex, 
including both products and services (Skaates ), which encourages the 
use of projects in the form of business. Project business is a profitable mode 
of entry to international markets and can provide international firms with 
competitive niches (Owusu et al. , ). Four characteristics distinguish 
projects from other forms of international business operations: uniqueness, 
complexity, discontinuity and the extent of financial commitment. Uniqueness 
refers to the extent of customisation in each project; complexity to all the 
technical, financial, political and societal issues related to implementing a 
project; discontinuity to the fact that there is a start and end date for each 
project; and financial commitment to significant sums of money being centred 
on a single project. These four characteristics also result in high uncertainty, as 
projects are products sold long before they are completed. (Cova et al. , 
–; Welch et al. , –)
  As regards the modes in which projects are delivered, Luostarinen and 
Welch () divide project operations into partial projects, turnkey projects 
and turnkey-plus projects. Partial projects provide partial systems or solutions; 
turnkey projects include a complete unit delivered to the buyer; and turnkey-
plus projects provide, in addition to the complete unit, supplementary services 
such as training. The fact that a certain technology is novel and/or complex in 
a certain society and commonplace in another creates the basis for international 
purchasing of projects as well as for determining the project mode. Based on 
this, Ahmed (, 5) states that the novelty and complexity of technology 
affect whether the buyer can rely on its own resources and take care of the 
project locally, whether it buys hardware only, whether it buys know-how 
only, or whether it chooses to buy an integrated project that includes both the 
hardware and know-how. For instance, for a developing country with modest 
technical capabilities and weak technical infrastructure, the preferred solution is 
often to buy an integrated project. 
  It must also be noted that a project is a process, the phases of which have 
been defined in several ways in the theoretical literature. In general, the first stage 
of project marketing involves market scanning, approaching and networking, 
that is, gaining information about project opportunities and connecting with 
prospective buyers. The following phase consists of bidding, tender preparation, 
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interaction with consultants, and perhaps also negotiating with the buyer. 
(Welch 5, ; Welch et al. , ) After negotiations follows the choice 
of supplier (Welch et al. , ), ushering in the project implementation 
phase, where the major challenge is seeing to it that the delivery matches 
the commitments made (Welch 5, ). The follow-up phase includes 
investigating possible spin-off opportunities of the project, such as provision of 
additional services, goods and equipment (Welch 5, ; Welch et al. , 
). In this way, the end of a project may be the start of a new one, meaning 
that the process is cyclic and iterative (Welch 5, ). 
  Firms are not necessarily involved in all stages of a project; they may be 
responsible for delivering only a part of the project. Particularly in the case of 
large integrated turnkey and turnkey-plus projects, a very diverse range of firms 
may be involved in implementing a single successful project (Welch 5, ). 
The following section continues with a focus on the preconditions for success 
in project marketing.
Key factors in successful project exports
As presented in the previous section, international projects are complicated – 
winning bids, let alone getting through the project cycle successfully, is not a 
given. The criteria for success in international projects have been studied from 
various angles, and research findings suggest that successful project marketing 
is a matter of designing an optimal project mix to address the challenges of 
complexity, heterogeneity, uncertainty, discontinuity and contextuality (Welch 
5, ). This mix comprises the package mix, the relational mix, the strategic 
mix and the understanding of the milieu (e.g. Welch 5).
  The package mix refers to the contents of a project offer, that is, to a 
technical solution, price, local experience, partnerships, financing, and offset 
activities such as technology transfer. This offer must be superior to that of any 
competitors and simultaneously take into account the possible socio-economic 
concerns related to the project. (Welch 5, ) An important part of the 
project mix is also the intangible presentation of credibility and assurance on 
the part of the supplier, as it may take years before the project is completed 
(Welch et al. , ). Credibility can be generated, for instance, via the use 
of references, existing relationships and word of mouth (Skaates et al. , ). 
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  The second category affecting the success of international project marketing 
is what is known as the relational mix, which refers to the development and 
maintenance of key relationships at all stages of the project cycle (Jansson 
, for reference see Welch 5, ). In order to scan project opportunities 
effectively to obtain a first-mover advantage and to supplement its internal 
competencies with external resources, a company needs a wide network of 
contacts (Welch 5, ); these will include non-business and socio-political 
actors, particularly in developing countries (Ahmed ). For example, the 
required network of actors includes the marketer and the purchaser, financiers, 
consultants, subcontractors, and governments as purchasers or regulators 
(Owusu , ). For a small seller company the particular challenge is to 
not only manage its own network but also to understand the composition of 
the buying network, which may not be transparent to the company (Owusu 
and Welch 5). Maintaining ‘sleeping relationships’ can also be a criterion 
for success if these non-active relationships can be quickly mobilised when a 
common project opportunity appears. Indeed, project marketing actions are 
not intended solely for one specific project but for a market of several projects, 
in which long-term relationships can be crucial. (Hadjikhani )
  The third group of factors, the strategic mix, refers to developing and 
combining anticipatory and adaptive project capabilities (Bansard, Cova and 
Salle , for reference see Welch 5, ). Anticipatory capabilities are the 
core of a project company’s ability to operate in differing international markets; 
they comprise the standardised product and service components that are ready 
for quick project launches in various situations and environments. Adaptive 
capabilities, in turn, enable companies to adjust their offerings to meet their 
buyers’ needs in differing contexts. These include technical abilities, financial 
abilities, as well as knowledge and contact systems through which companies 
can adapt project marketing and implementation. (Welch 5, ; Welch et 
al. , ) Both proactive and reactive capabilities are needed as a part of a 
long-term strategy: a company needs to actively study the market for suitable 
projects, use business networks for information and proactively suggest suitable 
projects to purchasers (Owusu et al. , ).
  In terms of the three mixes described above, the performance of a project 
company depends heavily on its understanding and ability to respond to the 
local project context. Consequently, the fourth group of success factors – 
the one perhaps most important in international project marketing – is the 
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understanding of the milieu. This is because the local political, social, cultural 
and business context influences projects at all levels. (Welch 5, ; Welch 
et al. , ) The project milieu includes a territory, a network of actors 
within this territory, a representation constructed and shared by the actors, 
Fig. 7.5 Interactive model of project business
Source: Ahmed 1993, 104.
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and a set of rules and norms regulating the actions of the actors in the milieu 
(Skaates et al. , ). In particular, the political and legal features of the 
milieu can be challenging for a foreign project seller, with these including 
national procurement laws and regulations, protection of local firms, political 
risk, corruption and collusion, home and host country relations, and host 
government intervention. In addition, the level of national economic 
development in the client’s country seems to affect the buying process in terms 
of project needs and specifications, requirements for technology transfer and 
levels of purchasing expertise. (Owusu and Welch 5, ) 
  Thus, the project seller has to convince other actors of its ability to perform 
as promised and expected in the milieu (Skaates et al. , ). There are several 
actors involved in a project, all of whom have their own motives, resources and 
constraints. In addition, the home and host milieus affect the actions of all 
the actors (Ahmed , 4), as can be seen in the following comprehensive 
presentation of project business (See Fig. .5).
  It can be concluded that project exports are a complex mode of business. The 
following section proceeds to illustrate practical experiences in international 
project marketing. 
earlier studies on business in the russian north
During the past ten years, a great deal of research has been conducted on the 
Russian business environment and business challenges for foreign companies, 
particularly as regards the general investment climate and concrete business 
experiences in the Russian market. The main findings of this research are 
discussed in what follows. 
the russian business environment
Jones, Fallon and Golov () explored the obstacles faced by transnational 
corporations considering FDI in Russia. Their findings suggest that Russia’s 
relative lack of success in attracting FDI and exploiting its potential benefits can 
be attributed to the country’s national infrastructural factors and government 
policies. The five main obstacles which help to explain the lack of investment 
in modern Russia are () “Russia’s political and economic culture, and its 
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impact on government reform policies”; () “the country’s taxation and legal 
infrastructure”; () “the presence of the oligarchy and the prevalence of crime 
and corruption”; (4) “the limitations of the natural privatisation process”; and 
(5) “the failure of domestic enterprises and managers to adapt to competitive 
market conditions” (Jones et al. ). Fabry and Zeghni () also studied 
the paradox whereby Russia is one of the largest countries in terms of natural 
resources and has a well-educated labour force and great market potential 
yet, at the same time, is one of the least attractive host countries for FDI 
in the region. They found that, in terms of quantity, FDI in Russia is too 
weak to enhance a restructuring process and contribute to a modernisation 
of local resources and skills. In terms of quality, they noted that Russia mainly 
attracts risk-taking foreign investors or investors willing to act in offshore areas 
protected by local government or by production sharing agreements. Foreign 
investors perceive the general business climate in Russia as unstable and risky 
(Fabry and Zeghni , , ).
  Zarkada-Fraser and Fraser () studied the perceptions that marketing 
managers of British construction firms involved in the Russian market have of 
political risk and market potential in Russia in comparison with other overseas 
markets. The analysis showed that the firms did not treat Russia any differently 
than they did other markets. However, the respondents were found to be highly 
concerned about the Russian political environment and the uncertain future of 
reforms. They were also worried about the possibility of government attitudes 
becoming unfavourable to foreign corporations in the future. The general state 
of the economy was found to be the second most worrying factor, with the 
legislative framework being the gravest concern. Aleshin () identified, 
classified and assessed risks inherent in joint projects in Russia. According 
to the study, the implementation of projects in Russia is characterised by an 
environment of high uncertainty and risk; this in turn is due to the absence of a 
mature market infrastructure and a lack of sufficient experience and knowledge 
for working under such conditions. The research examined  dwelling 
projects to ascertain their experienced internal risks. The analysis suggests, for 
example, that establishing closer contacts with the operational services of the 
focal city and developing information systems among the project participants 
might reduce risk events. The companies that faced risk events had limited 
knowledge of the organisation, construction process technology, and the legal 
basis of investment activity.
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  Yet business risks, as well as the intensity of foreign business operations, 
vary considerably between the Russian regions. According to Broadman and 
Recanatini (), the determinants of the geographic distribution of FDI 
within Russia comprise the economic potential of the region, the development 
of the local infrastructure, and the local policy framework governing the 
economic activities, that is, the prices charged by regular utilities, tax rates, 
customs clearance, and the like. Mögel () divided the Russian regions into 
 classes according to their investment climate. The study concluded that on a 
scale from  (favourable) to  (menacing), 5% of the Russian regions belong 
to classes  (undetermined) and 4 (rather unstable). The Murmansk region, 
located in the Russian Arctic, is one example of a region classified as politically 
rather unstable. In Murmansk, for instance, legislative stability and proper 
implementation of agreements, the social situation, and regional development 
of reforms were seen to be at a rather low level, and the presence of strong 
interest groups and the internal security and military threat to population 
groups were ranked high. However, the support for foreign investment was 
reported to be at the highest possible level (Mögel , 4).
  On balance, Russia on the whole is seen to be a somewhat risky business 
environment, but foreign investors nevertheless find business opportunities 
there attractive – albeit depending on the region in question. The next section 
takes a closer look at the Russian North.
Business experiences in the russian north
During the past five years, most of the empirical studies concerning the business 
experiences of Western companies in the Russian North have been conducted 
from the perspective of Norwegian companies (see e.g. Shevtsova ; Nilsen 
; Grinblat and Volkova ; Flatøy and Johansen ; Laaksonen ; 
Alteren ; Svishchev ). Shevtsova (), for instance, conducted a survey 
among theorists and company representatives on the incentives and obstacles of 
Norwegian companies in investing in Russia. According to her findings, the main 
problem for foreign investors is the lack of security where property rights are 
concerned. (Shevtsova , 5) However, opinions concerning the order of the 
next most important challenges differed among the experts and company rep-
resentatives interviewed. According to the experts, the customs authorities and 
the protection of creditors’ rights are the most significant challenges, whereas the 
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company representatives considered corruption and the tax authorities to be the 
next most problematic issues in the market. Both groups, however, shared a com-
mon understanding that macroeconomic instability, political changes and the risk 
of expropriation are of medium-level concern for the investors, and issues related 
to Russian workers, criminality, barter and current trade policy are among the 
least worrisome factors. (Shevtsova , 5–5) 
  In , Nilsen () carried out a comprehensive study on the business 
challenges encountered by two Norwegian companies in the Murmansk region, 
Barel and Reinertsen. He identified three groups of challenges: () bureaucracy 
and regulations, () language and culture, and () internal challenges (Nielsen 
, 4). Regarding the Russian bureaucracy and regulations, both the 
companies had experienced problems particularly with the customs authorities 
and accounting regulations. Contrary to the findings of earlier studies, the 
interviewees did not mention tax systems or property rights as problematic 
issues. Corruption was not considered problematic either - once they had 
chosen not to engage in  it. However, both companies emphasised having 
spent a lot of time familiarising themselves with Russia before entering the 
market and noted that business started to run more smoothly when they had 
learned the procedures. Regarding language and culture, the representatives 
stated that having fluent skills in Russian would have facilitated their operations 
significantly. Despite hiring Russian-speaking Norwegians for the project and 
having English-speaking Russians as business partners, the language was still 
seen as a barrier to cooperation, other obstacles being various differences in 
business culture, such as punctuality and formality. Internal challenges took the 
form of problems with the attitudes that the Norwegian and Russian employees 
had towards each other, which hampered cooperation between departments. 
However, the companies overcame these challenges and, according to Nielsen 
(, –), the success factors in these cases were thorough preparation, a 
long presence in the Russian market, patience with processes, the ‘financial 
muscle’ to be able to wait for the start of revenues, and the expertise gained in 
the Russian market.
  The studies of Grinblat and Volkova () and Alteren () support 
these findings. Both studies discuss the differences between the Norwegian and 
Russian business culture and emphasise the importance of creating personal 
relationships and a contact network in learning how to do business in Russia. 
Regular face-to-face contact is needed in building strong commitment and 
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trust, and the importance of language skills is also underlined. According to 
Alteren (), the companies in his study benefited from a Russian ‘door-
opener’, who presented Russian business life and introduced the right contacts 
to the foreign managers. Alteren notes that the building of business relationships 
is a costly and time-consuming process, but that it is essential for a company 
to stay up to date on matters such as prices, wage levels, new regulations, and 
recruitment possibilities. Based on these studies, it can be concluded that a 
company need not have previous experience on the Russian market to succeed 
there; selecting a qualified and trustworthy door-opener may provide the key 
to the business and networks.
  Flatøy and Johansen () took a closer look at the requirements for 
internationalisation in a Norwegian company and divided the success factors 
into intangible organisational factors, tangible organisational factors, external 
factors, and internationalisation factors. Intangible factors included experience 
from other complex projects and international operations, efficient cooperation 
and communication technologies, dedicated and skilled management, 
involvement in a supportive network and choice of the right time to enter 
the market after sufficient preparations. Tangible factors included attractive 
technology and/or products and financial strength. External factors, in turn, 
were related to the target location, and included low wages, the availability of 
qualified labour, taxation advantages, ability to handle bureaucracy, closeness in 
mentality between Norway and North-West Russia, and relations to decision 
makers. The final group, internationalisation factors, comprised maintaining 
control over risks, keeping control over knowledge transfer, good reputation, 
and knowledge of Russian language and culture. (Flatøy and Johansen , 
–) This framework is quite comprehensive and also in line with the 
previously discussed studies on Norwegian experiences.
  In comparison to the work done on Norway, far less research has been 
conducted concerning Finnish business experiences in the Russian North. In 
one example, Dutka, Rouge-Oikarinen and Ovaskainen () studied the 
attitudes of companies in Northern Finland towards the business opportunities 
in the Russian North. A majority of the respondents had not considered entering 
the Russian market, mainly due to the small size and local nature of their 
operations, lack of resources, difficulties related to customs regulations, and lack of 
knowledge about the Russian market. In addition, bureaucracy, the complicated 
legal system, corruption and the difficulty of finding trustworthy partners were 
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seen as concerns. Consequently, many of the companies surveyed were not 
interested in internationalising their business, or considered expanding their 
operations to countries other than Russia. While most of the respondents were 
nevertheless interested in further information and business training concerning 
the Russian North, only one of the companies was willing to participate in the 
courses offered. General training was not of interest, but the companies were 
keen on receiving concrete help in creating a contact network in Russia.
  According to a study by Siuruainen (), the key problem for Finnish 
SMEs in entering the Russian North is the lack of adequate knowledge about 
the business opportunities in the Barents Sea region. This is largely due to the 
lack of contacts, language skills and cultural knowledge. Siuruainen underlines 
that there is not enough information and support for SMEs in learning about 
the opportunities in Murmansk and in preparing to attend to emerging projects. 
  Siuruainen () presents the following suggestions for Finnish SMEs in 
entering the Murmansk region. Firstly, companies need to familiarise themselves 
with the target market, follow the development closely, and be prepared for 
the upcoming project opportunities in order to be able to participate in time. 
Secondly, SMEs should form strong clusters to be able to succeed in project 
bidding competitions and business negotiations. Thirdly, Siuruainen emphasises 
the importance of gaining connections to regional authorities and becoming 
subcontractors for large corporations. He also notes the need to create networks 
to promote continuous cooperation and to achieve acceptance and credibility 
among partners. In addition, he encourages Finnish companies to focus on their 
fields of expertise, noting that the large projects taking place in the Barents Sea 
region are not all that is taking place in the North; that is, many other sectors 
are developing in the area in the shadow of the giant projects. In addition, 
Siuruainen refers to the increasingly important role of research and education 
in increasing Finnish expertise on Russia and the Arctic and to the increasing 
importance of the Finnish investment support organisations in helping the 
companies to enter the Russian North. 
  To sum up the findings of this chapter, it can be said that despite their success 
in the Murmansk region, Norwegian companies have experienced their share 
of problems in the Russian business environment. This is the only way to learn 
to do business in Russia, and Finnish companies should follow this example and 
learn from the experiences of their Norwegian colleagues. The following section 
presents the conclusions of this review and gives suggestions for further studies.
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Conclusions and suggestions for further research
International project marketing can be challenging in several aspects. As 
discussed in the theoretical review, there are numerous factors that contribute 
to success in project exports – factors that a company starting project exports 
to a new country should be aware of and be able to manage. The experiences 
of Norwegian companies in the Murmansk region indicate that a successful 
company must have the products and services required, recognise the 
emerging business opportunities, have trustworthy contacts to get into business 
negotiations, and have the business strategies and knowledge of the Russian 
culture and language that will enable it to succeed in those negotiations. Despite 
the problems encountered, several Norwegian companies have managed to 
meet the needs of Russian buyers. In terms of the theoretical framework, these 
companies have met criteria for a successful international project – the package 
mix, relational mix, strategic mix and understanding of the milieu – at a level 
adequate to the buyers. 
  Even though Norwegian newspapers often discuss the problems and failures 
of Norwegian companies in the Murmansk business environment (Nilsen , 
III), it must be noted that the situation is better in Norway than in Finland: 
the Finnish media do not have much to report on - even unsuccessful business 
experiences in Murmansk. Risk-taking, a long-term presence, and patience 
are required when planning to enter the Russian market. An analysis of the 
literature indicates that the lack of business interest and/or success on the part 
of Finnish companies in the Murmansk region is mainly due to the following 
issues: lack of information about investment opportunities in the region, lack of 
necessary networks and contacts in Russia, absence of strong and competitive 
clusters to support market entry, bureaucracy, corruption, customs procedures, 
logistical problems and language and culture barriers.
  Finnish companies, researchers and policy-makers should cooperate to 
discuss these challenges and implement concrete actions to overcome the main 
problems. In addition, stronger practical and financial support should be made 
available for the companies in need. However, to gain a thorough understanding 
of the underlying attitudes Finnish companies have towards doing business in 
Murmansk, to comprehend the challenges they perceive in that ambition, and 
to recognise their practical needs, further studies including empirical surveys 
and interview data are required. 
176
  In order to be able to present practical policy recommendations and 
managerial implications, the following questions should be discussed and 
analysed against empirical data on Finnish companies’ experiences: What are 
the main obstacles to engaging in project exports to Murmansk? What is the 
role of clustering in this process? What is the role of international innovation 
collaboration in entering the Russian North? When the challenges and problem 
areas of Murmansk project exports have been identified comprehensively, it will 
be possible to find a way to address them. This literature review creates a basis 
for further research on the understanding of international project marketing 
and, in turn, on increasing the Finnish business activity in the Murmansk region.
references 
a h M e d, M . M . (). International marketing and purchasing of projects: 
interactions and paradoxes. A study of Finnish project exports to the Arab countries. 
Helsinki: Svenska handelshögskolan.
a L e s h i n , a .  (). Risk management of international projects in Russia. 
International Journal of Project Management  (4), –.
a Lt e r e n , g . (). Connecting to the right people; the key to develop 
business in Northwest Russia. Økonomisk fiskeriforskning (), –5.
B r o a d M a n , h . g . &  r e C a n at i n i , f.  (). Where has all the 
foreign investment gone in Russia? The World Bank. Policy Research Working 
Paper 2640. Retrieved October 5, , from http://www.wds.worldbank.
org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IWP/IB////44
_445/additional/5_455.pdf.
B s f e  (). Barents strategy for the advancement of Finnish enterprise in the 
Russian Barents region. Retrieved October , , from http://www.ouka.fi/
elinkeino/barents/barents_eng.pdf.
C ova , B . ,  g h a u r i , p.  &  s a L L e , r .  (). Project marketing: beyond 
competitive bidding. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
d i dy K , v. ,  r i a B ova , L .  &  B r i t v i n a , s .  (). Finnish companies 
in Murmansk Province: collaboration potential is underused. Murmansk Province 
2008, Biannual monitoring review. Retrieved October 5, , from http://
cemat.aalto.fi/fi/electronic/economicmonitoring/reports/murmansk/-
/murmansk__eng.pdf.
177
d u t K a , a . ,  r o u g e - o i K a r i n e n , r . &  ova s K a i n e n , a .  (). 
European High North CBBC Innovation Platform -projektin pk-yrityksille suunnattu 
kyselytutkimus: toimintakertomus ja tutkimustulokset. Retrieved October 5, , 
from http://www.barentsinfo.org/loader.aspx?id=e4ade-e5e-4cf-5-
ddfb5.
f a B ry, n . &  z e g h n i , s .  (). Foreign direct investment in Russia: 
how the investment climate matters. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 5, 
–.
f L at ø y, r . &  J o h a n s e n , K .  (). Living next door to Gazprom: 
how a Norwegian company found itself in Murmansk, employing  engineers 
and welders – and a guy from Verdal. Master’s Thesis in Energy Management, 
ENE . Retrieved October 5, , from http://brage.bibsys.no/hibo/
bitstream/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_brage_4//Flatoey_R.pdf.
f s a r  (). Finland’s strategy for the Arctic Region. Prime Minister’s Office 
Publications, /. Helsinki: Helsinki University Print.
g r i n B L at, M . &  vo L Kova , i .  (). Risks and barriers for Norwegian 
companies on the Russian oil-and-gas market. Bodø Graduate School of 
Business. Master’s Thesis in Energy Management, ENE. Retrieved October 
5, , from http://brage.bibsys.no/hibo/bitstream/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_
brage_545//Grinblat.pdf.
h a d J i K h a n i , a .  (). Project marketing and the management of 
discontinuity. International Business Review 5(), –. 
J o n e s , a . ,  f a L L o n , g . ,  &  g o L ov, r .  (). Obstacles to foreign 
direct investment in Russia. European Business Review (4), –.
L a a K s o n e n , e .  (). Political risks of foreign direct investment in the 
Russian gas industry – the Shtokman gas field project in the Arctic Ocean. 
Electronic Publications of the Pan-European Institute, 4/. Turku: Turku School 
of Economics. Retrieved October 5, , from http://www.tse.fi/FI/
yksikot/erillislaitokset/pei/Documents/Julkaisut/Laaksonen_netti_final.pdf. 
L u o s ta r i n e n , r . &  W e L C h , L .  (). International business operations. 
Helsinki: Helsinki School of Economics.
M o e , a .  (). The Russian Barents Sea: openings for Norway? In Rose 
Gottemoeller & Rolf Tamnes (Eds.), High North High Stakes – Security, energy, 
transport, environment, pp.5–5. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
M u r M a n s K s tat  (). Federal State Statistics Service of the Murmansk 
region. Data retrieved October 5–, , from http://murmanskstat.gks.ru.
178
M ö g e L , n . a .  (). The political risk in Russian regions. Reihe 
Transformationsökonomie/Transition Economics Series, No. . Vienna: The Institute 
for Advanced Studies in Vienna.
n i L s e n , e . L .  (). Motiver og barrierer for norske bedriftsetableringer i 
Nordvest-Russland – en analyse av to bedrifters etablering i Murmansk. Master’s 
Thesis in Marine Business Management. Norwegian College of Fishery 
Science, University of Tromsø. Retrieved October 5, , from http://www.
ub.uit.no/munin/bitstream/handle///Thesis.pdf?sequence=.
o W u s u , r . a . &  W e L C h , C .  (5). The buying network in international 
project business: a review and conceptual model (Presented at the st International 
Marketing and Purchasing Group Conference in Rotterdam, Netherlands in 
5).
o W u s u , r . a . ,  s a n d h u , M . &  Ko C K , s .  (). Project business: 
a distinct mode of internationalization. International Marketing Review 4(), 
–4. 
s d g  (). SteelDone Group sai ennätystilauksen. Oy SteelDone Group Ltd, 
News Archive. Retrieved November , , from http://4.../~s
teeldon/index.php?p=steeldone_group_sai_ennatystilauksen. 
s d g  (). Venäläinen tytäryhtiö OOO SteelDone Group aloittanut 
toimintansa. Oy SteelDone Group Ltd, News Archive. Retrieved November 
, , from http://www.steeldone.com/fi/uutiset/venalainen-tytaryhtio-
ooo-steeldone-group-aloittanut-toimintansa.html. 
s h e v t s ova , J .  (). Barriers and obstacles to foreign direct investment (FDI) 
into Russia. Master’s Thesis in International Fisheries Management. Norwegian 
College of Fishery Science, University of Tromsø. Retrieved October 5, 
, from http://munin.uit.no/munin/bitstream/handle///thesis.
pdf?sequence=.
s h to K M a n  (). Shtokman Development AG. Information retrieved April 
4, , from http://www.shtokman.ru/eng/about.
s i u r u a i n e n , e .  (). Barentsin alueen uusiutuvat rakenteet – suomalaisten 
yritysten toimintamahdollisuuksia Luoteis-Venäjällä. Retrieved October , , 
from http://www.tem.fi/files//Barents_web.pdf.
s K a at e s , M . a . ,  t i K K a n e n , h . &  L i n d B L o M , J .  (). 
Relationships and project marketing. Journal of Business & Industdrial Marketing 
(5), –4. 
s K a at e s , M . a . ,  t i K K a n e n , h . &  a L a J o u t s i J ä r v i ,  K .  (). 
The international marketing of professional service projects: to what extent 
179
does territoriality matter? Journal of Services Marketing  (), –.
s v i s h C h e v, r .  (). When management myths collide? Case study of 
management control systems in two Norwegian companies, operating in Russia. Master’s 
Thesis in Business, BE4E. Universitetet i Nordland. Retrieved October , 
, from http://brage.bibsys.no/hibo/bitstream/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_
brage_5//Svishchev_Roman.pdf.
ta i va n e n , M .  (). Mikä ihmeen arktinen teknologia? 
Ulkoasiainministeriön artikkelit ja kolumnit, published May , . Retrieved 
November , , from http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?content
id=4&contentlan=&culture=fi-FI. 
W e L C h , C .  (5). Multilateral organisations and international project 
marketing. International Business Review 4, –5.
W e L C h , L . s . ,  B e n i to , g . r . g . &  p e t e r s e n , B .  (). Foreign 
operation methods – theory, analysis, strategy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
z a r K a d a - f r a s e r , a . &  f r a s e r , C .  (). Risk perception by UK 
firms towards the Russian market. International Journal of Project Management 
(), –5.
180
c h a p t e r  
Luc Ampleman
transportation pLanning 
and sustainaBLe deveLopMent 
in the far north: the Main Barriers 
and potentiaL avenues 
introduction
Sensitive to technological progress and the insatiable desire for physical 
mobility, the world‘s infrastructure capital has not stopped growing for a long 
time. Even more, conclusions about human mobility seem undisputed in that 
we never have moved so much (Cattan ; Knowles, Shaw and Docherty 
; Sheller and Urry ): always further, faster, longer and more often. 
The social, economic and environmental impacts of transport go far beyond 
the location of infrastructure, and, sooner or later, transport policies interfere 
with one other. Technological development and know-how are transferred to 
new geographical areas, and access to safer and more reliable services becomes 
a political issue at all levels of governance. The harmonisation of rules, the 
arbitration of disputes and the prioritisation of ‘needs’ have proven to be 
foolhardy exercises for decision makers.
  In this regard, planning for sustainable transport solutions has appeared 
as part of an important mantra for nearly the past twenty years. Sustainable 
transport has found a place in the discourse and agenda of planners and 
policy makers who are currently facing a series of challenges which can 
appear contradictory: i) limiting the negative impact of transportation on 
the environment caused by the unbridled construction of infrastructure 
and the ‘over-mobility’ of human beings; ii) ensuring equitable access to 
key transportation services to the entire population, including the most 
disadvantaged populations, while at the same time iii) enabling transport to 
continue to play its economic role.
  To date, a substantial literature has developed around the theme of sustainable 
transportation. One may not be surprised by the important place accorded to 
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sustainable transportation in large urban areas, but how does it concern the 
hyper-periphery and the remote cold regions? Although there is an obvious 
interest in sustainable mobility outside the big cities, including the so-called 
‘rural areas’, are these general reflections about sustainable transport and its 
insights adapted to the Arctic region?28
sustainable transportation in the arctic: 
toward a pan-regional paradigm
The northernmost region of the world indeed faces a series of important 
challenges in terms of mobility. Although transportation is at the very heart of 
Arctic geopolitics and the economic agenda of the countries concerned, the 
planning of sustainable solutions for such a complex region remains poorly 
documented. In this regard, there are several reasons to believe that both the 
problematization and the initiatives put forward to facilitate the achievement 
of sustainable transport in the Arctic Region need an appropriate and 
original mental framework. Consequently, the paradigm of sustainability 
must be rethought for the circumpolar region, notably by considering the 
physical particularities of the region as well as the political heritage of Arctic 
region-building.
  The present chapter aims to trace lines between transport planning in 
the Arctic Region and the challenges of sustainable development. In doing 
so, the following pages will attempt to answer four key questions: What 
is transport planning? How is transport planning influenced by the idea of 
sustainable development? What are the main barriers encountered by the Arctic 
communities in terms of transport planning? What avenues can we adopt to 
overcome these barriers? Hopefully, this general picture of the situation and 
challenges will serve as a starting point to build more suitable indicators and 
approaches for sustainable mobility in the Arctic.
28  Some theoretical distinctions between ‘mobility’ and ‘transport(ation)’ will be discussed 
further below. However, to alleviate and avoid repetition, both words may sometimes be used 
interchangeably and generally refer to the physical movement of people and goods. The term 
‘Arctic region’, unless indicated otherwise and despite its variable geography, refers in a broad 
sense to the area proposed by the Arctic Human Development Report (2004, 17-20).
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transport planning
What is transport planning?
Transportation as a system encompasses many means of transport and concerns 
many aspects of a socio-political dimension including safety, economic 
development, impact on the environment, and efficiency of access. Transport 
planners work with the assumption that implementing one initiative or policy 
(for instance, on air transport) may have repercussions on other means of 
transportation (for instance, on land transport) and other aspects of life. In this 
context, the idea of taking a holistic view of the situation, including all means 
of transport, constitutes both an unavoidable idealistic requirement and an 
impractical challenge.
  Transportation planning can be defined as a practice aimed at establishing 
priorities, goals, scenarios, strategies, and instruments of intervention for the 
mobility of people and goods in a given territory. It consequently poses a series 
of simple questions in order to provide for (or restrict) the movement of people 
and goods over a given territory:
•	 What should / can we do? 
•	 Who can do it? 
•	 For whom should we do it? 
•	 Where should it be done? 
•	 When should it be done? 
•	 How should it be done (with what resources: know-how and financing)?  
 Who will pay for it?
As suggested by some analysts, the distinction between transport policy and 
transport planning is often blurred (Rodrique, Comtois and Slack , ). For 
the purposes of this paper, ‘transport policies’ are considered as available instruments 
that decision makers can use to intervene in services and infrastructure, while 
‘transport planning’ is a general meta-practice providing general guidelines about 
where, when and how to implement the policies. In this context, policies may 
be considered as ‘speech acts’ that constrain or influence different stakeholders 
to various degrees. Transport policies can be considered as initiatives formulated 
by authorities to achieve particular objectives related to the functioning and 
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performance of the transport system and the mobility of people and freight. As 
practitioners, transport planners may evaluate what the actual capital of transport 
infrastructure and service for a specific area is and what potential speech acts 
would make it possible to improve the mobility capital of the actors.
the functions of transport planning
As a political tool, transportation plans generally contain not only a series of 
priorities, goals, scenarios, strategies and instruments of intervention, but are 
also built around a specific context of intervention where the above-mentioned 
elements find their coherence and application. This context usually takes stock 
of both the past and current situation, as well as the expected evolution in the 
future. In this sense, transport planning does not differ from general planning in 
other sectors. Once transformed into a policy tool or translated into a political 
document such as a ‘transportation plan’, transport planning consequently fills 
different functions.29
  Transport geographers sometimes mention two complementary functions 
that are integrated into the modus operandi of ‘predict and provide’, a process 
in which planners are invited to anticipate (predict) the needs and future 
problems of geographical mobility in order to implement (provide) adequate 
infrastructure, facilities and policies to optimize the efficiency of the system 
(traffic flow, safety of users, etc.) (Owens 5; Shaw, Knowles and Docherty 
; Vigar , ). In this case, the prediction function concerns expectations 
based on the current situation, previous experiences and projections. Using 
illocutionary classification, one may refer to assertive and expressive speech 
acts.30 The providential function concerns more concretely directive, commissive 
and declarative speech acts (Searle ).
29   Transport planning fills a pragmatic function (a decision) insofar as it announces a doing (a 
speech act), a semio-narrative function in the sense that it tells a story (past, present and future) 
by presenting (or denying / being silent about) the failures or the potential or actual successes of 
what has been made known, and a rhetorical function or marketing purpose (justification) where 
the planning seeks to convince someone of the merits of the approach taken.
30  However, because transportation plans are more than just prospective and because they 
try to propose a complete diagnosis of the past and present situation, it is perhaps more relevant 
to speak of an evaluation function rather than simply a prediction function. In this sense, planners 
and transportation geographers should refer to ‘evaluate and provide’.
184
  The ‘evaluate and provide’ process constitutes two important functions 
of transport planning; nevertheless, another function, which is not always 
mentioned, deserves to be mentioned, namely the justification function. One 
purpose of planning is indeed to provide stakeholders with a ‘rationale’ of 
representation and defendable information constructed as key facts that help 
justify the orientation of the decision makers. The justification acts as political 
marketing and aims to convince stakeholders of the relevance of the evaluation 
and providential functions.
transport planning as a narrative 
As an object of analysis, there is another role played by transportation plans 
which often remains tacit. This aspect concerns the semio-narrative dimension 
of transport planning. Basically speaking, transport planning is a ‘fairy tale’, but 
a reverse fairy tale: it is a narration that tells what will or might happen. Of 
course, transportation planning could be narrated as something accomplished 
or currently happening, but it is first developed as a ‘saga-to-come’. In this 
sense, transportation plans can be analysed as a narrative in a Greimassian way.31
  Borrowing from Greimas the idea of canonical narrative forms, one may 
expect to find in transportation plans, as in any other forms of narratives, three 
general axes and six actants: I) an axis of desire, where a subject is linked and 
(co-defined) with an object; II) an axis of power, where helpers facilitate and 
assist the subject to reach the object and where opponents constrain a contrario 
the subject in her/him/its quest; III) the axis of transmission (or knowledge), 
where a sender transmits to the subject the mission to accomplish and possibly 
its significance. Once the mission has been accomplished (or not), a receiver 
(the sender and/or the subject and/or any other protagonist) may benefit (or 
not) from the accomplishment (or not) of the quest in which the subject was 
engaged (Greimas []).
  Through the complex articulation of the plot and its semiotic nomenclature, 
Greimas also pays attention to the four potential phases of the narrative: 
manipulation, competence, performance and sanction. In the manipulation 
phase the subject is instructed about its mission. In the competence phase, the 
31    Semio-narrative theory has been used in several fields of social science. For examples of 
some applications, Cf. Boudes (2002).
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subject acquires the capacity (knowledge and tools) to undertake and succeed 
in its mission. During the phase of performance, where most of the core action 
takes place, the subject does what it is supposed to do to achieve its mission. 
Lastly, in the sanction phase, the subject obtains a verdict about the success 
or failure of its quest according to the outcomes of the quest and the relative 
benefits for the receiver(s).
  By referring to fairy tales clichés, one may illustrate the standard narratives. 
In fairy storylines, the King/Queen [sender] gives a mission to a heroine/hero 
[subject] who must save the kingdom from a disaster [phase of manipulation]. 
To ensure the safety of the kingdom [object], the protagonist must arm him/
herself and develop his/her learning [phase of competence]. By doing so, the 
main protagonist is ready to confront dragons and villains [opponent] thanks to 
the help of allies [helpers]. This is the core of the action [phase of performance]. 
At the end the hero/heroine receives a sanction depending on the outcome 
for the kingdom and other protagonists [receivers], a situation that makes it 
possible to judge the subject’s failure or success [phase of sanction].
  A similar scheme may be used to understand the logic of transport planning. 
However, in the transport planning narrative, the fantasy world is replaced by a 
non-fictional one; the actors are different while the actants, as structures, remain 
the same. The government or a collective of national governments [sender] 
may give a specific group or itself [subject] the mission to reach sustainable 
development [object] for the benefit of the community [receiver]. Confronting 
lack of time, knowledge and financial resources as well as non-adapted legal 
structures [opponent], the main conductor of the transportation plan must 
develop its strategy, improve its knowledge and obtain supplementary capacity 
to intervene. Thanks to the help of useful resources like good political tools 
and public consultation [helpers], the conductor of the plan may reach its 
objective(s). Depending on the quality or quantity of the projects achieved 
(or not achieved) during the follow-up of the plan, depending on the smooth 
running of the planning process itself, and depending on the outcome on the 
sustainability of transport, the conductor of the plan will be sanctioned. This 
could lead to the failure, success or partial success / failure of the plan, which 
may lead to a request for a new transportation process (an update to the plan) 
to improve or maintain transportation intervention. It is important to note that 
the narrative can be told from the point of view of transportation conductors 
or from the point of view of the transportation plan itself. The transportation 
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plan can consequently be associated with a different actancial role depending 
on who is narrating and how the narrative is structured.
  During the planning process, planners and working groups must generally 
go through four phases: ) the manipulation phase, where they are asked to 
achieve the mission; ) the competence phase, where they receive knowledge 
and suitable tools; ) the performance phase, where they engage in suitable 
interventions and ensure the implementation of projects; and 4) the sanction 
phase, where they receive feedback from the community or initiators of the 
plan. The sanction could lead to various conclusions from an iterative update 
of the actual plan to the start of a new strategic plan. The sanction could also 
lead to the abandonment of the process or even simply to the neglecting of the 
planning process.
governance complexity
One of the peculiarities of transport in both the political and planning 
dimensions is its presence at all levels of public governance, as well as its 
physical dimension, which requires coordination on a large scale since ad 
hoc interventions will affect the rest of the network scale and sometimes in 
other places, each level of governance generally assuming the responsibilities 
attached to the scale of governance, including the supranational level. Shaw, 
Knowles and Docherty note that “policies for transport are not just in relation 
to particular modes, but also different spatial scales which themselves usually 
reflect hierarchies of government institutions” (, ).
  Over the past 5 years, political authorities at various levels of governance 
have increased the number of public policies, initiatives and strategic planning 
efforts to improve the mobility of people and freight in the circumpolar regions 
(see Table .).
  At the national level, for instance, one may mention the case of Iceland, where 
the Ministry of the Interior has carried out a general draft transport policy.32 The 
32   The  new Ministry  of  the  Interior,  which  officially  started  its  activities  at  the  beginning 
of 2011, is the result of the fusion of two former ministries, namely the Ministry of Justice 
and Human Rights and the Ministry of Transport, Communications and Local Government. The 
Ministry of the Interior covers a wide range of political sectors including justice, the police, 
security, family, religion and the national church, immigration, postal services, communication and 
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Table 8.1 Examples of transport plans/strategies in the High North
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policy, which covers the years -, has the main aim of ensuring an efficient 
transport system in the field of civil aviation, maritime and road transportation for 
its citizens. The draft policy constitutes a good example of a transportation plan 
at the national level coping with major political issues and state responsibilities in 
the transportation field (Iceland, Ministry of the Interior, ).
  The state of Alaska offers a good illustration of the transportation planning 
process at the regional level.33 The Department of Transport and Public Facilities 
(DOT&PF) is conducting a -year Long Range Transportation Policy Plan 
following the federal regulation of the United States as well as the state’s 
own statute (United States, Federal Highway Administration, Department of 
Transportation ; Alaska State Government ). The current statewide 
transportation plan, called Let’s Get Moving 2030 (Alaska State Government 
), is also supported by six regional plans (Prince William Sound, Southeast 
Alaska, Southwest Alaska, Northwest Alaska, Yukon–Kuskokwim Delta and 
Interior Alaska), two metropolitan transportation areas plan (Anchorage and 
Fairbanks)34, as well as different modal/system transportation plans for aviation, 
State Rail, bicycles and pedestrians, and for safety issues on the Alaska Strategic 
Highway (Alaska State Government ).
  Other transportation plans at the regional level include, for instance, the 
transportation plan of Finnmark “Samferdselsplan for Finnmark –” 
(Finnmark fylkeskommune ) and the Nunavut Transport Strategy, which, 
curiously, is also entitled Let’s Get Moving (Nunavut, Department of Economic 
Development and Transportation ). Less holistic and more project-
oriented, the Northwest Territories in Canada have also provided a series of 
planning exercises during the past few years that have led to planning narratives. 
This kind of initiative suggests that planning can be undertaken at different 
levels of governance (Northwest Territories , 5a, 5b).
  From time to time, transportation plans and strategy go beyond the political 
boundaries of local, regional and national levels of governance. In , Yukon, 
transport, among others.
33  By “regional” here and subsequently, I mean the first-level administrative subdivision of a 
country: e.g., “state” in the USA, “province” in Canada, “county” in Norway.” The term is used in 
an administrative sense, not a geographical, cultural or economic one.
34  The execution of transportation plans is also compulsory under the federal regulations 
of the United States. Cf. 23 CFR § 450.322. Development and content of the metropolitan 
transportation plan.
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the Northwest Territories and Nunavut joined forces to influence the Canadian 
federal government on what should be done to improve the mobility of people 
and goods in the High Canadian North by publishing ‘Multi-Modal Transportation 
Blueprint for the North, a pan-territorial perspective on the transportation needs of 
Northern Canada’ (Northwest Territories, Ministry of Transportation; Nunavut, 
Ministry of Economic Development and Transportation; & Yukon, Ministry of 
Highways and Public Works ). However, the most ambitious example of 
partnership in transport planning remains ‘Sustainable Transport in the Barents 
Region’ (STBR) conducted in the Barents Euro-Arctic Transportation Area 
(BEATA). The plan was divided into two phases – STBR I (-5) and 
STBR II (5-) – and has delivered a significant number of transport 
studies and a general strategy in the vast region covered by the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council (BEAC) with the goal of “strengthening transport cooperation 
across the borders, specifically between Russia and Nordic Countries, and 
improving sustainability in transport” (STBR ). The process has involved 
many participants at different levels and a steering committee with high-level 
officials meeting on an annual basis. While activities slowed down in , 
initiatives to ensure a follow-up and give a new direction to the strategy are 
under consideration.35
the sustainable dimension 
Although people were not deliberately planning ‘unsustainable transport’ before 
the emergence of the sustainability paradigm in the wake of the Brundtland 
Report, one may question whether transportation has already been and can be 
eo ipso sustainable.36 The rapid expansion of transport systems – especially in 
35  It is possible to consult most of the STBR sector-based and technical studies as well 
as  BEATA  steering  committee  meeting  reports  at  http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/document_
database/wg_documents.aspx?ID=4. [Last accessed: 29.03.2012]. For a short critical presentation 
of the process, see the document prepared by Stig Nerdal (2011).
36  William R. Black, referring to historical works on transport (Albion 1965; Lay 1992), states, 
with a dash of biting wit, his doubts concerning the possibility of constructing a transportation 
system without negative externalities: “The major long-distance transport mode of the 1700s 
was sailing ships. Although they used renewable wind energy, they were becoming non-sustainable 
because they were depleting lumber stocks used in their construction and repair. The typical 
190
the western world, but more and more widely all around the world – appears 
to force all stakeholders to improve the way we travel and limit the negative 
impact of transport on ecosystems.
  The list of negative impacts caused by transportation – but even more by 
the expansion of transport systems – includes “congestion; fatalities and injuries; 
noise, air, and water pollution; greenhouse gas emissions; diminishing energy 
resources; and biological and ecosystem damage” (TRB 5, ). On the other 
hand, as mentioned in the European White Paper on Transport, “Overall, 
transport infrastructure investments have a positive impact on economic 
growth, create wealth and jobs, and enhance trade, geographical accessibility 
and the mobility of people” (European Commission , 4). The challenge is 
to achieve balance and a good understanding of how we can reach sustainable 
transport: “No major change in transport will be possible without the support 
of an adequate network and more intelligence in using it” (ibid. 4). How should 
the action of planners be guided? How should sustainable transport and its 
indicators be defined?
  In a paper prepared for the Transportation Research Board (TRB), William R. 
Black has compiled several essays on the definition of sustainable transportation 
(Black 5). The definitions include ) adaptation to the transportation field 
of the concept of sustainability as found in the Brundtland Report, sustainable 
transportation being defined as one “that meets the current transport and 
mobility needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
these needs” (Black , 4, 5; UN-WCED ); ) the general idea of 
the bankability of transportation as suggested by Schipper: “sustainable transport 
is transportation where the beneficiaries pay their full social costs, including 
those that would be paid by future generations” (Schipper ; quoted by 
Black 5, 4) a definition focused more on the general sustainability of the 
mobility dimension: “the ability to meet the needs of society to move freely, 
gain access, communicate, trade and establish relationships without sacrificing 
other essential human or ecological values today or in the future” (MIT & 
Charles River Associates , quoted by Black, ibid.).
  Definitions are not, however, without problems, and the pragmatic sense 
of planners sooner or later requires them to identify a list of problems, develop 
transport mode of urban areas in the 1800s was the horse–wagon–buggy–carriage system. That 
system resulted in tens of thousands of horses polluting streams, wells, and streets of these urban 
areas and obviously exceeded the assimilative capacity of these environments” (Black 2005, 36).
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some indicators, and list potential solutions that are adapted to the problems 
identified (Black , 5, ; Kahn Ribeiro et al. ; Litman , 
, ; TRB ). Echoing the classic dimensions of the nomenclature of 
Table 8.2 Sustainable transportation issues and impact of transport on sustainability 
Source: Inspired and adapted from Litman and Burwell (2006) and Litman (2008, 2009)
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sustainable development, which finds its practical formulation in the concept of 
the three ‘E’s’ (environment, economy and equity), Litman and Burwell () 
have identified a series of transport issues and problems that have an impact on 
sustainability (Table .).
  Once the transportation impacts are measured, established or simply 
anticipated (the narrative phase of competence), the stakeholders in 
transportation intervention hope to take suitable actions (the narrative phase of 
performance). So far, transport analysts have suggested a global way to classify 
possible actions and also more concrete measures to improve transportation 
sustainability and limit the negative impact of transport. 
  Banister, Pucher and Lee-Gosselin (, -), for instance, divide actions 
to be undertaken into four sets of policy measures: “a) Technology, including 
investment in technology[,] in transport modes, information systems and in the 
transport system itself, and in giving industry clear directions on priorities (e.g. 
on hybrid and fuel efficient vehicles and alternative fuels); b) User regulation, 
including driver and vehicle licensing, taxation and pricing, standards and 
traffic regulations; c) Land use development, including planning and regulation; 
d) Information, including social pressure, awareness raising, demonstration, 
persuasion, and individual marketing.”
  More concrete proposals for sustainable actions may include, for instance, 
as suggested by Kahn Ribeiro et al., measures like: “Lower speed limits on 
motorways; [maximise] occupancy vehicle requirements; develop free and 
expanded urban public transport for certain roads and networks; [encourage] 
vehicle maintenance requirements; [implement] odd/even number plate 
and other driving restrictions; [encourage] alternatives to travel (e.g., greater 
telecommuting); [reduce] congestion through removal of night-time/weekend 
driving bans for freight; direct traffic restrictions in certain districts, [adopt] 
emergency switching from road to rail freight” (, ).
  So far transportation plans which are sensitive to the imperative of 
sustainability have worked out to integrate, more or less successfully, proposals 
for interventions into their narratives.37 How can transportation planning in 
the High North integrate the sustainability dimension? The following section 
proposes a list of the main barriers that may be encountered by High North 
37  Jeon and Amekudzi (2005) give a good example of the integration of the sustainability 
paradigm within the Missions of the State Departments of Transportation in the United States. 
Cf. especially Table 1 (p. 31).
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transport planners, forcing them to adapt their planning narratives. Those 
barriers do not concern sustainability issues alone, but they pinpoint in general 
the contextual challenges faced by transport planners in the Northern polar 
region and hyper-peripheries.
some barriers
Barrier 1: the far north dimension
The first barrier may appear as a truism for the High North as it concerns 
the geographical dimension of transport from a geophysical perspective. 
This inescapable dimension of circumpolar geography endlessly provides the 
quintessential pitch line of transport planners who argue that transport faces 
unique challenges in the polar regions and must de facto be treated differently. 
The vast territory and its relative ‘inaccessibility’, the cold temperatures of 
the high latitudes, the sensitive environment, the strong manifestation of 
climate change and its impact on transport infrastructures all make adapted 
engineering, complex environmental procedures and exorbitant investment 
in cold regions essential. In some polar regions, the material needed for 
infrastructure construction or simply for maintenance must be transported 
by boat during the navigable season. Bad planning and neglectful requisitions 
cause delays and raise the cost of intervention. Broken pieces of transport 
machinery cannot always be replaced the following day, and calling in a 
transport specialist may involve extravagant expenditures. The capricious 
northern weather also has an impact on transport delays and practice and the 
non-exceptional presence of wild fauna on roads or even landing strips forces 
transport planners to heighten alertness concerning mobility aspects that are 
relatively less disturbing in the southern part of the northern hemisphere. 
Even when it comes to transport regulations, one may state that some standard 
transport rules are difficult to apply in the High North. This might be the case, 
for instance, concerning the statutory maximum hours that a trucker may 
drive for safety reasons. Without a place to stop and rest alongside the road, 
truck drivers venturing into the north will probably not risk stopping in 
mid-winter on the shoulder of the roadway under the pretext of respecting 
the regulation. Despite the risk, it might appear safer for truckers to extend 
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the driving time and arrive at their destination (Gouvernement du Québec 
5, ).38
  The geophysical aspect of circumpolar geography is, however, not the only 
factor that has an impact on the complexity of transport planning in the High 
North. The social and political context has proven to be challenging as well 
for planners, and planning tools must take into consideration several elements 
which appear totally different in the southern and more populated areas of the 
Arctic countries. The strong presence of indigenous communities, sometimes 
as a regional majority, the existence of a non-market economy and subsistence/
traditional activities, the convolution of multi-level Arctic governance, the 
unusual nature of Arctic demography (low-density population, high birth rates, 
and the percentage of young people in many indigenous communities, the 
challenges and patterns of migration), and the importance of some social and 
cultural issues affecting well-being in northern communities compel transport 
stakeholders to negotiate the priorities differently. Classic conflicts linked to 
land-use in the context of new transport projects constitute one example 
of challenge and clash between values and stakeholders: the preservation of 
fauna and flora for traditional activities vs. the development of new access for 
industry that may lead to profits for the economy (Northern Development 
Ministers Forum ).
  When linked together, the social and physical dimensions of High 
North geography contribute to the image of the Arctic Region as a unique 
ecosystem far from the rest of civilisation. In fact, many areas of the Arctic 
are well-developed both technologically and socially. However, the persistent 
remoteness and the distance between southern and High North communities 
as well as between the northern communities themselves, nonetheless, 
appear to Northerners as a major issue for mobility. Ironically, one important 
planning issue of High North transport planning is transport itself, as meeting 
sessions between stakeholders become an amazing puzzle of logistics. 
Meetings between northern stakeholders and sometimes their southern 
partners generally involve long journeys. Meeting possibilities depend on 
the availability and length of flights, weather conditions, the availability 
38  I have occasionally seen a plane crew (pilot and co-pilot) forced to share the same room 
in Nunavik on an overnight trip. While each crew member should, in theory, be provided with his 
or her own room in order to get as much rest as possible, the unavailability of rooms can lead to 
some deviation from the regulations.
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of accommodation, and the costs of transport. As a result, many transport 
planning meetings concerning ‘northern remote regions’ have to take place in 
southern capitals or administrative centres.
  These factors have a major impact on project costs, risks, social outcomes 
and the political life of Northern stakeholders. But they also affect long-term 
transportation planning itself by:
a) making it more difficult to predict trends and needs and to provide adequate 
consensual long-term transport solutions that are adapted to northern 
conditions;
b) forcing decision-makers and transport planners to think outside the square 
and justify their actions;
c) compelling policy makers to adapt the transport policy standards to the 
regional context;
d) making the logistics of the transportation planning process itself a puzzle.
Barrier 2: Lack of awareness of the transport system
Considering what has just been said about the High North as an awkward field 
for transport planning, one might believe that a good knowledge of the Arctic 
Region and transportation can at least guarantee better transport planning. A 
second barrier to arctic transport planning comes from the complexity at the 
core of transport planning itself. In fact, transportation itself - like many other 
political areas and regardless of the geographical region that one considers - has 
been developed in sub-sectors and requires nowadays the expertise of many 
specialists. There are good reasons to believe that this complexity is amplified in 
the High North, but to what extent?
  Horizontally, many transport practitioners have their own geographical 
areas. In many transport geography books, the geographical division is still 
dominated by the twosome ‘urban area’ and ‘rural area’. General transportation 
plans conducted at the more global or national levels try to embrace this 
general vision. This nomenclature is usually constructed on the basis of 
subjective criteria of demography/density and geographical functions (cities 
= industrial transformation, commercial activities and main administration of 
services; rural area = extraction/exploitation of natural resources) (Desmarais 
and Ritchot ). Transport geography theories have notably developed 
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the concept of IURT (Inter-Urban and Regional Transport) to facilitate the 
implementation of policies targeting the improvement of mobility between 
the two parts of the so-called centre-periphery paradigm (Charlton and Vowles 
). If under this classical geographical paradigm, the Arctic appears at first 
glance to be a northern periphery opposed to the great southern centre, many 
High Northerners may not recognize themselves in the former category. 
They usually argue that the Arctic Region has its own development dynamics 
where major cities like Murmank (approx. , inhabitants), Arkhangelsk 
(approx. 5, inhabitants) and Anchorage (approx. , inhabitants) are, 
demographically speaking, similar to major areas in the south. Small and middle-
sized cities in the North, like Akureyri, Rovaniemi, Tromsø, Kirkenes and 
Fairbanks, have developed into important centres of knowledge and education. 
The geopolitical position and security issues related to the whole region also 
contribute in general to the distinctive dynamics of the region. In terms of 
transportation, the ‘shared’ area has notably triggered cross-border initiatives at 
a high political level in order to find the best solutions to link and harmonize 
disparate national practices, regulations, norms and infrastructural systems. The 
presence of traditional activities and the spectacular development of the mass-
tourism sector may also puzzle transport planners: aren’t the transport systems 
of the High North different from those described in the classical categories of 
urban transport systems and rural transport systems?
  Vertically, in term of means of transport – air transport, maritime 
transport, railways, road transport, off-road vehicles (ORVs), public transport, 
bikes, etc. – in land transport, structures and infrastructures are differentiated. 
These divisions are reflected in the departmental organization of national 
and even regional transport administration. Despite global planning, one may 
observe that relations between those fields are intricate and often rare, and 
specialists of air transport and land transport seem to live in different worlds. 
It is interesting to note that many localities in the High North, despite their 
small size, have to cope just as much as populous major southern cities with 
all kinds of transport infrastructures: ports, airports, roads and sometimes 
railways. The geographical context requires infrastructures and transport 
equipment to find technology that is adapted to northern conditions while 
the social context and the distinctive environment demand the adaptation of 
southern transportation policies to the northern context. As a consequence, 
the administration of northern transport policies necessitates the contribution 
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of many specialists in different fields and, moreover, special knowledge of the 
cold regions and the hyper-peripheral context.
  Transversely, the focus on domains of intervention in transportation also 
adds to the complexity of knowledge requested to ensure shared, accepted 
solutions. Core specialties like safety, economy and the environment have 
found an important place in transport administration and planning, even 
sometimes eclipsing issues like mobility and access itself. In the Arctic, the 
development of aboriginal law, the emergence of new agreements and treaties, 
and the consolidation of new governance architecture have necessitated the 
improvement of competence in legal terms.
Barrier 3: a cumbersome process 
between tokenism and the zeal of expertise
Because of the complexity of the High North, planners risk falling awkwardly 
into one of two non-constructive tendencies in planning: tokenism or the zeal 
of expertise.
  In the first case, facing the complexity and the large number of various 
groups and interests represented by the stakeholders, planners may try to comply 
quickly with principles to plug the holes, for instance, by forming a symbolic 
work committee on the environment or by supporting the participation of one 
representative from indigenous people on a project work committee.
  In the second case, the good intention of being inclusive by involving a 
maximum number of stakeholders can lead to a long and cumbersome process 
of planning. Such decisions may appear as a good strategy to avoid implementing 
some projects quickly and thus to play for time. Sometimes, however, this may 
be the only level-headed opportunity to make interveners face each other 
and try to benefit from the point of view/know-how of everyone and avoid 
possible misunderstandings. In -, in Québec, when the community 
of Whapmagoustui and the Ministry of Transport of Québec started exploring 
the possibility of building the first road connection between the south and the 
adjacent Cree and Inuit communities of Whapmagoustui and Kuujurapik, the 
Ministry of Transport of Québec organized the first two committee meetings, 
which were attended by  organizations, many of them coming with several 
representatives including specialists and lawyers.39 A similar project in the south 
39  The meeting was not a consultation. The idea was to form an authentic working group. 
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would not have involved as many actors. In the transport planning process, this 
kind of project constitutes just one among many that should be coordinated to 
optimize the results.
Barrier 4: the eternal dissatisfaction of users 
and the necessity of prioritization by decision makers
This barrier arises notably for three reasons. First, because the interventions 
sometimes need to be implemented in a specific order so as to maximize results; 
many projects may not figure in a specific plan or suddenly come out at the top 
of a list of priorities even if they were not planned earlier, turning the original 
plans upside-down. The operational sequences are particularly significant in 
logistical and economic terms. For example, some villages in the Far North 
cannot afford the purchase of a crusher for infrastructure maintenance. Such 
equipment must be moved by barge during the navigation season from one 
village to another. As there is a risk that they will not see the crusher again for 
a few years, localities might be tempted to improve not only the road but also 
the apron of the airport, which is not a priority if we compare it to another 
community airport that might be waiting for its turn.
  
The pre-project committee included from the Federal Government: Economic Development 
Canada, Transport Canada, Public Works Canada, and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada; 
from the Provincial Government: Hydro-Québec, Tourisme Québec, Ministère des Ressources 
naturelles et de la Faune (Mining Sector); Ministère des Ressources naturelles et de la Faune 
(Forest Sector), Ministère des Transports du Québec, Secrétariat aux affaires autochtones (two 
representatives: one for the Crees and one for the Inuit); Ministère des Affaires municipales 
et des Régions (MAMR), and Ministère du Développement économique, de l’Innovation et de 
l’Exportation (MDEIE); for the Inuit: Makivik Corporation, Kativik Regional Government, and the 
Community of Kuujjuarapik; for the Cree: the First Nation of Whapmagoostui, the Grand Council 
of the Crees, the Cree Regional Authority, and the Nation of Chisasibi. To avoid burdening the 
process at this stage, both federal and provincial ministries of the environment were not invited 
at this stage. (Is this an example of tokenism? It  is difficult to say.) However, even though they 
would have been concerned by the project as the proposed road would pass through the James 
Bay area, the Municipality of Baie-James, the Regional Council of Baie-James and the Société de 
développement de la Baie-James were not invited either. They nevertheless asked to participate.
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The second reason arises from the trivial human fact that although there are 
a number of important concerns that all translate into concurrent needs or 
desires from various stakeholder groups, there is unfortunately, in principle, 
a limited number of resources to respond to the demand. This situation is 
not unique to the High North, but concerns the typical problem of resource 
allocation. Everybody wants the latest technology and the best transportation 
services. We all want an asphalt road in front of our place, and if others have 
one, why shouldn’t we? Moreover, once a project has been implemented, we 
tend to forget it and move on to our next request. Different agendas, visions 
and concerns may lead to tumultuous or long negotiation processes between 
the parties involved. An important source of stress for transportation decision 
makers is the creation of a precedent: “If we do it here, they will all want the 
same thing there”. In this case, one may say that this situation is especially true 
in the North, where decision makers have to justify high levels of investment 
and public expenses in areas with small populations.40
  Finally, changes that occur during the planning process complicate the 
situation. These changes have various roots: natural disasters, new economic 
potential, lack of resources, new social priorities, new political orientations, etc. 
Changes can be expected especially when the established order of priorities 
is planned within a fixed long-term framework (typically 5 to  years). The 
rapid changes in the Arctic over the last  years have forced planners to up-
date their agendas constantly.
40  I remember, while working on new projects in the High North of Québec, the reactions 
of some high-level administrators and even one politician. One project, for instance, involved 
the paving of the local road in Nunavik, notably to limit the negative effects of dust from gravel 
roads. Though the project was intended for municipalities which were under the responsibility 
of the provincial government, the fact that the municipalities were inhabited by Inuit led some 
governmental administrators to say: “If we asphalt a road for Inuit, we will have to do it in all the 
other aboriginal areas.” A similar reaction happened later when working on the delivery of the 
Transport Strategy for the Nord-du-Québec region in 2007-2008. Some provincial civil servants 
were unenthusiastic about the idea of strong public participation of the Northerners – and 
especially the Crees and the Inuit – in the planning process. They were worried that Natives from 
other regions might ask for similar conditions in future projects. These kinds of reactions are 
taboo and not well documented or publicized among the public and the public administration.
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Barrier 5: the unnoticed high north dimension in transport 
planning - the gap between southern and arctic transport planners
Whether we talk about general reports, public policies or national strategies 
on transportation, polar transport in both its political and technical dimensions 
still remains overlooked. To illustrate the situation, one may refer to most 
official policies concerning transport planning in the West. For instance, the 
document from the European Commission “A sustainable future for transport: 
Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system” may be considered 
as representative of the style of semiotics (European Commission ). As 
in many cases, transport is represented visually in the main document as well 
as on the website by the most common means of transport (maritime, air, 
terrestrial), but the general semiotics concerns the urban dimension of great 
cities during summer time. In such a representation, it is difficult to find 
the presence of any circumpolar dimensions. In reality, despite the fact that 
many national and transnational policies intend to pay more attention to 
issues of equity and transport for remote regions (Hoffmann and Bentzen 
; Spiekermann and Wegener ; White ), remoteness remains 
scantily represented. Obviously, the illustration of heavy traffic in urban 
agglomerations is a well-known issue in Europe, whereas the simple northern 
image of reindeers on the roads of Lapland is far from being part of general 
European transportation concerns. In the case of Europe, this situation is 
especially interesting as Europe is currently engaged in an important process 
of creating a European Arctic policy (Airoldi , ; Council of the 
European Union ; European Commission ).
  One of the most important meetings of transport specialists in Europe is the 
Association of European Transport. The association holds a three-day congress 
(the European Transport Conference) every year, attracting more than 5 
specialists from more than  countries. Since , the proceedings of the 
conferences have usually been published on the website of the association as 
well as the list of presentations. Of a total of  papers listed, only two of them 
include the keyword ‘Arctic’.41 More than  papers include the keywords 
‘urban’, 5 contain the word ‘London’, and  have ‘Paris’ (Association for 
European Transport). Transportation analysts admit that transport geography 
41  One of them was written by Serge B. Shlikhter (1998). The other was written by the 
author of this paper in 2009 (Ampleman 2009).
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has a strong focus on urban populations and remains very car-centric (Shaw, 
Knowles and Docherty , ; Sustrans , 4). Northern transport planners 
have a great deal to do to integrate polar issues into the pool of sustainable 
mobility issues.
Barrier 6: oft-overlooked transport concerns in arctic studies 
and among social scientists – the gap between practitioners and 
social scientists
It is not only in the field of planning practice that the polar transport planner 
seems isolated. If the Arctic seems to be quasi-absent in transport planning 
discourse, the presence of transport in Arctic studies also remains significantly 
unremarkable. In general, the question of mobility in the Arctic has received a 
good deal of attention from the general public as well as from scholars in the last 
decade. In this context, transportation has been considered from various angles:
•	 Extreme transportation narratives: the crossing of the Bering Strait, the 
adventures of fearless explorers trapped in ice with their vessels, the polar race at 
the turn of the early th century, and lonely ice road truckers braving the polar 
night. Historians have borne out the difficulties and the ingenuity of northern 
communities and explorers linked to mobility toward, from and within the 
northernmost areas, reporting about all means of transport used from the dog 
sled to boat planes. Military history, especially after the late th century, provides 
relevant information to understand the development of transport systems and 
infrastructures. (Cf. the following publications of the journal Arctic - Arctic Institute 
of North America: Barr 5; MacLaren 4; Nelson ; and Veluwenkamp 
5. More generally, Cf. Drivenes and Jølle . Concerning ice-road truckers, 
Cf. the popular television series on the History Channel and Rowland ).
•	 Growing interest in Arctic issues and geopolitics has also brought significant 
concerns about the importance of transportation in the Arctic. Some events 
have benefited in recent years from generous press coverage and abundant 
publications: the Russian operation resulting in planting of the Russian the 
flag on the Arctic seabed, control of Arctic sea passages, the need for new 
icebreakers, the risk of maritime piracy, the struggle over Hans Island, military 
patrols and exercises in the Barents Sea, and the search for new opportunities 
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for towing and commercializing icebergs. (Many examples in this field can be 
given: Cf., for instance, Christopher and Fast ; Du Castelle ; Heininen 
4; Labévière and Thual ; Lasserre , ; Quilleré-Majzoub ; 
Voronkov .)
•	 There is a need for new investments in the far North following national poli-
cies and strategies pinpointing the economic potential of the ‘polar-dorado’ and 
the importance of improving infrastructures in order to access natural resources. 
Another aspect of this economic development in the High North concerns new 
tourist packages and the development of Arctic sightseeing: epic polar cruises, 
dog sledding trips, and whale watching in converted fishing boats. (Following 
are some examples for guidance: Ejdemo and Söderholm ; Glomsrød and 
Aslaksen ; Heininen ; Stewart, Draper and Johnston 4.)
•	 Anthropologists have studied the significance of mobility and the impact of 
new infrastructure and technology (including snowmobiles, GSP, infrastructures) 
on traditions and small and remote northern and traditional communities. (Cf. 
Hastrup 4; Stammler .)42
42  During the Seventh International Congress of Arctic Social Sciences (ICASS VII) held in 
Akureyri in June 2011, a session was organized by Joachim Otto Habeck (Siberian Studies Centre, 
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Germany) and Ludek Broz (also from the Max 
Planck Institute) on the theme: Movement for Pleasure – the Pleasure of Moving. This session 
focused on the topic of physical mobility, bringing new considerations on transport, trade and the 
actors associated with different patterns of mobility. These presentations can be considered “in 
line” with the concept of the New Mobility paradigm (Ury & Sheller 2006). Among the researchers 
who spoke during this session, I would like to mention Donatas Brandišauskas (Walking, Routes and 
Strength among Orochen-Evenki Hunters and Herders of Zabaikal’e (East Siberia)), Anna Stammler-
Gossmann (Pleasure with profit or profit with pleasure: The concept of travelling abroad in Russia), 
and Ludek Broz (Changing habits of travelling in Siberia). In another session, Tanya Argounova-Low 
presented a paper about truckers in Sakha (Roads and Long-Distance Driving in Sakha (Yakutiia)). 
I  believe  that  this field of  research can be beneficial  for  transport  analysts by bringing newer 
perspectives than those associated with “hard” geopolitics and technical engineering. Cf. http://
www.iassa.org/images/stories/ICASS_Program_book_main_text_Revized_June_19_jhi.pdf. [Last 
accessed: 26.11.201]
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This recognition of transportation as a significant factor in the development of 
circumpolar regions sheds light on many significant issues affecting the well-being 
of Arctic people(s). However, Arctic transportation is rarely at the centre of these 
analyses or studied as a system.43 In the essential Arctic Human Development 
Report (4), for instance, the mobility of people and goods has not been 
studied thoroughly, although its importance has been mentioned, notably in 
the chapter on Circumpolar International Relations and Geopolitics (Heininen 
4). Overall, there is little risk of mistake in stating that the overall picture of 
the status of polar transport is still missing. Such a picture could help decision 
makers and Northern transport analysts by providing referential guidelines in a 
different paradigm than those associated with urban and rural transportation.
Barrier 7: the lack of publicity about local transport in 
the polar regions: the gap between the global and the local
So far, an essential part of geopolitical analysis regarding transportation in the 
Arctic has focused on both the spectacular dimension and global perspective 
(IR), especially issues involving security, the environment and economics.
  This situation has led, for instance, to the consideration of the important 
global dimension of transport. However, without denying the importance 
of those international matters, one might argue that a number of concerns 
regarding the Circumpolar mobility of people and goods at the local and 
regional levels continue to be unfamiliar to both the general public and global 
transportation specialists. Among the concerns that have found a place on the 
agenda of High North regional transportation planners, but still may appear 
strange to others, one may mention:
•	 Access to trap lines / hunting zones
•	 Reindeer husbandry protection
•	 Mobile health care and evacuation
•	 The improvement of east-west connections
•	 Border crossings for people 
•	 Rescue services cooperation
•	 Small craft safety 
43  A quick look at the Arctic Journal, for example, shows that among the 2600 articles 
published since 1948, only six to ten touch more specifically on transportation as a system.
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•	 Adapted snowmobile networks 
•	 Decontamination of former mining and military sites
•	 Protection from problems associated with drugs, alcohol, gambling and           
 crime
•	 Cost of transport vs. imported goods
•	 Food safety 
•	 Maximisation of local benefits generated by the transport industry as well  
 as by parallel industries (infrastructure construction, logistic services,  
 consulting, etc.)
The division between the levels of issues (local and global) represents a 
significant barrier that transport planners, notably at the regional level, must 
surmount to propose solutions considering the Arctic transportation network 
as an integrated transport system.
Barrier 8: The long-lasting road to an Arctic global vision and filling 
the void between transport users and specialists of arctic regions
At the technocratic level, Arctic transportation practitioners and specialists across 
the Arctic have not had many occasions to meet and discuss circumpolar mobility 
issues in their global dimension. Although in the recent past some initiatives 
have been undertaken and have provided an occasion for transport specialists of 
remote regions to meet or have a rallying point for discussions about shared issues 
in their practice, most of these events have been aimed at specific, limited sectors 
(for example, the Arctic Marine Transport Workshop 4, Arctic Roads , 
the Arctic Aviation Experts Conference ). Other events linked to security, 
the environment and technical challenges take place on a regular basis. A good 
example would be the Arctic Council - Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response working group (http://eppr.arctic-council.org). The Journal of Cold 
Regions Engineering, which has been in print since , publishes articles for 
transport specialists interested in technical issues of the high latitudes (ascelibrary.
org/cro/). Architects of transport policies in the Arctic are beginning to have 
closer contacts. Several of them have already had the chance to meet at the pan-
regional level. The Barents Euro-Arctic Transport Area is an example drawn from 
Northern Europe.44 A Northern Transportation Conference in Canada has taken 
44  Cf. Barents Euro-Arctic Transport Area: http://www.beac.st/?DeptID=8573 [Last 
accessed: 29.03.2012].
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place every two years since 5; issues such as new transportation technologies 
for Northern climates, the capacity of current transportation resources to meet 
demand, sovereignty and security issues, updates on major projects, and northern 
transportation corridors have been at the centre of discussion (Van Horne 
Institute ). Some projects are currently being developed which embrace 
a more global vision for the idea of a working group in transport and logistics 
at the Northern Institute.45 In the near future, one may hope that those recent 
initiatives will provide a general toolbox to improve practices and support 
transport interventions adapted to the situation in the High North.
  However, the distance between decision makers / specialists and those who 
should be the general beneficiaries of transport policies – the infrastructures 
users and the northern population – must be taken into account. As already 
suggested, the world of transport is particularly complex. The technical jargon 
and impossible-to-read infrastructure plans and specifications may widen the 
gap between the experts and the public.
  Hypothetically, the strong male dominant culture in the field may also have 
certain consequences in the way issues are prioritized. From those who conduct, 
drive and pilot the means of transport to transport ministers, from those who 
build infrastructures to those who own transport companies and offer services, 
transport remains a world oriented towards the male gender (RTPI ). The 
development of a global vision and matching plan that can challenge, raise 
questions, and generate debate in which everybody participates, including 
indigenous people, youths and elderly people, remains an important issue.
Barrier 9: the invisible mobility behind transport
A major barrier regarding the planning of transport in general may be found in 
the significant misunderstanding that exists between ‘fundamental mobility’ and 
‘transport as physical mobility’. The second concept concerns people’s physical 
access to their place of work and places that provide services like schools, 
hospitals, post offices and commercial centres. The situation may refer to the 
existence of public services and the capacity of governmental organizations 
to provide transport service for the population. Fundamental mobility goes 
45  Concerning logistics issues in the High North, cf. The Centre for High North Logistics in 
Kirkenes (http://www.chnl.no/) and the project conducted by the Northern Dimension Institute 
on Transport and Logistics (http://www.ndinstitute.org/) [Last accessed: 29.03.2012].
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further and concerns an anthropological dimension impacting the geography 
of transport itself. To be more explicit, it is worth going deeper into the 
fundamental dialectical concepts of nomadism and sedentarism.
  In traditional scientific literature, the concept of nomads and sedentary 
people has been used to distinguish different human lifestyles. The term 
‘nomad’ is used to designate people who are in “constant movement in search 
of sustenance, especially for grazing animals”, and ‘sedentary people’ is used 
for those who are ‘non-migrant’, who set up for good in a specific location 
where local-based production takes place (Clark 5, ). This distinction 
remains important in the Arctic for social scientists and people defending their 
traditional rights in connection with nomadic and semi-nomadic activities.
  In a distinct usage of this nomenclature, structural geographers have made 
a distinction between nomads and sedentary people. The former are defined as 
actors who control their own mobility, who have the political, symbolic and 
economic power to go ‘where they want when they want’. Sedentary actors 
are, therefore, those who must make do with the available space following the 
control of geographical positions (Desmarais and Ritchot ). According 
to this new definition, nomads can historically be associated with powerful 
institutions (the church, the State) and major landowners who benefit from 
certain privileges, inherited or variously obtained. This situation makes 
them able to access not only certain prestigious positions but also to insure 
the building of production equipment and industries, the creation of rules 
concerning the zoning of agricultural areas, and the displacement of certain 
populations or groups for various reasons. The advantageous situation of 
nomads has also given them, and continues to give them, a certain measure of 
control over transport infrastructures.
  This new distinction is important in the sense that it helps to debug the 
traditional distinction between the rural and urban dimensions, between the 
centre and the periphery. Having access to the most prestigious places or to the 
production places is structured in part by the actors’ fundamental capacity for 
pre-mobility (Desmarais and Ritchot ). There is an important difference 
between those who build mines and deep water ports, travel by hydroplane with 
remote hunting/fishing/trekking outfitters for adventure weekends, finance 
roads and set up military bases, and have the power to prevent construction in 
certain areas and allow the building of infrastructure in other places; and those 
who deal with new rules about ORVs, who have to economize in order to buy 
their own plane tickets or have moved to the North because of their work, 
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thanks to the mobility capacity of the former. The development of research 
in structural geography has opened a new field of research to understand 
mobility and the power relations between actors (Desmarais and Ritchot ). 
Transport planners concerned with the social issue of transportation equity can 
no longer ignore this new theoretical advance.
Barrier 10: The deficiency of mobility and 
sustainable transport indicators for the arctic
All of the above-mentioned barriers have a major impact on the ideal of 
transportation planning in the Arctic Region: the development of a global 
vision and an appropriate toolbox for sustainable mobility in the Arctic. In order 
to improve the development of a sustainable solution for transport, transport 
experts have been working for the last  years on transport indicators. Many 
indicators and models have been developed in the context of challenges faced 
by large agglomerations. Some work has been proposed together with some 
reflections to improve sustainable rural transport in the context of IURT 
(Inter-Urban and Regional Transport). In a preventive perspective, several 
practitioners have put forward a series of initiatives that can be undertaken to 
improve the sustainability of transportation.
  Most of the indicators and initiatives that seem appropriate in most 
western countries would, however, have difficulty finding adequate support 
in the Arctic Region and remote areas. Classical initiatives that have been 
suggested include: i) reducing the need to travel; ii) switching to more 
efficient modes of transport, providing more ecological transportation options 
like pedestrian and bicycle routes; iii) reducing travel distance by promoting 
high-quality locations; iv) using the best available technology, like hybrid 
cars; v) implementing road pricing systems and increasing parking costs; vi) 
organizing projects like car-free days (Banister, Pucher and Lee-Gosselin ; 
Black 5; Litman ).
  After evoking some barriers encountered by transportation planners 
in general and, more precisely, in the context of the High North, where 
interventions and planning face more specific if not exclusive difficulties, 
the following section aims to suggest some avenues that may help predict, 
provide, and justify long-term transportation planning and intervention in the 
circumpolar regions.
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some avenues 
Five avenues may be suggested to surmount the difficulties and facilitate 
the planning of polar transportation. Although these avenues may appear as 
general intuitive recommendations, they are nonetheless based on the central 
assumption that transport planning, like any public narrative, can be understood 
by all the stakeholders who are potentially part of the narrative scheme and 
who are open to implementing potential solutions to circumvent the previously 
diagnosed barriers.
avenue 1: preparing a global portrait of transport, 
mobility, and transport planning strategies in the arctic
As has already been mentioned, the transportation systems in the Arctic have 
been treated to date in several specific ways under various approaches and 
rarely as a whole. In addition, a general picture of the polar transportation 
situation is still missing. Such a picture has already been produced for other 
sectors (the environment, health, education, language, culture). The mobility 
of people and goods could and should receive, in the near future, the same 
kind of attention as those issues addressed in the Arctic Human Development 
Report. Such a general picture could i) serve as a basis for discussion to 
inform public policies in the field of Arctic transportation; ii) feed further 
studies and facilitate decisions in other areas where transportation constitutes 
an issue (the economy, education, health, well-being in general); and iii) allow 
actors of the Northern circumpolar region to share a common vision and 
compare their own situations within the Arctic. Then they could negotiate 
with national governments in order to establish appropriate policies, 
particularly regarding criteria for sustainable transport that are adapted to the 
conditions in the Arctic.
avenue 2: encouraging studies on a new mobility paradigm 
that is applicable to the arctic
The question of transport has, for too long, been dominated by issues related 
to engineering. This applies rightly to construction standards and maintenance, 
but also to social aspects concerning safety, comfort, the environment, access 
and quality of services. The advent of a new mobility paradigm has opened a 
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field of refreshingly new and critical reflections on the movement of people 
and goods (Sheller and Urry ). It has also raised the question of sustainable 
transportation in a much more holistic dimension. Transportation specialists 
can no longer ignore this new dimension and must take into account the 
contributions of interdisciplinary researchers who question travel experiences: 
Why do people move or not move? Why it is acceptable for some travellers to 
take more time while travelling or commuting? How can a sense of security 
be increased among travellers? How can greater equity in transportation be 
promoted? How can we, in some cases, facilitate the ‘immobility’ of certain 
groups who prefer to avoid travel? How can we transform stops and transits 
into more pleasant experiences for commuters? In this regard, the Arctic 
Region might not appear only as an area of challenges for transport, but 
also as an immense opportunity for travellers. The efficiency of transport, the 
ability to reach one’s destination and the importance of the automobile remain 
pervasive aspects of transportation planning, but their ‘obviousness’ as priorities 
for transport can also be subject to further questioning. As the Arctic is facing 
unusual challenges from the traveller’s point of view, the region also offers great 
opportunities to confront conventional points of view on transportation.
 
avenue 3: debating the criteria for sustainability mobility and a
typology of mobilities in the arctic (propose a model and promote it)
Due to concern about the intense development of transport networks in dense 
urban areas, as well as road congestion and increasing sensitivity to questions of 
safety and the risk that transportation represents for the environment, several 
solutions have been advanced in the last twenty years to promote more sustainable 
transportation. Indicators have been developed and public policies have been 
implemented to bring about changes. Since the majority of the population 
is concentrated around central and dense agglomerations, many policies and 
intervention measures are not tailored nowadays to meet the environmental, 
economic and equity challenges affecting transportation in the High North. 
In the near future, stakeholders from the northern circumpolar region should 
work on new indicators, taking into account long-distance travel, the natural 
and physical conditions of the High North, traditional activities, the limited 
possibilities to implement some urban-tailored solutions, and the mobility 
patterns of polar people. New criteria should be debated and developed in line 
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with the type of polar transport users/actors (workers travelling in and out, 
locals practicing traditional activities, locals with low-regional mobility, tourists, 
etc.) and the type of localization.
avenue 4: Linking global/spectacular issues to Local/ 
Modest Concerns
Transportation modes are complementary, and people generally use the 
same transportation infrastructures. However, several polar actors such as 
multinationals, wealthy hunting/fishing outfitters and army forces have their 
own transport infrastructure. Transportation networks can be considered on 
a regional basis, but travellers and traders often do not pay attention to these 
political limits. In the long term, transportation systems and infrastructures 
represent capital for those who build them and a source of challenges for 
those who inherit them. Who is going to benefit from good infrastructure 
tomorrow? Who is going to suffer from a dangerous network, and who will 
have to cope with the environmental impact of transportation? Who will 
have better access to resources and services? Who will profit from the effects 
generated by transport? All these questions are linked. Transport planners 
concentrate only on a few ‘strategic corridors’ while geopoliticians focus 
only on international transportation conflicts. But, then again, the issue of 
managing the capital of transportation systems remains. In the Arctic, as in 
other regions, the modest infrastructure must be seen as part of a bigger system 
and the mobility of local actors as part of the geopolitics of well-being. In 
this geopolitics, the actors negotiate projects and services while institutions at 
different levels of governance spend a great deal of time, energy and money 
to reconcile divergences and mediate conflicts. However, transportation 
systems in the Arctic appear rapidly in their international dimension. A project 
for a new mining road in Sweden may quickly be considered to have a big 
impact on the transport logistics of northern Russia or even China, while a 
new legal agreement with an Aboriginal community in Alaska concerning 
the construction of a pipeline may be considered as a model for further 
transportation development in Labrador. Transport planners, policy makers 
and mobility researchers must consequently re-think polar transportation as a 
system in its holistic dimension.
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avenue 5: simplify the reading of transportation plans 
by using simple tools (posters) and presenting them as 
they really are: narratives 
Planning tools are often designed by practitioners with extensive technical 
experience. They are the product of a long process and complex engineering. 
Transport strategies may appear to citizens to be long, mind-numbing 
documents. Conversely, shorter versions may look like the meaningless result 
of political marketing. To be understandable and satisfactory to all stakeholders, 
transportation plans must be readable by all. One possible strategy for planners 
to ensure common understanding is to develop visual tools offering a 
comprehensible synopsis of transport planning at a glance, for instance, on a 
poster or a series of posters.
  Such a tool should be easily modifiable and easily revised over time according 
to the evolution of planning. Progress should be noticeable: which interventions 
have been successfully completed, which ones have not yet been accomplished, 
which ones have been abandoned, and which ones are under development. 
Transport planners can then add new projects and mention new constraints. 
Transportation plans should also be honest and assert, without hiding anything, 
what they really are: narratives. All stakeholders should be able to assess the story 
which is told and identify who the subjects are, the objects, the helpers and the 
opponent, the senders and receivers of the planning quest. People of the Arctic 
might be able to understand in what way the region is a general receiver (that 
will benefit from the quest) and whether the subject will be able to accomplish 
its mission. They must be able to confront the narrative of “their” transportation 
plan with their own projected narrative. This situation is also true at the pan-
national level, for example, in the Barents Region. The fact that people from dif-
ferent cultures and countries are working on the same narrative constitutes a sup-
plementary challenge, but also justifies the development of simplified tools with 
which everybody can understand the direction taken. With Arctic sustainability 
as the object of the narrative of transport planning, people from the Arctic would 
also benefit from telling their own narrative about the future to decision-makers 
at the national level of governance. In short, they may make clear for themselves 
why planning sustainable transport in the High North is different and requires 
different tools from those used in other regions. The national decision makers 
may then negotiate this narrative with other decision makers.
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Conclusion
Planning the best solutions for transport systems and providing adequate policies 
remain a perpetual challenge for transport specialists. However, non-planning is 
not an option, as non-planning is, in fact, a form of planning. The assumption 
that one must evaluate and provide the best solutions to ensure the mobility of 
people and goods by using existing infrastructural capital appropriately seems 
indisputable. Nonetheless, this capital differs from place to place. The mobility 
of actors and benefits from transport are also unequal. For both physical and 
political reasons, polar transportation is confronted by supplementary challenges. 
Some of these challenges have been discussed in this chapter.
  So far, despite the importance of transportation as a key development factor 
for the Arctic, as well as for the well-being of its inhabitants, few studies have 
been undertaken to describe the transportation situation in the circumpolar 
region. The development of specially adapted indicators for sustainable mobility 
in the Arctic has yet to occur. The establishment of a general picture and the 
identification of polar transport indicators would constitute an opportunity 
for the people of the High North to clarify the situation, agree on common 
sustainable objectives in order to maximize positive effects on regional well-
being, and facilitate better use of existing infrastructural capital. It would finally 
constitute a foundation to negotiate with national governments concerning the 
implementation of adequate solutions for the Arctic.
  For a region like the one covered by the Barents Euro-Arctic Transport Area 
(BEATA), this challenge is even more complex. The STBR process undertaken a 
few years ago constitutes a serious effort to plan several specially adapted actions 
in transport and reinforce the position of the region by enhancing the transport 
systems. Even if the follow-up to the STBR appears modest, the region has 
benefited since the beginning of the process from a better overview of the 
situation. Transport policy-makers have developed links with each other, many 
projects are still under development, and the common interest in going further 
with a general vision for the region still seems to have general support. As a 
narrative, transport planning is never completely finished. Despite the difficulties 
that transport planning represents in regions such as the BEATA, some avenues 
have been proposed in this chapter to facilitate the next steps. These avenues 
notably imply the elaboration of specially adapted Arctic transport indicators, 
the facilitation of general participation and the understanding of all stakeholders 
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concerned by transportation through the use of simplified tools, and the 
inclusion of all transport dimensions in order to make better use of the actual 
infrastructural capital of the Barents Transport systems.
references
a L a s K a  s tat e  g ov e r n M e n t  (). Alaska statute (AS 44.4.5): 
State transportation plan. Retrieved March , , from http://touchngo.
com/lglcntr/akstats/Statutes/Title44/Chapter4/Section5.htm.
a L a s K a  s tat e  g ov e r n M e n t , Alaska Department of Transportation 
and Public Facilities (). Alaska statewide transportation plan: Let’s get moving 
2030. Retrieved November , , from http://www.dot.state.ak.us/
stwdplng/areaplans/lrtpp/SWLRTPHome.shtml.
a L a s K a  s tat e  g ov e r n M e n t,  Alaska Department of Transportation 
and Public Facilities (). Statewide long range transportation plan: Guiding 
transportation development for Alaska’s future. Retrieved March , ,. from 
http://www.dot.state.ak.us/stwdplng/areaplans/.
a L B i o n , r . g .  (5). Forests and sea power: The timber problem of the Royal 
Navy, 1652–1862. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books.
a M p L e M a n , L .  (). Planning, managing and communicating together: The 
“results chain” as an alternative tool for regional transport planning (Paper prepared for 
the European Transport Conference held in Leeuwenhorst, 5- October ).
a i r o L d i , a . (). The European Union and the Arctic - policies and 
actions (Report prepared for the Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen 
). Retrieved November , , from http://www.norden.org/da/
publikationer/publikationer/-/at_download/publicationfile.
a i r o L d i , a .  (). The European Union and the Arctic: Main developments 
July 2008–July 2010 (Report prepared for the Nordic Council of Ministers, 
Copenhagen ). Retrieved November , , from http://www.norden.
org/en/publications/publikationer/-.
a r C t i C  av i at i o n  e x p e r t s  C o n f e r e n C e  (). Fairbanks, 
Alaska, - October . Retrieved March , , from http://www.
institutenorth.org/programs/arctic-advocacy-infrastructure/arctic-aviation-
experts-conference/-conference.
214
a r C t i C  h u M a n  d e v e L o p M e n t  r e p o r t  (4). Akureyri: 
Stefansson Arctic Institute. Retrieved November , , from http://www.
svs.is/AHDR/.
a r C t i C  M a r i n e  t r a n s p o r t  W o r K s h o p  (4). Organised by 
the Scott Polar Research Institute, Cambridge University, United Kingdom. 
Retrieved March , , from http://www.institutenorth.org/programs/
arctic-advocacy-infrastructure/arctic-maritime/arctic-marine-transport-
workshop/.
a r C t i C  r o a d s  (). Operating, maintaining and building roads in a 
climatically challenging environment, Sisimiut, Greenland,  - 5 March . 
Retrieved March , , from http://www.greenland-innovation.com/stuff-
UK/UK-Vejkonf-invitation.pdf.
a s s o C i at i o n  f o r  e u r o p e a n  t r a n s p o r t  (n.d.). Proceedings 
of the European Transport Conferences held since . Retrieved November 
,  from http://www.aetransport.org/lc_cms/page_view.asp?id=.
B a n i s t e r , d. ,  p u C h e r , J .  a n d  L e e - g o s s e L i n , M .  (). 
Making sustainable transport politically and publicly acceptable. In P. Rietveld 
& R. Stough (Eds.), Institutions and sustainable transport: Regulatory reform in 
advanced economies, pp. -5. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
B a r r , W. (5). Imperial Russia’s pioneers in Arctic aviation. Arctic (), 
-.
B e a C  (n.d.). Steering committee for the Barents Euro-Arctic Pan-European 
transport area (BEATA). Retrieved March , , from http://www.beac.
st/?DeptID=5.
B L a C K , W. r .  (). Sustainable transportation: A U.S. perspective. Journal 
of Transport Geography 4(), 5-5.
B L a C K , W. r .  (4). Sustainable transport and potential mobility. European 
Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research (/4), -5.
B L a C K , W. r .  (5). Sustainable transport: Definitions and response. 
In Transportation Research Board (Ed.), Integrating sustainability into the 
transportation planning process (Conference Proceedings  by the Committee 
for the Conference on Introducing Sustainability into Surface Transportation 
Planning, Baltimore, Maryland, July –, 4), pp. 5-4.
B L a C K , W. r .  () Sustainable transportation: Problems and solutions. New 
York: Guilford.
215
B o u d e s , t.  (). Faut-il demander des contes au management stratégique 
? La dimension narrative de la stratégie d’entreprise. Actes de la 11e Conférence 
Internationale de l’Association Internationale de Management Stratégique, ESCP-EAP, 
2002, 5-7 Juin, Paris.
C at ta n , n .  (). Transport. In C. Ghorra-Gobin (Ed.), Dictionnaire des 
mondialisations, pp. -5. Paris: Armand Colin.
C h a r Lto n , C . &  vo W L e s , t.  (). Inter-urban and regional 
transport. In: R. Knowles, J. Shaw & I. Docherty (Eds.), Transport geographies: 
Mobilities, flows and spaces, pp. -. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
C h r i s to p h e r , J .  &  f a s t, e .  (). The Arctic - transportation, 
infrastructure and communication. In InfoSeries. Government of Canada, Library 
of the Parliament. Retrieved November , , from http://www.parl.gc.ca/
Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb-e.htm.
C L a r K , a . n  (5 []). Penguin dictionary of geography. Third Edition. 
London.
C o u n C i L  o f  t h e  e u r o p e a n  u n i o n  (). Council Conclusions 
on Arctic Issues (5th Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels,  December 
). Retrieved November , , from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/4.pdf.
d e s M a r a i s , g . &  r i t C h ot, g .  (). La géographie structurale. Paris: 
L’Harmattan.
d r i v e n e s , e . - a . &  J ø L L e , h . d.  (). Into the ice: The history of Norway 
and the Polar Regions. Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag.
d u  C a s t e L L e , v.  (). Le grand Nord: un nouvel enjeu très courtisé - 
L’exemple de la mer de Barents, Norvège. Paris: L’Harmattan.
e J d e M o , t. &  s ö d e r h o L M , p.  (). Mining investment and regional 
development: A scenario-based assessment for Northern Sweden. Resources 
Policy (), 4-.
e u r o p e a n  C o M M i s s i o n  (). Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council - The European Union and the Arctic Region 
(COM()  final). Retrieved November , , from http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:::FIN:EN:PDF.
e u r o p e a n  C o M M i s s i o n  (). A sustainable future for transport: 
Towards an integrated, technology-led and user-friendly system. Retrieved November 
, , from http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/doc/_future_of_
transport/_presentation_communication_a_sustainable_future_for_
transport.pdf.
216
e u r o p e a n  C o M M i s s i o n  (). Roadmap to a single European transport 
area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system (White Paper: 
Brussels, .. COM() 44 final). Retrieved November , , from 
http://www.europolitique.info/pdf/gratuit_fr/-fr.pdf.
f i n n M a r K  f y L K e s Ko M M u n e  (). Samferdselsplan for Finnmark 
–. Retrieved March , , from http://www.ffk.no/docs/
d55b45-af-4c-a-5ec4f.pdf.
g L o M s r ø d, s .  &  a s L a K s e n , i .  (Eds.) (). The Economy of the North 
2008. Oslo: Statistics Norway. Retrieved November , , from http://
www.ssb.no/english/subjects////sa_economy_north/.
g o u v e r n e M e n t  d u  q u é B e C , M i n i s t è r e  d e s  t r a n s p o rt s 
(5). Plan de transport du Nord-du-Québec. Analysis. Retrieved November , 
, from www.mtq.gouv.qc.ca/portal/page/portal/Librairie/Publications/
en/regions/abitibi/diagnostic_nord.pdf.
g r e i M a s , a . J .  ( []). Sémantique structurale. Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France.
h a s t r u p, K .  (4). The nomadic landscape: People in a changing Arctic 
environment. Geografisk Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of Geography (), -.
h e i n i n e n , L . (4). Circumpolar international relations and geopolitics. 
In Arctic Human Development Report, pp. -5. Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic 
Institute. Retrieved November , , from http://www.svs.is/AHDR/.
h e i n i n e n , L .  (). Barents Sea energy resources and regional cooperation: 
New challenges and opportunities. In G. Austin & M.-A. Schellekens-Gaiffe 
(Eds.), Energy and conflict prevention. Anna Lindh programme on conflict prevention, 
pp. -4. Madariaga European Foundation. Södertälje: GIDLUNDS.
h o f f M a n n , t. &  B e n t z e n , K .  (). Analysis of current transport 
practice and policy for business activities in remote areas. FDT - Association of Danish 
Transport Centres. Retrieved November , , from http://www.spatial.
baltic.net/_files/Analyses_bt.pdf.
i C e L a n d, M i n i s t ry  o f  t h e  i n t e r i o r  o f  i C e L a n d  (). 
Samgönguáætlun 2011-2022. Retrieved March , , from http://www.
innanrikisraduneyti.is/media/frettir-/SGA---Drog-ad-tillogu-
fylgiskjal-umhvmats.pdf.
217
K a h n  r i B e i r o , s . ,  Ko B aya s h i , s . ,  B e u t h e , M . g a s C a , 
J . ,  g r e e n e , d. ,  L e e , d. s . ,  M u r o M a C h i , y. ,  n e W to n , p. J . , 
p L ot K i n , s . ,  s p e r L i n g , d. ,  W i t, r . &  z h o u , p. J .  (). Transport 
and its infrastructure. In B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, & 
L.A. Meyer (Eds.), Climate change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of working 
group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, pp. -5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
K n o W L e s , r . ,  s h aW, J .  &  d o C h e r t y, i .  (). Introducing 
transport geographies. In R. Knowles, J. Shaw, & I. Docherty (Eds.), Transport 
geographies: Mobilities, flows and spaces, pp. -. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
L a B é v i è r e , r . &  t h u a L , f.  (). La bataille du Grand Nord a 
commencé… Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin.
L a s s e r r e , f.  (). Le passage du Nord-Ouest: une route maritime en 
devenir? La revue internationale et stratégique 4, 4-.
L a s s e r r e , f.  (Ed.) (). Passages et mers arctiques. Québec: Presse de 
l’Université Laval.
L ay, M . g .  (). Ways of the world: A history of the world’s roads and of the 
vehicles that used them. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
L i t M a n , t.  (). Planning principles and practices, Victoria Transport Policy 
Institute. Retrieved November , , from www.vtpi.org/planning.pdf. 
L i t M a n , t.  (). Well measured: Developing indicators for comprehensive and 
sustainable transport planning, Victoria Transport Policy Institute. Retrieved 
November , , from www.vtpi.org/wellmeas.pdf. 
L i t M a n , t.  (). Sustainable transportation indicators: A recommended research 
program for developing sustainable transportation indicators and data. Retrieved 
November , , from http://www.vtpi.org/sustain/sti.pdf.
L i t M a n , t.  (). Sustainable transportation indicator data quality and availability 
(Paper submitted for presentation at the  Transportation Research Board 
Annual Meeting held in Washington, D.C., on January -4, ). Retrieved 
November , , from http://www.vtpi.org/sustain/TRB__STI_
Data.pdf .
L i t M a n , t.  (). Sustainability and livability: Summary of definitions, 
goals, objectives and performance indicators (Written in cooperation with the 
Transportation Research Board Sustainable Transportation Indicators 
Subcommittee ADD4 []). Retrieved November , , from http://www.
vtpi.org/sus_liv.pdf.
218
L i t M a n , t. &  B u rW e L L , d.  (). Issues in sustainable transportation. 
International Journal of Global Environmental Issues (4), -4.
M a C L a r e n , i . s .  (4). From exploration to publication: The evolution of 
a th century Arctic narrative. Arctic 4(), 4-5.
M a s s aC h u s e t t s  i n s t i t u t e  o f  t e C h n o L o g y  a n d  C h a r L e s 
r i v e r  a s s o C i at e s , i n C .  (). Mobility 2001: World mobility at the end of 
the twentieth century and its sustainability (Document prepared for the Sustainable 
Mobility Working Group of the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development). Retrieved November , , from http://www.wbcsd.org/
web/projects/mobility/english_full_report.pdf.
n e r d a L , s .  (). A Barents transport strategy progress proposal for 
the Barents Regional Committee. Retrieved March , , from http://
www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Presentation_Nerdal_Tromso_presented_at_
RegCom_Tromso__January_.pdf.
n e L s o n , s . B .  (). Airships in the Arctic. Arctic 4(), -.
n o r t h e r n  d e v e L o p M e n t  M i n i s t e r s  f o r u M  (). Initiatives 
to maximize economic and social impacts from major projects in the North. Activities 
report 2005-2006 and recommendations. Retrieved November , , from 
http://www.focusnorth.ca/documents/english/library/other/initiatives_to_
maximize_economic_and_social_impacts_recommendations.pdf.
n o r t h W e s t  t e r r i to r i e s  (). Highway strategy. Retrieved 
March , , from http://www.dot.gov.nt.ca/_live/documents/content/
Highway%Strategy
%-%Summary%Report.pdf.
n o r t h W e s t  t e r r i to r i e s  (5a). Connecting Canada coast to coast: 
A proposal to complete the Mackenzie Valley highway to the Arctic. Retrieved 
March , , from http://www.dot.gov.nt.ca/_live/documents/content/
Connecting%Canada.pdf.
n o r t h W e s t  t e r r i to r i e s  (5b). Corridors for Canada II: Building 
on our success: A proposal for strategic infrastructure. Retrieved March , , 
from http://www.dot.gov.nt.ca/_live/documents/content/Corridors%for%
Canada%II%-%Building%on%our%Success.pdf.
219
n o r t h W e s t  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  M i n i s t r y  o f  t r a n s - p o r t a -
t i o n ;  n u n a v u t ,  M i n i s t r y  o f  e C o n o M i C  d e v e L o p M e n t 
a n d  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ;  &  y u K o n ,  M i n i s t r y  o f  h i g h -
W a y s  a n d  p u B L i C  W o r K s  (). Northern connections: Multi-modal 
transportation blueprint for the North. A pan-territorial perspective on the transportation 
needs of Northern Canada. Retrieved November , , from http://www.
hpw.gov.yk.ca/pdf/northernconnections.pdf.
n u n av u t, d e pa r t M e n t  o f  e C o n o M i C  d e v e L o p M e n t 
a n d  t r a n s p o r tat i o n  (). Nunavut transport strategy - Let’s get 
moving. Retrieved March , , from http://www.edt.gov.nu.ca/apps/
UPLOADS/fck/file/trans_eng.pdf.
o W e n s , s .  (5). From predict and provide to predict and prevent: Pricing 
and planning in transport policy. Transport Policy , 4-4.
q u i L L e r é - M a J z o u B , f.  (). À qui appartiennent les icebergs. Revue 
québécoise de droit international (), -.
r o d r i q u e , J . p. ,  C o M to i s , C . &  s L a C K , B .  () The geography of 
transport systems. New York: Routledge.
r o W L a n d, h .  (). On thin ice: Breakdowns, whiteouts, and survival on the 
world’s deadliest roads. New York: Hyperion.
r oya L  to W n  p L a n n i n g  i n s t i t u t e  (). Gender equality and 
plan making: The gender mainstreaming toolkit. Retrieved November , , from
http://www.rtpi.org.uk/download/5/Gender-Equality-and-Plan-Making-
Mainstreaming-Toolkit.pdf. Electronic Sources.
s C h i p p e r , L .  (). Sustainable transport: What it is, whether it is (Paper 
presented at the conference Towards Sustainable Transportation organized by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Conference 
in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 4- March ).
s e a r L e , J .  r .  (). A classification of illocutionary acts. Language in Society 
5(), –.
s h aW, J . ,  K n o W L e s , r . &  d o C h e r t y, i .  (). Transport gover-
nance and ownership. In R. Knowles, J. Shaw, & I. Docherty (Eds.), Transport 
geographies: Mobilities, flows and spaces, pp. -. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
s h e L L e r , M . &  u r ry, J .  (). The new mobilities paradigm. Environment 
and Planning , -.
s h L i K h t e r , s .  B .  (). The North Sea Route as an international transport (Paper 
prepared for the European Transport Conference ). Retrieved November , 
, from  http://www.aetransport.org/lc_cms/page_view.asp?id=.
220
s p i e K e r M a n n , K . &  W e g e n e r , M .  (). Accessibility and spatial 
development in Europe. Scienze Regionali 5(), 5-4.
s ta M M L e r , f. M .  (). Mobile phone revolution in the tundra? 
Technological change among Russian reindeer nomads. Electronic Journal of 
Folklore 4, 4-. Retrieved November , , from http://www.folklore.
ee/folklore/vol4/stammler.pdf.
s t e Wa r t, e . J . ,  d r a p e r , d. &  J o h n s to n  M . e .  (4). A review 
of tourism research in the Polar Regions. Arctic 5(4), -4.
s u s ta i n a B L e  t r a n s p o r t  i n  t h e  B a r e n t s  r e g i o n  (). 
Retrieved March , , from http://www.barentsinfo.fi/stbr/.
s u s t r a n s  (). Making sustainable transport easier for rural communities. 
Retrieved November , , from www.sustrans.org.uk/assets/files/Wales 
Policy Docs/Rural Transport Report.pdf.
t r a n s p o r tat i o n  r e s e a r C h  B o a r d  (5). Integrating 
sustainability into the transportation planning process (Conference Proceedings 
, by the Committee for the Conference on Introducing Sustainability into 
Surface Transportation Planning, Baltimore, Maryland, July –, 4).
t r a n s p o r tat i o n  r e s e a r C h  B o a r d  (). Annual meeting on 
sustainable transportation indicators (A Recommended Research Program for 
Developing Sustainable Transportation Indicators and Data,  November 
, by the Sustainable Transportation Indicators Subcommittee of the 
t r a n s p o r tat i o n  r e s e a r C h  B o a r d , ADD4 []). Retrieved 
November , , from http://ww.vtpi.org/sustain/sti.pdf.
u n i t e d  s tat e s  f e d e r a L  h i g h Way  a d M i n i s t r at i o n , 
Department of Transportation (). Title  CFR 45.4. Development and 
content of the long-range statewide transportation plan. Retrieved March , 
, from ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&rgn=div5&view=te
xt&node=:...5.&idno=#:...5. ....
u n - W C e d  (). Our common future. World commission on environment and 
development. Oxford: University Press.
va n  h o r n e  i n s t i t u t e  (). Northern Transportation Conference. 
Retrieved March , , from http://www.vanhorne.info/research-
publications/northern-transportation-conference-.
v e L u W e n K a M p, J . W.  (5). The Murman coast and the Northern 
Dvina Delta as English and Dutch commercial destinations in the th and 
th Centuries. Arctic 4(), 5–.
221
v i g a r , g .  (). The politics of mobility: Transport, the environment and public 
policy. London: Spon.
v i g a r , g .  (). Transport governance for sustainable cities: Practices, processes 
andcCultures (Paper prepared for the Malaysian Institute of Planners: International 
Urban Transport Conference, A Platform for Change, Sarawak, Malaysia).
vo r o n Kov, L . s .  (). Geopolitical dimensions of transport and logistics 
development in the Barents Euro-Arctic Transport Area (BEATA) (Presented by the 
author at the international conference Development of the judicial normative 
base in the field of transport in the region of the Barents Euro-Arctic Transport 
Area (BEATA), October ,  in Moscow).
W h i t e , p.  (). Equitable access: Remote and rural communities ‘transport 
needs’ (Discussion paper prepared for the  International Transport Forum, 
on 5- May in Leipzig, Germany, on Transport for Society). Retrieved 
November , , from http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/
DiscussionPapers/DP.pdf.
222
c h a p t e r   
Maria Tysiachniouk
fostering sustainaBiLity through
the suppLy Chain: soft LaWs and trust
MarKers as drivers of soCiaL Change
in russian CoMMunities
introduction
It has become more and more common, with the development of international 
trade and the globalization of manufacturing processes, to transfer the produc-
tion of various goods from economically developed countries to countries with 
developing economies.  In the latter local resources and low-cost labor are put 
to use, and the laws touching on questions of organized labor, human rights and 
ecology are, as a rule, far less demanding than those in economically developed 
nations.  Producers and consumers of a product are spread across the entire world 
and are often, strictly speaking, geographically distant from one another.  One of 
the results of these processes has been the development of social movements that 
defend the social rights and ecology of developing countries.  During the s 
and s, in connection with social movements and consumer boycotts against 
the use of sweat-shops and child labor in production facilities of the developing 
world — as well as against the use of pesticides and the cutting down of valuable 
Amazonian forests — an interest in the processes of production in far-off coun-
tries developed amongst consumers (O’Rourke 5, ; Conroy , 4-5; 
Tysiachniouk ).  In part, consumers became interested in just how socially 
and ecologically responsible the producers of the goods they used were.
  Over the last two decades responsible purchases have become a method 
of joining one’s voice to demands made on producers of goods in developing 
countries and in countries with transitional economies to abide by a sense of 
social justice and ecological responsibility.  In other words, purchases have be-
come a way to affect practices in countries where the laws are weak, the social 
protections enjoyed by the population are low, and ecological questions are not 
treated as a priority by the majority of society (Tysiachniouk ).
  Society’s concern and the growth of social movements incrementally 
prompted transnational corporations to verify their own supply chains.  Over 
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time, beginning in the early s, producing corporations began to use moni-
toring practices in relation to their contractual chains and similar elements of 
their businesses — which could prove the corporation’s social and ecological 
responsibility — all in order to induce trust amongst consumers.  In connection 
with the lack of trust in production in countries with transitional economies, 
moreover, special institutes and certification systems have begun to develop, the 
goals of which include the provision of trust for various products produced in 
these countries.
   A great deal of sociological research has been conducted on the idea of trust 
in market conditions.  Studies have been done on market systems, companies, 
sellers, monetary units and other similar market elements (Helman 4, ). 
Economic sociology, moreover, pays a great deal of attention to trust within a 
company and its subsidiaries in regards to production processes and in relations 
with partners (Kapustkina 4, -).  The innovative approach of the pre-
sent study, however, comes to light in its use of the chain of custody as a basic 
unit of analysis — and in its consideration of the role of various links in this 
chain in the provision of consumer trust in production processes.  Under the 
general heading “supply chain” are understood to fall all the levels of processing 
through which a product passes from its producer to its final consumers.  Such 
chains of custody are at times very lengthy, and the main difficulty in demon-
strating their transparency and legitimacy tends to be the geographical disas-
sociation between a product’s makers and its end consumers.  A supply chain 
is a complicated system of business relations and a continuously redeveloping 
mechanism that brings together into a single process a large number of com-
posite parts: materials, components and levels of production that may take place 
in several different countries.  Moreover, monitoring such a chain of custody 
is extremely difficult.  Although monitoring has become easier at present due 
to various types of certification that are used as tools for the formation of trust 
in the production process (and in the chain of custody itself), the goal has yet 
to be fully realized, insofar as generally not all of the processes within the links 
in the chain are covered by certification.  Another complication in monitoring 
is the vulnerability of the supply chain mechanism, in light of its dependence 
on the market, the laws of the countries in which it is located, the relevant tax 
and import regulations, and the economic stability and particularities of these 
countries.  Depending on how these influential factors and conditions change, 
the chain may reform.  The reformation of a supply chain requires the forma-
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tion of new partner relationships and mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing trust, 
as well as other important elements that make up a successful business.
  This chapter considers the chain of custody in the timber industry, where 
logging occurs in Russia and the final consumers of the products of timber 
production (paper and cardboard) are located in the countries of Europe and 
in the USA.  The timber industry, as problematic as it is considered to be in 
terms of ecology and social rights, was one of the first to develop guarantees 
for its products.  Beginning in the s with the development of a system of 
forestry certification, first of all on the part of the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) and the Program for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC), 
the goal of proving the transparency of timber production and the sustainability 
of forestry management became notably easier.  In Russia FSC certification 
has developed much faster than PEFC, as a result of which, at the time of this 
writing, an absolute majority of those who have received certification belong 
to FSC and only one enterprise in the whole country has been certified by 
both PEFC and the FSC. The FSC certification boom began in the s.  In 
the majority of cases certification is a relatively long process, and the necessity 
arises amongst corporations that have set out on the path of certification and 
socially and ecologically responsible business to use other guarantees of their 
responsibility while waiting for certification.  This last has particular relevance 
for Russia, because in the years of Perestroika a foreign societal view of Russia as 
a country with a high level of corruption and one presenting notable risks for 
business was formed under the influence of the Western press.  In those years 
— and not without a certain basis — it was considered that the timber indus-
try in Russia was controlled by a “Forest Mafia,” that the majority of logging 
occurred illegally, and that the existent laws, due to continuous reformation, 
had little, if any, influence insofar as innovations in the country’s legal structure 
— which quickly replaced one another — were unable to make it to practical 
implementation.  Despite the risky nature of business in such conditions, Russia 
remained the object of constant interest from transnational forestry corpora-
tions, insofar as % of the world’s forest reserves are located in Russia.  In the 
s, particular interest in Russian forests on the part of foreign corporations 
was driven by low-cost labor, which made the use of Russian timber resources 
even more profitable.  Nonetheless, given the image of Russia that had formed 
in foreign social circles, transnational corporations working in Russia found 
it necessary to pay a great deal of attention to the development of their own 
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social and ecological responsibility in order not to lose their market share in the 
ecologically and socially sensitive markets of the West.
  I have chosen the chain of custody of the transnational corporation Stora 
Enso for study.  This company was one of the first corporations that began 
to sell its products in Russia even during the socialist period.  In the s 
Stora Enso began to widen its business in Russia, and one of the important 
factors that drove success in this endeavor was the company’s ability to prove 
the legality of the origins of Russian timber: in other words, the provision of 
transparency in the chain of custody and the social and ecological responsibility 
of logging companies.
  Insofar as Stora Enso works with a great number of timber providers, it 
was faced with the particularly difficult question of verifying and proving the 
legitimacy of timber arriving at its facilities.  The current article will consider 
how Stora Enso attempted to solve the problem of trust by founding a trans-
parency model and a reliable timber supply chain.  The main guarantee of trust 
chosen by the concern was FSC certification, but along with this choice Stora 
Enso also used other mechanisms to follow up on the legality of timber that was 
delivered from uncertified providers.
  The aim of my research was to analyze how trust is formed in relation 
to the system of a supply chain in different links in this chain, what level of 
importance can be assigned to forest certification, and other aspects of trust in 
overall system design that create trust. ,I am interested in how trust markers are 
created in the contractual chain especially in conditions where it is impossible 
to rely upon the existence of FSC certification (that is, in its absence) and yet 
when tools are needed to prove the transparency and sustainability of forest us-
age, as well as for the verification of elements of production that are not covered 
by certification (for example,  freedom from corruption).  The article focuses 
on how each link in the supply chain builds trust and how these links have an 
affect on the final consumer’s sense of trust in a product at various intermedi-
ary levels: in the local society, in the company’s offices in Russia, and in its 
international offices in Finland and Sweden.  Attention is paid to the relation-
ship between institutional and interpersonal trust in various links in the supply 
chain, as well as to what final consumers from far-off countries have said, when 
coming face to face with individuals from the first, production-level link in the 
chain, about how their trust in the overall chain was formed.
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research methods
Qualitative methods were used in this research — in particular, the methods of 
case-study and semi structured interviews with representatives of the main links 
in the supply chain.  The choice of the case was based on the consideration of 
a chain of custody that would lead from Russian logging companies to con-
sumers in various countries.  Although one Russian project, Tikhvin-Chalna, 
was selected as the basis for research, my research interest includes general ap-
proaches to the design of guarantees of trust in the supply chain of a transna-
tional corporation such as Stora Enso.  The research can, therefore, provide a 
conditional and formative framework for broader research.
  I have used both primary and secondary sources in my analysis.  Among 
the primary sources are 5 interviews with representatives of various links in 
the supply chain.  Project reports, presentations and documents were also used 
as primary sources.  Secondary and additional sources used in the research in-
clude  interviews with stakeholders and representatives of Stora Enso, all of 
which were conducted earlier (between  and ) in the course of other 
projects.
  Of the fifteen interviews related to the case, four were conducted in  
and  with final consumers, one was held with a consultant and project 
designer in Holland, five were set up with managers of middle links in Stora 
Enso’s chain — one in Stockholm, two in Imatra and two in St. Petersburg 
— and five were conducted with managers of the production link in Tikh-
vin.  Three different guides for interviews were set up: one for conversations 
with final consumers in the USA, Germany, Great Britain and Sweden; one 
for managers of middle links of Stora Enso’s chain; and one for representatives 
of logging companies.  The guide for final consumers (publishing houses and 
producers of cardboard packages) included questions intended to clarify their 
motives for monitoring supply chains.  In the course of the interviews I strove 
to shed light on what risks consumers undergo in connection with purchases 
made from Russia, how they may develop necessary and sufficient mechanisms 
for the provision of trust in their supply chains and how this is reflected in their 
purchasing politics.  I was also interested in the consumers’ views of the supply 
chain of logging enterprises in Russia, what their motivation and experience of 
participation in the current project had been and their opinions concerning the 
basic results of the project.  In the guide for managers of middle links, attention 
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was focused on the explanations of mechanisms the managers used to build 
trust.  In part, I was interested in their political sense of certification and the 
procedures taken in relation to providers.  Various issues were chosen for study 
in these interviews: how managers of middle links are able to achieve recogni-
tion of the legitimacy of a company’s actions among stakeholders, including 
transnational purchasers and loggers.  I was further interested in what concrete 
actions these managers were led to take in order to provide transparency in 
the supply chain, what difficulties they encountered while working with final 
consumers and the Russian production link, and what mechanisms that provide 
for trust are demanded by such actors.  It became clear in conversations with 
representatives of logging companies what practices they found it necessary to 
change in the course of a project’s realization, what difficulties they ran into, 
what provided the project with its ultimate result, who – from the company’s 
point of view – is considered to be the final consumer, and how these com-
panies form trust in their partners and in themselves.  In interviews with all 
three groups, questions were formulated in such a way as to indirectly provoke 
a conversation about trust (or lack of trust), and only in the final section of the 
interview were direct questions asked about trust.  As an additional method I 
used informal research-related conversations (face-to-face and by email) with 
experts who had been attracted to the project and who participated in the 
consideration of its reports.
  The project was finished — along with the closing of the company Rus-
sian Forest/Russkii Les — towards the beginning of .  The research that 
was done for this case has historical and phenomenological value insofar as it 
presents an analysis of the path taken to build trust at a certain moment of eco-
nomic development in Russia when the growing market economy still carried 
within itself the remains of earlier Soviet- and post-Perestroika-era relations.
theoretical approaches
In this study analysis is built on the approaches of the classics of trust theory 
by N. Luhman and A. Giddens and their followers, as well as on work that to a 
high degree focuses on the peculiarities of trust in countries with transitional 
economies.  According to Luhman, trust occurs in connection with the fact 
that it allows for the solving of problems of uncertainty and complications 
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within the surrounding society by founding certain expectations in relation to 
organizations, institutions, people and systems (Luhman , ).  In the case 
of uncertainty, a characteristic of the majority of modern societies, trust allows 
individuals to overcome certain risks (Luhman , ).  According to Luh-
man’s theoretical work, the more uncertain a societal system is, the more im-
portant trust becomes (Meyer et al. , ).  Trust acquires particular impor-
tance in societies with continuously reforming political systems and economic 
turbulence, because in such societies it becomes impossible to predict the future 
using the example of the past, in contrast to traditional societies, where most 
matters are based on repetitiousness and cyclicality (Zvonovskii , ).
  The most important aspect of Giddens’s approach for my research was the 
fact that he considers trust in systems, referring to it as institutional trust in 
symbolic signs and expert systems, all of which allow for an abstraction from 
concrete contexts — traditions, cultures, and economies (Giddens , ). 
Such systems are based on the belief of a modern and complex society in sci-
ence and rational explanations.  People delegate a great deal of authority to 
experts who evaluate and certify what is worth — or not worth — trusting. 
Giddens pays attention to the fact that along with globalization there are bigger 
risks, and it becomes necessary to take action in relation to changes in accord-
ance with new risks.  Researchers refer to this process as “reflexive moderniza-
tion” (Giddens 4).  Giddens’ understanding of trust co-aligns with Ulrich 
Bek’s conception of societal risk.  The necessity of meeting growing risks in 
society creates a need for expert systems, which lower risks, explaining and 
analyzing processes and events.  These expert systems, according to Giddens’ 
theory, cut across all aspects of social life in modern conditions (Giddens 4, 
).  That is, for Giddens trust is directly connected with the conception of 
risk and possible ways of overcoming this risk.  The risk stimulates trust to the 
extent that trust in expert systems gives birth to partial understanding, which, 
however, never manages to be complete; because of this, it remains trust and 
does not become a sense of certainty (Gambetta ; Alekseyeva , -). 
No matter how many experts provide a variety of different evaluations of one 
and the same phenomenon, they cannot provide full and complete understand-
ing, but they can create a sense of trust.
  With the growth of uncertainty in the modern global society there comes 
a need for entire institutes focused on the creation and guarantee of, as well as 
support for, trust (Levi ; Misztal ; Shapiro , 44).  Independent 
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trust brokers of one sort or another appear, a category to which insurance com-
panies, independent auditors and auditors of auditors can be added.  All of these 
are systems that form guarantees of trust.  However, as was noted above, trust 
systems are never able to guarantee certainty in their own uninterrupted work, 
and as such the foundation of trust guarantees turns into an eternal process, one 
in which the systems of control only multiply (Shapiro ).
  In a market economy there are two sides of the coin in connection with 
trust in, and the effectiveness of, a business.  On the one hand, economic actors 
— companies — create mechanisms of trust in a system (procedures, ecologi-
cal and social politics, additional standards, internal regulations, ethical codices, 
audits by third parties, fines for transgressions, etc.).  All of these mechanisms 
work towards an increase in trust and a decrease in uncertainty (Shapiro , 
5-), leading to lower transaction costs (Veselov 4, ).  On the other 
hand, since these mechanisms demand significant expenditures and time to be 
implemented, their application and management may lower the overall effec-
tiveness of a business and its competitiveness.  With this in mind companies at-
tempt to find a balance between these processes and do everything they can, on 
the one hand, to create trust in their production and their product, and, on the 
other hand, to make sure their efforts do not lead to a negative economic effect.
  In this article I am operating with understandings of legitimacy and trust 
taken as both similarities and differences.  Legitimacy relies on an understand-
ing of a thought-out social action that, in its own way, is based on the idea that 
society, in the process of divvying up various roles to its members, willingly 
recognizes the right of a given actor to take certain actions.  This is in contrast 
to the powers that be, which, in turn, require cooperation, even sometimes 
against the will of particular individuals (Parsons 4).  The social roots of 
legitimacy can be extremely varied, including traditions, reasoning, and emo-
tional certainty.  In the sphere of organizational sociology, an understanding of 
the legitimacy of organizations has been applied in relation to the new phe-
nomenon of non-governmental regulation.  In this manner nongovernmental 
organizations are vested with the right to regulate a particular area and become, 
in that sense, legitimate agents of the institutions of change (Cashore , ; 
McDermott , ).  Trust, in contrast to legitimacy, is more applicable to 
exchange relationships, whether symbolic or material.  However, like legitima-
cy, trust suggests dynamic and mutually-dependent relations in which various 
partners — those involved and interested in various relationships — negotiate 
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the parameters of their mutual interactions.  In the course of such negotiations 
a general understanding of some process or idea is developed amongst the par-
ties.  If legitimacy can be considered more of a one-directional process of rights 
allocation, then trust presents itself as something more of an interactive process 
where all interested parties are vulnerable and therefore strive for cooperation.
  In economic sociology no less attention is paid to person-specific inter-
personal trust between partners than to institutional trust.  According to F. 
Fukuyama, interpersonal trust allows individuals with similar values, orienta-
tions and ethical principles to come together in relations of partnership and 
cooperation (Fukuyama 5).  In this manner trust can be seen as a hope that 
partners will act in a predictable manner, insofar as their actions are based on 
general norms and values shared by all those involved.  Personal trust in busi-
ness or in other areas, connecting people to groups, creates social networks that 
increase available resources and develop opportunities for the multiplication of 
these resources.  That is, trust opens a path to new and additional sources of 
information, expertise and power (Radaev , ).  It is worth noting that 
trust can sometimes be forced, if an actor is led to act in conditions where his/
her intentions are unclear.  However, no matter what form trust may take, it is 
always a catalyst of economic development.  That is why many sociologists view 
it as part of social capital.
  There is no definite boundary between these two types of trust — insti-
tutional and interpersonal — insofar as one cannot exist without the other. 
Person-specific relations between individuals give birth to interpersonal trust. 
Impersonal relations imply a belief in symbolic markings and expertise systems 
— that is, trust in systems.  When uncertainty exists and there arises a need for 
trust, impersonal relations are solidified by interpersonal ones.  Yet the opposite 
is true as well: when trust has been formed in a system as a whole, a sense of 
trust in this system’s representatives also develops (Samantha et al. , ; 
Fukuyama 5).  This trust can be, for example, in a company’s managers — 
those who are interested in strategic cooperation (Hardin ).  It is worth 
noting that trust in impersonal systems occurs only to the event that the systems 
are reliant on certain general ideas and values that are shared by all interested 
parties.  It is these general understandings and values that, shared by all, lend 
strength to a system’s procedures, standards and expertise.
  To some degree, particularities in the formation of interpersonal trust de-
pend on the political system Levi , -; Veselov 4, ), which allows 
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the definition of societies with higher or lower levels of trust (Fukuyama 5). 
Sociologists note, for example, that in Soviet society person-specific trust was 
built up not only amongst family and friends, but was also spread across the 
production sphere and in work collectives to a higher degree than in Western 
societies (Kortelainen and Nystén-Haarala , 5).  This has been explained 
by the institutional trust in a government that displayed its paternalistic qualities 
in the form of social protections and provisions, given which it was possible to 
consider a work collective as a family (Zvonovskii , 5).
  In the reform conditions of the s, when previous social institutions had 
fallen apart but new ones had yet to be formed — and institutional turbulence 
undermined earlier trust patterns — personal contacts formed on personal trust 
and in social networks became, to a large degree, the basis for business activity. 
At that point an interesting phenomenon, referred to by sociologists as ”the 
sacralization of theft”, blossomed: while theft from a business enterprise or the 
government was not considered as a crime but rather as restoration of justice, 
stealing amongst citizens was — as before — considered criminal (Zvonovskii 
, ).  In the case that I have studied, the post-Soviet context is reflected in 
the way in which Russian actualities and work with Russian contractors, their 
structural subdivisions and Finnish partners are perceived — as well as how this 
perception influences trust constructs.
trust markers in the chain of custody
Corporate ethical codices, socio-ecological political stances and — what is 
more important for my research — certification systems aimed at stricter third-
party verification of the level of a corporation’s socio-ecological responsibility 
and the legality and openness of its activities can all be thought of as trust mark-
ers.  Such institutions assist buyers in becoming oriented in uncertain situations 
in relation to the products they purchase.  These institutions ultimately help 
buyers make a choice between products that may be delivered from all over the 
world and give preference to one product while not trusting others.
  Although certification systems do act as trust guarantors, they came about 
due to a lack of trust on the part of civil society and nongovernmental organi-
zations both in government systems of forestry regulation and in the logging 
industry as a whole.  Standards of forestry certification were created as a new 
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regulatory mechanism, one based on values shared by all interested parties and 
taking into consideration the social and ecological components of forest utiliza-
tion (McDermott , 5).
  The logo of any certification system acts as a trust marker behind which 
certain semantic connotations are hidden — and each of the existing certifica-
tion systems has its own trust “audience”.  Thus the logo of FSC forest certifica-
tion provides information about how the system is supported by NGOs, that is 
— vested with legitimacy.  Moreover, this logo provides a sense that third-party 
verification has been conducted, and that the system follows strict social and 
ecological standards.  The PEFC system sends a semantic signal about how the 
certification system in question is an accredited national standard upheld by the 
government and supported by private business.  The level of trust on the part 
of NGOs in the latter certification system is, to a notable degree, defined by the 
amount of trust in government regulation systems in various countries.
  Forestry certification and similar verification systems and procedures in 
the chain of custody are, in practice, based fully on trust, insofar as no matter 
how these systems were checked by third parties, it would be impossible to be 
certain that they did not fail in some situations.  As such, in conditions where 
production and product use are geographically dislocated (that is, spread across 
the entire world), it is impossible to guarantee a sense of absolute certainty, yet 
systems that make the formation of trust possible are essential.  In view of this 
necessity, end consumers are left to trust the systems that provide verification, 
and companies use verification, accordingly, as an additional market advantage. 
Trust in a system, for its part, depends on the context in which a system oper-
ates.  If there is trust in a larger system (for example, a political system), then 
trust in smaller systems that function within the larger system also becomes 
more likely.  In other words, interaction and mutual connections between sys-
tems also influence trust.  For example, lumber arriving from economically 
unstable Russia causes a great deal more concern than lumber that arrives from 
Finland, where the economy is stable and ecological standards are quite high. 
In addition, the design of a symbolic system is also important, as this is what 
provides for the system’s reliability and the possibility of control over the fulfill-
ment of what is declared.  Different types of systems that guarantee impersonal 
trust are also, in this way, bound to provide for the possibility of social control 
over production processes (Shapiro , 4).  At the same time many func-
tions, including those related to control, are often delegated to experts.
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  In the current case I have considered a complicated chain of custody, one 
in which the end user receives paper produced from lumber produced not only 
in Russia, but in other countries as well.  As a result, varying trust markers are 
used in relation to the production processes involved — in part, various systems 
of forest certification, the most reputed of which are FSC and PEFC.  Inde-
pendent third-party verification of accordance with a company’s standards is 
included in the design of both certification systems, with a particular emphasis 
on the use of accredited expert firms.  Nonetheless the FSC forestry certifica-
tion system has prevailed among both market players and researchers, eliciting 
a greater amount of trust amongst interested parties.  FSC certificates are more 
likely to guarantee that a company satisfies its own corporate and social re-
sponsibilities in the eyes of its products’ end users in “sensitive” markets — all 
of which is a basis for trust in the FSC logo.  The PEFC system, setting aside 
significant attention to proving the legality of lumber origins, concentrates to a 
lower degree on social and ecological questions.  This system, moreover, based 
as it is on the national standards of each competing country, has a tendency 
to operate differently in different countries, and its overall effectiveness can 
depend on a country’s national standards (Cashore et al. 4).  In both systems 
there exists, in addition to certification of the chain of custody, forest manage-
ment certification.  Forest management certification evaluates logging practices 
much in the way that chain of custody certification bears witness to the legality 
of timber as it passes along a variety of production and transport processes.  In 
the FSC system, in contrast to the PEFC, stress is placed on the democratic 
nature of forest management processes.  Moreover, in FSC a company’s interac-
tions with interested outside players, including local communities, is also evalu-
ated.  Finally, the FSC system generates a greater amount of trust thanks to the 
fact that it is supported by NGOs.
  In the FSC system there are two different types of chain of custody cer-
tificates, named “pure FSC” and “mixed FSC”.  In the pure FSC chain all the 
timber is from certified territory.  In the mixed FSC chain timber is not deliv-
ered only from certified territory; it may also arrive from uncertified locations, 
although at the same time all contractors undergo, in one form or another, 
some verification of the legality of their timber production.
  The FSC system has spread widely throughout the Russian timber industry. 
In the current research project, timber delivered from Russia was in the process 
of FSC certification, but had yet to receive the relevant certificate.  Systems of 
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forestry certification that authenticate the legality of timber from the very first 
link in the chain (standing timber) to the final link (end consumer) are concen-
trated on various aspects of production and do not always cover all elements of 
the relevant business conduct.  As a result, one of the goals of this project was 
the verification of freedom from corruption — something that certification 
fails, in fact, to cover.  In order to check the level of freedom from corruption 
in the chain of custody in the project, the NGO Transparency International 
was brought in as an expert consultant, as were a group of local experts; over 
the course of their activities related to the project Transparency International 
used their own in-house principles of defining freedom from corruption.46  It 
is worth noting that these principles cannot be considered as an absolutely 
exact standard, which made it more difficult for the experts to determine the 
mechanisms of trust exactly.
Brief case description
This chapter includes a study of Stora Enso’s Tikhvin-Chalna project, the chain 
of custody of which included, at one end, companies involved in logging on be-
half of Stora Enso in forests around Tikhvin and Chalna (the Tikhvin Integrated 
Logging Enterprise and Russian Forest in Tikhvin and Shuyales in Chalna, Ka-
relian Republic).  At the other end of the chain of custody leading international 
newspaper, magazine and book publishers were to be found, as well as producers 
of cardboard packaging: the publishing house Axel Springer in Germany, Ran-
dom House in the United Kingdom, Time, Inc. in the USA, and TNK Tetra Pak 
headquartered in Sweden.  Stora Enso developed a model of transparency for its 
chain of custody in order to form a system of timber verification at all levels of its 
passage to the end consumer.  The project was interesting in that over the course 
of its realization, end consumers from a variety of countries, all of whom had an 
interest in the monitoring of the supply chain, were able to become personally 
acquainted with Russian production links in the chain of custody. (See Map .)
  The Tikhvin-Chalna project was realized between 4 and , and was 
initiated by an end consumer — the publishing house Axel Springer — which 
suggested conducting such a project to Stora Enso concerning its chain of cus-
tody.  Contract partners included the buyers listed above from the USA, Ger-
46   Transparency International Principles for Countering Bribery 2002.
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many, the United Kingdom and Sweden, as well as logging companies.  Work 
was also conducted within the project’s framework with Stora Enso’s timber 
providers — that is, those that are not part of the latter’s structural divisions. 
From the beginning, it was not intended for Stora Enso’s structural divisions 
to be included in the project; however, Tikhvin Integrated Logging Enterprise, 
which took part in the initial stages of the project as one of Stora Enso’s suppli-
ers, was bought by another transnational corporation, UPM Kymmene.  As such, 
the company Russian Forest was brought into the project after it was purchased 
— and therefore became part of the structural division of Stora Enso — in 4. 
  The project was aimed at providing transparency mechanisms in the chain 
of custody in Russia that would guarantee continuous communication be-
tween the links in the chain.  Over the course of the project various events were 
held in order to develop internal practices and ways of providing for this sort of 
transparency.  Parallel to the project, a process of forest management certifica-
tion in accordance with the FSC schema was put in place in Russian Forest and 
other structural divisions of Stora Enso.  In the project, particular attention was 
paid to the tracking of timber along the entirety of the chain of custody, which 
made the certification of the chain of custody easier.  At the same time Stora 
Enso and its divisions worked out their own policies in relation to suppliers and 
conducted training and audits.
  The object of the project was broadly conceived, and discussions were also 
held about sustainable forest management in general.  During the project’s re-
alization, however, attention was focused primarily on the tracking of the tim-
ber’s legal origin.  Of various logging practices, particular attention was paid 
only to measures that had been taken concerning the provision of workers’ 
safety and that had led to a reduction in the number of accidents amongst tim-
ber producers.  All other forestry management questions, however, were left to 
be decided within the framework of preparation for forest certification.
  A methodological project was conducted in the form of seminars and mini-
conferences that were generally organized in production locations.  Buyers’ 
representatives were present at these meetings, and timber providers, interest-
ed parties and NGOs were invited, depending upon the theme of individual 
events.  A working group was put together for the planning of these events as 
well as project strategy as a whole, and was made up of representatives from all 
project partners.  These events included personal meetings between producers 
and buyers, as well as an opportunity for buyers to get acquainted with produc-
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tion processes and practices on the ground.  On the one hand, these meetings 
were simple fact-finding trips; yet, on the other hand, they were sociological 
“interventions” of a sort, acts of interference, insofar as buyers demanded proof 
of the timber’s legal origin, checked documents, considered processes, and in-
troduced new demands on the basis of what they saw.
  In order to boost the project’s legitimacy, third-party monitoring and evalu-
ation of the results were built into the project’s framework.  Two experts were 
Map 9.1.Stora Enso’s Tikhvin-Chalna project
Source: Stora Enso
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brought into the project for this purpose: a local expert from the Karelian Re-
search Center of the Institute for Economics of the local branch of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences and an expert from Transparency International. These 
outside experts evaluated, along with other elements, areas that are not covered 
by the chain of custody or forestry management certification: specifically, the 
battle against corruption.
  The project was undertaken in parallel with FSC certification, and Stora 
Enso received certification in both forestry management and chain of custody 
in .  While the certification process occurred independently of the research 
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project, its goals of verifying the sustainability of forestry utilization and the 
legitimacy of timber origin in the chain of custody overlapped with the goals 
of the project itself.  As such, the fact that Stora Enso received certification also 
figures in the final project report.  As a result of the project, moreover, mecha-
nisms providing for the verification of the legality of timber were refined, and 
internal standards of corporate and social responsibility were created.  Com-
munication between producers, suppliers and users in the chain of contract was 
notably improved, as was the overall system of chain of custody management. 
Risks connected with violations of the principles of sustainable development 
were lowered and technical monitoring tools were advanced.  However, work 
towards verifying freedom from corruption proved more complicated.  The 
absence of corruption, in the opinion of the experts involved, could only be 
guaranteed in the chain of custody from standing timber to the end consumer. 
The experts were skeptical as to the idea of guaranteeing the absence of cor-
ruption in other business practices.  They explained their skepticism by noting 
that outside initiatives do not generally lead to noteworthy results in a corrupt 
country or corrupt environment where the majority of business practices in-
volve the use of informal methods.47  Admittedly, these experts did not provide 
any concrete proof to support their position.  Independently of the experts’ 
final report, Stora Enso’s representatives declared that the company was free 
from corruption — and that this sort of freedom from corruption was a real 
possibility in Russia.
end users of stora enso’s products
End users at the very end of the chain of custody represent the link most in-
terested in the overall chain’s transparency.  In addition, a product’s end user has 
the right to choose amongst providers: that is to say, the right to make demands 
about transparency and quality in the chain of custody and, by using this right, 
the ability to change the social reality and practices at logging locations.
  The publishing house Axel Springer, a major publisher of large-circulation 
newspapers and magazines in Germany, was the main initiator of the research 
project.  Like most major modern corporations, this publishing house gives 
47    From  a  presentation  given  by  Elena  Panfilova,  director  of  the  Russian  division  of 
Transparency International, at the 13th International Conference on the Conflict with Corruption. 
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notable weight to its social and ecological responsibility.  At the same time, Axel 
Springer sets itself apart by way of its original and creative approach to these 
sorts of questions.  By stimulating sustainable development along the entire 
chain of custody, Springer’s managers believe they are raising the level of trust 
in their company.  For them, monitoring the chain of custody is connected not 
only with adherence to norms of social and ecological responsibility, but also 
a method of social enterprise that allows them to move production towards a 
more socio-economically friendly platform (the “supplier chain approach”). 
The manager of sustainable development at Springer believes that the publish-
ing house’s interest in monitoring its chain of custody has been based on ethical 
and value-based motivations.  This can be explained, in part, by the fact that 
amongst the more than , journalists that work at newspapers published 
by Springer, quite a number write critical articles about social and ecological 
problems and business ethics.  According to the source at Springer, the publish-
ing house asks itself questions like, “Where does my newspaper grow?  Where 
was my office paper grown?  Where does my magazine grow?”  This interest 
is reflected in many of the publishing house’s monitoring projects aimed at 
the chain of custody and, in part, in projects aimed at tracking the origins of 
Russian lumber.  In its own projects, Springer has set quite ambitious goals: for 
example, the battle against corruption in the Tikhvin project.  The publishing 
house also pays attention, in its projects, to conflicts concerning climate change 
and the use of bio-energy.  There was a project, for example, that measured the 
CO² emissions related to the production of a newspaper along the entire chain 
of custody (from the raw material to paper and, further, in relation to the actual 
printing of the newspaper).  This project attempted to lower the repercussions 
of such emissions through the use of more environmentally friendly technolo-
gies and energy resources.
  The policy of responsible purchasing, in the opinion of the source at 
Springer, “gives credibility for what we write”48; that is, it provides a basis for 
trust in the company based on the accordance of its social and ecological values 
with what is advocated in its publications.  In the publishing house’s view, if 
Springer raises ethical questions in its publications, then the publishing house 
itself ought to serve as an example of how the practice of these ethics can be 
48  From an interview with the manager for sustainable development of the publishing house 
Axel Springer.
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realized.49  From this comes the assiduous attention paid to purchases, and the 
source at Springer outlined the idea of trust in a product through the use of 
such concepts as “tangible and intangible quality elements of the product.”50 
It is through “unmeasurable” or “intangible” product characteristics – such as 
ecological and social responsibility in relation to a product’s production, free-
dom of production from corruption, and so forth – that trust in a product is 
developed.  The source underlined that his company strives for “de-homogeni-
zation of an anonymous product”: that is, seemingly identical products ought 
to have “different faces” and ought to be connected to the image of a specific 
company and the values it promotes.  As an example, he referred to “green” 
energy, or energy acquired with little harm to the environment.  These sorts of 
value connotations, when associated with various products, can create a sense 
of trust amongst purchasers.  According to the informant, other than ecologi-
cal characteristics and qualities, avoiding involvement in corrupt relationships 
should also be an inherent consensual project value.  This means that during 
production of a product, a dialogue has taken place with all interested parties — 
and at as many levels as possible — and specifically with NGOs.  This dialogue 
involves a company asking questions: how its suppliers coordinate with NGOs, 
whether or not these suppliers consult with NGOs, and what sort of relation-
ships they have with ecological organizations such as Greenpeace or WWF.
  Timber, like electricity, can carry information about a business: about ethics, 
the ability of a company or producer to communicate with interested parties, 
cooperation with NGOs, and environmentally friendly practices.  All of these 
elements and values need to be established across the entirety of the chain 
of custody (the process of bringing intangible quality along the value chain). 
For example, the FSC certificate confirms these intangible qualities of a prod-
uct and gives the faceless and anonymous timber a certain concrete “facial 
expression”.51
  In the Tikhvin-Chalna project, as in other similar projects, a buyer’s power 
and strength are used to change logging practices and even to combat corrup-
tion.  Insofar as producers prefer to work with large buyers, they sincerely listen 
to the opinion of the latter, and in this sense the buyer’s influence on a company 
is palpable.  Axel Springer used its power over suppliers and the competition 
49  Ibid.
50  Ibid.
51  Ibid.
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between timber companies to intervene in logging practices, suggesting moni-
toring projects at once to a few different timber companies (UPM, Stora Enso 
and others).  Stress was placed on different elements of different projects.  In the 
Tikhvin-Chalna project a great deal of attention was paid to technical ques-
tions of worker safety, but in the project with UPM Kymmene far more atten-
tion was given to questions of safeguarding biodiversity and old-growth forests.
  The manager at Axel Springer who initiated the Tikhvin-Chalna project 
qualifies NGOs as “guard dogs” and “critical companions”.52  Insofar as Axel 
Springer has not had any run-ins with NGOs, it follows that there was little ne-
cessity to legitimize their activities specifically through the use of NGOs.  The 
manager had previous experience working with NGOs in relation to virgin 
forests in Russia, and his “critical companions” there had included Greenpeace 
Russia and WWF.  In the Tikhvin-Chalna project the NGO Transparency In-
ternational filled the role of “critical companion,” having been brought to the 
project to evaluate the level of freedom from corruption in the chain of custody.
  In the Tikhvin-Chalna project, as in others, intervention with the goal of 
changing practices on the ground occurred in a methodologically strict fashion. 
Suppliers were sharply criticized and presented with demands to change their 
practices in the direction of ecological and social responsibility.  The aim of 
these demands was ultimately to create the intangible production characteris-
tics referred to earlier.  In the given projects, as noted above, these characteristics 
included a boost in safety technology at the place of production: narratives 
involved questions such as: “How many cut-off arms and legs are included in 
one ton of your paper?”53  In order to improve the safety of workers, the pro-
ject’s organizers worked to align communication practices along the chain of 
contract, build trust and overcome communicative, cultural and other barriers 
between different links in the chain of contract.
  Another project participant, the major publishing company Random 
House Group — headquartered in the United Kingdom54 — was invited to 
the project by Stora Enso.  This publishing house has a policy of social and 
ecological responsibility and a policy of relations with suppliers and standards 
of paper purchasing; its interest in the project was produced by a desire to re-
52  Ibid.
53  From an interview with a consultant-designer assigned to transparency-monitoring 
projects along the chain of contract.
54    Specifically, Random House Group UK.
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search its own chain of contract and become acquainted with practices on the 
ground.  This was done less in order to change such practices and more simply 
to understand to what degree they are in accordance with Random House’s 
policies of corporate ecological and social responsibility.
  Random House’s method of constructing trust in a product differed from 
the trust constructs used by the representatives of Axel Springer.  The Random 
House Group’s approach to questions of trust was largely practical, relying on 
well-accepted trust markers such as FSC and PEFC certification.  Statements 
made by Random House Group’s representatives reflected the general discus-
sion about the legitimacy of various certification systems that came up in re-
lation to the forestry industry.  One of the major buyers of Random House 
Group’s publications, the retailer Marks and Spencer, prefers goods certified in 
the FSC system.  In part because of this, Random House was the first publish-
ing house in the world to have its entire chain of contract certified by the FSC 
system.  The publisher is now currently pushing FSC certification throughout 
the International Publishers’ Association, because of the support it has received 
from NGOs and the preference shown for it by major buyers.
  Random House Group had never been the target of criticism from NGOs, 
nor had it previous worked with them directly.  That being said, Random 
House’s representatives do regularly meet with representatives of ecological 
NGOs at conferences and other events, and the company tries to consider the 
opinions of major ecological NGOs such as WWF, Greenpeace and others. 
Random House Group, moreover, is interested in having its consumers associ-
ate the company with a higher degree of certification and, it follows, with a 
higher level of attentiveness to the environment and questions of social justice. 
Random House Group is willing to admit, however, that very few of the au-
thors who work with the publishing house understand the differences between 
the two forestry certification systems, and the rest – especially young authors 
who are just starting their careers – are, in general, simply interested in purchas-
ing policies and broad questions of corporate responsibility in relation to the 
publishing house specifically and ecological politics in general.55
  Random House Group’s trust construction depends on their sense of the 
economic systems of various countries.  This is reflected in the narrative used 
by Random House Group to explain their interest in the monitoring of the 
Russian-side chain of contract and Greenpeace’s sharp criticism of Stora Enso’s 
55  From an interview with Random House Group’s director for sustained development.
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logging on PEFC-certified virgin forest territory in Finland.  Random House 
Group’s logic is that if this sort of violation can occur in Finland – where the 
ecological situation is relatively under control – then matters could plausibly be 
much worse in Russia.  Understanding that paper bought by Random House 
in Finland is produced from Russian timber, the publishing house wished to 
become acquainted with logging practices on the ground.
  Random House Group’s interest in the Tikhvin-Chalna project was to get 
a direct look at the part of the chain of contract that stretches from Russia to 
Finland.  As a result of their newfound acquaintance with this chain, the pub-
lishing house – according to a source at Random House – became aware of 
the business context of timber production in Russia and associated difficulties 
related to applying new forest utilization practices to the Russian environment: 
“It’s nice to sit in an armchair and give advice, but I went out there and saw 
what was going on”56, said the source at Random House.  Having been on the 
ground, this informant, for example, in reference to a conversation with one 
of the managers of Tikhvin Integrated Logging Enterprise, cast doubt on the 
possibility of successfully combating corruption.  This opinion was based on 
the source’s sense that business in the Russian context is completely impossible 
without informal agreements that are generally viewed in Western countries as 
a form of corruption.
  In joining the Tikhvin-Chalna project, Random House Group was mostly 
interested in tracking the ecological aspects of forest utilization, something that 
had not been focused on in the project.  As a result, the company quickly lost 
interest in the project and did not actively develop its stake therein.
  The company Time, Inc., another buyer of Stora Enso’s paper products, 
was another participant in the Tikhvin-Chalna project.  In addition to its well-
known magazines, this company also publishes a large number of catalogues for 
various other companies.  Time, Inc., like many other major corporations, has 
a well worked-out program of corporate social responsibility and purchasing 
policies oriented towards certified products and the stimulation of certification 
processes amongst its suppliers.  In ecological terms, they focus on the use of 
recycled paper in the publishing of their printed products as well as on innova-
tive policies: for example, purchasing paper produced with the use of alternative 
fuels.  In the framework of its transparency policies, Time, Inc. makes informa-
tion available about all of its paper suppliers.
56  Ibid.
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  Nonetheless, insofar as Time, Inc. publishes advertising catalogues, it is often 
the target of assiduous attention on the part of ecological organizations.  The 
company has only felt direct NGO pressure once: in 4, when NGOs con-
ducted a major campaign against the use of chlorine in the production of paper 
pulp.  Direct action against Time, Inc. and other companies was organized, and 
Time, Inc. put together a “paper working group” that began to thoroughly 
work out purchasing strategies and ways of influencing the ecological practices 
of the company’s suppliers.  In general, Time, Inc. demonstrates a preference 
for purchasing paper made from timber procured in northern countries, rather 
than paper made from wood from tropical forests; with the latter, problems of 
environmental protection have a tendency to be much more serious, according 
to a source at Time, Inc.57
  The company chose to collaborate with NGOs.  In the middle of the 
s, Time, Inc. began to cooperate with the Environmental Defense Fund 
and, together with this NGO, wrote and published a manual entitled “Buy-
ing and Using Environmentally Preferable Paper” – a manual that has not lost 
any of its timeliness at the moment of the writing of this paper.  Time, Inc. 
has also worked on these questions with the World Resource Institute and the 
organization Metaphore.  The company has, within the framework of the World 
Business Council for Sustained Development, prepared a report on compa-
nies from which paper that is “clean” from an ecological point of view can 
be purchased.  The National Recycling Coalition has also been one of Time, 
Inc.’s partners, and together the two organizations have promoted the idea of 
recycling amongst the latter’s buyers.
  Time, Inc.’s interest in monitoring the chain of custody fits into the frame-
work of their policy on sustainable development.  The company’s trust con-
structs rely on trust markers, including certification, and the company works 
towards increasing the extent of its certified production.  Operating in the 
USA, Time, Inc. does not have an opportunity to base its trust markers on 
the particularly high standards of FSC certification: its suppliers work almost 
exclusively with the SFI system, which is allied with the PEFC system.  The 
company is, however, is in the process of analyzing the national standards that 
form the basis of the PEFC system.  Time, Inc. analyzes exactly which forest 
utilization practices stand behind various trust markers and, depending on this 
analysis, chooses whether to trust or not to trust.  Trust or a lack thereof in 
57  The source called the forests of the Amazon the “lungs” of the planet.
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the economic system of specific countries is also a factor in Time, Inc.’s trust 
constructs: in part, Russia and Russia-related discourses are classified as an “un-
traditional wood basket.”58  Moreover, Time Inc.’s trust constructs can be seen 
as including value-based connotations and assignable products.  Nonetheless, if 
Axel Springer holds social components to be a first-priority element of intan-
gible product characteristics, then Time, Inc. pays more attention to ecological 
components: for example, the “ecological preferability” of a product, a concept 
that is understood as covering a product’s “legality” and the “sustainability of 
the forestry utilization”59 from which it was produced.
  One further participant in the project under consideration, Tetra Pak, manu-
factures packaging for beverages.  Tetra Pak’s social policies in developing coun-
tries are, first of all, focused on providing the sort of infrastructure that would 
make products sold in its packaging available in all corners of these countries. 
For Tetra Pak, risk evaluation and monitoring of the chain of custody are ex-
tremely important, and the company works to legitimize itself through part-
nerships with WWF-Sweden, with whom it coordinates in the realization of 
projects related to sustainable forestry and climate change.  Risk evaluation is 
especially important for Tetra Pak in relation to timber procurement: in the 
forestry sphere the company supports FSC certification, acting as one of the or-
ganization’s members and stimulating, through demands made to timber suppli-
ers, its development in Russia.  Tetra Pak generally relies on the British company 
ProForest to conduct monitoring and risk evaluations in developing countries.60 
Tetra Pak eagerly joined the project in Russia in light of the fact that this project 
fulfilled the objective of monitoring and risk evaluation in relation to Russian 
timber.  Broadly speaking, Tetra Pak’s trust constructs are closely connected to 
minimization of risk and the development of control mechanisms.
  As the project was realized and the participating corporate paper buyers be-
came personally acquainted with the processes of product manufacture, particular 
attention — especially on the part of Time, Inc. and Axel Springer — was paid to 
questions related to the provision of work safety, given the number of accidents 
and violations of safety regulations in the logging industry.  Having noted the 
fact that none of the workers employed on a frame-saw were given to wearing 
gloves, a representative of Time, Inc. compared Russia to Canada ten years earlier: 
58  From an interview with Time, Inc.’s manager for sustainable development.
59  Ibid.
60  From an interview with Tetra Pak’s manager for sustainable development.
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in the latter, loggers and workers in related fields used to demonstrate a similar 
lackadaisical approach to their safety and their health, almost as if they were fatal-
istic about it.61  The source at Time, Inc. considered this to be a step on the path 
of development, and noted that over the last ten years in Canada practices had 
changed for the better — which, it would seem, is what awaits Russia.
  Over the course of their trip, project participants were astounded by the 
high social expectations of the local population, a population that had become 
accustomed to collaboration with government logging enterprises during the 
Soviet period and to these collaborations having a paternalistic nature.  The 
informant at Time, Inc. found this a reason to compare Russia to countries 
such as Brazil and Tasmania, where the social component of business is broader, 
in connection with which a company’s role in local society changes notably.
  The value of the project for all those participating was to be found in the 
open dialogue it provided between representatives of various links of the chain 
of custody.  Participants also valued highly the fact that the project provided an 
opportunity to demonstrate to timber producers that consumers of final timber 
products — those living in various countries outside Russia — are interested in 
timber production, working conditions and environmental protection at places 
where timber is produced.  This interest, according to the source at Time, Inc., 
ought to stimulate timber producers to change their practices.  One of the 
project’s results was increased understanding between timber purchasers and 
their supplies at the base-level timber production link in the chain of custody.
the role of stora enso’s managers in the
development of trust between interested parties
The goal of collaboration between stakeholders across the entire chain of con-
tract depends, in general and in most companies, on middle-level managers who 
deal with questions related to the environment and sustainable development. 
At Stora Enso, there is an entire team of managers tasked with questions of the 
environment and sustainable development and who work in various countries 
with the aim of creating trust amongst stakeholders in Stora Enso’s products 
and production process.  The responsibilities of these managers include devel-
oping partnerships with buyers, producers and suppliers, conflict-free relations 
61  From an interview with Time, Inc.’s manager for sustainable development.
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with NGOs and government institutions in the many countries where the 
company operates, and with all other interested parties at all possible levels — 
from transnational to local.  These relationships ought to be established in such 
a manner as to avoid any possibility of doubt arising from any of the interested 
parties concerning Stora Enso’s corporate social and ecological responsibility. 
As such, the company finds itself forced to take into consideration the various 
contexts of different countries, their laws, and the demands of NGOs.
  One of the strategies for building and strengthening trust relations between 
purchasers and manufacturers is an increase in the percentage of certified timber 
in the chain of custody.  This can be achieved, on the one hand, by certifying 
one’s own leased territory, and on the other hand, by pushing one’s suppliers 
towards certification.  By , Stora Enso has been able to bring the amount 
of certified timber in its chain of contract up to 5%, while on the worldwide 
scale only % of timber is acquired from certified territory.
  Stora Enso is unable to work with just one certification system in its chain 
of custody, insofar as different certification systems are used in various coun-
tries.  The forestry certification system FSC, for example, although considered 
by many to be amongst the most reliable and preferable, is quite undeveloped 
in countries such as Finland, where small forest owners are dominant and prefer 
the PEFC system.  The fact that there are a number of different forestry certifi-
cation systems, none of which are given to recognizing one another, means that 
additional alignment of timber preparation is needed and that more resources 
are taken up in the preparation of certification and audits.  This, clearly, prevents 
Stora Enso from standardizing its practices across the entirety of the corpora-
tion.  Moreover, purchasers might demand that the manufacturer comply with 
the stricter FSC certification, but the manufacturer is not always able to meet 
this demand, given the absence of this certification in certain countries.
  At Stora Enso, managers exert separate efforts towards reconciliation and 
the establishment of dialogue between the various certification systems.  The 
managers’ efforts are directed at effecting a change in trust structures, trust 
that various categories of stakeholders have in various certification systems. 
Stora Enso’s managers have used a variety of strategies in order to reconcile 
certification systems and change trust institutions.  One of these strategies was 
the company’s participation in Forest Dialogue62 events dedicated to various 
62  Forest Dialogue is an NGO headquartered at Wales University.  Together with the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development, the organization organizes dialogues about 
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themes, including those connected with sustainable forestry use, certification 
and the guarantee of timber legality.  Over the course of the meetings organized 
by Forest Dialogue, a dialogue was initiated between various certification sys-
tems with the goal of overcoming contradictions between the different systems.
  Partnership with WWF was another important strategy used by Stora Enso 
to stimulate trust amongst participants in the chain of contract and reconcile 
differences between different certification systems.  In its collaboration with 
WWF Stora Enso worked on building forest usage models, during the course 
of which a dialogue was also started between different certification systems. 
With the goal of bringing together a system of trust guarantees through mutual 
acceptance of certification systems, Stora Enso acted in three distinct ways. 
First, by experimenting with dual certification (both FSC and PEFC) in Swe-
den, where both systems have been legitimized, mutual understanding between 
process participants and interested parties was established, and, as a result, so 
was a level of mutual trust.  Secondly, Stora Enso attempted, through a pilot 
certification program, to bring FSC certification to Finland, where only the 
PEFC system is well developed.  Finally, Stora Enso attempted to apply FSC 
certification to small forest owners in Latvia, bringing these owners together 
into a group and receiving certification for a logging company rather than for 
the owners of forests.63  Each of the actions described above was an attempt to 
overcome a certain “bottle-neck”, which, in the end, ought to have made the 
standardization of trust markers in the chain of custody easier.  The greater the 
number of standards used by the company, the greater the amount of additional 
effort that is needed in order to achieve trust relations in the chain of custody 
and  to overcome any obstacles that could arise.
  Stora Enso would also have liked to support the idea of developing dual 
certification in Russia, but set its sights on FSC for two reasons.  First, the FSC 
system was already well developed.  Second, the stricter FSC system acts as a 
guarantor of a greater level of trust in countries with developing economies. 
Moreover, FSC certification is more suitable in Russia, where, for the most part, 
only major leasers operate.64
  
forestry usage around the world.
63  From an interview conducted in Stockholm with Stora Enso’s manager for sustainable 
development.
64  From an interview conducted in Imatra, Finland with Stora Enso’s internal auditor.
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In Russia Stora Enso also worked to develop two models aimed at achieving 
trust from various categories of stakeholders.  The “Pskov Model Forest” served 
to win the trust of government institutions and other Russian stakeholders in 
innovations undertaken by Stora Enso in relation to forestry usage.  The model 
here focused on the goal of developing Stora Enso’s business in Russia, adapting 
Scandinavian technology to Russian conditions, collaborating with stakehold-
ers, making logging technology ecologically friendly, and putting in place a 
holistic approach to forestry management.  This last includes the exposition 
of innovations for intensive forest use and simultaneous approbation of FSC 
certification in Russia (Tysiachniouk ).
  To a great degree, the Tikhvin project was oriented towards winning the 
trust of transnational stakeholders.  This project brought both ends of the chain 
of custody — external purchasers and suppliers of raw material — face to face. 
This was necessary in order to demonstrate that even in a complicated context 
(such as that which exists in Russia, in an environment with weakly operat-
ing laws, corruption, illegal logging and so forth) it is possible to put together 
a business and chain of custody in a such a way that transparency, legality and 
ethical business practices are all provided for.65  For Stora Enso, the working 
out of trust guarantees in the chain of custody was an internal process — this 
in comparison to other models, where a large number of consultants were 
brought in.  In the Tikhvin-Chalna project, work was generally focused on 
bringing together management systems and improving the level of account-
ability in different links of the chain of custody (Tysiachniouk ).  At the 
same time, in addition to certification practices, Stora Enso expanded and em-
ployed its own monitoring procedures in relation to the chain of custody.  In 
methodological terms this occurred in the form of internal inspections of the 
entire corporation and its management.  Stora Enso focused on identifying 
potential risks, analyzing them and working out preventive measures that were 
then put into place across all elements of the chain of custody.  Whether it was 
a question of finalizing a leasing agreement, for example, or participating in an 
auction, identifying timber, preparing for logging, logging, purchasing equip-
ment, building roads, transporting timber, storing timber, accounting for timber 
transported and stored, or any other level of manufacture, Stora Enso strove 
to institutionalize the elements of its internal inspections at all points of the 
chain of custody.  Preventive measures were aimed at averting the possibilities 
65  From an interview conducted in St. Petersburg with Stora Enso’s manager for ecology.
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of selling timber on the side, theft, or the mixing of illegal timber together with 
legal.66  These efforts were led by Stora Enso’s managers in Stockholm together 
with managers of Wood Supply Russia, representing contractors in Russia and 
based in Imatra, Finland and St. Petersburg, Russia.
  Responsibility for the development and continuous improvement of veri-
fication procedures related to the legality of all timber arriving at the point of 
manufacture lay on the shoulders of Stora Enso’s managers for the environment 
and sustainable development, both within the framework of the Tikhvin-Chal-
na project and in general.  These managers were also responsible for the organi-
zation and monitoring of safe working conditions and the ecological responsi-
bility of the company’s business practices.  Throughout Stora Enso, moreover, it 
was forbidden to engage in corrupt relations or informal agreements that could 
be negatively interpreted as corrupt by either government officials or business 
partners.  Some distinct difficulties arose in connection with this last stipula-
tion, according to a manager in Stora Enso’s office in Imatra.  This manager 
was responsible for tax-related issues and customs regulations: the whole of the 
manufacturing process through customs and immigration.  In Russia, according 
to this manager, customs officials were the most corrupt element in the chain 
of contract.  Having become accustomed to extorting bribes, Russian customs 
let Stora Enso’s shipments through only after lengthy (sometimes longer than 
a week) stoppages, which cost the company significantly.67  There were also 
significant difficulties in connection with local police forces.
  Middle-level managers tended to solve the problems they encountered 
through procedural improvements and both internal and external (third party) 
audits that fell within certification frameworks.  These audits checked the en-
tirety of Stora Enso’s storage, the possibility of theft and the transport of tim-
ber.  Information included in contracts and related documents was thoroughly 
checked against actual materials in storage; video cameras were set up, along 
with similar control mechanisms.68  According to the source at Stora Enso, the 
weakest links in the chain of custody — those in need of especially thorough 
scrutiny — were areas where a great deal of timber or money had accumulated.69
66  Report on the Tikhvin-Chalna project (2007).
67  From an interview conducted in Imatra, Finland with the manager of Stora Enso’s local 
office.
68  Report on the Tikhvin-Chalna project (2007).
69  From an interview conducted in Imatra, Finland with Stora Enso’s internal auditor.
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  Stora Enso found that the development of effective business practices in 
its Russian structural divisions required an especial direction of effort towards 
overcoming differences in business cultures between the company itself and 
post-Soviet enterprises.  Modernization and reorganization of business enter-
prises, including the standardization of business practices, have ground to a 
halt, in part, because of the differences in trust constructs between Finnish and 
Russian elements of the Russian contract division.  Finnish managers note 
the particularity of Russian business collaboration, in which closed social net-
works of a particular type are built and in which especial trust relationships are 
formed.  Both big and small bosses surround themselves at an enterprise with 
a tight circle of friends and relatives to whom they relate paternalistically and 
whom they protect in case of alleged violations.  These relationships and the 
interests of this circle are given preference, moreover, over the interests of the 
business enterprise itself.70  These bosses are quite capable of reacting calmly, 
for example, to the news that one of the members of such a circle has, during 
working hours, built something on a frame-saw for his or her personal dacha.71 
One of the informants from Stora Enso, while speaking about trust, stressed that 
for Russians — especially during the years of and after Perestroika — trust was 
built on interpersonal connections, and if such connections did not arise, then 
it was not possible to develop business relationships: “In Russia, you have to 
first win personal trust in yourself, as a person, and only after this will someone 
conduct business with you.”72  In this light, trusting relationships were often 
developed at lunch or in the sauna.
  It was difficult to maintain trust that had been won during the course of the 
modernization and reorganization of various enterprises.  A large number of 
people — all of whom received quite small salaries — were as a rule registered 
at Russian enterprises.73  This approach differentiated Russian companies of the 
post-Perestroika era from international corporations, where there was a strong 
preference for employing a small number of people, all of whom were maxi-
mally loaded with work and provided with high levels of monetary compen-
70  Ibid.
71  From an interview conducted in Imatra, Finland with Stora Enso’s manager in charge of 
logging.
72  Ibid.
73  From an interview conducted in Imatra, Finland with Stora Enso’s manager for sustainable 
development.
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sation for their efforts.  A large portion of the workers in Russian enterprises 
were cut as part of corporate restructuring, a process that led to a fluctuation 
in trust in Stora Enso’s managers.  The source from Stora Enso noted that the 
system of interpersonal relationships that was predominant during the post-
Perestroika period started to move incrementally towards an international or-
ganizational style beginning in , and over time Russian managers have be-
come more and more similar to their colleagues in other countries.  Moreover, 
the informant noted a willingness on the part of qualified Russian managers to 
work overtime and their generally career-oriented approach to business, which 
set them apart in a positive way from their Finnish equivalents.
Managers of the russian production unit
Managers of the Russian manufacturing link – primarily technical production 
managers – were faced with the task of implementing business practices that 
would serve to increase trust in their enterprises at the international level, and 
to do so in a context that was less than ready to accept such practices.  This task 
was complicated, on the one hand, by the internal conditions at enterprises, 
where workers who had been socialized in a Russian context would need to 
accept external practices.  On the other hand, the external context of a country 
going through a period of economic reformation and institutional turbulence 
created definite impediments on the path to changing production practices 
over to new, internationally accepted processes.
  According to one of the production managers, one of the most complicated 
tasks was to reach a point where workers would adhere to safety regulations: 
“It’s difficult to explain to a Russian why he’s not allowed to throw pipes 
around or pour out oil in a forest.  But it’s especially difficult to explain why 
he should wear a hardhat.”74  Russian legislation includes safety regulations 
regarding all these issues; however, in practice, authorities in charge of check-
ing safety regulations tend to worry more than anything about making sure 
the necessary signatures are recorded in safety regulation logs: signatures of 
workers that testify that they are acquainted with safety instructions and regu-
lations.  Authorities in charge of verifying safety regulations also relied on the 
existence of documents that verified that hardhats had been purchased.  Within 
74    From an interview with a technical director of one of Stora Enso’s filial companies in Russia.
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the framework of the Tikhvin project and within its attempts to provide FSC 
certification for Russian enterprises, Stora Enso conducted a broad campaign 
against accidents in the workplace.  Instead of simply checking the existence of 
hardhats on documents, they checked whether workers were actually wearing 
hardhats at their place of work.  Oil spillages were tracked, as was compliance 
with all necessary rules related to manufacturing conduct; a variety of sanctions, 
including economic ones, were taken against those who violated such rules. 
According to one of the technical directors of an enterprise acquired by Stora 
Enso, the overall culture of this manufacturing concern significantly improved 
after it became part of Stora Enso.
  The peculiarities of the Russian context were reflected in the manner in 
which production-level managers formed notions of trust.  They defined trust 
in a company, first and foremost, in terms of work stability at an enterprise, its 
provision of “white” salaries (“not in envelopes, but transferred to an account 
in a savings bank”75), the enterprise’s payment of taxes, the absence of dual 
and misleading accounting methods, and the provision of health insurance for 
workers – not only the minimum insurance required, but additional, voluntar-
ily provided insurance.  One of the technical directors interviewed believes that 
trust in a company occurs amongst local residents if they see the enterprise’s 
workers “in the proper clothing, on machinery in good working order, having 
passed medical examinations and received vaccinations for encephalitis.”76  A 
local community’s trust in the constructs outlined by production-level manag-
ers is based on the idea that the company invests in local infrastructure – for 
example, in the building of roads – and fulfills its social obligations as stipulated 
in its rental agreement.
  Russian production-level managers shared the feelings of their Finnish col-
leagues about effective manufacturing organization.  For example, the Japanese 
practice of “lean production” – based on principles of production optimization 
– was held up as an example to be emulated by Stora Enso’s Russian general 
director in Tikhvin.  According to this director, the most important objective 
was to centralize planning and optimize production: “If people are just wander-
ing around, there’s no labor organization.”77  This director was in favor of hiring 
75  From an interview with a technical director conducted in Tikhvin.
76  Ibid.
77  From an interview with the general director of a Tikhvin-based enterprise (on the job 
since 2008).
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qualified workers who would be capable of working with new technology and 
who would understand the finer points of sustainable forest use, not to mention 
the essence of ecological approaches: for example, the necessity of safeguarding 
biodiversity.  Forwarder and harvester operators, in his opinion, should have 
the proper level of qualifications and responsibility so that the need for further 
specialists at logging production points would drop.
  Production-level managers ran into definite and Russian-context-specific 
difficulties in terms of providing for an enterprise’s environmental responsibil-
ity – a major component of certification requirements and a necessity for the 
creation of trust.  These difficulties were connected with the limited develop-
ment of, changes within and poor functionality of, Russian legislation.  In both 
 and  the Russian Forest Codes retained elements that conflicted with 
certification requirements: for example, the concept of the conservation of bio-
diversity in commercial forest usage was not included in the Codes.  It proved 
necessary, in order to fulfill certification requirements, to switch the terminol-
ogy and set aside key biotypes78 under the guise of “unexploited zones.”
  Difficulties also arose in the provision of yet another demand made by end 
consumers: freedom from corruption.  It was necessary to bring this norm into 
a Russian context, where informal relationships were quite acceptable. Accord-
ing to one of the production-level managers interviewed, those involved in the 
Tikhvin project “refused to give out under-the-table bonuses and bribes.  We 
need to increase the number of honest workers and punish the charlatans.”79  It is 
worth noting that quite a lot of illegal logging occurs in the areas leased by Stora 
Enso in the neighborhood of Boksitogorsk and Tikhvin.  According to one of 
the managers interviewed, corrupt networks were especially well developed in 
Boksitogorsk municipality, insofar as they were protected by government institu-
tions; if the latter had had any desire to clean up corruption in the municipality, 
it would have long ago come to fruition.80  Illegal cutting on Stora Enso’s leased 
territory was a problem for the company not only in terms of the economic loss 
it caused, but also because the company, in accordance with certification norms, 
is responsible for everything that occurs on its leased territory.  Illegal cutters 
occasionally chopped down lots that had been left as valuable ecosystems or 
78  Sites of particularly high biodiversity.
79    Quotation from a production-level manager in the film “Clean Timber Imports,” available 
on line at www.axelspringer.de/en/artikel/films_525366, viewed February 22, 2010.
80  From an interview with a technical director.
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seed-bearing plots, creating circumstances beyond the control of Stora Enso.81 
  The company, together with regional forestry administration bodies, found 
it necessary to conduct raids and forcibly guard its territory.  To fulfill the latter 
requirement Stora Enso employed certain elements of OMON (Mobile Unit 
of Russian Police, the Russian equivalent of American SWAT forces) – and 
yet, due to the significant amount of land rented by Stora Enso and the well-
developed warning system developed amongst illegal cutters, such methods 
proved largely ineffective.  One of the managers interviewed noted that before 
his company became part of Stora Enso, it had been easier to organize the 
struggle against illegal cutting: they had been able to use informal channels.82 
For example, working through acquaintances at the appropriate government 
agencies, they initiated audits of enterprises that had accepted timber previously 
stolen from the first company’s leased territory.  These audits included working 
with police forces, ecological agencies, energy agencies and other government 
institutions that were able to affect the situation.  A particularly independent 
company that used this sort of practice managed to get three sawmills closed 
down, after which the remaining regional sawmills, fearing retributive action, 
accepted stolen timber less and less frequently.  After the corporation’s local 
partners became part of Stora Enso, this sort of informal approach became in-
admissible.  Stora Enso’s regulations allowed only for the use of formal methods 
of combating illegal cutting, especially in relation to guarding leased territory, 
an area in which formal methods proved costly and largely ineffective.
  In addition to the difficulties listed above, other problems arose in the pro-
cess of bringing new practices – ones capable of developing trust amongst con-
sumers – into the Russian production link.  According to one of the managers 
interviewed, the fulfillment of certification requirements was made more diffi-
cult by the limited culture of a local populace that had left enormous quantities 
of rubbish in surrounding forests – something which the leaser of a forest is 
obligated to deal with.  The individual interviewed noted that “for us, certifica-
tion was a ‘combing out’ of practices begun [by Stora Enso] with the aim of 
inculcating a certain production culture…overall, this brought about a larger 
amount of order within these practices.”83
81  From an interview with an ecological manager conducted in St. Petersburg.
82  From an interview with a production-level manager in Tikhvin (on the job since 2008).
83  From an interview with the Stora Enso CEO conducted in Tikhvin.
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discussion
Managers of various units in the supply chain bear their own share of respon-
sibility and play their own roles in the provision of socially and ecologically re-
sponsibility practices that allow companies to win trust amongst end consumers 
in “sensitive” markets for their products.  The greatest degree of responsibility 
lies with the first link in the chain, that is, at the place of timber preparation. 
Processes occurring at the moment of logging are what attract particular atten-
tion from both local and international environmental organizations (Tysiachni-
ouk ).  At the same time, the largest number of demands is made by those at 
the very end of the chain: those who purchase the goods and who, for their part, 
are exposed to risks, pressure, and at times a lack of trust – all boosted at times 
by NGOs (Tysiachniouk ).  Ultimately, the final purchasers of one good or 
another, with their particular purchasing policies and chain of contract monitor-
ing practices, are the ones who demand the perfection of systems to guarantee 
institutional trust in the entire chain of custody and manufactured products.
  Users and manufacturers at different levels of production can be, literally 
speaking, unknown to one another, something that is true more often than 
not.  This complicates the formation of personalized trust.  As a result, trust in 
a system becomes a priority (Giddens ), as well as trust in procedures and 
mechanisms that provide for transparency in business processes.  It is worth 
noting that managers of structural divisions that are part of the chain of custody 
aim for stability and partnerships – something that, along with institutional 
trust, requires interpersonal trust as well.  As has been shown, the interest of the 
end consumer in manufacturing processes can facilitate the realization of pro-
jects intended to influence a manufacturer’s practices.  In this case, consumers 
and manufacturers do meet face to face, and actions taken mutually to develop 
systematic trust markers are strengthened by interpersonal trust created in the 
course of such meetings.
  In the case studied, I considered responsible purchasing practices amongst 
consumers of products made from Russian timber, paying close attention to the 
motivations underlying such purchases.  My analysis demonstrated that amongst 
media companies that purchase paper made from Russian timber, there ex-
ist quite different basic motivations for this sort of responsible purchasing ap-
proach.  These companies also form notions of trust in Russian manufacturing 
processes and Russian products in differing ways.  For all the companies par-
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ticipating in the project, however, it was important to cultivate their images as 
socially and ecologically responsible corporations.  Following interviews with 
end consumers, it became clear that, from their perspective, trust on the part 
of NGOs was imperative, as well as on the part of consumers of their products, 
stockholders, journalists, and all other interested parties.  Reaching this level 
of trust meant that these companies needed a guarantee that they themselves 
were buying “clean” (in terms of social and ecological responsibility) products. 
Insofar as it is more or less impossible in a global economy – taking into consid-
eration quite extended chains of custody – to have a complete guarantee, these 
companies found it imperative to create procedures that would form, uphold 
and guarantee their own trust in the “cleanliness” of the goods they purchased. 
This explains their willingness to participate in the project, take on the role of 
agents of institutional change in Russia, receive a first-hand impression of what 
is happening at the place of production, and form requirements for change in 
practices on the ground.  In technical terms, they worked to partially replace a 
lack of institutional trust (insofar as certification had yet to be received) with 
personalized trust that ought to have come together over the course of personal 
meetings with loggers. If the companies had had sufficient guarantees of trust 
in the form of FSC certification, there would have been no need for them to 
participate in the project. 
  Given a deficit of institutional trust, however, attempts were made to com-
pensate for this deficit, on the one hand, through personal verification and, on 
the other hand, through the initiation of procedures that should be able to serve 
as guarantees of trust.  In other words, the project was practically aimed at the 
formation of trust mechanisms, markers and guarantees: improving verification 
procedures for transparency in purchases, and boosting the level of legality, free-
dom from corruption, and social practices such as improved workplace safety.
  Research has shown that in “sensitive” markets, certain companies find it 
more necessary than others to form ideological systems capable of creating 
and upholding trust in a brand.  The more vulnerable a transnational corpora-
tion is to pressure from NGOs, the more imperative this corporation will be 
concerned about its image and winning trust in a community.  Concern for 
a company’s image prompts demands made to contractors in terms of raising 
certain requirements.  In the project at hand, all of the statements made by 
the participating companies to explain their responsible purchasing policies 
included both value-based motives and motives based on a desire to avoid risks 
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that would threaten these companies.  Within this continuum, statements about 
risks were barely present in the argument made by Axel Springer’s representa-
tive: to a large degree, this representative focused on value-based motivations 
for his company’s choices, as well as a desire to achieve social change around the 
world and become an agent of such social change.  The representative of Time, 
Inc., however, generally emphasized that the basic motivation for his company’s 
responsible purchasing was an attempt to take preventive measures that would 
avert risks associated with NGOs.  To a large degree this is understandable, 
given what Time, Inc. produces: as noted above, Time Inc. publishes not only 
magazines but also catalogues, both of which are connected with a very large 
amount of paper use.  At the same time, society tends to see this as low-value 
production, insofar as a catalogue, having fulfilled its passing advertising func-
tion, immediately goes out of circulation and is thrown away.84  An analogous 
motivation for monitoring the chain of custody was found at Tetra Pak, the 
major production of which is focused around cardboard packaging.  Explaining 
its responsible purchasing policies, Tetra Pak mentioned only possible risks.  It 
is precisely this sort of company, however, that is often faced with NGO-based 
pressure, so Tetra Pak focuses a great deal of attention on the ecological “friend-
liness” of its policies and procedures, and is willing to make similar demands 
of its contractors.  Trust guarantees are especially important – both in relation 
to acquired production and to a product itself – for companies like Tetra Pak.
  When Stora Enso’s end consumers visited Russian timber enterprises, 
seminars and mini-conferences associated with the project, their attention was 
drawn by the peculiarities of Russian manufacturing, which differ vastly from 
manufacturing policies in the countries from which they had arrived.  As a 
result, during the course of the project, particular emphasis was placed on 
technical questions of worker safety and a reduction in the number of ac-
cidents at the workplace, while other manufacturing policies were left largely 
aside.  Over the course of the project, certain initial objectives were aban-
doned, including the struggle against corruption, against illegal cutting, and 
so forth.  Upon completion of the project, participants noted that they were 
not quite capable of changing the system as a whole and that they would 
simply like to prevent corruption and the use of illegal timber in their chains 
of custody.  Their objective became to prove that even in an imperfect system 
84  In relation to Time, Inc. such catalogues are – when possible – not thrown out, but instead 
recycled.
259
of forest usage with elements of corruption and other abuses – ones that do 
little to support the formation of institutionalized trust – it was nonetheless 
possible, using internal procedures and a verified design, to create a system of 
trust guarantees in relation to timber arriving in the chain of custody from 
Russia.  Yet timber theft by “black loggers” and their use of corrupt methods 
were considered unavoidable problems that projects such as the one studied 
here are incapable of changing.  All elements touching upon sustainable forest 
usage were delegated to the process of certification, which, in and of itself, is 
a guarantor of trust.
  According to statements made by Stora Enso’s middle-level managers based 
in Sweden, concern for the company’s image and an attempt to avoid risks 
were strong motivating factors for their interest in the project.  However, along 
with providing for consumer trust guarantors (in the form of various proce-
dures), certifications and so forth, an affirmation of the need to optimize the 
very mechanisms that provide for trust comes through clearly in interviews 
with these managers.  When middle-level managers find it necessary to work 
with various certification systems, they try to reach mutual acceptance between 
these systems; where this proves impossible, they try – at a minimum – to gain 
trust in both systems on the part of end consumers.  Stora Enso’s innovative 
methods and programs were, in line with such reasoning, aimed at the estab-
lishment of a dialogue between different groups that were used to applying 
one certification system or another, in order to standardize, at least to some 
degree, mechanisms that would guarantee a certain level of trust in manufac-
turing processes and the chain of custody.  Participation in the Tikhvin-Chalna 
project was important for Stora Enso, first and foremost, because it allowed the 
company to establish optimal and standardized procedures capable of providing 
transparency and verifying the legality of wood supplied by contractors.
  When discussing manufacturing processes in Russia with Finnish manag-
ers, there is a clear sense that the latter work simultaneously in both countries 
– Finland and Russia – and are obligated to collaborate with officials on both 
sides of the border.  As such, more often than not they note the post-Perestroika 
peculiarities of the Russian economy, as well as the remaining traces of the 
previous Soviet era.  If middle-level managers and end consumers alike can be 
seen in trust-related conversations as giving particular value to institutionalized 
trust on the part of international stakeholders, the statements of Finnish man-
agers connected with manufacturing processes in Russia are a bit more focused 
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on the description of various practices that help create interpersonal trust in a 
Russian context and which influence business processes in Russia.  While in-
terviewing these managers, I saw a certain tendency – the same tendency noted 
by other sociologists involved in the study of post-Perestroika Russia: a lack of 
trust in the transformation of the government system gave Russians cause to 
work out special adaptive mechanisms (Minina 4, 54), especially the forma-
tion of business networks through individualized contacts and the winning of 
interpersonal trust rather than through official institutions or organizations 
(Zvonovskii , 4).  Over time, the post-Perestroika type of relationship, 
where interpersonal connections were both more important and more effec-
tive than institutional ones, has slowly been eliminated.  The managers who 
were interviewed pointed to a growing similarity between the economic en-
vironments in Russia and Finland; elements of personal and institutional trust 
elements have been incrementally coming together as a whole.
  There is a significant difference in the understanding of trust constructs 
among Stora Enso managers: that of the manager in charge of certification and 
working in a team alongside middle-level managers in Stockholm is hardly 
the same as that of the managers involved in the manufacturing link (technical 
directors).  The understanding of the manager in Stockholm is quite similar to 
that of the middle-level managers, insofar as she works together with them on 
a team: over the course of close collaboration, they have developed similar val-
ues in the relevant field.  This manager, who is responsible for certification in 
Russia, discussed the development of mutual relationships with all interested 
parties, something that is reflected in her trust construct (which is closely 
aligned with the demands of FSC certification).  In contrast, managers who 
organize manufacturing in Russia construct the idea of trust quite differently. 
Their trust construct is aimed at the normal functioning of production and 
an enterprise as a whole: the absence of dual (misleading or illegal) account-
ing practices, technical implementation and technical safety measures – all of 
which are part of a manufacturer’s “culture” and have a tendency to evoke 
trust.  At the same time, these managers note the price that one has to pay for 
such trust: the loss of qualified workers due to lower legal salaries, difficulties 
in the struggle against illegal cutting – given the impossibility of using infor-
mal mechanisms to combat illegal cutting – and delays connected with the 
impossibility of paying bribes.
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Conclusion
The current study considered how trust is formed in different links in the chain 
of custody.  As the research showed, the formation of trust occurs differently in 
each link.  Amongst end consumers aiming at forming ideas of trust, the pur-
chased product itself – paper – carries within itself certain value connotations 
that provide information about social, ecological and even consensus values of 
its manufacture.  This product, moreover, takes on value qualities such as com-
pliance with environmental, social and even democratic norms; the existence 
of value characteristics gives birth to impersonalized trust.  In order to develop 
this type of trust in a product amongst its consumers, a company publicizes its 
adherence to policies of responsible purchasing, something that suggests strict 
monitoring of its chain of contract.  Paper purchasers have the objective of 
forming guarantees that could stimulate this sort of impersonalized trust.  This 
trust is imperative for companies not only because they agree with its underly-
ing values, but also because it improves their image and helps their economic 
performance in “sensitive” markets.
  Amongst managers of a middle-link company that produces paper, the goal 
was the practical provision of a basis for this trust.  These managers are involved 
in the sorting and working out of trust guarantees, and their actions are aimed 
at the provision of value-based connotations that could be associated with a 
product.  At the same time they are bound to observe economic equilibrium 
with other corporate elements and must not undermine economic effectiveness.
  Amongst managers of the Finnish offices of a company that produces paper, 
trust is based, in general, on the observation of legal structures, the timely pay-
ment of taxes, and compliance with any and all ecological and social requirements, 
including international ones.  All of this is, for these managers, part of an under-
standing of responsible business and forms a structure of trust.  It is worth noting 
that when interviewed, Finnish managers are more likely to mention responsibil-
ity in relation to their own workers than in relation to a local community.
  Amongst Russian managers who are working for a manufacturing organi-
zation, trust concepts are connected with the idea of overcoming post-Soviet 
business practices.  To some degree this is, in fact, what is demanded by their 
product’s end consumers.
  An analysis of interviews conducted with managers of different links in the 
chain of custody demonstrates that as one moves along links from the consum-
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er to the producer, trust constructs become more and more practically framed. 
Trust that is founded on value-based connotations amongst consumers is re-
placed with a more instrumental approach to the formation of trust amongst 
middle-level managers.  For the latter, it is imperative to provide for trust, while 
at the same time working out certain markers, incorporating practical measures 
that increase social and ecological responsibility and monitoring to make sure 
that these measures do not have a negative effect on profits.  At the level of pro-
duction-link managers, the trust construct becomes even more bound up with 
day-to-day practices.  Here trust is understood as a business norm that ought to 
be observed.  In this way, the generally broad trust construct – including a large 
number of value-based connotations – decreases in its movement along the chain 
of custody to the place of forest production and in the end comes close to the 
provision of “normal” business – that is, nothing more than a practical day-to-day 
approach.  The differences that can be seen in trust constructs in different links 
in the chain of custody are attributable to two factors: first, the objectives held 
by each individual link in the chain (and with the instrumental components that 
are superimposed on the link) and, second, the fact that a trust construct is always 
connected with the value system of one link or another.  Thus, in the Russian 
manufacturing link, consensus values – although given a great deal of weight 
by end users – in no way figure into trust constructs and are replaced with little 
more than an instrumental approach – one in which trust is equivalent to the 
norms and requirements of the manufacturer itself.  In this way, the research has 
shown that, to some degree, the development of trust markers is a business strate-
gy, protecting a business from risks and allowing for successful business operations 
in “sensitive” markets and the development of significant market advantages.
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Mapping reneWaBLe energy poLiCies in
the Barents region froM a MuLtiLeveL
governanCe perspeCtive  
introduction
Investment in research and technology development, as well as commercial 
projects related to renewable energy, has been growing gradually in the Bar-
ents Region during the last decade. Consequently, the development of the 
renewable energy sector has been recently identified as a megatrend in the 
Arctic. This new trend is important for three main reasons. First, those ‘low-
carbon’ technologies decrease the level of emissions and balance the con-
sumption of fossil fuels. For those reasons, renewable energy is a mitigating 
and adaptive measure that combats the effects of climate change and contrib-
utes to environmental protection. Secondly, it is a new, intensively developing 
branch of industry that creates potential prospects for new jobs and economic 
growth. Thirdly, given the conditions of the Arctic climate and remoteness, 
it is an essential issue for security, especially in small isolated communities, 
to have access to reliable supplies of energy. Accordingly, renewable energy 
technology emerges as a core element in the pathway to sustainable socio-
economic development in the Arctic. 
  Nevertheless, the generation of energy from renewable sources is still not 
economically competitive in comparison to energy generated from fossil fu-
els. For this reason, the involvement of political measures and the prices of 
conventional energy sources on the global market are crucial for the stimu-
lation of investments – both public and private – in energy solutions using 
alternative supplies. This chapter describes the development of the renewable 
energy sector within the Barents Region and analyzes various policy practices 
relating to that issue from the perspective of multilevel governance. Using five 
regional case studies drawn from members of the Barents Euro-Arctic Coun-
cil, the study identifies and compares interests and actors that play a leading 
role in the governance of renewable energy. The research material includes 
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policy documents, reports and statistical data, as well as media materials. I 
argue that the regional capacity to influence the development of renewable 
energy and political engagement varies within the cases studied in the Bar-
ents Region. However, the development of alternative energy solutions at the 
regional level is led by national policy goals and pressure from international 
organizations. 
renewable energy in the Barents region
Renewable energy is produced from natural, constantly replenished processes 
and renewable resources, and it may take various forms, such as solar energy, 
wind power, bio-energy, geothermal, tidal and hydropower (International En-
ergy Agency ). Analysis of the data presenting electricity generation within 
the Arctic shows that the Barents Region definitely takes the lead in power 
production from renewable sources. In Norway the long tradition of the hydro-
power industry give it dominance in the regional energy balances in the High 
North. Due to rich timber resources and the forest industry in northern Fin-
land and Sweden, bio-energy also appears as a significant regional source of en-
ergy supplies. Finally, a new generation of technologies utilizing wind, solar and 
ocean energy is intensively developing in the Barents Region, especially in the 
Scandinavian part (Rasmussen et al. , 5). Wind power, in particular, is the 
focus of new investments in the European High North (Rautajoki , ). 
  Because of the exceptional vulnerability of Arctic nature and livelihoods, 
measures for adapting to, mitigating and preventing the consequences of cli-
mate change are an important issue in the political agenda of regional and 
intergovernmental organizations acting in the European North. Several region-
al cooperative bodies, such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the 
Arctic Council (AC) and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), deal with 
renewable energy as a cross-cutting issue that contributes to the main goals of 
their activity: environment protection and the stimulation of sustainability in 
socio-economic development. From a political perspective, the Barents Region 
is a territorial configuration (Painter and Jeffrey ) that originates from a 
security policy and intends to overcome challenges related to economic de-
velopment, social problems and environmental hazards. Therefore, the Barents 
intergovernmental and regional structures cooperate in order to ensure sustain-
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able development and economic growth, and consequently neutralize conflicts 
and provide stability in the region (Pettersen ).
  The concept of ‘governance’ can be applied to various disciplines in the so-
cial sciences and a wide range of issues. It refers to the structures of power and 
processes of regulating and controlling the contemporary world (Bovaird and 
Loffler , -4). Due to its multidisciplinary nature, it has been used to 
describe complex relations among various actors and actions undertaken by 
them in the policy-shaping and policy-making process. The literature lists five 
types and principal areas where the concept has been applied: ) economic 
development and ‘good governance’, ) ‘governance without government’ in 
international regimes, ) ‘corporate governance’ in the private sector, 4) New 
Public Management within public administration, and 5) ‘negotiated social 
governance’, which includes organizations of civil society and various actors 
in the process of decision making and policy formulation (Hirst , 4-). 
Multi-level governance is described as a process of decision making that is the 
result of interaction among multiple agencies representing public and private 
interests and acting at various territorial levels (Keskitalo , 4). In addition 
the process of networking among multiple political actors, as well as their rela-
tions with non-governmental organisations, takes place in horizontal (sector) 
and vertical (territorial) ‘governance’ dimensions (Nystén-Haarala and Koti-
lainen , ). 
  National decision-makers have to face problems concerning energy secu-
rity, while simultaneously under pressure from the international community 
to tackle global challenges related to climate change and environmental pro-
tection. Measures to adapt to climate change require multidimensional coor-
dination and governance including multiple institutions and political actors 
making decisions or undertaking actions at the international, state and local 
levels (Keskitalo , 4). As for renewable energy, practices of governance in-
clude law, regulations, policies and their instruments and strategies, as well as 
the funding of programmes and facilitating of projects. Networks of agencies 
appear within public institutions, producers, consumers, and interest groups 
that benefit from the development of green energy or resist it. Questions that 
need studying include how actions at the regional level depend on the national 
context and what the role of international regional organizations and European 
Union (EU) frameworks is, as well as the role of local and non-governmental 
actors in renewable energy development in the Barents Region.
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regional governance of renewable energy 
in the context of national policies
The following section presents five cases of renewable energy development and 
governance within Nordland, Finnmark, Murmansk, Lapland, and Norrbotten 
in the context of two national strategies – energy and climate policies – as well 
as their strategies for the Arctic. Furthermore, in the case of Finland and Sweden, 
the study starts with an analysis of the EU’s energy strategy and policy on Arctic 
issues. Therefore, those regional cases, which are nested in a national and Euro-
pean context, may highlight aspects of multi-level governance such as planning 
systems at different territorial levels, public-private partnerships, and the par-
ticipation of various stakeholders in national and international networks dealing 
with renewable energy and influencing policy-making in the Barents Region.
the norwegian high north - support for local 
communities in nordland, and supplying electricity 
for the petroleum industry in finnmark
Regarding renewable energy development in the High North, the role of the 
state appears first of all within the national planning system. The Norwegian 
Climate Policy sets two long-term targets: to reduce global greenhouse gas emis-
sions by the equivalent of % from its  emissions level by , and to 
become carbon neutral by 5. Additionally, on a voluntary basis the Norwe-
gian government wants to strengthen its Kyoto commitment by %, which 
corresponds to % below the  level. However, those emission reductions 
should be achieved through domestic actions. In the Norwegian High North, 
the role of the state first of all appears within national planning system. Regard-
ing renewable energy, the Norwegian Climate Policy sets three overall targets: 
being carbon neutral until 5, reducing the greenhouse gas emissions by % 
until , supporting Kyoto commitment by % points.  As a general way 
to meet those goals, domestic climate policy plans to develop climate-friendly 
technologies, and expects a transition to CO-neutral fuels (bio-ethanol, bio-
diesel, biogas and hydrogen) in transport, CO-neutral heating (greater use of 
biomass, more effective use of solar heat and heat pumps), and “new renewables” 
in electricity (wind power and small hydropower plants). Policy instruments 
such as the emissions trading scheme and CO taxes are economical and gen-
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erally have a cross-sector character. Nevertheless, an exception among financial 
instruments is feed-in tariffs. Since  they have been provided only for wind 
power producers. Furthermore, an awareness campaign initiated by the gov-
ernment provides information about opportunities for change to individuals, 
private companies and local governments. Finally, the document states that each 
municipality should have its own climate strategy (Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment ).
  The importance of the High North for the national interests of Norway is 
reflected by the establishment of a separate planning document for the region. 
The Strategy for the High North highlights prospects for the development of 
renewable energy, particularly in Finnmark, and stresses economic opportuni-
ties for business activity in northern areas (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs ). Updated in , the strategy confirms previous statements and 
especially emphasizes the potential of wind energy and small-scale water power 
plants. Nevertheless, if northern areas want to take advantage of those new op-
portunities, they need to upgrade the electric power infrastructure, particularly 
the transmission grid85 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ).
  Rich reserves of hydrocarbons and electric power that is produced almost 
entirely (more than 5% in ) from hydropower provides energy self-suffi-
ciency and security in Norway (NVE a). Concerning the northern regions 
the analysis confirms the vast potential of other renewable sources. Firstly, it 
forecasts a boost in the utilization of wind energy as soon as technology appro-
priate for arctic conditions becomes more available. Especially the combined 
use of wind and hydropower was identified as a remarkable option for remote 
areas in Northern Norway. Secondly, ocean power emerges as an interesting 
possibility, but not as a substantial source of energy. Finally, using photovoltaic 
technology to produce electricity was too expensive and so far has been under-
valued in the northern regions. However, the study emphasizes that solar power 
may be an attractive solution as a supplementary source of heating (Nordic 
Council of Ministers ). 
  The assumptions above concerning development trends seem to corre-
spond with reality. It appears that the three Northern Norwegian provinces are 
85    Increased capacity will be essential for phase II of the Snøhvit development. The production 
of large amounts of wind power in Finnmark and new processing plants in eastern Finnmark will 
create a need for 420 kV transmission lines from Skaidi to Varangerbotn and from Varangerbotn 
to Finland. Preliminary estimates put the necessary investments at NOK 1.4 billion. 
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particularly interested in developing wind power. According to the Norwegian 
Water Resources and Energy Directorate, within all three of those counties,  
wind energy projects are under consideration (including 4 offshore),  have 
been given concessions, and the scheduling of  has been completed (NVE 
b). Local media have also reported on two large-scale wind-energy proj-
ects. In  local media announced that Troms Kraft had invested in a wind-
mill park at Vannøya. The Fakken project is expected to start generating power 
in  and provide energy to  households in the region (BarentsObserver 
a). One year later, Varanger Kraft got permission to install ten windmills in 
Berlevåg, Eastern Finnmark. The first phase of the Rákkocearro project should 
be completed by . The second phase, however, depends on grid capacity, 
which has to be upgraded in order to extend the number of windmills to  
(BarentsObserver a). In addition, research and development projects for 
ocean power are continuously being undertaken in Northern Norway. In ad-
dition to the Hammerfest Strøm, a floating tidal power plant named Morlid 
II has been patented by the company Hydra Tidal. The tidal turbines were 
installed in Gimsøy stream in Lofoten, Nordland County. The two-year testing 
period began in  (Renewable Energy Focus ). Furthermore, on-going 
research on the most effective methods and proper machinery for converting 
wave power into electricity is being conducted at the Norwegian Technology 
University. Therefore, the use of wave energy in the arctic climate may become 
possible in the future (Cappa ).
  Together with research projects and private sector initiatives, regional au-
thorities are also paying special attention to opportunities created by green en-
ergy development in the High North. The role of authorities in policy-making 
at the regional level may be either limited to implementation of state regula-
tions that contribute to national goals or extend to independent decisions that 
reflect local and regional interests. Regarding renewable energy, practices of 
governance in Nordland and Finnmark appear as regional plans and strategies 
for climate and energy, as well as particular projects and programmes. 
  In Nordland, a regional policy addressing the environmental challenges was 
adopted in April . The mission is to meet the national targets as well as tar-
gets related to the Kyoto Protocol for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In or-
der to contribute to this overall objective, the Regional Plan - Climate challenges 
in Nordland sets  main goals: () to reduce emissions by % of the  level, 
() to focus on the potential of renewable energy and energy efficiency, and () 
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to decrease the region’s vulnerability to climate change and enhance its capac-
ity to adapt (Nordland County Council ). The county takes independent 
actions as well as initiating various measures in cooperation with other actors 
across sectors and administrative levels. The policy for renewable energy targets 
wind energy and small hydro power, which is specified in two separate docu-
ments. The first, Regional Plan for Wind Power in Nordland, includes strategies for 
the development of wind farms and guidelines for licensing. The priority is to 
give authorization to projects in areas where it is estimated that there will be 
minimal impact on the environment and public interests (Nordland County 
Council ). The assessment of the location for each project should take into 
consideration not only wind resources and power line capacity, but also its ef-
fect on areas covered by various types of protection, the landscape, biodiversity, 
interference-free natural areas in Norway, cultural heritage, the outdoors, rein-
deer herding, tourism, and natural resources. The Council declares its intention 
to improve knowledge about land use conflicts. Thus, it works in coopera-
tion with the reindeer herding industry and the Norwegian Water Resources 
and Energy Directorate (Nordland County Council ). The authorities also 
held public consultation regarding Regional plan for small hydro power plants from 
March to May  in order to assess the level of potential conflict for small 
hydro power projects. This second document established overall strategies and 
targets to be met by 5, as well as thematic guidelines for new hydropower 
development in Nordland. Localization of small hydroelectric power plants will 
be prioritized in areas where: () population decline and the opportunities for 
economic development are limited, () aquaculture facilities use the same water 
supply, () the possibilities for establishing a new power infrastructure capable 
of meeting local energy needs are limited. The plan also established guidelines 
for municipalities and requirements for project applicants. Thus, potential in-
vestments must comply with rules similar to the assessment used in the case of 
wind power (Nordland County Council ).
  In Finnmark, the energy sector is one of the main areas of industry. Hence, 
the county’s vision for economic development is to become a leading energy 
region in the national and European context. Regional authorities established 
the policy in two documents: Regional Development Programme 2010-2013 and 
Energy Strategy for Finnmark 2010-2013. The first is equally focused on the 
petroleum sector and promising opportunities for renewable energy sources. 
The first area has already been recognised as a driving force for regional de-
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velopment. However, Finnmark, with its large wind power resources, wants to 
contribute to the further of wind power and strengthen its own position in 
Northern Norway. For that reason, the regional authority is committed to de-
veloping a new potential to work on local competences and ownership, which 
will play a role in increasing incomes and welfare within the municipalities of 
the region (Finnmark County Authority a). This idea is expressed as one 
of the main goals in Energy Strategy for Finnmark: “to become a major supplier 
of renewable energy based on profitable development solutions providing high 
value back to the community” (Finnmark County Authority b, 4). 
  The analysis of the current situation recognized a number of challenges: the 
lack of capacity in the transmission grid, a need for land-use plans in relation to 
wind power, weak expertise and knowledge exchange within the industry sector, 
a low level of awareness among public and private actors about strict environ-
mental requirements related to the implementation of renewable energy projects, 
and finally no educational environment or strong research institutions that could 
provide a basis for the development of advanced technology. The weaknesses 
described above hamper larger investment in wind power and other renewable 
energy projects. For that reason, the county set plans to overcome the difficulties 
through various policy measures and key actions directed at the business sector, 
research and educational institutions. Some examples of those actions are: the 
establishment of a dialogue forum for renewable energy between authorities and 
business, setting climate targets for energy consumption in industry, and investi-
gation of possibilities to establish a national centre for wind energy in Finnmark 
(Finnmark County Authority b). Furthermore, using political influence, re-
gional authorities pledged to improve the general framework and promote proj-
ects that facilitate the use of wind power, tidal power and other renewable energy 
sources. The most important goal is to work on upgrading the line capacity 
within and out of the county, which has two purposes. First, energy export and 
partnership with Murmansk Oblast are key actions within International Strategies 
for Finnmark County Authority 2011-2014 (Finnmark County Authority c). 
The second aim is to use power from renewable sources produced in the region 
to supply electricity for petroleum-related activities (Finnmark County Author-
ity b, 5). In the context of sustainable development, the goal of which is to 
replace fossil fuels by renewable energy sources, developing green energy for this 
purpose is quite controversial. Nevertheless, without an upgraded transition grid, 
putting any of these objectives into practice is not possible. 
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  In the description of the situation in Northern Norway above, two differ-
ent patterns of development appear. The significance of clean energy generation 
for regional and national interests has been recognized by both Finnmark and 
Nordland. However, each region has focused on a different aspect of renewable 
energy development in its policies. In Nordland, the mission of the policy ad-
dresses global interests and problems. However, the development of the targeted 
technologies - wind and small hydro power - is not without restrictions and 
special rules. The intention is that new investments should emerge from local 
energy needs. Their implementation would occur only if they appear to be the 
most effective way to meet those needs and do not hinder other local activi-
ties. Thus, the county balances different interests among regional actors, who 
are involved in policy formulation or at least allowed to express their positions, 
and other national, as well as global, agencies. Finnmark, on the other hand, is 
focused on the economic aspect of renewable energy and the region’s contri-
bution to national energy plans. The county’s authorities appear as the main 
‘agitator’ to develop facilities and a good climate for renewable energy sources. 
However, the aim is not to completely phase out the extraction of fossil fuels, 
which is a very important industry in the region, but to support it by supplying 
low-carbon electricity. In addition, as mentioned in the policy documents, the 
returning of value to the local community most probably means benefits and 
economic profits from energy export, not local consumption. 
Murmansk oblast – the pioneering region in the russian federation
or the centre for arctic investment projects.
 
In  the federal government approved the Russian energy strategy, which 
presents long-term guidelines for the energy sector and acknowledges that the 
potential for green energy exists on the domestic market. Nevertheless, the 
development of green energy requires closer cooperation with international 
partners that will provide scientific and technical support. The target of the 
policy is to increase the share of renewables in electricity production and con-
sumption from .5 to 4.5% roughly by . The measures set by the state 
include repayments for electricity produced using renewable resources, sup-
port instruments for research and business, the creation of favorable conditions, 
and relevant legislation to attract off-budget investments. In the context of the 
Arctic region, the federal government regards green energy mainly as a way of 
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providing reliable energy supplies to local communities, especially in remote, 
isolated areas that are not connected to central energy networks. In particular, 
tidal power, wind power, and local energy production based on thermal power 
plants running on bio-fuels will be promoted (The Ministry of Energy of the 
Russian Federation ). The Russian strategy for the Arctic refers to renew-
able and local energy sources with regard to socio-economic development and 
describes the use of these sources as a measure for the stabilization of economic 
mechanisms of “northern delivery” (The Security Council of the Russian Fed-
eration ). The Russian Arctic has vast reserves of hydro-carbons. Similarly 
to Norway, their exploitation and export provides substantial revenues for the 
state budget and benefits for the regional economy. In that situation, investment 
in expensive technology for alternative sources that are operative in arctic con-
ditions is not a priority. Consequently, fossil fuels, supplemented by hydro-and 
nuclear power to varying degrees, dominate in electricity production within 
the northern regions of Russia (CENTEK AB ). 
  In Murmansk Oblast, with the exception of hydro energy, other types of 
renewables are undeveloped. It has been estimated that the enormous poten-
tial of non-conventional sources may replace traditional ones in the region. 
The prospects for wind energy are especially good as it may be successfully 
developed in two forms: autonomous converters for decentralized consumers, 
and system-based elements operating as part of the grid. Nevertheless, official 
figures state that the centralized Kola energy system covers half of the region’s 
territory and serves % of the population. The Kola nuclear power plant sup-
plies approximately 5-% of the regional energy needs. The rest is provided 
by  hydro-electric stations and 5 heating stations (operating on fossil fuels). 
However, small and remote villages which are not integrated into the central 
system use diesel generators. In addition, regional energy self-sufficiency makes 
it possible to sell part of the power generated to Archangelsk Oblast and the 
Republic of Karelia (Minin and Dmitriev ).
  Current experience shows that wind and tidal energy projects are being de-
veloped by foreign investors and Russian companies as well. The Dutch com-
pany Windlife Energy BV is developing a windmill park near Teriberka. (Bar-
entsObserver a) It was established with the idea of providing energy for the 
Shtokman gas fields, but it seems there is little interest on the part of Gasprom. 
However, the project is expected to deliver clean energy to , households 
and should be completed in  (BarentsObserver b). Russian compa-
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nies are investing in building windmill parks as well: Russkii Veter in Pechenga 
(BarentsObserver b) and RusHydro in Ura Bay. The latter investment will 
be a backup supply for the tidal power plant located near Kislogubskaya sta-
tion (BarentsObserver b). The same company has constructed the North-
ern Tidal Power Plant in Dolgaya-Vostochnaya Bay. It was estimated that the 
implementation of the project would take three years (BarentsObserver c); 
thus it should be in operation by . Finally, the biggest Russian shipbuilding 
company – Sevmash – has been awarded the contract to build the Kolskaya 
Tidal Power Plant, which will be located near the military town of Vidyaevo 
about  km west of Murmansk city (BarentsObserver c). 
  The political declarations on the subject of renewable energy that have 
been made during the last few years in Murmansk reflect the role of regional 
authorities. In , the governor of Murmansk announced support for a % 
share of wind-power in the energy balance by , the target proposed by en-
vironmental groups. In addition, two subordinate bodies - the Working Group 
on Renewable Energy and the Oblast Committee for Nature Protection - were 
established in  within the regional administration (Minin and Dmitriev 
, 5). Regional politicians were particularly interested in wind power op-
portunities and investments, so they provided funding for a development pro-
gramme (Senova ). The governor - Yuri Yevdokimov - strongly supported 
the construction plan for the windmill park in Teriberka, as it could provide 
electricity for the Shtockman project’s facilities. In  the Murmansk Com-
mission on Industrial Development approved the proposals of two companies 
- Windlife and Russkii Veter - for the construction of windmills along the 
Barents Sea. Nevertheless, the administration stressed that the park should con-
tribute to the development of new industrial activity and the modernization of 
grid lines within the region (BarentsObserver d). Those plans were seen 
as a unique opportunity for Murmansk Oblast to become a pioneering region 
in the development of alternative energy in all of Russia. Finally in January 
, a wind power programme was drafted with the goal of providing .5% 
of energy by wind power by 5 (Senova ). But three months later the 
position of regional Governor in Murmansk was filled by Dmitry Dmitriyenko, 
and the programme has not yet been adopted. During a meeting with Dutch 
company managers, the new Governor stated that the rapid implementation of 
this wind-power project is in the interests of the region and assured them of his 
support for alternative energy solutions in the region (BarentsObserver d). 
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However, it seems that since the political change, the regional administration 
has less interest in plans for the development of innovations in Murmansk 
Oblast (Staalesen ), particularly in light of The Strategy for Socio-economic De-
velopment, which was approved by the regional authority in . According to 
this document, the regional vision is to become the centre for Arctic develop-
ment. Such an idea would demand a shift from current resource-based industry 
structures to new technologies and an innovative economy. Carbon-neutral and 
new energy solutions are taken into account in the Strategy 2025 as one of the 
directions for further activity. However, arctic investment projects - transport 
infrastructure, the processing of minerals, and highly-developed industry - were 
defined as driving factors in regional development (BarentsNova ).
  The scientific community and environmental organisations have an impor-
tant role to play in advocating for the utilization of the clean energy potential 
of Murmansk. The Bellona Foundation and the Centre for Renewable Energy 
provide independent information and organise workshops, seminars and meet-
ings in order to raise awareness and disseminate knowledge about low-carbon 
energy solutions to all stakeholders. The Russian Association of Wind Industry 
works to promote renewable energy within industries and the business sector. 
The Russian Socio-Ecological Union is focused on society, and its mission is to 
educate energy consumers through various information initiatives. For instance, 
a media tour was held in Murmansk region to demonstrate local examples of 
low-carbon solutions. The campaign has presented local initiatives for energy 
efficiency and clean energy supplies (Senova ), demonstrating potential 
benefits for local communities, as well as recommendations for decision-makers 
on how to improve the energy system in Murmansk Oblast. Those projects 
have shown that the small-scale clean energy plans are hampered mostly by a 
lack of financial support and by structural barriers in the energy system, which, 
in turn, create a monopoly situation. When the consumers reduce energy con-
sumption due to efficient solutions, the energy suppliers often increase the 
tariffs. Environmental organisations advocate the introduction of special tariffs 
or green certificates, because such economic measures would allow consumers to 
get benefits and suppliers additional income, thus attracting investment in clean 
energy solutions. Moreover, the United Nations Environmental Programme 
has recently opened an office in Russia that monitors the climate change situ-
ation, as well as preparing recommendations for climate policy in the Russian 
Arctic (UNEP ).
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  The renewable energy sector in all of Russia remains at an early stage of 
development, and the northern regions are no exception. The national target 
of 4.5% for renewables in energy production by  is not very ambitious 
compared with the goals of Russia’s Nordic neighbours. Nevertheless, given the 
weak political commitment to the promotion of renewable energy and faint 
state support, even this aim may be difficult to achieve. Murmansk Oblast with 
its good natural conditions has the potential to become a pioneering region in 
the development of alternative energy in Russia. However, the initiatives under-
taken by the regional authorities have been slowed down by the lack of com-
plementary federal priorities and governmental subsidies. Undoubtedly, it is the 
civil society and the international agencies that appear as the main ‘promoters’ 
and that have more interest in renewable energy development than the national 
government. Therefore, private investors and non-governmental organizations 
play the leading role and have the capacity to transform the situation. 
‘Wind colonialism’ in Norrbotten and regional benefits from renewables in 
Lapland  
The development of renewable energy sources in northern Sweden and Fin-
land must be considered in the general context of EU plans to shift to a low-
carbon economy, as well as growing EU interest in the Arctic, as expressed in 
the communication The European Union and the Arctic Region. The EU Arctic 
policy is aimed at limiting emissions and mitigating the negative effects of 
climate change (European Commission ) that will have a major impact 
on the coastal countries of Europe, as well as on climate-dependent sectors 
of the economy, including renewable energy. Furthermore, the ambition of 
EU Energy Strategy by 2020 is to provide security of supply, competitiveness, 
and sustainability. The policy’s goal is to have a % share of renewables in the 
EU energy mix by . Moreover, the Directive on renewable energy established 
a mandatory target of renewables within the transport and electricity system 
for each member state. The EU Commission has also introduced a number 
of policy measures, initiatives and institutions, as well as funding, to achieve 
those targets and promote clean energy production. Finland and Sweden were 
therefore obliged to prepare National Renewable Energy Action Plans. These 
plans include national guidelines to achieve the renewable energy goals set by 
the directive: % in Finland and 4% in Sweden (European Union ). In 
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addition, regions and towns in Northern Sweden and Finland participate in EU 
initiatives involving local and regional authorities in actions aimed at increasing 
energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources in their territories. 
Finally, the EU contributes to capacity building by funding research projects 
and providing scientific input on policy processes.
  Swedish objectives in the energy sector by  are: 5% of the energy pro-
duced from renewable sources, including % in the transport sector, and a 4% 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. In the long-term perspective, the plan 
is to completely phase out fossil fuels from heating by  and from transport 
by  through the development of bio-fuels. In order to reduce its depen-
dence on nuclear and hydropower, Sweden wants to increase the share of wind 
power in electricity production, and therefore has set targets for it on the order 
of  TWh by . General economic instruments to promote renewable 
energy are: () a carbon dioxide tax and fuel taxes, () international emissions 
trading, () certificates for renewable electricity, and (4) a Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). In addition, the government plans to invest in the research 
and development sector and remove institutional barriers to transition to an 
“eco-efficient economy” based on clean energy supplies (Government Offices 
of Sweden ). 
  In Norrbotten County hydropower plants produce % of Sweden’s total 
electricity supply. The county’s self-sufficiency results in half of the generated 
electricity being transmitted to other parts of the country. In addition, around 
5% of the regional energy demand is consumed by primary industries (Cli-
mAct Regions ). However, studies on wind power generation are being 
conducted at several sites across northern Sweden. Due to market forces and 
state incentives, wind power generation is expected to increase significantly 
in the coming years (ÅF-Infrastructure AB ). The construction of a wind 
park near Piteå has strategic importance for European and national interests. 
The Markbygdens project was approved by the Swedish government in March 
, and its production may cover half of Swedish targets for wind energy 
production by  (Invest in Norrbotten a). It will be one of the biggest 
on-shore wind power parks in Europe, including  windmills in an area of 
about 45 square kilometres. The project is owned by Svevind AB (5%) and 
developed in partnership with the German company Enercon (5%), one of 
the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturers (BarentsObserver c). The 
park should be completed and start operating by . The decision concern-
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ing its location was made not only because of the wind conditions, but also 
the infrastructure - crossing highways and transmission lines - that are neces-
sary to deliver generated power to the grid. Moreover, two hydropower plants 
are nearby, so they can provide backup energy when the wind speed weakens 
(Vindkraftcentrum i Barentsregionen ). All those investments are expected 
to generate a demand for a skilled labour force and create opportunities for 
business development as well as further research. For that reason, the local au-
thorities have made efforts to take advantage of the emerging prospects and 
transform Piteå into the wind energy centre for the entire Barents Region.
  On the other hand, new wind farms constructed in northern Sweden are a 
matter of serious concern and protests among the Sami community. Reindeer 
herders claim that large-scale wind farms - such as the afore-mentioned Mark-
bydgen project - would affect the reindeer industry. It would limit the move-
ment of herds between seasonal grazing lands and endanger the animals. Mem-
bers of the Sami Parliament described it as “the latest chapter in a longstanding 
struggle between Sámi reindeer herders and industrial interests” (Reindeer blog 
) and accused the authorities of “lack of consultation, the disrespect of the 
rights of the reindeer herding communities and the absence of will to give the 
Sámi villages fair compensation for loss of land and livelihoods” (Baer ). 
Nevertheless, Svevind - the company owning the project - offered to pay ap-
propriate compensations and declared its willingness to engage in further ne-
gotiations in order to reach an optimal solution. The project’s supporters admit 
that the wind farm will affect reindeer herding, especially during the construc-
tion phase. However, most of the work is planned for summer time, when the 
herds are in different areas. In addition, the supporters claim that there will be 
very little or no impact when the turbines are in operation (Lundmark ). 
It is an example of clashing local and national interests and the continuation 
of a conflict between Sami rights to land-use and the economic development 
promoted by national and regional authorities.
  Apart from wind energy, the development of low-carbon energy schemes 
is also underway. A pilot project for small hydropower in Kukkola on the Torne 
River began in  and is scheduled to be completed in three years. Luleå 
University of Technology is a leader of the project, which is financed by the 
EU along with participating companies from Sweden, Norway and Finland 
(Noe-Energy a). In addition, there is currently a focus on wood technol-
ogy, biomass and fuels produced from crops and peat. Research projects on 
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bio-refining technology in Solander Science Park in Piteå and the development 
of bio-fuels at Luleå University of Technology are currently being carried out 
(Invest in Norrbotten b).
  The Swedish national policy is aimed at strengthening regional and mu-
nicipal work on climate and energy. As a consequence, the government has 
allocated substantial subsidies for all municipalities and counties which agree 
to work actively on energy efficiency. The Norrbotten County Council has 
approved two documents establishing its regional energy policy: “Climate and 
Energy Strategy for the County of Norrbotten” in  and “Action plan for climate 
and energy work in Norrbotten” in  (County Administrative Board ). The 
Swedish government has also chosen Norrbotten as a pilot region for green 
development. This means that the county is obliged to cooperate closely with 
regional and local actors in industry, government, and non-profit organisations. 
That linkage between various regional stakeholders will support a shift to green 
development, climate change mitigation and energy transition at the regional 
level (County Administrative Board ).
  Northern Sweden co-operates on energy issues with various regional ini-
tiatives or bodies, such as the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of 
Europe (CPMR) and the Joint Energy Working Group of the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council (BEAC JEWG). In addition, both regions implement com-
mon actions and projects such as Energy Cooperation North, Biofuel Region, 
the Norrbotten and Västerbotten Energy and Climate Offensive (NV Eko), 
and VindFyr (County Administrative Board ). In  one of the local 
and regional energy agencies was founded in the region. Norrbotten Energy 
Network (NENET) is an independent, non-profit organisation owned by mu-
nicipalities and the county of Norrbotten. Since  it has also worked on 
the territory of Västerbotten. The agency is a partner in an EU Interreg pro-
ject - Regions for climate protection towards governance, from knowledge to 
action (Climact Regions). The project’s goal is to disseminate information on 
regional strategies, policies and measures for climate protection and sustain-
able development (Norrbotten Energy Network ..). In addition, the 
Swedish northern towns of Lycksele, Piteå, and Jokkmokk are also signatories 
of the Covenant of Mayors – a voluntary European movement that involves 
local authorities in working towards sustainable energy. 
  Additionally, a regional cooperation platform – Network of Expertise for En-
ergy in Cold Climate (Noe-Energy) – was established in order to create a good 
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environment for technical development to achieve renewable energy solutions. 
Within the project, seminars and workshops are organized to exchange infor-
mation and bring together policy makers, financial institutions and players from 
the whole value chain, from applied research to commercialized product. Thus, 
new innovations and products in the field of renewable energy sources and 
energy efficiency will be commercialized in the northern regions of Norway, 
Sweden and Finland (Noe-Energy b).  
  The Finnish energy policy was established in the same EU context. The 
goal of the policy is to increase the share of renewable energy to % in total 
final energy consumption by . Considering the technological potential and 
Finland’s extensive wood resources, priority will be given to wood-based ener-
gy, waste fuels, heat pumps, and biogas. Furthermore, wind power plants are ac-
ceptable for environmental requirements, thus they should become financially 
profitable. Moreover, the Finnish government has issued a permit for a nuclear 
power plant near Oulu (Ministry of Employment and the Economy a). 
The newly implemented policy instrument – the feed-in tariff system – provides 
a state subsidy for electricity produced from wind power, biogas and wood fuel 
(Ministry of Employment and the Economyb). The aim is to equalize the 
price of energy produced from renewable sources86 with that of energy pro-
duced from fossil fuels (Ministry of Employment and the Economy c). In 
addition, a variety of energy taxes was imposed on oil products, fossil fuels and 
electricity in order to stimulate the market and encourage the increasing use 
of clean technologies. Finally, a supportive institution – Motivia Oy – serves as 
an information and research centre. Funding instruments for alternative energy 
solutions are provided by the Finnish Innovation Fund (SITRA), which created 
the Energy Programme -. 
  Hydropower, peat and wood fuels are the most important energy sources in 
the northern regions of Finland. Lapland is self-sufficient in electricity produc-
tion, and around % of its energy is generated from renewables. Nevertheless, 
current industry investment in Lapland (steel mills and mining projects) and the 
86  Electricity producers will receive a subsidy for a period of 12 years. The expected budget 
for the renewable energy subsidy is 55.35 million EURO, including: wind power plants - 22.6 mil-
lion EUR, biogas power plants - 2 million EUR, wood-fuel powered plants - 3.75 million EUR, and 
forest chip power plants - 27 million EUR. Electricity produced with renewable energy sources 
(wind power, biogas, forest chips, hydropower and recycled fuel) outside the feed-in tariff system 
will receive a fixed electricity production subsidy. 
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development of the tourism sector will probably result in a significant increase 
in energy consumption. Most of the wind turbines installed in - are 
located in the Oulu region (two in Oulunsalo, four in Raahe) and Lapland 
(nine in Kemi Ajos, one in Laitakari, Ii, eight in Tornio). A number of new 
wind power projects are under construction or are scheduled for installation. In 
Lapland, offshore and onshore turbines will be located  in municipalities along 
the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia - Kemi, Tornio and Simo - as well as in more 
inland areas: Muonio, Kittilä, Sodankylä, and Kemijärvi (Finnish Wind Power 
Association ).
  The Regional Council of Lapland has prepared its energy strategy with 
the vision of bringing together two values: sustainability and self-sufficiency. 
The goal is to use large energy resources for the benefit of Lappish economic 
development and to reach a regional position as the principal developer of 
energy solutions that are suitable for northern conditions. This means that 
new competitive technology solutions should be developed thanks to Lap-
land’s know-how and business activities. Furthermore, energy resources should 
be more diversified and their production and utilization process should take 
into consideration the environment and the unique nature of Lapland. Those 
objectives will be achieved through key projects focused on: () the increased 
use of local resources - forest, peat, hydro and wind power; () the construc-
tion of a nuclear power plant; () the development of energy efficiency; and (4) 
support for innovation in schools and co-operative networks between educa-
tional institutions, research institutes and companies. All of these activities are 
expected to bring significant benefits to the region. First, the planned energy 
projects –especially wind power and the potential construction of a nuclear 
power plant – would bring money from real estate tax and other revenues. Sec-
ondly, investment in a new bio-fuel power plant and a biodiesel refinery would 
result in increased employment. Finally, it is expected that local sources of re-
newable energy, especially wood fuels, will decrease carbon dioxide emissions 
from power and heat production by -4% from the current level (Regional 
Council of Lapland ).
  It seems that the goal of energy strategies within the northern regions of 
Finland and Sweden is to contribute to national and EU renewable energy 
targets; even though they are already self-sufficient with respect to electric-
ity, they still intend to produce more. The EU Commission provides various 
funding opportunities for renewable energy projects, especially by investing in 
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infrastructure, technology and research projects. The boost in commercial wind 
energy projects in northern Finland and Sweden is an example of the results 
emerging from EU actions and national economic policy measures such as 
feed-in-tariffs in Finland or carbon dioxide and fuel taxes in Sweden. Therefore, 
financial benefits and business development appear as the driving factors and 
the main goals of the regional authorities’ “green energy” policies in Lapland 
and Norrbotten. 
  All in all, it seems that sub-regional and national policies address renewable 
energy as a strategic intersection of climate, environment and energy strategies. 
The discussion of the situation regarding the use of renewable sources in the 
Barents Region above shows that there is a large gap in development trends and 
the pace of development between the Russian and Nordic parts of the BEAC. 
What seems to be crucial are differences in goals between national policies, as 
well as the types of instruments that facilitate development. The Nordic coun-
tries have long-standing traditions in environmental policies that create a good 
political climate and basis for stronger policy measures – financial support or 
taxes – that stimulate the competitiveness of renewable energy sources on the 
market. In Russia, the target for clean energy is set very low, and policy instru-
ments – repayments and attracting private investors – try not to undermine 
the federal budget. The sub-regional policies for the Arctic established by those 
countries prioritize taking advantage of the economic prospects offered by the 
exploitation of natural resources (oil and gas, mining, fishing) or infrastructure 
development to transport raw materials to the European market. Simultaneously, 
the Arctic strategies highlight the need to monitor the environment and climate 
in the Barents Region, but renewable energy appears as a supplementary issue 
that is a means of cutting greenhouse gas emissions, providing energy security 
for remote local communities, or developing a new industry branch within the 
region. Furthermore, strong regional cooperation has been established within 
the Barents Region. Organizations such as the Arctic Council, the Barents Eu-
ro-Arctic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers have created a network 
of multilateral political collaboration and partnerships that deal with energy is-
sues as well as other issues. However, their actions are limited to soft policy meas-
ures such as exchanging information, disseminating knowledge and networking 
with various stakeholders within the renewable energy sector through the or-
ganization of workshops and seminars. Only the NCM has the capacity to sup-
port research and development projects focused on renewable energy through 
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various funding programmes. However, those financial instruments are available 
only for the northern regions of Finland, Sweden and Norway. 
  The regional energy and climate strategies in the European Arctic result 
mostly from governmental plans. Their mission is to contribute to the imple-
mentation of national goals. Despite that, the ways in which the regions intend 
to support the policy of the state vary between the cases studied. Those differ-
ences result from responsibilities, the accessibility of technology and resources 
at the regional administrative level, economic and funding capacities, as well as 
possibilities for non-governmental actors to be included in the policy making 
process and influence decisions. 
 
renewable energy and Barents cooperation
Multilateral cooperation and partnerships on the subject of energy are carried 
out within Barents Cooperation structures. The Joint Working Group on En-
ergy (JEWG) was established in  as an ad-hoc body to prepare the Energy 
Action Plan for the Improvement of the Energy Situation in the Barents Region and 
serve as a cooperation platform for the coordination of energy systems. Since 
that time, the existence of the JEWG has been regularly prolonged, and its 
mandate was revitalized in . Its work focuses on various kinds of energy 
issues, including the petroleum industry and energy efficiency, but the “promo-
tion of renewable energy sources, particularly bio-energy and hydropower” is 
stressed as one of its main goals (BEAC BRC , ).
  So far, the JEWG’s main activity has been the organization of meetings, 
seminars and workshops. Their aim is to exchange information with other or-
ganizations and share national experiences in the promotion of energy projects 
and programmes as well. One of the main achievements has been the establish-
ment of Energy Efficiency Centers which collect data on the energy situation in 
the regions of Northwest Russia (BEAC a). Working on an eco-efficient 
economy and cooperation in the field of renewable energy and energy ef-
ficiency were the priority area of the recently ended Swedish chairmanship of 
the BEAC (BEAC , ). During the last years, two workshops on Energy 
efficiency and renewables - possibilities and challenges for Russian municipalities have 
been held in Arkhangelsk. Both of them have gathered together representatives 
of the BEAC states and the northern regions of Russia, financial institutions, 
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project managers from consulting companies, local energy experts and non-
commercial organizations (JEWG ). Furthermore, the report Preconditions 
for Improved Energy Efficiency and Increased Use of Renewable Energy in the Barents 
Region was presented during the last JEWG meeting in Arkhangelsk in May 
. It contains data about the present status of renewables in energy systems 
within the Barents Region and analyzes the technical and economic potential 
for the development of that sector (CENTEK AB ). 
  Nevertheless, the Barents Cooperation has no separate funding to cover the 
expenses of its activities. Therefore, initiatives that are relevant for the matter of 
clean energy, similarly to other issues, have to search for funding opportunities 
within national, international and regional financing instruments. Grants are 
provided by EU Programmes, the NCM funding and national sources. Loans 
are offered by international financial institutions and funds. Thus, a number of 
various funding sources, with a scope of application covering all or part of the 
territory of the Barents Region, may support investment in projects that are 
focused on the promotion or implementation of renewable energy solutions. 
However, there is no separate fund aimed specifically at the Barents Region 
(BEAC b).
  From the perspective of multi-level governance, the analysis of regional 
cases shows that national energy and climate strategies set not only policy pri-
fig. 10.1 Elements involved in the governance of renewable energy in the Barents Region 
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orities and types of measures to be undertaken within targeted sectors, but 
also directly influence the goals of regional and even municipal plans. Fig.. 
shows the general structure of multiple dimensions and actors in renewable 
energy governance in the Barents Region. In addition, relations between those 
components and the intensity of actions or influence vary for each country. 
fig. 10.2 The structure of relevant EU governance practices for renewable energy 
and the Arctic region
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The studied cases of renewable energy governance within the BEAC regions 
show that each of them has its own special characteristics in the way it wants 
to contribute to the state’s interests, how it is involved in regional cooperation 
and activity within international forums, and finally what kind of economic 
capacity and funding opportunities it possesses. Another very important actor 
is the EU and its various instruments that affect international, national and 
regional policies. Fig. . presents EU governance practices on renewable en-
ergy and the EU’s involvement in the Arctic. Within the study, the influence of 
the EU energy policy’s goals and directives is reflected in the national policies 
of Finland and Sweden, and those goals and directives directly affect regional 
planning in Lapland and Norrbotten. What is more, EU energy goals may also 
shape development directions in non-EU member states, through funding 
programmes that cover the northern areas of Norway (Interreg IV Nord, the 
Northern Periphery Programme) and Russia (Kolarctic). 
  Finally, actors outside government and administration, such as the private 
sector, research and non-governmental organisations should be involved in 
governance process, because all those elements create favourable climate for 
development of renewable energy in the Barents Region. However, the cases 
studied show that different configurations of relations between those elements 
may speed up the development process or bring it to a halt. In the Nordic 
part of the Barents Region regional cooperation projects were established to 
enhance development and research on clean energy solutions in northern lati-
tudes. A good example is the NeoEnergy project (funded by European Re-
gional Development Fund, ERDF within the Interreg IV Nord Programme), 
which established a partnership between business, research and educational in-
stitutions, as well as regional authorities, in order to commercialize renewable 
energy technology in the northern regions of Finland, Sweden and Norway. 
On the other hand, Murmansk region presents a completely opposite picture of 
renewable energy governance in the Russian part of the BEAC. There is more 
civil society commitment supporting research and international funding that 
facilitate business than state desire to use renewable sources. Even though the 
region has the potential to become a pioneer in the development of alterna-
tive energy in Russia, a lack of favourable economic conditions and political 
interest in the issue hampers the possibilities for more intensive development. 
Consequently, regional cooperation structures (such as the BEAC JEWG) and 
non-governmental organisations (Bellona) initiate workshops and seminars 
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that bring together regional authorities, as well as research and business actors 
within the BEAC regions in order to exchange experiences and disseminate 
knowledge about new possibilities in northern Russia. Therefore, NGOs, inter-
national environmental organisations and regional cooperation structures play 
a leading role in the facilitation of green energy development in the Russian 
part of the Barents Region.
Conclusions
Complex political goals, economic interests and social needs appear in climate 
and energy policies, regional development plans, strategies, and particular pro-
jects within the Barents Region. Those practices of governance are undertaken 
at the international, state and regional levels. Regional policies are established in 
the context of international processes and national goals. The most obvious ex-
ample is the case of Norrbotten and the Markbygdens project, the aim of which 
is to contribute to national goals and targets set by the EU. The region does 
not need more energy for itself, but intends to export it. Therefore, renewable 
sources of energy become an object of trade that will bring economic benefits 
for some and losses for others within the region. State interests are placed ahead 
of local needs, and therefore disadvantaged social groups perceive the situation 
as an example of so-called ‘wind colonialism’. 
  On the other hand, Nordland’s regional plans for renewables may be con-
sidered as a model of “negotiated social governance”. Wind and small hydro 
energy projects must meet various requirements, and the plans are publicly 
consulted in order to avoid conflicts related to land-use. Furthermore, prior-
ity is given to projects that meet the energy needs of remote settlements, thus, 
benefitting local communities.
  The division of the roles between those governance levels varies within the 
Nordic and Russian parts of the region. Nevertheless, for the implementation 
of renewables into an energy system to be successful, effective economic in-
struments are needed. Those are within the competence of the state, making it 
the most important agency of governance. The national influence on regional 
planning may be active, as in the case of the Nordic countries, which use vari-
ous economic and political measures to make renewables more competitive and 
profitable for producers and consumers alike. Or, on the other hand, a state may 
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take a passive attitude towards the issue. The Russian government is pursuing 
less ambitious goals than the regional authorities of Murmansk. Therefore, the 
state’s role becomes negative, as it limits actions that are undertaken within pub-
lic institutions and slows down development, which is then driven by private 
and social forces. 
  All regions are interested in further developing opportunities related to 
the use of wind power, but it appears that each area has different motivations 
and priorities. In the cases of Finnmark and Lapland wind energy is being 
developed in order to supply the petroleum or mining industries. It is a con-
troversial way of understanding the concept of sustainable development, which 
was originally intended to replace fossil fuels by renewables, not support their 
exploitation. The examples above show the importance of this issue in the 
development of industry and economic growth in the Barents Region. In that 
situation, decreasing emissions may be regarded as a secondary goal, as those re-
gions already generate most of their electricity from hydropower or bio-energy. 
  To summarize, the Barents Region is an example of a territory covered by 
a network of complicated political relations. This area is an arena where differ-
ent interests of regional, national and international political powers meet. The 
study demonstrates that the issue of renewable energy is multidimensional, and 
various agencies within the public sector, business, and civil society are involved 
in the process of governance in the region. Nevertheless, the configurations of 
those interests, practices of actions, political engagement and the capacity to 
influence the development of renewable energy vary within the cases studied.
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Nils-Gustav Lundgren 
far aWay, CoLd and Windy!  are sWedes 
happy With their Lives in the north?87
introduction
International happiness research points to a number of factors that influence 
perceived happiness. In a questionnaire sent to 4, Norrlanders, answered 
by , individuals, several hypotheses testing the factors were confirmed: A 
higher income, in particular relative income, leads to greater happiness, as do re-
ligious beliefs, a permanent job, good health and an established career. Contrary 
to the findings of international research, people belonging to a national minor-
ity can experience greater happiness – at least if they are Sami or inhabitants of 
the Torne Valley. Geographical location can also influence happiness: people in 
Skellefteå and Piteå are definitely happier than the average Norrlander.
the main question in happiness research 
Time and again, the societal debate, probably mostly in the affluent part of the 
world, has come to centre on the question of whether people become hap-
pier through economic growth, that is, by getting higher incomes and hence 
opportunities to buy more - and more varied - goods and services. One way 
of ironically characterising what many people view as a strongly materialistic, 
competition- and achievement-oriented mentality in the USA – the American 
Way of Life – is to say, “The one who has the most possessions when death 
occurs has won!” Is there any connection then between people’s income and 
well-being, and can we say anything general about this in a Swedish, and pri-
marily Northern Swedish, context?
  In a recent survey of Norrlanders’ “outlook on life”, Kerstin Westin has 
shown that work, leisure and being in one’s social context, that is, proximity 
87  Previously published in Swedish in Ekonomisk Debatt nr 8 2010.
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to friends, family and relatives, are highly valued, while “the American Way of 
Life” – making a career – is given markedly low value. Another conclusion is 
that there are small regional differences in the north concerning such life values. 
Moreover, neither “social heritage”, that is, the home environment in which 
a person grew up, nor having lived for a long time in the same place seem to 
influence these attitudes to any appreciable extent (Westin ). 
  What can research then say generally about human beings’ subjective con-
ceptions of their lives? Who are, or experience that they are, happy or unhappy 
and what influences such an attitude to, or valuation of, life?
  In recent years, more and more social scientists have come to take an inter-
est in what has become known as happiness research; traditionally the province 
of sociologists, the field has increasingly attracted economists and political sci-
entists as well. One starting point for economically oriented happiness research 
is an article by the economic historian Richard Easterlin titled “Does economic 
growth improve the human lot? Some empirical examples”, published in 4 
in a Festschrift dedicated to Moses Abramowitz (see also Easterlin /).
For a brief but still thorough presentation and discussion of current happiness 
research, see Lind 5; Norberg ; Graham ; Fleurbaey ).
  The attention that Easterlin aroused with his article stemmed from a dia-
gram showing how Americans’ answers to the question “All in all, would you 
say that you are “Very happy, Fairly happy, Not very happy or alternatively Not 
happy at all?” had been distributed since the 5s. What Easterlin showed was 
that the proportion of the population of the USA that said they were “on the 
whole very happy” was not getting higher although the country’s gross national 
product, that is, citizens’ income, was increasing all the time. The proportion of 
“happy people” was largely unchanged, settling at values around 5 to  per 
cent. If there was any trend, it was that the proportion of “Very happy people” 
was decreasing over time, a development that was not statistically significant, 
however (Easterlin , ). 
  If, on the other hand, people’s happiness is investigated in a cross-sectional 
study, that is, one conducted at the same point of time and comparing people 
with different levels of income, considerably more people with a high income 
always state that they enjoy a higher degree of happiness that do persons with a 
low income. This applies to cross-sectional data concerning individuals as well 
as countries. The fact that increasing income does not result in more happy 
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people at the same time as people with larger incomes state that they are happy 
has been termed “the Easterlin paradox”. How can this paradox be explained?
  Two explanations have been put forward, both based on a relativisation: 
People compare both their present situation with what their life was like before 
and other people’s present situation to their own, that is, how their lives have 
developed in relation to the lives of others. The absolute income level, that is, 
the “physical” difference in material well-being between then and now, would 
then have a negligible influence on “the feeling of happiness”.
  If this were the case, it would lead to a problematic conclusion from an 
ideological point of view; that is, if an individual is successful, which manifests 
itself as a rise in income, for example, this may generate a “loss of happiness/
well-being” for others. The policy conclusion is then close at hand that higher 
income taxes, which restrain income-motivated work efforts, might raise a so-
ciety’s total “level of happiness”. This is, albeit summarised in somewhat stark 
terms, what the polemic is about that Daniel Lind and Johan Norberg have en-
gaged in in the Swedish journal Ekonomisk Debatt (Lind 5; Norberg ).
  Norberg thinks that it might be true that more money/possessions do not 
make us happier, but to “close the future” by means of conscious political meas-
ures, that is, extinguishing the hope of future improvements for people, would 
definitely lead to “great unhappiness” in most people’s experience of life.
  What does Easterlin himself have to say about “his paradox” between econ-
omy/income and well-being/happiness? His conclusion is, briefly, “Generally 
speaking, happiness, or the subjective well-being, co-varies (positively) with one’s 
own income, while it co-varies negatively with other people’s income” (Easterlin 
, ff). In addition he emphasises that people’s aspirations rise continuously 
with increasing income, for which reason happiness does not self-evidently in-
crease despite “more money per person” (on this, see Graham ).
  Empirically oriented happiness research based on studies of individuals has 
usually been able to show that a high income, a high level of education, a cohe-
sive family life, good health and a religious and optimistic attitude to life cor-
relate positively with happiness. By contrast, ill health, a low income, a low level 
of education, unemployment, being an immigrant, belonging to a national/
ethnic minority and “loneliness” (living in a one-person household) are usually 
negatively correlated with happiness (see Fleurbaey ; Layard ).
  We will now study whether Swedes living in the northern part of the coun-
try with such personal circumstances experience satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
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with their lives. An extensive survey conducted in the autumn of  on 
commission by the northernmost county councils, in Jämtland, Västernorrland, 
Västerbotten and Norrbotten, may contribute to answering the questions. The 
questionnaire was distributed to 4, Norrlanders in such a way that it would 
adequately represent the respondents’ age and gender as well as the region’s 
counties and densely and sparsely populated areas. A total of , persons 
answered the survey, representing a response rate of 4. per cent. The study 
was justified by a political need for scientifically based knowledge to inform the 
complicated process whose aim is to establish large regions in the north. The 
study is reported in Kan norra Sverige regionaliseras. Politiska beslutsprocesser och 
medborgarperspektiv [‘Can Northern Sweden be regionalised? Political decision 
processes and citizens’ perspectives’] (see Lidström  ). 
  The Norrland study is partly identical to the investigations that have been 
conducted by the SOM [‘Society, Opinion and Mass Media’] Institute at Goth-
enburg University since  at both the national level and in the regions of 
Skåne and Western Götaland. These studies have no questions explicitly dealing 
with happiness, that is, of the type “Are you happy or unhappy?”. Answers to a 
number of questions with approximately similar content were used, however, to 
create a “happiness” or “satisfied with life” index among Norrlanders. 
how a norrland happiness index was constructed
In order to obtain a comprehensive measure of the degree to which Norrland-
ers feel satisfied with their lives, a “happiness index” was constructed. This index 
is based on individuals’ answers to questions on self-assessed health, confidence 
in other people in general as well as in the place where they live, an overall val-
uation of the conditions of life where they live, to what degree they feel affinity 
with other people and whether they experience a high degree of security in 
their lives. We thus assume that if human beings feel well, have great confidence 
in and feel great affinity with other people where they live, and feel very secure, 
this indicates a high degree of well-being, in other words, some form of “happi-
ness”. How was the “happiness” or “satisfied with life” index then constructed?
  Personal health is assumed here to be an important ingredient in a happy 
life. A common measure in research on public health is to ask the question, 
“How do you assess your general state of health?” with response alternatives 
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from  for “very bad” to  for “very good”. In the happiness index con-
structed here, responses between  and  were given the value , those  or 
below the value . 
  Another measure of “well-being” used was the confidence in other people 
that an individual expresses. This applies both to people in general and to those 
living in the respondent’s immediate surroundings. The responses to the ques-
tion, “In your opinion, is it possible to rely on people in general?” fall on an 
eleven-degree scale from “Not at all”, with the value , to the value  for “It 
is possible to rely on other people.” Once again only responses indicating high 
values, that is, - were given the value , while those  and lower received 
the value .
  Our “happiness index” also included an overall valuation of the conditions 
under which people live. The response “Very good” to the question “What is 
your opinion of the living conditions in the place where you live?” was given 
the value , while the responses “Fairly good”, “Rather bad” and “Very bad” 
received the value .
  Not feeling excluded from the context in which one lives is also likely, for 
very good reasons, to be an important part of well-being. We thus assume that 
the human being is a gregarious animal, an assumption that is entirely in line 
with the points of departure and conclusions of “happiness research”. In order 
to capture individual attitudes, responses indicating “Great affinity with others 
in daily life in the place where I live” were given the value ; all other responses 
on a -degree scale were assigned the value .
  Feeling secure where one lives may also be assumed to be an important 
element in how satisfied one is with one’s life. For the question “Do you feel 
secure in the place where you live”, where on a four-degree scale the value  
was given for “Very secure” and the value 4 for “Not at all secure”, responses 
indicating the value “Very secure” in our index were given the value , while 
all others received the value .
  There is of course a considerable measure of arbitrariness in this, as in all 
other attempts to define “happiness”. Happiness research has devoted a great 
deal of effort to this criticism of its sources, that is, to answering how such ques-
tions should be designed and how the answers can be interpreted when they 
are asked and in what order.  Everyone can certainly confirm that even if life 
remains essentially unchanged, the answers might differ depending on whether 
they get the question on a Monday morning, or after a “heavy weekend” with 
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anxiety about the coming working week, or on a Friday afternoon with bud-
ding hopes for “opportunities” over the weekend. On a Wednesday afternoon I 
might also be looking forward to dinner with good old friends in the evening, 
which I appreciate and will put me in high spirits, influencing me if just then I 
am asked to fill out a “happiness questionnaire”. But even if the party was good, 
why should I in general be even happier on the Thursday morning because of a 
fairly normal experience, albeit one that gives life a great deal of meaning (see 
Norberg ,  4f)?
  It would have been possible to construct a considerably more “fine-grained” 
scale. But since the questions have different scales, from -, from -, and 
from -4, it is difficult to weigh different dimensions of happiness against one 
another in a more fine-grained manner. For this reason, we chose a simple, 
easily understandable and hopefully robust measurement, that is,  giving the 
value  only to responses that  are very high, or at the very top, in the respective 
dimensions, and to give very high valuations in different dimensions of life the 
same value, that is, . 
  We thus chose here primarily to consider the persons that in one or several 
respects express very high values in any of the six dimensions. All in all, a “hap-
piness” or “satisfied with life” index was constructed that can have seven values, 
zero through six. This means that those respondents who received the value  
on all questions do not in any respect value “the quality of their lives” as very 
high; alternatively, respondents scoring  on all six questions – receiving a total 
of  on the scale  - are very happy Norrlanders.
how is “happiness” distributed 
among the norrlanders?
How the total population of , Norrlanders is distributed on these  cat-
egories is shown in Fig. .. We can see that the category with the value  
comprises  per cent of Norrlanders; these are respondents who did not indi-
cate a very high value on any of the six questions, that is, indicate in at least one 
respect a very high valuation of their lives. It is roughly the same proportion as 
in the two highest groups – values amounting to 5 or  – which taken together 
comprise slightly more than  per cent of the respondents. The great majority 
of the nearly ,4 respondents stated high values in one and up to four of the 
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dimensions captured by our index, or 5 per cent. There is no perfect normal 
distribution, but rather a certain bias in the “unhappy” direction. This might be 
an empirical illustration of the “prejudice” or “conception” of the somewhat 
gloomy Norrlander, or maybe even the “melancholy” Swede.
  In the national SOM investigation that was also implemented in the au-
tumn of  there is a question that tries to measure on  dimensions how 
satisfaction with life among Swedes is valued and influenced by different fac-
tors. It shows that good health, family, good housing, good friends and a good 
financial situation, inner harmony and an existing love relationship are deci-
sive for well-being in life. By contrast, social standing, good looks, being well-
dressed, having a religious belief or an interest in politics have very little impact 
on a person’s well-being (Nilsson and Weibull , ).
  Relating these results to Fig. . shows that in the national SOM inves-
tigation  per cent of Swedes are definitely not satisfied at all with their lives 
-  essentially the same proportion as among the Norrlanders, of whom  per 
cent did not indicate a high value on any dimension of the happiness index we 
constructed. In the  SOM investigation, 5 per cent of Swedes stated that 
they were “fairly satisfied with their lives”, that is, the same proportion of Norr-
landers who indicated values between  and  and thus stated in at least one 
and up to three respects that they were very satisfied with their lives. The exact 
proportion in the North was  per cent.
In the SOM investigation,  per cent stated that they were “very satisfied with 
their lives”, which is close to the value that Fig. . shows for Norrlanders, 
among whom slightly more than 5 per cent indicated a very high satisfaction 
fig. 11.1 Distribution of “happiness” among the population of Norrland in the autumn of 2008 
(N=2.392) 
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with life, meaning a corresponding response for at least 4 of the  types of hap-
piness captured by our index. This probably indicates that there are very stable 
structures among Swedes in this respect.
  We will now make a closer study of what may explain the differences among 
different people as regards the degree of being satisfied with life and will also in-
vestigate whether there are regional differences in happiness in northern Sweden.
  In Table . below, the degree of satisfaction with life, in accordance with 
the index described above, is related to the respective county in Norrland. For 
the sake of simplicity, the seven values have been fused into three; that is, - 
have been designated as “low happiness”, - as “some happiness” and 4- as 
“high happiness”.
table 11.1 Proportion of the population stating a low, moderate and a high degree of happi-
ness in the four counties of Norrland
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The table shows that the residents of Västerbotten and Norrbotten experience 
somewhat greater satisfaction with their lives than those of Västernorrland and 
Jämtland. In the two northernmost counties,  per cent of the population 
are in the group with the greatest satisfaction, that is, those with index values 
between 4 and , as against  per cent in the other two counties (a statistically 
significant difference at the . level according to a Chi test).
  What the corresponding distribution is like where the population is 
classified based on different types of municipalities, that is, coastal, inland or 
mountain communities, is shown in Table .. We can see that there are small 
differences among different types of municipalities, but that somewhat more 
respondents in the coastal municipalities are in the category of “high happi-
ness”; in the category with the lowest value, these differences are not statisti-
cally significant, however.
table 11.2 Proportion of the population stating a low, some and a high degree of happiness dis-
tributed on coastal inland and mountain municipalities
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To what extent can the differences among counties and mountain, inland or 
coastal locations be an “effect” of the respective municipality’s population? In 
other words, is there a difference between demographically small and large plac-
es? This is shown in Table ., where we can see that, on the whole, regardless 
of the municipality’s total population the same proportion of the population is 
found in the lowest category -  unhappy people; at the same time a significantly 
higher proportion (according to a Chi test at the .5 level) is found in the 
group of “high happiness” in municipalities with more than , inhabitants, 
that is, Östersund, Sundsvall, Örnsköldsvik, Umeå, Skellefteå, Piteå and Luleå.
  The overall conclusion is, however, that there are markedly small geograph-
ic differences between counties and municipalities and that, to the extent that 
there are statistically significant differences, these are in all probability primarily 
due to the population being differently composed in different parts of Norr-
table 11.3 Proportion of the population stating a low, moderate and high degree of happiness 
distributed on the municipality’s population
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rland with regard to age, health, gender, education, income and labour market 
situation - factors which the happiness research described above has identified 
as being decisive for a human being.
  That this is in all probability the case is indicated by Tables .4A and .4B, 
where the degree of satisfaction with life is related to income and education, 
respectively. The tables show that there are considerably more individuals in the 
highest category of happiness among high-income households as well as among 
persons with an academic education (the differences in the two tables are statis-
tically significant at the . level according to a Chi test).
  Based on the findings presented above, we will now investigate what indi-
vidual attributes can be related to a higher or lower degree of satisfaction with 
life. Is it the case, among , Norrlanders, that higher income, more educa-
table 11.4a Proportion of the population stating a low, moderate and high degree of happiness 
distributed by income bracket category, respectively
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tion, being a woman, having a religious outlook on life, being an optimist and 
being successful in life – in the sense of having “climbed the social ladder” – co-
vary positively with happiness? Do unemployment, a low level of education, ill 
health, a small income, living in a one-person household, being an immigrant 
or belonging to a national minority at the same time imply that a person is dis-
satisfied with her or his life? We will also study whether certain “fixed ideas”, 
“prejudices” and “dogmas” of regional politics can pass an empirical test. It is 
then a matter of whether culture can have a decisive importance for regional 
developments and whether Norrlanders really are not entrepreneurial but pre-
fer living life as employees.
  An overall conclusion regarding these questions is given in Table .5. It 
shows that a higher income definitely enhances one’s degree of satisfaction 
with one’s life, as previous research has shown. The measure of income used 
here is a household’s income as a percentage of the average income in the 
table 11.4B Proportion of the population stating a low, moderate and high degree of happiness 
distributed by educational category, respectively
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municipality where the household is located. This relative measure of income 
of course strongly correlates with absolute income, but the relative measure of 
income has a markedly stronger effect on “satisfaction with life” than an abso-
lute measure. It indicates that it is not merely the absolute income, but perhaps 
even more the relative income that is of tangible importance for “the quality of 
life”. This shows that Richard Easterlin probably has strong support for his idea 
that relative income is essential for subjectively experienced happiness. A salary 
as a professor of 5, to , SEK per month is of course a total “financial 
failure in life” in Danderyd, Täby or Lidingö, but perhaps not so to the same 
extent in Växjö, Umeå, Luleå or Linköping.
  Table .5 also shows that higher education enhances “happiness”, but only 
with less than half the effect that income gives (education is divided here into 
six categories: incomplete basic education, completed basic education but no 
upper secondary degree, completed upper secondary degree, completed post-
secondary degree, academic studies and an academic degree at both undergrad-
uate and postgraduate level). We can also see in Table .5 that an optimistic 
attitude towards life increases happiness to the same degree as a higher income. 
The measure of an optimistic attitude to life is based on answers to nine ques-
tions in which the persons were asked whether they believe that conditions will 
become better or worse where they live. Those who answered “much better” 
were given the value  and all others , which implies that the variation of 
“optimism” may be between  and  among the Norrlanders. An “optimistic 
attitude to life” has an effect that is just as strong as that of income and is clearly 
stronger than that of education. This “optimist/pessimist index” does not co-
vary at all with the size of the place where the respondent lives or with income 
or education, but it does - negatively however - with age. The older a person 
is, especially in upper middle age, the more difficult it seems to be to expect 
future improvements.
  Being unemployed or on a disability pension markedly decreases happiness, 
while a religious outlook on life markedly increases it. We can also see that an 
“upward climb on the social ladder” increases happiness, for example, for a 
person who spent his or her childhood and adolescence in a working-class or 
farmer’s home and who is now living in a higher official’s, academic’s or en-
trepreneur’s home. On the other hand, a social climb in the opposite direction 
does not seem to result in a lesser degree of happiness. This observation might 
encourage support for strongly equality-oriented policies in Sweden (Greider 
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) as well as for politicians representing the “red-green” opposition alter-
native to the alliance government in the general elections in Sweden in the 
autumn of .
  The frequently seen conclusion in international research that being an im-
migrant or belonging to a national minority implies that a person is less happy 
can definitely not be verified in Norrland. The attribute “immigrant” has a 
negative effect, but not a statistically significant one. At the same time, we can 
see that if people have a strongly Sami or Tornedalian identity, they are happier 
“all other things being equal”, a finding which runs counter to international re-
search on the exposed position of immigrants and national minorities (for how 
a “strong” Tornedalian and Sami identity is defined see Lundgren  ). In a 
binary analysis there is also support for this conclusion. Among all Norrland-
ers there are slightly fewer than  per cent in the category that has the values 
4- in our “happiness index” compared to  per cent among Tornedalians and 
slightly more than 4 per cent among Sami (a statistically significant differ-
ence at the . level according to a Chi test). On the other hand, having an 
identity related to any of the other three national minorities – Jews, Roma and 
Finns – exhibits no significance in either direction. It may be pointed out here 
that Norrlanders with a strong Jewish identity have a considerably more posi-
tive attitude to the globalisation of society in Norrland than do other residents 
of the county (see Lundgren , ).
  Regional economic research on the international, national and regional 
level into what promotes positive social development has recurrently em-
phasised culture and cultural events as being of decisive importance. It is a 
statement, or a hypothesis, that was brought forth early and energetically by 
Å. Andersson in the Swedish debate on regional policy (see Andersson 5, 
a, b). According to this view, a rich cultural life would be decisive for 
whether an attractive living environment for local/regional development can 
be created for both enterprises and individuals.
  Table .5 shows that if Norrlanders attach great importance to culture, 
then they also view their lives in a more positive light. We can also see that age 
does not influence general satisfaction with life, nor does whether a person lives 
in a one-person household. A non-linear estimate of age was tested, but it did 
not yield any statistical significance; in other words, it does not seem to be the 
case that a positive attitude to life might exist up to a certain age and then start 
to decline. Young and old people seem equal when it comes to having hope for 
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or regarding life pessimistically. Neither does there seem to be any gender dif-
ference. In some previous investigations being a woman has been found to be 
positively correlated with a higher degree of happiness, but this does thus not 
seem to be the case in Northern Sweden.
  The interpretation we can make of Table .5 that if a person has a  per 
cent higher income, his or her “happiness” increases by a little more than 5 per 
cent. There is an equally strong effect from having a more optimistic attitude 
to life. Being on a disability pension or unemployed decreases happiness by 
about 5 per cent, as does entertaining plans to move. In the latter case, how-
ever, there is naturally a tangible problem with the direction of causality, that is, 
determining what is the “dependent” and the “independent” variable. Thinking 
of moving is quite certainly caused precisely by “unhappiness” of some kind; in 
other words,  unhappiness among persons entertaining plans to move should 
be studied as a dependent variable to “be explained by something else”, for 
example, satisfaction with life in the place where they live. However, we can 
draw the conclusion that plans to move have a strong negative correlation with 
the “soft” factors/statements expressed by the happiness index we constructed. 
We can also note that living in the municipalities in the north that are smallest 
demographically in absolute terms, for example, mountain communities, has no 
significant effect in either direction on well-being.
  In Table .5 we can see that two geographical places actually exhibit sta-
tistical significance. Inhabitants of Skellefteå and Piteå experience life as clearly 
more positive that do people living elsewhere. Being a resident of Piteå would, 
according to these results, be associated with being no less than  “units” hap-
pier on the seven-degree scale, that is, “ per cent happier”, while residents of 
Skellefteå are about  per cent happier, “all other things being equal”.
  Table .5 also shows that being an employee significantly enhances Norr-
landers’ “satisfaction with life”. On the other hand, being an entrepreneur 
has no significant effect in either direction. This might reflect one of the 
basic development problems in Northern Sweden, one seen in many other 
Swedish regions: a strong “employee culture” and lack of a strong entrepre-
neurial culture. In other words, at the local level a social climate is lacking that 
encourages entrepreneurship in the form of establishing new businesses and 
business development.
  How large a part of the variation in well-being among nearly ,4 Norr-
landers can then be “explained” by these factors? It turns out, as always, that 
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table 11.5 What explains satisfaction with life/happiness among 2.392 Norrlanders
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relatively low explanatory degrees apply; that is a given individual’s valuation 
of life is predicted on the basis of rather “blunt” background factors. The effects 
accounted for in Table .5 can only explain about .5 per cent of the total 
variation among the individuals surveyed.
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c h a p t e r   
Soili Nystén-Haarala and Antonina Kulyasova 
rights to traditionaL use of 
resourCes in ConfLiCt With 
LegisLation: a Case study of poMor 
fishing viLLages on the White sea Coast
introduction
There is nowadays global concern about fish resources and the sustainability 
of fishery, due to the fact that the resources are diminishing while fishery has 
become a large-scale industry (Loder 5). The Convention on Biological Di-
versity () urges governments to regulate the amount and means of fishery 
in order to preserve supplies of fish and other renewable biological resources for 
future generations. With the industrialization of fishery, traditional fishing has 
diminished. The Russian legislature has started to modernize fishery, leading to 
more extensive use of fish resources and diminishing the traditional use of fish. 
The tendency is similar to what has happened on the Canadian, U.S. and Euro-
pean coasts, as well as elsewhere, to a great extent with huge, efficient trawlers 
pushing local fishermen out of their own fishing areas (Ostrom ). However, 
there are still small communities that depend on traditional fishery. The Pomors 
of the White Sea coast are an example of people who still get their livelihood 
from the exploitation of natural resources and fishing with traditional methods. 
Their traditional use of natural resources has kept these communities alive for 
centuries, even through the Soviet times (Kulyasova and Kulyasov ). Now, 
however, new market economy legislation and the increasing number of other 
users of the resources threaten their traditional way of life.
  The drafters of the new Russian federal law on fishery seem to have ad-
opted the widespread idea of the “tragedy of the commons”, which was pre-
sented in Garrett Hardin’s famous article in . According to Hardin, ratio-
nally behaving people always tend to maximize their own gains, and when 
it comes to common resources there is no limit to self-interest without state 
intervention or some other outside coercion to limit it (Hardin ). The 
Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom’s empirical research on the commons, however, 
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shows that self-organized governance of the commons can also function ef-
fectively. She presents empirical evidence of both successful and unsuccessful 
self-governance (Ostrom ). Traditional fishery does not necessarily imply 
that people can fish anywhere as much as they want to, but sets rules on the 
division of resources, taking into consideration the need to preserve them for 
future generations. Pomor fishing on the coasts of the Onega Peninsula seems 
to fill the criteria which Ostrom gives for effective governance of the commons 
with self-organization and rules that are accepted by all users (Ostrom ). 
Fish were abundant on the coasts of the Onega Peninsula before newcomers 
introduced more effective fishing based on new state-created rules that conflict 
with the traditional rules. Self-organization no longer functions if all users do 
not respect it.
  Legal sociologists have studied co-existence and conflict between nation 
state regulation and local rules ever since Eugen Ehrlich’s empirical research on 
different ethnic groups’ legal institutions in the Duchy of Bukowina in Austria 
during the era of great codifications by nation states. Ehrlich argued that the 
“living law” which people apply in their legal relationships is what matters most 
(Ehrlich ). This kind of co-existence of several legal systems, which legal 
sociologists call legal pluralism, was also typical of British colonies, where local 
rules were allowed to co-exist with British law in order to avoid conflicts with 
the local people (Michaels 5).
  The co-existence of traditional rules and state laws has been and still is typi-
cal of the legal regime under which indigenous peoples live. For instance, in 
Finnish Lapland, some state authorities are reported to have ignored national 
legislation up till the s whenever traditional fishing conflicted with state 
regulations (Joona ). Typically, legal centralism and the sovereignty of the 
state have gradually taken over, and traditional rules have been interpreted as 
having lost their significance, unless they have been adopted into nation state 
legislation. Yet, the indigenous population has continued to follow its traditional 
rules, such as the division of fishing and berry picking areas between indigenous 
families, and has every now and then demanded that they be officially accepted, 
as well (Joona ).
  In the Nordic countries the requirements of ILO Convention No.  
on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples have put pressure on states to 
regulate the rights of indigenous populations to land and natural resources. This 
demand is based on the idea that international law and its regulations on hu-
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man rights are worldwide principles that are above the laws of individual states 
(Anaya 4). The special regulation concerning fishery in Upper Lapland in 
the fishery law of Finland and the exclusion of the region of Finnmark from the 
national fishery law in Norway are examples of the adoption of the principles 
of the ILO Convention in nation state legislation (Joona ; Ravna ).
  In Russia the sovereignty of the state is a strongly established doctrine. The 
Leninist doctrine of the state as the sole creator of legal rules (Lenin 4) is still 
strong, even though it has led to double standards for many groups in the multi-
national population of Russia and unrecognized legal pluralism in practice. The 
 Constitution of the Russian Federation introduced a totally new principle 
declaring that the principles of international law are above those of Russian leg-
islation, and in case of conflict the international principles prevail (Articles 5.). 
The rights of indigenous peoples are recognised, in principle, in federal legisla-
tion. The Law on the Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous and Small Peoples 
grants “small and indigenous” peoples rights concerning traditional fishing and/
or hunting (.4. N--FZ). The groups which have received the status of 
indigenous peoples are peoples in the North and in Siberia whose population 
does not exceed 5, people (.4. N5p). Other ethnic groups have no 
special rights outside of general legislation. The Pomors have not officially been 
recognized as an indigenous people or even a separate ethnic group in Russia. 
Therefore, the traditional legal regime of the Pomors is unprotected, and the 
local fishermen are poachers in the eyes of the state legal regime.
  In this article we first explain who the Pomors are. Secondly, we outline 
the development of the official rules concerning fishery in Russia. We then 
describe the conflict between nation state law and local practice based on in-
terviews in Pomor villages. Finally we try to find solutions to the conflict by 
drawing comparative examples from the neighbouring countries, Finland and 
Norway, which are struggling to comply with the ILO Convention on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
  The method is empirical, covering eleven fishing communities in the 
Mezen district (see Map .) of the Onega Peninsula on the White Sea Coast. 
The research was carried out in 4- through interviews with the local 
population, participatory observation and focus groups. Literature on the his-
tory of the Pomors is provided for information on the social and economic 
development as well as the origins and exercise of traditional rights. Legislation 
is studied together with legal commentaries to describe the official legal regime. 
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The information concerning the enforcement of legislation is based mostly on 
interviews with the Pomors.
the pomors and their communities
The people who have lived on the Western coast of the White Sea from the 
th and th centuries onwards and who traditionally got their livelihood from 
fishery are called Pomors; the area is called Pomorie. The first inhabitants of 
Pomorie were Finno-Ugric people, who assimilated with people who came 
from Novgorod to the north during the th to th centuries. As a result of 
this assimilation, the original Finno-Ugric language died out. In 4 Pomorie, 
together with Novgorod, joined the Muscovite State. In the 5th and th cen-
turies not only people living on the West coast of Onega, but also people living 
near Lake Onega, the Onega River, the Northern Dvina River, Mezen, Pecho-
Map 12.1 The Mezen District  Source: Arctic Centre
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ra, Kama, and Vyatka as far as the Ural Mountains were called Pomors. Later in 
the th century “Pomor” started to mean any inhabitant of the Russian North 
(White Sea basin). Yet, in the narrower definition, Pomors are people who live 
on the White Sea Coast and get their living from fishery (Bulatov , 5-).
  Historians have differing opinions on whether Pomors are a separate ethnic 
group or a sub-ethnic group of Russians. Bernshtam, a famous Soviet ethnog-
rapher, regards them as a sub-ethnic group of Russians, although she consid-
ers them to have a special Pomor identity (Bernshtam ).Kotlyakov, on 
the other hand, finds features of a separate nation, because of a long period 
of autonomy under Novgorod, and regards them as a separate people in the 
Slavic family in the same way as Ukrainians and Belarusians (Koltyakov, 
). Similarly, Bulatov also regards the Pomors as a separate people, because he 
detects almost all the signs of a nation, such as their own territory, their own 
northern culture and psychological features, and their own Northern Russian 
language, which has largely disappeared but can still be found in local dialects 
and sayings (Bulatov , ). Ethnically, the Pomors can be described either as 
an indigenous people or a sub-ethnic group of the Russians.
  Pomor traders travelled to both the West and the East. Typically, they had a 
reverent attitude towards the sea, which gave them their livelihood. Literacy was 
quite well developed among the people, because reading, writing and calculating 
were needed in trading (Bernshtam ). They had their own fishing culture, 
their own methods and tackle, such as long lines, nets and seines, which often re-
quire the cooperation of a group of people to use. Traditional Pomor songs, rituals, 
and dialect almost disappeared during the Soviet period, but Pomor fishery, tradi-
tional resource use, traditional building style and other everyday practices contin-
ued to exist among the people living in the remote coastal areas of the White Sea.
  Earlier the Pomors owned their fishing boats privately, but the Soviet State 
forced them to live in fishing kolkhozes, which were a form of collective farms. 
Although private property was abolished, the Pomor communities continued 
to live in quite a traditional way, since whole communities were incorporated 
into the kolkhoz system. The captain of the fleet was the kolkhoz leader and 
every inhabitant participated in fishery. The collective farm shared the income 
from fishery and supported the village, which had its own school, library and 
house of culture (Kulyasova and Kulyasov ).
  In the fishing kolkhozes the Pomors also farmed and utilized the forests, 
although farming was never as profitable as fishery. The modernization of fishery 
321
started in the 5s and s. Kolkhozes bought bigger trawlers and modernized 
their equipment. However, the Pomors did not abandon their own traditional 
fishery, but continued to practice it for their own livelihood in the coastal area 
and in rivers and lakes. The s and s were quite a good time for fish-
ery, which supported the villages considerably well, although their fishing quo-
tas were diminished because of international agreements. Most Pomor trawlers, 
however, could not go far out on the ocean, focusing on fishing within the ter-
ritorial waters of Russia. The s were an even better period, because the Po-
mors started to cooperate with Norwegians and sell fish abroad. President Yeltsin’s 
decree in December  allowing fishing entities to keep % of the currency 
which they earned from exports reanimated the pre-revolution cooperation with 
Norwegians (Kulyasova and Kulyasov ; Riabova and Ivanova ).
  The Pomor communities have continued to be considerably self-sustained 
and self-organized. The communities consist of about  inhabitants, and have 
their own schools and libraries, but the roads to the outside world are poor. 
Many villages cannot be entered in spring or autumn, and ice-roads are used 
in winter. Isolation has forced the communities to become self-organized and 
self-sustaining. Social relationships are important and continue to exist with 
people who have moved away from the village for study or work (Kulyasova 
and  Kulyasov ).
   A radical worsening of the socio-economic situation has taken place dur-
ing the last few years due to the loss of fishing rights. Although fishing kolk-
hozes have survived in all the villages we studied, they have lost their role as the 
fundamental socio-economic institution. The main reason for this development 
is that most of the kolkhozes were taken over by a single commercial player. 
The goal of acquiring more fishing quotas for industrial fishery and later selling 
them for a profit was the reason for this merger, which was initiated by federal 
policy (Kulyasova and Kulyasov ).
  Because of the functioning of this one effective commercial organisation, 
only a couple of independent fishing kolkhozes have survived in the Arkhan-
gelsk region. Others lost their independence or were driven near bankruptcy. 
As a result, many kolkhoz members who were active earlier lost their jobs in 
the kolkhoz and consequently their power of decision in meetings of kolkhoz 
members. This led to a decrease in the production of the kolkhozes in the vil-
lages. Most of the village population lost their jobs. Consequently, fishing for 
household use in rivers and lakes started to be more important for their survival.
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The development of official fishing rights
Even if the Pomors consider (traditional) fishing on the White Sea as having been 
free from time immemorial, fish as a resource has formally belonged to the state 
ever since Tsar Peter the Great’s decree of 4, in which he declared that all the 
fish belonged to him personally (Bekyashshev et al ). In  Pomors were 
given special rights to build ships and fish freely in the Arkhangelsk Governorate. 
The right was limited to two sea-going ships or five river ships per peasant, and 
the governor had the right to control the enforcement of the law (Bekyashshev 
et al ). Evidently, the Pomors were following their own traditional rules, 
which the state formally granted to them through the special law. The high num-
ber of ships per peasant shows that Pomor fishing activities were substantial in the 
th century. Richer peasants hired poorer ones to work for them. The traditional 
regime and the formal state regime co-existed quite peacefully probably because 
there was no real competition for the abundant fish resources.
  The collective farms (fishery kolkhozes) introduced by the Soviet state pre-
served the traditional structures, since whole communities were transferred un-
der the collective farm structure. During the Soviet times the fishing collective 
farms had an advantageous tax situation. Until the s there were no quotas 
for fishing. The kolkhozes had to fill the state plan with a certain amount of 
fish, but it was accepted that this plan was not up to date. Therefore they were 
allowed to fish as much as they could. The traditional regime continued to ex-
ist under the auspices of the Soviet structures (Kulyasov and Kulyasova ).
  The official and traditional regimes clashed following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the introduction of a market economy. The management 
of natural resources underwent a radical transformation. The former federal 
bodies were dismantled and the ministry that was responsible for fishery was 
abolished, as well as the Federal State Committee for Fishery. A great number 
of small private fishing companies emerged from the ruins of huge state com-
panies. The total number of catches dropped, and the Russian fleet began to 
fish mainly inside the Russian economic zone (Riabova and Ivanova , ).
  On the Onega Peninsula the fishing kolkhozes continued to exist. Even 
earlier they had focused on coastal areas and the domestic economic zone. 
Although export was now supported and new markets opened, the Russian 
rouble was devaluated, and soon there was no money for fuel and the repair of 
ships. Furthermore, the new Russian Federation introduced auctions for the 
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exploitation of natural resources, including fishing rights. The fishing collectives 
faced problems when they were forced to buy quotas for fishing and pay taxes. 
They did not have the necessary financial resources to buy enough quotas, pay 
taxes and keep their ships in good condition. The fishing collectives suffered, 
and many of them went bankrupt. Some were transformed into private com-
panies, but some decided to continue as fishing collectives. Finally one com-
mercial player took over most of them.
  However, the period of selling fishing quotas by auction did not last long. 
From 4 onwards, the quotas were divided according to the so-called “his-
torical principle”, meaning that the average amount of fishery of the kolkhozes 
was calculated for the next five years, based on earlier catches, and the five year 
quota that was obtained in this way was then prolonged to ten years. In this 
way each kolkhoz obtained a certain amount of quotas based on its own special 
circumstances (Kulyasova and Kulyasov ).
  The Federal law on Fishery and Preserving Aquatic Biological Resources 
(..4 N ) was not enacted until 4. The disputes during the draft-
ing process mostly concerned the division of powers between the Federation 
and the regions. The Constitution of the Russian Federation declares that natu-
ral resources are under the joint jurisdiction of the Federation and its regions 
(Art. ). The Constitution also declares that natural resources are to be used for 
the benefit of those who live in the areas (Art. ). The Law on Fishery ended 
in victory for the Federation as far as the interpretation of the concept of joint 
jurisdiction is concerned. During President Putin’s first presidential term, all 
natural resources became federal by means of new or revised federal legisla-
tion. The rights of the regions to make decision concerning the use of natural 
resources were diminished on the grounds of equality between the regions 
and the fight against corruption, which was detected at the regional level, but 
ignored at the federal level. The regions, which still tried to claim management 
of coastal fishing for themselves, were only allowed to give advisory opinions 
on coastal fishery (Riabova and Ivanova ).
  The aims of the Law on Fishery are preserving biological resources on 
the one hand and increasing industrial fishery and the amount of catches on 
the other. According to the Law on Fishery and Biological Resources, fish 
resources belong to the Federation (Art. ), which establishes fishing quotas 
and gives permission to fish for industrial purposes. The responsible authority 
is the Federal State Agency of Fishery (Rosrybolovstvo), which works under 
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the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and its Decree on Quotas. The fishing 
quotas are based on the evaluations of PINRO, the state maritime research 
organization. Quotas for industrial fishery are issued for a five-year period. 
The subject of the Federation (the region) can issue a fishing permit for 
industrial use for a new entrepreneur for the first three years of activity. The 
latter regulation was disputed during the drafting process: those who opposed 
the right of the region to give additional fishing rights referred to the poten-
tial overuse of resources and wanted to give control completely to the federal 
organs (Il’yasov et al. , 4). Along with the quotas, fishing organizations 
and fishermen also get permits to fish for industrial purposes from the Federal 
State Agency of Fishery.
  The Law on Fishery also recognizes a new fishing category called “coastal 
fishing” (Art. ), which means fishing by small and medium-sized enterprises 
not only in coastal areas, but also in territorial waters, the continental shelf, the 
Russian economic zone, and even on the high seas. The main feature of coastal 
fishing is that it is driven by small enterprises such as the fishing kolkhozes of 
the Onega Peninsula. The concept was included in the law in order to recog-
nize the importance of small-scale fishery in Russia (Il’yasov et al. 5, 5). 
However, the distinction between industrial fishing and small-scale industrial 
fishing is unclear. The Federal Ministry of Agriculture has been given the au-
thority to issue special norms on benefits or exceptions for small-scale fishing, 
but so far it has not exercised this power (Il’yasov et al. 5, ). Therefore 
coastal fishing does not have a special status with special subsidies; this new cat-
egory of fishing only constitutes an option for special treatment in the future. 
The regions, which are allowed to give advice concerning coastal fishery, have 
an opportunity to influence federal fishery management in this respect as well. 
Special benefits at the regional level are also possible. However, it looks as if the 
Ministry wants to support large-scale fishing above all.
  The Pomors have to compete with both industrial fishing in their tradi-
tional fishing areas and with increasing recreational and sport fishing for tour-
istic purposes. The Federal Law on Fishery considers tourism as an important 
developing branch of business, especially in the countryside (Bekyashev ). 
Sport and recreational fishing is either free of charge for all Russian citizens or 
subject to a fee, depending on what equipment is used and at what scale the 
fishing is done. In principle, only angling is free. Tourist enterprises buy permits 
and sell them to tourists, including foreigners. Free fishing by ordinary citizens 
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goes back to Soviet times and can sometimes be carried out more or less pro-
fessionally (Il’yasov et al. 5).
  The re-distribution and formation of new fishing areas has recently become 
one of the key issues in the Arkhangelsk region for both coastal fishing and 
fishing in rivers and lakes. Some of the earlier kolkhoz fishing areas remained in 
the hands of the kolhozes, while some have been transferred through auctions 
to new users. However, regional organs – specifically the Committee of Fishery 
of the Arkhangelsk Region – started actively to form new fishing areas, which 
were approved by the Federation, and sold them by auction. In this way some 
fishing areas which were traditionally used by the local population have ended 
up in new hands. For instance, the former fishing areas of the kolkhoz on the 
river banks near the village of Letnaya Zolotitsa on the Onega Peninsula were 
given to a tourism company, which built a tourist centre near the village. As a 
result, the local population was supposed to turn to the tourism company buy 
a legal permit to fish.
  The kolkhozes are concerned about the village populations and try to pro-
vide them with an opportunity to fish. They can, for instance, give them a permit 
to fish in their industrial fishing areas. However, fishing areas can be established 
either for industrial fishery, in which case the local population is not allowed to 
fish for their own household needs, or for recreational fishery, in which case the 
kolkhoz is not allowed to fish for industrial purposes. It is not profitable for the 
kolkhoz to own fishing areas only for recreational use. Therefore, violations of 
the law become inevitable (Interview with a representative of a kolkhoz ).
  Traditional fishing has been included in the law (Art. 5) only as a special 
right of indigenous peoples that are included on the list of small indigenous 
peoples with populations of less than 5, people. They have the right to 
fish for their traditional livelihood, but this does not include large-scale com-
mercial fishing. The federal agency of fishery also sets limits on how much each 
indigenous group can fish. However, the indigenous groups do not have to 
participate in the auction of quotas. As mentioned above, the Pomors are not 
included on the list of indigenous peoples
  The monitoring of biological resources is the task of Rosrybolovstvo and 
PINRO, the agency which collects and analyses information on the state of bio-
logical resources. The control of legal fishing is the duty of Roshoznadzor, the 
organ that controls natural resources (Art. 4.). The customs authorities seem 
to take care of the control of fishing permits in coastal territorial seas, such as 
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the White Sea, as well. The penalty for poaching is generally a fine and the loss 
of one’s fishing permit, as well as confiscation of the catch and the tackle. The 
fine can be as high as , roubles, and a prison sentence of up to  years 
can be imposed (Bekyashsev ). In Russia there is both criminal as well as 
administrative liability, the latter of which is based on the Law on Administrative 
Breaches of Rights (.. N 5-FZ). The administrative regime includes 
fines, confiscation and the loss of one’s permit as penalties. The fine can extend 
to a maximum of 5 times the minimum monthly salary.88 Penalties for adminis-
trative liability are easy for the authorities to collect, because they do not have to 
take the case to court unless the citizen insists. Therefore, the organs that control 
fishery prefer to deal with poaching through administrative measures.
the role of the pomor Movement
The difficult economic situation during the post-Soviet period awakened the 
interest of the leadership of the kolkhozes in the newly emerged Pomor Move-
ment. The perestroika and glasnost policies of the last years of the Soviet Un-
ion generated a nationwide revival of national and ethnic identities. The Pomor 
Movement was initiated in the s among city dwellers who became interest-
ed in the dying Pomor culture. The village populations were not interested in the 
movement at first; for them the Pomor identity was quite natural and was part of 
the way of life in the fishing villages. The fishing kolkhozes, however, were inter-
ested in the movement for economic reasons. The Pomor Movement wanted the 
Pomors to be granted the status of an indigenous people, since fishing continued 
to be free for indigenous peoples in support of their own livelihood. However, 
the Pomors did not receive the status of an indigenous people. Their attempt to 
get on the list of indigenous peoples was rejected in  based on the specialist 
opinions of the Kunstkamera of St. Petersburg and the Institute of Ethnology 
and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which regarded Pomors 
as Russians (The Pomor Movement website). One reason for the negative deci-
sion is the double identity of Pomors. Many urbanized inhabitants of the region 
consider themselves to be Pomors, but since they no longer earn a living from 
traditional resources, they do not see any point in demanding a special status, but 
88  The minimum salary is 4611 roubles a month according to the Law on Minimum Salary 
19.6.2000 N 82.
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instead regard themselves as Russians. Pomor ethnicity, however, was recognized 
in the population census of . According to the census, 5 people identi-
fied themselves as Pomor, 5 of them in the Arkhangelsk region (The Russian 
Population Census). In the census of  only  people registered them-
selves as Pomors (The Pomor Movement website). The Pomor Movement claims 
that in the Arkhangelsk region people who worked for the population census 
agreed not to give people a chance to register their Pomor ethnicity even though 
it was an option. Therefore, those who wanted to register themselves as Pomors 
had to insist on it (The Pomor Movement website; Kulyasova and Kulyasov ; 
Interview with the leader of the Pomor Movement ).
  Another strategy of the Pomor Movement is to disseminate information 
concerning ILO Convention No.  on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples among the population. Russia has not ratified the Convention, although 
the official opinion is that the rights of indigenous peoples are guaranteed by 
legislation. The status of indigenous people has, however, been limited to only 
4 small groups that have a population of less than 5,. Although the Pomor 
have not been able to get on the list of Indigenous and Small Peoples and their 
special ethnicity has been rejected, they were recognized as an indigenous people 
in the FSC certification of the company Onegales, which agreed to give them an 
opportunity to utilize their own forests (Kulyasova and Kulyasov ).
  In the next chapter we will describe the conflict concerning fishing rights 
and its socio-economic effects on Pomor fishing communities based on the 
empirical information described above.
Traditional practices of fishery or poaching?
In this chapter we give examples from Pomor villages in the Mezen Rayon of 
the Onega Peninsula in the Arkhangelsk region in order to understand how 
Pomors fish and what their conception of poaching is. Even nowadays people 
in the Onega Peninsula fish for their own household use with traditional tackle, 
including special seines and fyke nets and other kinds of nets and lines. Further-
more, they also engage in fishing under the ice with seines and fyke nets as well 
as special kinds of angling for navaga fish.
   This more extensive traditional fishing is permitted only with a permit 
and only in industrial fishing areas. However, the fishing tackle is laid on coast-
328
al strips and in the mouths of rivers flowing into the sea. In the villages of 
the Mezen Rayon, where the research was conducted, catching of fish occurs 
mainly in rivers and at the point where rivers flow into the sea. The fishermen 
use the kinds of nets they have traditionally used, although neither federal nor 
regional legislation recognizes these traditional features of fishery.
  However, it is very difficult to engage in these fishing practices legally: “All 
our people feel the pressure of these restrictive decrees and regulations on lo-
cal fishery. It is the stumbling block. If everything is forbidden, you need to 
take a closer look and find ways to get around it…” (Interview , employee 
in a kolkhoz office, Mezen Rayon ). In the present circumstances peo-
ple engage in silent protests, which the whole community accepts, because 
the restrictions violate their values: “We are northern people, not fighters, but 
when a person cannot accept a law deep in his heart, he would rather try to 
find possibilities to break the law” (Interview , the vice-leader of a kolkhoz, 
Mezen Rayon).
  As a result the local population developed its own special conception of 
poaching: “At the present time I have not met any real poachers, and I have 
lived here more than 5 years. In our understanding a poacher is a person who 
destroys fish, destroys nature, and fishes and sells the fish for his own enrich-
ment. You are supposed to fish to eat and to feed your family” (Interview , 
employee in a kolkhoz office, Mezen Rayon ). Therefore, local people who 
use traditional fishing methods do not regard themselves as poachers.
  The following examples show how people have become poachers in the 
eyes of the nation state law because of the collision of legislation and traditional 
rules. The first example is from the mouth of the Kuloi River, which, according 
to the present legislation, is regarded as a protected spawning river where only 
angling is allowed. The river mouth naturally contains salt water, because the 
tidal current brings seawater there. The local population fish in May during the 
high tide with seines, because other kinds of fishing are impossible: “the popu-
lation does not travel anywhere, they lay down the seine and catch here from 5 
to  kilograms of fish, which is enough that they don’t have to fish any more 
for a long time. In the village they sell the fish to babushkas (old ladies) for 5 
roubles a kilogram, and that is all” (Interview 5, head of local administration, 
Mezen Rayon ). This practice makes all the informants we interviewed, as 
well as the people in the villages, poachers.
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   Another example is fishing for flatfish on the seashore: “From the sea to 
the shore you can see enormous amounts of flatfish. They are just everywhere. 
If you fish with a seine. Anyway, it [that kind of fishing] will be fined. Officially, 
you need to have a fishing area” (Interview with the head of local administration, 
Mezen Rayon ). A third example comes from the Onega Peninsula, where 
pensioners lay a fyke net across the river mouth to fish for their own household 
purposes. This is illegal, because they are fishing in the industrial fishing area of a 
kolkhoz without a permit; if the authorities catch them, their fishing tackle will 
be confiscated (Interview with a retired fisherman, Onega Peninsula ). All 
these examples show that the local people are forced to become poachers.
  According to the local interviewees, the authorities’ fight against poaching 
by the local people has changed during the last few years. The interviewees 
have noticed that a few years ago the authorities appeared quickly and acted 
very strictly. When they caught someone fishing illegally, they confiscated all 
the fishing tackle and sometimes even destroyed it. Strict fines were imposed on 
local people who were caught fishing illegally. There were many checks, several 
times a month. During the last two years, however, the control has loosened. The 
authorities appear, for example, once a month, and they don’t confiscate fishing 
tackle at all (Five interviews with local fishermen and a representative of a kolk-
hoz, Onega Peninsula ). According to the local interviewees, the reason for 
the looser control is that there are secret instructions for the authorities to ease 
up in order to give the local population an opportunity to fish. The truth of this 
argument may be disputed, but it offers a typical example of how strict Russian 
legislation is softened by the non–enforcement of it in practice. Because of such 
enforcement practice, however, the traditional rights remain illegal.
  Who is a real poacher in the eyes of the local population? In their opinion, 
the main violators of the law are the authorities themselves. Practically every-
one in the villages of the Onega Peninsula said that the border guard detach-
ment, which also monitors fishing, confiscates fishing tackle from the local 
population and then fishes with the same tackle right before their eyes. This 
kind of behaviour by state authorities provokes a negative attitude among the 
local population towards the state authorities as the worst poachers. It is doubt-
ful that official legislation, which is respected neither by the local population 
nor by the authorities themselves, can fulfil the aim of preventing the over-
harvesting of fish and other biological resources.
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Comparative examples of the recognition
of traditional fishing rights
The direct change from considerably free fishing rights to state-arranged auc-
tions in the Russian Federation was quite radical. The main justification for the 
new legislation on the auctioning of fishing quotas was the protection of bio-
logical resources (Ilyasov et al. 5). Another background motivator was the 
centralization tendency and the assumption that effectiveness and centralization 
go hand in hand. The Russian federal government seems to believe that formal 
legislation is the only effective way to control the use of natural resources and 
that the users of these resources simply have to adjust to rules imposed on 
them from above. The government seems to ignore problems which arise from 
various informal institutions, the same way that citizens typically ignore the 
formal laws and institutions. Traditional fishing rights are recognized only in 
the framework of the Law on the Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous and 
Small Peoples (.4. N -FZ). Self-regulation of local populations is not 
recognized at all. The participation of local people would be extremely impor-
tant in such a huge country with a large number of differing local traditions 
with which the federal centre is not necessarily familiar. Adjustment to local 
traditions, however, seems to be regarded as ineffective.
  The Russian situation is not unique: a similar development took place ear-
lier in the Western countries. Elinor Ostrom has reported on the state taking 
over the commons in Nova Scotia, Canada, justifying its interference as neces-
sary to prevent “the tragedy of the commons”. The result of state interference, 
however, has been the ousting of local fishermen from their fishing areas, which 
have been given to “more effective” commercial newcomers. Traditional rules 
and self-regulation have been ignored. Ostrom criticizes particularly the belief 
in one method only, such as only state regulation or only private governance, 
pointing out that local fishermen have long applied self-regulation in order to 
control the amount of catches (Ostrom ). The head of a fishing kolkhoz 
sees the situation in Russia as follows: “Once this was not a private traders’ busi-
ness. […] But then, in the s private traders appeared everywhere, here and 
in the Far East. And, of course, they needed to make profits. They most likely 
also had friends in the government. They were able to lobby for their interests 
in the Duma. And that was it. They decided to pool everything, and everything 
was redistributed at our expense.”
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  Russia’s neighbouring countries, Finland and Norway, have quite a similar 
history of fishery. The indigenous peoples of Lapland have followed their own 
traditional rules for fishing in lakes and rivers for centuries. Fishing areas have 
been divided among families, and these rules have been followed in spite of 
differing national legislation. In Finland fishing rights are connected with land 
ownership of riverbanks and lakeshores. There are also many common law fishing 
rights (usufruct) from time immemorial concerning lakes and rivers in the whole 
country. Otherwise, fishing without a permit is allowed only for local inhabitants 
and only for angling. For other kinds of fishing, permission from the landowners, 
who have formed fishing communities, is needed. Even angling is limited to local 
people in Finland, whereas in Russia all citizens are allowed to angle everywhere. 
In Russia, only for more extensive kinds of fishing is a permit required.
  Contrary to other parts of Finland, where private land ownership prevails, 
in Finnish Lapland the most prominent landowner is the state, the rights of 
which are represented by the State Forestry Agency. Hence, land property rights 
can be compared with the situation in the Russian Federation. There are re-
ports in Finnish Lapland of local police chiefs closing their eyes to violations of 
state laws that conflict with traditional rights. Local people have been allowed 
to fish in Lappish rivers and lakes in spite of the official requirement of a permit. 
As in Russia today, the practice has been varying: some authorities have strictly 
applied the law of the nation state, while others have ignored it because of their 
own knowledge of local traditions (Joona ).
  Fishing laws have been updated in the Nordic countries because of new 
EU regulations. The ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(No. ) has also put pressure on national legislatures to recognize the rights 
of the Sami people, the only officially recognized indigenous people in the 
European Union. The Sami live in Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Kola Pen-
insula in Russia. The Sami also have the status of indigenous people in Russia 
and are included on the list of small and indigenous peoples. According to the 
ILO Convention, the rights of indigenous peoples to natural resources and land 
should be restored or at least settled in a fair manner. The Nordic countries have 
tried to find new solutions to align their legislation with the requirements of 
the Convention. The solutions in Finland and Norway have been quite similar. 
Unlike northern Norway, Finnish Lapland does not have seacoasts, but fishing 
in Lake Inari, as well as in smaller lakes and rivers, is important for both the 
local population and for the purposes of tourism.
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  In Norway there is traditional fishing in coastal areas as well as in inland 
waters. Finnmark, the northernmost county of Norway, was excluded from 
the new national fishery law. The special law, called the Finnmark Act (No. 
5/5), differs considerably from earlier land legislation. It aims at protect-
ing the Sámi culture and has turned land which earlier was owned by the 
state over to an agency called the Finnmark Estate, which administers land 
and natural resources. The Estate’s board of directors consists of six people: the 
Sámi Parliament appoints three, and three are selected by the Finnmark County 
Council (Ravna ). Section  of the Act states that the Finnmark Estate 
“shall manage the renewable natural resources on its land in compliance with 
the purposes of this Act and within the frameworks provided by the Wildlife 
Act, the Salmonid and Fresh Water Fish Act and other legislation”. Section  
gives to individuals living in the municipalities of Finnmark the right to fish for 
freshwater fish with nets, to fish for anadromous salmonid with fixed gear in the 
sea, to gather eggs and down, etc. This special legislation gives the same fishing 
rights to both the Sami and others, including the Kvens, who do not have the 
status of an indigenous people, for which they have applied without success. 
In this respect the Kvens can be compared to the Pomors. They are actually 
descendants of Finns who moved to the Norwegian sea coast to escape famine 
in Finland in the th and th centuries and have lived there from traditional 
coastal fishing ever since (Saressalo ).
  Sami rights to land have still not been settled Finland, which prevents Fin-
land from ratifying the ILO Convention and has produced a great deal of 
criticism (e.g., Anaya ). The recent fishery law, however, regulates fishing in 
three municipalities of Upper Lapland differently from the rest of the country 
and quite similarly to the way Norway has regulated fishing in Finnmark. Ac-
cording to Section  of the Law on Fishery, all local people living in the three 
municipalities of Upper Lapland have the right to fish in Lake Inari. The local 
inhabitants are indigenous Sami, Finns (the majority population), and all other 
people who live in the area of the three municipalities. This regulation has led 
to a peculiar situation where a seasonal employee who comes from Southern 
Finland is allowed to fish without a permit, while an indigenous Sami who 
lives in a neighbouring municipality does not have the same right (Joona ).
  The Sami, as well as Finnish specialists of constitutional law, suggested that 
this right be extended only to indigenous people, but the Ministry anyhow 
drafted the law differently, and the Parliament approved the draft (Joona ). 
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The regulation circumvents the bitterly disputed issue of defining who is a 
Sami and who is not. The precise population of the Sami is not known, because 
the Nordic states do not keep a register on ethnicity. The estimated number of 
Sami varies between 5, – ,, 45, of whom live in Norway, , 
in Sweden,  in Finland, and  in Russia (Kulonen et al. 5). Among 
the population are some whose Sami ancestors abandoned reindeer herding 
centuries ago and become farmers and in some cases abandoned the Sami 
language for Finnish, and some who were historically registered as Lapps only 
because they practiced reindeer herding. The official definition of the Sami 
Parliament is thus quite narrow.89 There is a large mixed population whose situ-
ation can be compared with that of the Pomors, whose status as an indigenous 
people is likewise disputed.
  Local inhabitants of the three municipalities of Upper Lapland (Inari, Uts-
joki and Enontekiö) select a negotiation committee which gives an annual 
statement on fishing rights for outsiders. The state Forestry Agency must com-
ply with these statements. Fishing rights for outsiders are usually granted only 
for recreational and sports fishing purposes. The arrangement makes self-organ-
ized governance of fishery in Lake Inari possible, as well as allowing local dis-
putes to be decided at the local level. Parallel to the free fishing rights of every 
inhabitant, the local people also have traditional fishing areas, which are divided 
among families. From time to time, the Sami have tried to have these tradi-
tional rights be officially recognized as official rights by the state either through 
proposals to the Parliament or by taking disputes concerning traditional rights 
to court. At the legislative level, the locals have not been successful, but courts 
sometimes recognize traditional rights as rights from time immemorial (Joona 
). Such rights can be recognized in the property law of Finland, Sweden 
and Norway. Even if the rights of the Sami concerning land have not yet been 
settled in Finland, a trend towards officially recognized self-regulation, which 
may take local circumstances into consideration, can be seen.
  Although the situation in Finnish Upper Lapland and Norwegian Finn-
mark is not an ideal one and many disputes still need to be resolved, the idea of 
89     The definition is connected with language. A Sami is a person who identifies herself as a 
Sami and who is either a native speaker of Sami or has at least one parent or grandparent who 
learned Sami as a first language (The Sami Parliament Website). In order to have the right to vote 
in the elections of the Sami Parliament, one must have an ancestor who was registered as a taxed 
Lapp (reindeer-herding Sami) in the old tax records.
334
a committee that applies local decision-making on the use of natural resources 
in a self-regulating manner can be recommended as a possible solution to the 
difficult situation of the Pomors. In Pomorie, it should be even easier to solve 
the problem since the Pomors are not threatening the rights of any (other) 
indigenous peoples. Their fishery rights could be recognized as rights of the 
local population, depending on fish resources, without entering into a dispute 
on whether or not the Pomors are an indigenous people.
Conclusion
Whether they are considered to be an indigenous people or not, it is clear that 
the Pomors are a group of people who are dependent on traditional fishery. 
The Pomor Movement has tried to get the status of an indigenous people for 
the Pomors in order to guarantee them the right to fish at least for their own 
livelihood. In other words, the Movement is trying to get traditional rights 
recognized in the legislation of the nation state. The Movement also provides 
information about the ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
in Pomor villages, referring to international law, which obligates states to re-
spect the rights of indigenous peoples. This may be a difficult way to find justice 
in the conflict concerning fishing rights because of the double identity of the 
Pomors and because the name “Pomor” can be used in various ways. Attempts 
to reinterpret the status of indigenous people can lead to endless disputes con-
cerning ethnicity and the definition of indigenous people. The Pomor Move-
ment could also try to refer to the special economic, social and cultural situa-
tion of the Pomors and demand special legislation, examples of which can be 
found both in the history of Pomorie and in recent legislation in neighbouring 
countries. The reason for not pursuing this alternative may be that special legis-
lation is not popular in contemporary Russia, where similar rules for everybody 
are understood as a guarantee of equality.
  It seems that stronger commercial players have been able to influence legisla-
tion and align their needs with the strong trends towards centralization in the 
legislation concerning natural resources. Weaker groups have great difficulties be-
ing heard both in the federal centre and at the regional level, where short-sighted 
commercial gains are often preferred to protecting vulnerable local groups that 
are suffering because of the changing socio-economic environment. There are, 
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however, some small signs of a gradual acceptance of special regulations to sup-
port weaker groups in Russia. The category of small coastal fishing in the Fishery 
Law is at least a sign that the problem of small entrepreneurs competing with big-
ger, more resourceful ones has been recognized. Subsidizing small business could 
be one solution to the problem of the Pomor fishing kolkhozes, but it would 
not solve the crucial problem of traditional fishing for unemployed Pomors’ own 
household purposes and the small-scale selling of fish in the villages.
  Self-organization and the possibility to take control of their own living 
circumstances have been traditional Pomor values for centuries. Official rec-
ognition of the self-organization of local people has, however, not been part 
of Russian values since Soviet times. Self-organization has been driven in areas 
where state power has not been able to penetrate effectively. Since Soviet times, 
such self-organization has been regarded as a weakness of the state. The Pomors 
are not the only example of a community within the Soviet Union which was 
left alone to live according to their own self-organizational rules.
  With democratization, it would be only fair to recognize the existence of 
traditional legal regimes and legal pluralism in Russia. Recognizing only small 
indigenous peoples is not a danger to the official system, but recognizing other, 
usually ethnic, legal regimes, is considered to constitute a threat to the unity of 
Russia. This is a tragic dilemma for Russia, because the forceful implementation 
of rules which are considered to be wrong at the local level only leads to passive 
resistance and may also escalate into active resistance in certain circumstances. In 
other words, the Russian Federation seems to be too weak to recognize a mul-
tiplicity of norms beside nation state legislation. In this respect, however, Russia 
does not differ very much from other nation states. The easiest way to accept tra-
ditional rights is to include them in the legislation of the nation state. In this way, 
the role of the state as the rule maker is not threatened. Other methods could 
lead to legal pluralism and considering nation state law as only one set of alterna-
tive “laws”. Nation states are reluctant to accept such a change (Michaels 5).
  As Elinor Ostrom’s studies show, self-regulation does not always work, but, 
nevertheless, it can be a sustainable solution for settling fishing rights. The Po-
mors have lived for centuries under a self-regulated regime and have extensive 
knowledge concerning fish and fishery in their traditional fishing areas. Their 
fishing methods may not be in accordance with the opinions of Russian spe-
cialists of marine biological resources, but they are a small population with a 
long tradition of living from fishery. Thus, self-regulation would not present 
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a threat to other actors. However, Ostrom’s studies show that self-regulation 
no longer works when there are many newcomers with commercial interests 
but no interest in following the local rules concerning self-regulation (Ostrom 
). Thus, some kind of alternative dispute settlement is needed in order to 
preserve the rights of local people and their livelihood.
  The current situation in the White Sea area indicates that the competition 
between state legislation and traditional rights is actually leading to the same 
sad result as the tragedy of the commons – not to the regulated protection of 
biological resources, as claimed by the Federal Law on Fishery. The situation is 
also rapidly leading to the human socio-economic tragedy of a group of people 
who are dependent on natural resources, the governance of which they have 
been forced to relinquish. Such tragedies are not unique on the international 
scale. However, the unwillingness of the nation state to try to solve the prob-
lem is a sign of a cavalier attitude on the part of the decision-makers towards 
the weaker groups in society. In the case of the Pomors, they have been driven 
from being a self-organized group with a centuries-old pride in their culture 
and their ability to support themselves to losers in the redistribution of fishing 
rights that has been forced upon them.
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Legislation
Federal’nyi zakon o rybolovstve i sohranenii vodnyh biologicheskih resursov ..4 
N  FZ (with amendments from ..5 N  FZ, .. N , 
.. N , .. N , .4. N 5, .. N -FZ 
5, .. N 5, .. N 4-FZ, .. N 4).
Federal’nyi zakon o garantiyah prav korennyh i malochislennyh narodov. .4. N 
-FZ red. 5.4..
Federal’nyi zakon o minimal’nom razmere oplaty truda. .. N -FZ (red. 
..).
Kodeks RF ob administrativnyh pravonarysheniyah .. No 5 FZ (amend-
ments ..).
Perechen’ korennyh malochislennyh narodov .4. N 5 r.
Postanovlenie pravitel’stva RF 4.. N 4. Polozhenie ob osushshestvlenii 
gosudarstvennogo monitoringa vodnyh biologicheskih resursov i primene-
nii ego dannyh.
Postanovlenie Pravitel’stvo RF 4.. N . O vvoze (vyvoze) na tamo-
zhennuyu territoriyu RF ugolovov vodnyh biologicheskih resursov doby-
tiyh pri osushestvlenii promyshlennogo rybolovstva vo vnutrennyh mors-
kih vodah RF, territorial’nom more RF, na kontinental’nom shelfe RF v 
isklyuchitel’noi ekonomicheskoi zone RF, i proisvedennoj iz nih rybnoj i 
inoj produktsii.
Postanovlenie pravitel’sva RF .. No 4. O kvotah na bylov (dobychu) 
vodnyh biologicheskih resursov.
Postanovlenie Pravitel’stvo RF .. No . O sozdanij otraslevoj sistemy 
monitoringa vodnyh biologicheskih resursov, nablyudeniya i kontrolya za 
deyatel’nost’yu promyshlovyh sudov.
Prikaz Federal’nogo agenstvo po rybolovstvu ot  aprelya  g. N.  g. Moskva 
Ob utverzhdenii Poryadka opredeleniya granits rybopromyslovyh uchastkov.
Kalastuslaki (Finnish Law on Fishery) .4./.
The Finnmark Act No. 5/5 (Norway).
ILO Convention No. . 5... Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
.
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c h a p t e r   
Nafisa Yeasmin 
Life as an iMMigrant 
in rovanieMi, finLand
introduction
Immigrants today form a heterogeneous population, one that defies easy gen-
eralisations (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco ). Receiving immigrants 
entails both advantages and disadvantages with respect to the receiving coun-
try’s national interests. This chapter focuses on local attitudes towards immi-
grants and refugees in a northern town in the Finnish part of the Barents Re-
gion and discusses the multiple daily challenges they face. I have chosen the city 
of Rovaniemi for a case study, as it is a place where I have lived since  and 
have established my own business. In addition, I have worked as a cultural me-
diator, teacher of tolerance education in  the elementary school, and interpreter 
for immigrants residing in the city; in all of these capacities, I have sought to 
promote tolerance and equality. As an immigrant, I have also sometimes faced 
some difficult situations. The chapter is based on a literature review, participant 
observation and my personal experiences of immigration issues in Rovaniemi. 
attitudes towards immigrants
Rovaniemi is the capital city of the northern part of Finland, the province of 
Lapland. More than ,4 people live in Lapland, a number that includes over 
, immigrants. Rovaniemi has a population of more than , people, of 
whom 5, or .%, are immigrants. These immigrants come from some 5 
different countries, and approximately 5 to  % of them are refugees.
  Table . shows the number of foreigners who were living in Rovaniemi 
permanently in the period -. Those who are now Finnish citizens are 
not included in the figures.  
  In , the City of Rovaniemi received an award from the Ministry of 
the Interior for its contribution to the well-being of immigrants. However, 
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this does not mean that the attitudes of all local people towards immigrants are 
particularly positive or that the experiences of immigrants themselves have all 
been encouraging. 
  Attitudes towards immigrants are shown directly and indirectly by civil so-
ciety in many stages from the labour market to individuals’ feelings. Local peo-
ple’s attitudes towards immigrants vary on the basis of the dress and situations 
they encounter, the immigrants’ country of origin and educational background, 
the views of the respective groups,  and so on. The cultural and national iden-
tity of an immigrant also plays an important role in how he or she is treated 
by local residents.  Another factor that may figure significantly in this regard is 
how ambitious immigrants are economically, and this varies from locality to 
locality. For example, people viewed foreign job applicants and refugees more 
favourably in Helsinki, Turku and Tampere than in the countryside and smaller 
cities. Young Finnish men clearly have more negative attitudes towards foreign 
job applicants and refugees, particularly Somalis, than young Finnish women 
do. Such attitudes have concrete consequences for immigrants. In , almost 
half of the Somali nationals in Finland were unemployed and in that same year 
negative attitudes towards Somalis appeared in a police report (Jaakkola , 
-). Somalis socialise mainly with other Somalis and do not have much 
table  13.1 Number of foreigners residing in Lapland 2000-2010
Source: Statistics Finland 31.12.2010; Lapland Centre for Trade, Development and the Environment (2011).
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contact with Finns (Perhoniemi and Jasinskaja-Lahti ).
  Native Finns’ attitudes towards immigrants fluctuate depending on the im-
migrants’ religious beliefs, practices and level of commitment. The “ethnore-
ligious” perspective (Green ) is one lens through which the influence of 
religion on individuals’ attitudes can be understood. This theoretical perspective 
views particular religious traditions as a key factor in the putative link between 
religion and individuals’ attitudes (Benjamin , -). In Rovaniemi, 
some individuals occasionally exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants 
openly, while others either do not express their attitudes publicly or hide their 
negative views.  Some native-born Finns do not like immigrants from specific 
countries, and some immigrants have had difficult experiences. There is a clear 
social distance between various groups in this context.  The attitudes of Finnish 
civil servants working with immigrants and immigration were surveyed and 
analysed using factor and variance analysis (Pitkänen and Kouki , -4). 
The results showed that the attitudes of the respondents were primarily related 
to their specific type of work and to the experiences they had had with immi-
grants as clients. The experiences of teachers, social workers and employment 
agency personnel were mainly positive, whereas the majority of police officers 
and border guards surveyed reported that their experiences were negative or 
neutral. The most negative views were expressed by police officers and border 
guards, and the most positive by social workers and Swedish-speaking teachers. 
(Pitkänen and Kouki , - 4).
Categories of immigrants
The majority of immigrants in Rovaniemi are refugees, whereas the others are 
students, asylum-seekers, or spouses of Finns. Quite a few Russians have moved 
to Rovaniemi through marriage and for other reasons, such as education and 
business. The five most common nationalities living in Rovaniemi are Russians, 
Swedes, Iraqis, Myanmarese and Somalis. (See Table .; Lapland Centre for 
Economic Development, Transport and the Environment ).
  Many immigrants come as students or professional trainees and then decide 
to stay permanently after finishing their training to secure a better career or 
brighter future. Some immigrants, however, have come as refugees and have 
experienced poverty, financial insecurity, and a lack of peace and daily necessi-
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ties in their own country. Many other 
immigrants have come as asylum-
seekers due to constant political unrest 
and violence in their country. Asylum-
seekers leave their country to find bet-
ter living conditions, whereas refugees 
are driven from their home countries, 
fleeing into camps in neighbouring 
countries and eventually seeking asy-
lum in different countries (e.g. Fin-
land).  Rovaniemi accepts a quota of 
some 5 refugees and  asylum-seek-
ers per year. In Lapland, the figures for 
the year  were  and 55, respec-
tively.
Students come from many coun-
tries to Rovaniemi because of Finland’s high-quality schooling system and free 
tuition. For example, there were  foreign university students and 5 ex-
change students in the year  (Rovaniemi Municipality ).  Student 
immigrants develop their skills in many disciplines and receive various forms of 
support from local people. One example is what is known as the “Friend Fam-
ily” programme, through which many students get a family. This programme 
helps foreign students become more knowledgeable about Finnish culture; yet, 
some students – mainly those of colour – have to wait longer than others to 
get a friend family.
   The Finnish government welcomes students from all over the world to 
study in Finnish educational institutions. This is one of the attitudes of the Finn-
ish government towards immigrants that is considered most positive and is most 
highly praised.  The impact of immigration in the field of education is very 
specific. One aspect of it is that it greatly increases the overall expenses of the 
education system in the country (Brimelow 5). Many countries are receptive 
to students as immigrants and earn money from foreign students by imposing 
fees. However, Scandinavian countries such as Finland do not charge tuition 
fees, since they guarantee education as a basic right, although this entails more 
costs for the national educational system. Nevertheless, attitudes towards student 
immigrants in Rovaniemi are more liberal than towards other immigrants. 
table 13.2 Country of origin of the largest 
immigrant groups in Rovaniemi (2010)
Source: Lapland Centre for Economic Develop-
ment, Transport and the Environment (2010). 
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  In Rovaniemi, the local people would like foreign students to go back to 
their native countries when they have finished their studies in Finland. Students 
cost the government less than other categories of immigrants, such as refugees, 
and thus the attitude of local people towards students is comparatively friendly. 
By contrast, it is clear that the attitudes of the government and the general pub-
lic towards children and adolescent immigrants differ: immigrant children are 
treated the same as Finnish children in the schools and need not pay any fees. 
Moreover, Finnish authorities make extra provision for  immigrant children 
to address special circumstances. For instance, the government provides them 
with language teaching as well as religious education in the school. The School 
Service Centre in Rovaniemi offers instruction in the mother language for im-
migrant children if there are at least four students from the same country and 
religious teaching if there are at least three students who have the same religion. 
(Multicultural education and guidance -)
  According to the Finnish National Board of Education (), the objective 
of immigrant education is to provide people moving to Finland with opportu-
nities to function as equal members of Finnish society and to guarantee them 
rights to education that are equal to those which an ordinary citizen enjoys. In 
fact, Finland spends a considerable amount of money to this end, and it could be 
seen as a laudable policy on the part of the Finnish government for immigrant 
children. By contrast, the children of immigrants in American society live in fear 
because of their different culture, priorities, and ways of acting and thinking. Im-
migrant parents there create informal parallel structures to aid in their children’s 
learning - ´shadow schools’ for example – in what is a frightening environment 
for immigrant children. (Suárez-Orozco ) However, immigrant children in 
Rovaniemi do not have to face such a serious situation in the schools.
  The attitude of local Finns towards immigrant children is to some extent the 
opposite of that of the Finnish government. There is much evidence that a local 
child may react dramatically to an immigrant child even in a small matter. For 
example, some groups of immigrant children eat their lunch in school using their 
right hand, which many Finnish children cannot accept and will react to. In such 
cases, the school authorities provide the children with supportive measures de-
signed to teach them to use their left hand, which is against their traditional cul-
ture. This approach reflects the maxim: “When in Rome do as the Romans do”. 
  Sometimes local children annoy immigrant children by referring to them 
using the term “dark rye bread” (fi ruisleipä) in the school because of the im-
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migrants’ dark skin colour. These attitudes of local children target only a few 
groups of immigrants, however, such as those from Somalia and Afghanistan. All 
in all, it is quite a challenge for immigrant youth to live within and between 
two cultures (e.g., Berry et al. ).  Many early studies note that immigrant 
children are at increased risk of mental health problems (e.g., Munroe-Blum et 
al. ). The most frequently suggested reason is that the immigration process 
causes stress, not only because it entails extensive loss of family and friends, 
customs and surroundings (e.g., Hicks et al. ; James ), but also because 
immigrants have to adapt to a new cultural environment, one which often en-
tails different moral values and standards, as well as a new language (Berry ; 
Pawliuk et al. ; Stevens and Vollebergh , –4). 
  Some Finns are very much against such negative attitudes towards immi-
grant children and treat all children equally irrespective of their immigrant 
status. Some also protest if a teacher in school distinguishes between local and 
immigrant children on school premises.
immigration and refugee policies in rovaniemi
 
There are different opinions about receiving refugees in Rovaniemi, as in Finn-
ish society at large. During the period - (as of  August), approxi-
mately 55 refugees were received by the municipality of Rovaniemi from 
different countries (See Table .).
  Some Finns like receiving refugees while others dislike it. The local newspa-
per ran a headline saying that the arrival of foreigners and refugees in Rovanie-
mi has perplexed local residents. I have found positive as well as negative com-
ments on this issue. Some Finns agreed with the headline; others disagreed with 
it entirely.  Rovaniemi has a football club and many of the players, as well as the 
coach, have been foreigners and even refugees. Nowadays football and support-
ing the team are one of the host citizens’ favourite hobbies. Here one sees an 
optimistic group of Finns – football fans – criticising those opposed to accept-
ing immigrants and refugees.  Refugees are a vulnerable minority who need 
support from the local people in the host country to adjust to Finnish society. 
  Every Finn reacts to refugees in his or her own way. However, in gen-
eral Finns do not like refugees’ manners and customs. One Finn expressed the 
view that the customs of civilised people are essential to everyday life, but that 
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unfortunately some groups of refugees (e.g., Somalis) do not adhere to these 
customs. He did not like the way in which refugees from Third World coun-
tries talk; he found their normal talking to be more like shouting. According 
to Tiilikainen (), among the immigrants to Finland, Somalis in particular 
have faced discrimination both at work and in everyday life; in the eyes of many 
Finns, Somalis embody cultural and religious otherness, social and economic 
problems and increasing global security threats. Ironically, in Rovaniemi there 
are also critical feelings on the part of some refugees towards other refugees: it 
has been observed that some refugees from the Middle East behave aggressively 
towards Somalis. Yet, these are not the only attitudes:  there are people who have 
enough patience towards refugees and do not have any complaints about them. 
  Individuals’ educational background sometimes influences their attitude to-
wards refugees, with educated persons reacting more positively than less educated 
ones. Persons with a low social and economic status are assumed to be more 
prone to fearing foreigners and expressing xenophobic sentiments than persons 
with a higher status (Ervasti 4, 5-44).  The usual trend is that adult Finns do 
not like to show others that they are racist.  According to one refugee, “Before 
table 13.3 Refugees and asylum-seekers received by the municipality of Rovaniemi (2006-2011)
Source: The Lapland Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment 2011.
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coming here I thought that Finland was a rich, civilised country. People are well 
educated and the society is free of corruption; they cannot be malicious towards 
immigrants. However, in living in Finland for three years, my experiences have 
shown that there are good and bad people, racist as well as non-racist, in every 
nation; some nations express this openly while others hide it”.
  Aggressive attitudes towards refugees on the part of local children are found 
fairly commonly in Finland (Lindsey et al. ), although negative group at-
titudes towards refugees or immigrants are not officially acceptable in Finland, 
a country famous for its anti-discrimination laws. The children of refugees are 
discriminated against by host children. Some immigrant groups play together 
amongst themselves in the school and outside of the school. (Valjakka 5) 
Few host children play with immigrants; most of them avoid playing with the 
children of refugees. In the school, host children tease refugee children, who 
may experience culture shock at being discriminated against because their skin 
is a different colour. Adults understand everything, but it is difficult to explain 
all the negative feelings to a child; such negative and discriminatory attitudes 
might cause mental depression for children as well as for their parents.
  Refugees are a minority group in the host country, and it is thus the duty 
of host citizens to receive them warmly and enthusiastically. Refugees from a 
Muslim or conservative family in a European country experience a new environ-
ment and culture, ones that differ in many ways from those in their native society. 
Sometimes immigrant parents become worried that their children may learn 
bad habits from Finnish adolescents, such as sex before marriage and drinking 
alcohol, both of which are prohibited in Muslim society (Valjakka 5). In ad-
dition, children meet unfamiliar people and experience culture shock. Refugees 
in Rovaniemi come from countries such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq 
and Myanmar and have already suffered a great deal before coming here. They 
need a positive reception and treatment from the host society to cope with their 
new environment. Otherwise both refugees and the host society may experience 
problems: for example, different dress codes, using mobile phones even in a meet-
ing, and a commanding rather than requesting style make Finns uncomfortable. 
  Refugees from Third World countries would like to change their life style, 
thinking that, if they do, they will receive treatment similar to that given Finns 
in their daily and social life. However, in a short period of time, they realise 
that they are not in the same position as native Finns. Then they become de-
pressed and think like disadvantaged persons; they may become unbalanced 
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mentally and behave aggressively. This aggression may affect their whole group 
and sometimes they are treated as outsiders in the host society. These changing 
attitudes may ultimately lead to criminal behaviour. 
immigration and its impacts 
on the finnish labour market
Immigration is a contentious issue in the industrialised nations of the world 
- not merely in the traditional receiving countries but, in recent decades, in 
Europe as well (Friedberg and Hunt 5). A large number of immigrants 
come as job-seekers to Finland from within and outside Europe and have an 
impact on the Finnish labour market. For local Finns, the policy of admitting 
immigrant workers is seen as an economic threat to the Finnish government, 
even though the unemployment rate of immigrants is much higher than that 
of native Finns; nationally, the rate is about % for immigrants as opposed to 
.% for Finns. (Finnish Statistics Centre ) The situation in Rovaniemi 
is worse, with   % of immigrants unemployed and many of the rest either 
pursuing some form of education with the support of the employment of-
fice or working as trainees. (The Lapland Centre of Economic Development, 
Transport and Environment, )
  The numbers of foreign job-seekers in Rovaniemi (as of  July ) are 
set out in Table .4.
table 13.4 Immigrant job-seekers in Rovaniemi (as of 31 July 2011)
Source: The Lapland Centre of Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (2011).
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The five largest groups of job-seekers by nationality ac-
cording to the employment office are described in Table 
.5 (as of  July ).
  The job opportunities for immigrants in Lapland 
are very limited. Few immigrants find work in the 
region, a fact that made the headlines of the Finn-
ish Broadcasting Company YLE (Sarjas ). I have 
found that many local people comment on the reports 
of immigrants finding jobs; all of these comments have 
been negative and through these comments the host 
people in Rovaniemi express their negative attitudes 
toward immigrant job-seekers. Their view is that there 
are many Finns in Rovaniemi who are unemployed 
and they ask why it is important to give work to im-
migrants. If there is a job available, it should be offered 
to a Finn first. They also ask why the newspaper does 
not run headlines such as ‘Finns do not have work in 
Lapland’. One of the comments was, “Immigrants will 
be a growing problem for us Finns if we do not deal with them with a firm 
hand.”  (Sarjas ). 
  To some extent, foreigners come to Finland to do low-paying jobs – unfor-
tunately. Immigrants may compete with native workers in the labour market and 
displace them, driving down wages (Friedberg and Hunt 5). Different wage 
rates for different groups of immigrant workers and discrimination against im-
migrant workers seem to exist nowadays in the European labour market (Mül-
ler ). In fact, the most employed immigrants have odd jobs, for example, 
cleaning, or delivering newspapers, and very few of them get high-status jobs. 
However, working in an office is not necessarily satisfying, as they frequently 
face discrimination in their working places. One immigrant quipped: “Every 
Finn has only one boss, but an immigrant has a lot of bosses”, because all Finns 
in the same working place treated him or her as a subordinate.  European for-
eigners, including Russians, are in an advantageous position in this regard. Many 
Russians come to Rovaniemi as tourists the year round, which has created job 
opportunities in Finnish businesses for persons skilled in the Russian language. 
Present statistics indicate that immigrants will get more employment opportuni-
ties in , when it is estimated that more than , jobs will have become 
table 13.5 Five largest 
groups of job-seekers by 
nationality in Rovaniemi 
as of 31 July 2011
Source:  Lapland Centre for 
Economic Development, 
Transport and the Environ-
ment, Rovaniemi 2011.
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available in Lapland; the number of immigrants will be about , in Lapland 
by 5 (Lapland Centre of Economic Development, Transport and Environ-
ment ). This situation has worried the Finnish government, which is trying 
to support immigrants so that they will be able to work in Lapland. 
  The employment office in Rovaniemi assists immigrants by providing them 
with Finnish language instruction, which is important for, but no guarantee of, 
getting a job. The office always encourages unemployed people to visit many 
employers in seeking a job. However, experience shows that it is very difficult 
to reach employers, because they are always too busy with their regular work 
even to receive a phone call from an unemployed immigrant. Some organisa-
tions do not like to hire immigrant workers, although many immigrants are 
highly educated and have language skills.  In some contexts, Finnish employers 
think that immigrants are not capable of doing Finnish work and question 
their honesty. Finnish employers are more liberal when it comes to recruiting 
European and American immigrants than immigrants from Third World coun-
tries. The reason for this may be that the culture of Europeans and Americans 
is in many ways similar to Finnish culture. Finns also have much more trust 
in immigrants from nearby countries. Jaakkola () found that immigrants 
from Nordic countries are culturally closer to Finns and their standard of living 
is closer to that of Finns. Moreover, Finns’ attitude towards immigrants from 
Anglo-Saxon countries are more favourable than towards immigrants who are 
culturally different or who come from countries that have a low standard of 
living or are far away. (Jaakkola )
  Finnish entrepreneurs think that it is better to pay a salary to a Finn than 
to someone else. According to the Eurobarometer Survey on Entrepreneurship 
(, 4-), in the Scandinavian countries the status of local entrepreneurs 
is positive and about % of Finns have a favourable view of them.  According 
to statistics for recent years, the local unemployment rate for Finns is dropping, 
whereas the immigrant unemployment rate is rising by the day (Lapland Centre 
of Economic Development, Transport and the Environment ). In Scandi-
navia, a number of social indicators show that immigrants, especially those from 
outside the EU, have considerably higher rates of unemployment than native 
Swedes and Finns, who may depend on social welfare benefits (Westin ).
  Predicting attitudes towards immigrants is discussed by Hainmulle and His-
cox (, -4), who suggest that natives oppose immigrants with similar skill 
levels but favour immigrants with different skill levels. However, projects have 
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been initiated by governmental or non-governmental sectors to change the 
attitude of Finnish entrepreneurs towards immigrants by mentoring or coach-
ing on the one hand, and improving immigrants’ qualifications on the other. 
MoniNet () is an organisation in Rovaniemi which has been working 
for the well-being of immigrants as well as for expanding the social network 
of immigrants’ which is also important for immigrant to get a good job It is a 
multicultural centre that was established in  for immigrants and functions 
as a meeting place where immigrants may receive all kinds of basic help. The 
centre organises language courses as well as training and free-time activities, and 
helps immigrants in the job-seeking process. Immigrants can spend time at the 
centre, which offers free use of computers, an opportunity to meet people and 
assistance with everyday matters and problematic situations, such as using bank 
services, filling in application forms and finding housing. The centre also offers 
trips and courses in cooking and handicrafts free of charge. 
  Finns who are working for the integration of immigrants into Finnish socie-
ty have more liberal attitudes towards immigrants than Finns working elsewhere. 
Sometimes immigrants help to improve the situation of other immigrants and 
contribute to solving the unemployment problem in Finland.  For instance, a 
number of immigrants have established restaurants and businesses where im-
migrants may get jobs alongside Finns. In this way, immigration flows change 
the economic and unemployment situation of a country. Immigrants become 
self-employed and promote employment opportunities for others through their 
businesses. The overall atmosphere in Rovaniemi is business friendly, although 
there have been several incidents which have disturbed the immigrant com-
munity, such as a robbery in an immigrant-owned restaurant and negative com-
ments from local citizens about immigrants published in the daily newspaper 
(Aamulehti ). The newspaper has also reported that some years back Finns 
only used to shout at immigrants in the night when drunk, but today they may 
use abusive language even during the day. Some Finns believe that the increase 
in the immigration rate is one of the main causes of the employment crisis.
  There are some envious Finns who do not like immigrants being in a bet-
ter situation. For instance, one immigrant who lives in the city of Oulu had a 
luxury car; the mirror of the car disappeared one day in the car park, and the car 
suffered some other damage from time to time. The owner of the car suspected 
certain local Finns of these acts and believes that envy of immigrants is behind 
the attitudes involved. 
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Cultural effects of immigration 
Cultural differences may create some distressing situations for immigrants. Cul-
ture, as Huntington (, -4) defines it, is as “a people’s language, religious 
beliefs, social and political values, assumptions as to what is right and wrong, 
appropriate and inappropriate, and to the objective institutions and behavioural 
patterns that reflect these subjective elements”. Sometimes immigrants may 
change their cultures in a new society, yet they cannot change their skin colour 
or ethnicity. They get shocked by a new culture, one quite unknown to them 
before. Cultural misunderstandings sometimes distort the interpretation of the 
original issue, generating intercultural conflict. Cultural differences are the fo-
cus of a crucial debate which still has not explained that historically and today 
immigrant-receiving societies suffer from excessive recognition of minorities’ 
collective cultural rights (Couton ).
  Rovaniemi offers many cultural elements that are useful for both natives 
and immigrants; however, immigrants many times do not understand the new 
language, manners, norms, different-looking people or the new atmosphere 
in their host country. Cultural differences may create a communication gap. 
Shaking hands between a male and a female is not permitted in some Muslim 
culture, yet it is a common sign of politeness in Finnish culture. This may creat-
ing feelings of guilt in a Finn who has become aware that the custom is not 
acceptable in another culture. 
  Nevertheless, many refugees cannot forget the intensely negative experi-
ences that they had to face in the past and that may have altered their normal 
personality. Any odd situation in a new environment affects them more severely 
where it stems from racism, because no one has control over which race he or 
she belongs to. Culture shock is a sensitive issue all over the world. It is difficult 
for a person to survive in an environment where he or she occasionally faces 
culture shock, since everybody values his or her own culture. Creating mutual 
respect for all cultures is essential in a civil society; coping with a new society 
and culture is not an easy task; its is a lengthy process. In this situation, citizens 
in the host country may play a key role, since immigrants are vulnerable with 
regard to many issues. Initially, members of the host society can help by provid-
ing information and facts and highlighting the main features of their cultures 
to the immigrants, discussing in the process cultural differences and similarities. 
353
social effects of immigration in the host country
There is a growing pre-occupation with the possible dangers to social cohe-
sion represented by growing immigration flows and ethnic diversity (Cheong 
et al. ). Many people in Rovaniemi and Finland at large believe that such a 
danger exists.  Many Finns in Rovaniemi also find that if received in a positive 
way, immigrants may contribute to Finnish society and that the host society can 
learn something from them; others see the issue in negative terms and worry 
about the negative impacts on Finnish society of receiving immigrants.
  It is generally agreed that social ties play a beneficial role in the mainte-
nance of psychological well-being (Kawachi and Berkman ) among some 
groups of immigrants; in contrast, modern Finns are far more private when it 
comes to family life. However, family ties are important to promoting mental 
health: people with many good friends and family around are likely to live 
longer than isolated or lonely people (Mann ). Through interaction with 
different groups of immigrants, Finns in Rovaniemi get to know the social life 
of immigrants and immigrants can learn about the Finnish community.
  Even after getting Finnish nationality and living in the country for a period 
of time, some immigrants do not feel that they are a part of Finnish society, 
because their acceptance in Finnish society is still limited; they suffer a strong 
sense of rejection by the general public. They then try to build their own soci-
ety within Finnish society to provide unity. Yet, in Rovaniemi, due to disagree-
ments among immigrants and a tendency among them to move to the southern 
part of the country for better job opportunities, this has resulted in the forma-
tion of a number of mini communities. Immigrants’ social unity, which was 
strong in their native country, has broken down.
  Some immigrants have noted that there are opportunities to study Finn-
ish in Rovaniemi but that there are limited opportunities to practice the 
language, because Finns do not talk much – even with other Finns. Getting a 
chance to talk to native speakers would improve immigrants’ language skills – 
especially  pronunciation -  which are important in social life to cope with the 
core society. Sometimes immigrants in Rovaniemi have had a negative impact 
on life in the community by being involved in crime and corruption. This 
is an increasing trend in the case of sexual offences and also in working life. 
Some women from different countries such as Thailand, Estonia, and Jamaica 
come to Finland and begin engaging in prostitution, which has a negative 
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impact on Finnish society and violates Finnish law. Sometimes women come 
with their husbands to Finland and later get divorced; many of the divorced 
women start working as prostitutes to survive here rather than entering the 
job market. They earn money without paying any taxes, which is a crime. 
Moreover, they may spread serious diseases, including AIDS, and encourage 
young Finnish girls to be involved in prostitution.  Some Thai women liv-
ing in Rovaniemi have said that prostitution does not mean that that all Thai 
women living in Rovaniemi are prostitutes. The irony is that many times an 
innocent Thai girl may be teased as a whore by other nationals, including 
Finns.  Thai girls are in a disadvantageous position in the minds of young 
Finns in Rovaniemi although the number of Thai women getting married to 
Finns is increasing in the city. 
  In another development, immigrants from different countries come here and 
start a business, but make a deal with their workers and do not pay regular taxes 
to the Finnish government. Some refugees draw social and employment benefits 
from the Finnish Social Insurance Institution, yet work off the books without 
paying taxes. This practice is profitable for both entrepreneurs and workers, yet it 
is a violation of Finnish law and is condemned by Finnish entrepreneurs. 
  It is widely expected that this situation can be overcome by people showing 
respect for each other’s cultures, leading to a peaceful society. Otherwise life will 
be somewhat difficult for future generations, for children learn from the environ-
ment around them. If it is corrupt then they cannot learn anything good about 
the society they live in; this is a common concern throughout the world.
political effects on immigration
Immigrants discriminated against, immigrants decried, immigrants rejected, 
immigrants treated as scapegoats - all these are unfortunately commonplace 
occurrences (Salama ). Finland is not immune to these phenomena. Some 
political groups in Finland have endorsed the above attitudes, while others de-
plore them.  Migration and mobility are increasingly integral to the trajectory 
of European political economies. Migration policy, which is formulated exclu-
sively by the governmental authorities of the destination countries, is interested 
in receiving skilled migrants (Bruff ). According to the DESA country 
report (), Nordic countries have reformed their economic and migration 
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policy so that migrants may contribute to their national economy, and the gov-
ernments show the international community their initiatives in combating the 
global economic recession. However, due to the opposition of local voters and 
opposition political groups, the countries take far fewer immigrants than ex-
pected in the reports prepared by the governments of the EU countries (DESA 
report ). The same situation exists in Finland.
  It is very difficult to describe racism; it is not frequently acknowledged but 
very real in practice. Sometimes it is clearly visible; sometimes it is practiced 
subtly. In Finland there are differences between the Finns Party in Parliament 
and Finns in general. Members of the right-wing party think pessimistically 
that immigrants are a burden to the host society, but ordinary Finns think 
optimistically that every nation needs support from others. The Finns Party 
does not want immigrants to be able to get jobs in Finland when Finns are 
jobless and the employment crisis is worsening by the day. The attitudes of the 
Finns Party towards immigrants are expressed directly in the Finnish media. 
Many Finns support the Finns Party on the issue, yet many others oppose the 
party’s views. 
  In , when Finland started to receive refugees and asylum-seekers, there 
were many direct reactions towards immigrants. The situation later improved 
and Finns at large were more accepting of the situation for a few years. Nega-
tive reactions against immigrants emerged again after the receiving of refugees 
became a regular practice of the government; it was not welcomed by Finns 
Party and the recent general election is an example of this reaction. The party is 
now the largest opposition party in Parliament.  Thus it is clear that some Finns 
still strongly oppose receiving refugees. Nevertheless, the industrial world will 
need increasing numbers of immigrants in the medium and in the long run, 
and not just those who are most skilled. In many countries, the ratio of active to 
inactive persons is falling and this trend is likely to become more pronounced 
in the future (Salama ).
  In the near future, Finland will also need a considerable number of immi-
grants – experts and ordinary labour alike – to address the impending labour 
shortage. Finland is a country with little corruption and a model country when 
it comes to obeying the law. Accordingly, everybody should obey the Integra-
tion Act and the Anti-discrimination Act. 
  Immigration politics play an important role in Finland nowadays. In 
Rovaniemi the host community needs more information on immigrants as 
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well as refugees. Cultural mediation is needed to promote tolerance. To better 
learn from their respective cultures, both Finns and immigrants need support 
from each other.  Every city clearly has prejudice, yet increasing information 
might help reduce it (Salmela, translated into English from Monitor ).
  As an EU member state, Finland adopted its model for developing immi-
gration from EU migration policy, although certain domestic actors bypass the 
process of interest aggregation by mobilising in international venues. Most of 
the national ministries concerned with migration do not attend international 
negotiations (Guiraudon ).  According to Finland and its neighbours, it is 
important to encourage and to promote public interest in global development 
issues. It is also important to take the initiative to promote mutual knowledge 
and the wisdom of favouring a positive relationship between subjects of differ-
ent cultures. Development ideas and messages should be changed according to 
the current situation. The political  positions of the Finns Party sometimes ap-
pear in the newspaper as well as other media and can generate much anger and 
negative sentiment among the public. Sniderman et al. (, 4) found politi-
cal conservatism to be correlated with opposition to policies to assist blacks and 
with support for negative images of blacks as “lazy and irresponsible”. However, 
in Finland, the attitudes of supporters of the Finns Party and ordinary Finns 
directly affect the attitudes of host people towards immigrants. 
Conclusion
There are various communities of immigrants living in Rovaniemi who ex-
perience negative and positive attitudes on the part of the local Finns. The 
pessimistic conclusions about the negative effects of ethnic diversity on trust 
in general cannot be confirmed at the aggregate level across European coun-
tries. (Hooghe et al. ) An immigrant is not free from experiencing nega-
tive attitudes from other immigrants living in the same city. Young people are 
more aggressive than other Finns towards immigrants. However, adults do not 
frequently express their opinion about immigrants, that is, whether they either 
like or dislike them; all in all, Finns’ attitudes towards immigrants today are 
more positive than in the year .  Immigrants have both positive and nega-
tive impacts on the core society in Rovaniemi in different respects, including 
employment as well as socio-economic and cultural life. Nowadays they also 
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influence political life in the national context. However, Finns’ attitudes to-
wards immigrants and vice versa are a complex phenomenon which cannot be 
assessed in a general way; attitudes vary from individual to individual.
  The City of Rovaniemi and the Finnish government have specific pro-
grammes in place to improve the situation of immigrants and their commu-
nication with the native population. Proper initiatives for mutual knowledge 
and understanding may improve the overall situation and contribute to Finnish 
society more effectively. 
  Different cultures can enrich Finnish culture. People should eagerly await 
opportunities to learn about each other’s culture. Cross-cultural psychology 
has demonstrated important links between the cultural context and individual 
behavioural development. Given this relationship, cross-cultural research has 
increasingly investigated what happens to individuals who have grown up in 
one cultural context when they attempt to re-establish their lives in another. 
The long-term psychological consequences of this process of acculturation 
are highly variable, depending on social and personal variables that lie in the 
society of origin.
  Cultural mediation could play an effective role in promoting better un-
derstanding of other people’s cultures and improving progress in attitudes. In 
Rovaniemi, there are many governmental and non-governmental organisa-
tions, and their projects are playing a vital role in this regard.  Most of the 
projects are funded by the Red Cross, the European Union, the Finnish 
Slot Machine Association, the Ministry of the Interior, the Municipality of 
Rovaniemi and the Parish of Rovaniemi. They seek to enhance multicultural-
ism in Rovaniemi.
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c h a p t e r   4
Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen
gender, eConoMy and deveLopMent 
in the north
introduction
The North, and the Barents Region as a part of it, is facing many changes and 
challenges. The environmental changes that are taking place threaten tradition-
al livelihoods, local economies and social communities, but also provide new 
economic opportunities and possibilities for regional development. (e.g. Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment 5, hereafter ACIA; Arctic Human Development 
Report 4, hereafter AHDR) At the same time, the North is balancing be-
tween international political and economic interests. The rising role of Arctic 
politics (e.g. Heininen ; Ronson ), the changing environment and 
northern resources have made the economy and development key questions for 
the region (e.g. Megatrends ). 
  In the midst of the ongoing economic “boom” in the North, it is relevant 
to ask what in fact the economy of the region is. How is it defined, where does 
it operate and what are the underlying understandings of development entailed 
in accounts of it? This chapter examines understandings of the economy and 
development of the North, with a specific focus on gendered dimensions of 
those understandings. As Penny Griffin (, ) insightfully remarks “gender 
is a composite part of the relations of power that drive systems of economic 
development and growth, global financial flows and systems of manufacturing 
and production.” Hence, the economy in the North and the Barents Region, as 
elsewhere, is a gendered structure.
  In this chapter I ask where gender is or how it is perceived in accounts of 
the Northern economy and development. The paper engages the discussions 
of critical international political economy (IPE) (e.g. De Goede , ; 
Waylen ). By setting gender as a category of analysis, the chapter aims at 
reflecting on and illustrating the often concealed gendered assumptions, mean-
ings and practices of the economy. 
  The economy is understood here as a culturally variable and discursively 
performed practice that has material power to (re)produce hierarchies and mar-
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ginalisation (e.g. De Goede ). In a similar vein, the question of gender is 
understood not in terms of women and men (per se) but as a “governing code” 
(Griffin ; Peterson ) that entails and exposes gendered understandings, 
practices and hierarchies. Hence, by analysing the socially constructed under-
standings of the economy and its processes, it is possible to make visible how 
economic practices and people are valorised differently. The division between 
masculine and feminine is one such divide, one that works to (re)construct a 
gendered understanding of the economy (Peterson ).
  The context of the study is Arctic politics. The Arctic Council, a regional 
intergovernmental forum, has worked as an “Arctic voice” (Møller ) and a 
political decision-shaping body by highlighting issues of the North. Economic 
issues and economy-driven development have gained momentum in the region 
in recent years (e.g. The Economy of North, ECONOR-projects). One of 
the Council’s working groups, the Sustainable Development Working Group 
(SDWG), has been named as the leading working group for activities and out-
puts relating to economic and social questions. The reports published under the 
auspices of the Council and the SDWG are used here as data.
    The paper analyses, through the lenses of feminist economics, understand-
ings of both the economy and development, as well as the dispositions of gen-
der entailed in those understandings (e.g.  Griffin ). As the analysis reveals, 
the understandings of the economy of the North vary in terms of scale (global-
local), place (multinational corporation-community), value (money-culture) 
and necessity (subsistence economy- energy consumption). What these under-
standings share is a silence on questions of gender. 
  Hence, the analytic focus of this text is on explicating silenced understand-
ings of the economy and shedding light on the questions of gender that have 
been neglected (e.g. Foucault ; Fairclough ; Irni ). The method 
used to this end is text analysis. 
politics of the economy
International political economy (IPE) has been defined as “the analysis of in-
teraction between the political and the economic sphere involving state and 
non-state actors on the national and the international level.” (Leiteritz 5, 
5) The IPE approach emphasises the parallel existence and interaction of states 
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and markets and, for example, the role of new international actors such as mul-
tinational corporations and social movements. (Leiteritz 5)
  Despite this broad understanding of the economy and economic actors, it has 
been noted that contemporary IPE suffers from a paucity of gender research. If 
and when the economy is viewed as a gendered structure, it becomes pertinent to 
study the ways in which the economy acts “both to uphold and refashion existing 
patterns of gender relations” (Waylen , 4). Thus, the task for gendered IPE 
analysis becomes “understand[ing] how social structures, particularly structures of 
inequality, come into being and are transformed”. (Waylen , 4)
  Critical IPE also requires that the understandings of the economy should 
be diversified. Peterson (, ) suggests three types of economies: repro-
ductive, productive and virtual. Her approach highlights that the focus should 
not be only on the “increasingly global, flexibilised, information-based and ser-
vice-oriented ‘productive economy’”. Rather, informal economies, non-wage-
labour and various “virtual economies” (e.g. financial markets) are equally im-
portant. (Peterson , )
  In the North, the Arctic Council can be seen as a vivid example of the co-
existence of politics and economics as well as of states and other actors. Hence, 
the Council serves as a fruitful context for IPE analysis. Established in , the 
Council is an international political forum that brings together the Arctic states 
and representatives of indigenous peoples to address concerns and challenges 
affecting the region. The Council has extended the concern over the Arctic to 
include the social, cultural and economic challenges that northern communities 
face (e.g. Hønneland and Stoke ; Nilsson ). In doing so, it has also taken 
part in framing, organising and representing the economy of the North in par-
ticular ways. In Foucauldian terms, it has brought Northern political economy 
“into being”. (Rutherford , ; also e.g. Bäckstrand 4; Dillon 5)    
  The question of gender has been a complex one politically in the Arctic 
(e.g. AHDR 4; St. Denis ; Sloan et al. 4; Taking Wing ). Gender 
is at the same time everywhere and nowhere. It has been seen as a relevant issue, 
for example, in the contexts of human development (AHDR 4), participa-
tion (Sloan et al. 4) and well-being (Taking Wing ) of the North and 
northern people. In the realms of political decision-making, the economy and 
resources the question of gender has remained ignored. Gender is also often 
interpreted as something female or feminine. (e.g. AHDR 4) It is through 
such divisions into ‘gendered’ and ‘genderless’ topics that social structures, in-
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cluding economic structures, are formed. As Butler (according to De Goede 
, 5) notes, the discourses of sex and gender underpin a “specific operation 
of the sexual and gendered distribution of legal and economic entitlements”.  
  One facet of IPE research is to recognise the production of economic and 
financial knowledge as an important site where power is exercised (De Goede 
). The Arctic Council is one producer of such knowledge: according to 
Stokke (, ), the Council has “carved out a cognitive niche” in generating 
knowledge on the Arctic that is not provided elsewhere and in taking action in 
those areas of knowledge. Through its projects, reports and political discourses 
the Council thus influences how economic knowledge, rationality and devel-
opment are defined. 
  Hence, the Arctic Council is one context within which the economic 
discourses of the North are negotiated and constructed. These discourses can 
be interpreted as having material and gendered distributions and effects (De 
Goede ). In Griffin’s (, ) words, “institutional and discursive en-
vironments in which policies and practices are reproduced create (and thus 
constrain) certain ‘spaces of action’…”.
gendering development: questions of participation
Gender, development, sustainability and the environment have been themes in 
feminist research since the late s. The approaches known as “women, the 
environment and sustainable development” (WED), “women in development” 
(WID) and “gender and development” (GAD) all have their origins in criticism 
of traditional conceptions of development. Gender scholarship, as Griffin (, 
) argues, has revealed “the extent to which conventional ‘development’ issues 
are ‘informed by assumptions around gender’”.
  The particular claim of the gender and development approaches has been 
that development projects and processes have not been able to erase pov-
erty or inequality, but rather have worsened living conditions, particularly for 
women (in the global South).  The shared concern of these approaches has 
been to increase women’s participation in development processes and at the 
same time transform the unequal gender relations in development. The aim 
has been to empower women and make women’s lives and problems visible 
in their full complexity. (Braidotti et al. 4; Waylen ) 
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  The studies on gendered political economy also owe their history to debates 
on gender and development (GAD). Such work is now seen as part of feminist 
economics and the literature on gender and globalisation (Waylen , 55). 
Current studies on gendered political economy, like critical IPE, are concerned 
with (historically) “constituted frameworks or structures within which political 
and economic activity take place, as well as with the nature of different indi-
viduals and their actions” (Waylen , 4).
  The question of participation has been and continues to be one of the 
key focuses of discussions on gender, development and political economy. 
Discussions of gender and development have had an effect on the notions of 
women’s agency in development processes (in the global South), with images 
of victims changing into images of strength and resourcefulness. The shift in 
positions has also taken place in political priorities. Women’s role as efficient 
environmental managers is being recognised, and they are now even seen 
as the most valuable resource in achieving development and sustainability. 
(Braidotti et al. 4) Another, the focus of gendered political economy is 
on non-state actors and activities, women’s movements and their interactions 
with the state and governance structures. The aim is to understand gendered 
roles, recognise inequalities and identify the possibilities for change in the 
dominant gender order. (Waylen )
    The interlinkages of gender and development have also been recognised 
in the North and in the Barents Region. Discussions of development in the 
North have included features similar to those associated with the global South. 
These debates have addressed questions of women’s participation (e.g. AHDR 
4; Sloan et al. 4), their role in development processes (Taking Wing ; 
Nuttall , -) and unequal gender relations in development (e.g. Meg-
atrends ; AHDR 4). Women’s roles as valuable actors in achieving de-
velopment have also been recognised, especially in the current demographic 
situation, in which women are migrating to the south and northern communi-
ties are being left with predominantly male populations. (e.g. Megatrends ; 
AHDR 4).  
  What is missing in this research design – the third leg of the triangle in ad-
dition to development and gender – is economy. The northern “gender code” 
of silence seems to suggest a priority for male agency and male-dominated 
branches of the economy (Keskitalo-Foley , ). Value is ascribed to eco-
nomic activities and agents “that are characterized as masculine, at the expense 
of those stigmatized as feminine” (Peterson , 5).
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understandings of the economy and development
It is within political and organisational discourses that the economy and “the 
limits of achievable human ‘development’” are defined (Griffin , ), also in 
relation to questions of gender. The Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development 
Working Group (SDWG) has been an important organisational forum for ac-
tivities and outputs pertaining to the economic dimension of sustainable devel-
opment in the North. The working group has managed projects directly related 
to economic issues, for example, “The Economy of the North I and II” and has 
guided other projects with economic dimensions (e.g. AHDR 4; Family-
Based Reindeer Herding and Hunting Economies… 4, hereafter RHHE). 
The project reports are equally important in discerning the faint discourses of 
the northern economy defined through the vocabularies of “socio-economics”, 
industries, income and resources. 
  The data analysed in the present research consist of four reports published 
under the auspices of the Arctic Council and the SDWG.  The reports are Fam-
ily-Based Reindeer Herding and Hunting Economies, and the Status and Man-
agement of Wild Reindeer/Caribou Populations (4; referred as RHHE); 
The Economy of the North (; hereafter Econor ), The Economy of 
the North II (; hereafter Econor )  and the SDWG Report on Arc-
tic Energy (; referred as AE).The analysis reveals three different kinds of 
‘economies’ operating in the North: a global economy of resources, a local 
economy of traditions and a future economy of opportunities. Each of these 
entails and represents understandings of development and gender.  
the global economy in a local landscape
The first economy of the North comprises natural resources, resource extrac-
tion and global markets. The economy of the North is a manifestation of the 
global economy in local settings. Arctic economies are described as “largely 
based” and “heavily dependent” on natural resource extraction (Econor , 
, ). The Arctic, and the Barents Region as part of it, is described as geo-
economic space that supplies natural resources, but possibly also benefits from 
them. The report “The Economy of the North” states: 
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The circumpolar Arctic is exploited as a vast reservoir of natural resources 
that are destined for the southern, non-Arctic, parts of the countries, that also 
include Arctic regions, and more broadly to global markets. The Arctic is a 
major producer of hydrocarbons, minerals and marine resources, whose im-
portance is confirmed by the very value of the resources produced. (Econor 
, ; see also Megatrends , 5 “the international resource economy”)
  
The importance of northern resources binds the economy of the North to 
global needs and aspirations. The economy of the North is represented as the 
export of natural resources from North to South. The global economy is de-
picted as a necessity; no alternatives to participating in it are mentioned. It is, 
however, also mentioned that the exploitation of resources may cause social 
stratification and vulnerability in local communities. (Econor , -)
  The named agents of this economy are global industries and states. Local 
communities or individuals are not named as the key actors. On the contrary, 
the global economy of the North is described as being “outside physical or 
geographic spaces” (Larner and Walters 4, 4), somewhere “out there”. The 
Economy of the North goes on to observe:
The vast Arctic regions, most of which were opened to large-scale industrial 
exploitation in the th century, attract large national and transnational firms 
that have the necessary means to support massive operation and retain profit. 
Most often, this large-scale exploitation is carried out with capital, equip-
ment and labour from outside the Arctic regions themselves. (Econor , 
) 
  
For the Barents Region, the ‘economy’ of the global suggests development that 
is based on the extraction, mobility and transferability of resources, especially 
oil and gas (e.g. Soppela et al. , 5). Development is understood as access to 
global markets, and globalisation is represented as “beneficial and inextricably 
reproductive” of development (Griffin , ). As Griffin (, ) points 
out critically, the neo-liberal economy relies on the assumption that “people 
adhere to the rule of the market by identifying themselves with and internalis-
ing certain… modes of production”.
  The question of gender is silenced in the descriptions of the global econ-
omy of the North. By not naming individual actors or agents of the economy 
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and development, these accounts fail to acknowledge gender. Globalisation and 
global economy are portrayed as “weightless”, “deterritorialized” or “placeless” 
(Larner and Walters 4, 5). According to Waylen (, 5), the analyses of 
globalisation and the processes of the global economy are “devoid of gender”. 
The gendered processes of the global economy, in terms of both labour and 
impacts, are ignored. Yet, at the same time, the opening of economies to global 
finances has been “advocated as fundamentally empowering to the individuals” 
and to women, particularly in developing countries (Griffin , ). 
  Larner and Walters (4, 5) argue, however, that globalisation, includ-
ing the global economy, is situational, time- and place-bound, and embodied. 
The global economy operates in bodies and always has spatial effects. Hence, 
the global economy should be best understood “as a situated process that in-
volves diverse subjects and objects, including nation-states and sociotechnical 
networks and bodies” (Larner and Walters 4, 5).
  In the Barents Region, prostitution and trafficking in human beings are 
examples of embodied and gendered modes of globalisation and the global 
economy. The global “bioeconomy” (Dickins ) of the sex trade has a long 
and extensively studied history in the Barents Region (e.g. Penttinen 4; 
Skaffari ; Sverdljuk ). The research has shown that cross-border prosti-
tution and trafficking in human beings are economies that influence individu-
als, communities and the whole region. It is a global economy that is bound to 
bodies and genders and has spatial effects. Hence, it is one part of the gendered 
economy of the North, even though it is unrecognised and silenced in the 
broader political discourses.
the economy of continuity
The second economy of the North is depicted in terms of subsistence activities. 
It is represented as the local, and often traditional, economy that is manifested in 
the practices of hunting, reindeer herding, fishing and gathering. There is a clear 
distinction, even dichotomy, between the subsistence economy and the global 
“market economy” of natural resources, and generally the two are discussed 
separately. (e.g. Econor , ) The subsistence economy is often described 
as existing outside the market-economy and market-oriented activities (e.g. 
Econor , 5; see also Megatrends , 5 “the traditional economy”).
  The role of the local subsistence economy is more social and cultural than 
financial. It is portrayed as a vital part of the traditional social and cultural life 
of the North. The Economy of the North (, ) observes how subsistence 
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activities “continue to be of major significance to the indigenous peoples of the 
Arctic in providing food, social relationships and cultural identity”. The local 
economy is described as a means to maintain culturally important livelihoods 
and hence to provide continuity. 
  The local subsistence economy works within families, social networks and 
activities of the private sphere (e.g. RHHE 4). The named agents of this 
economy are local communities and peoples, that is, indigenous peoples, herd-
ers, men and women. Transferring cultures, values and traditions is an integral 
part of the subsistence economy, making that economy part of the reproductive 
economy of the North. According to Peterson (, ), a reproductive econ-
omy is “the economy of families and the private sphere – where human life is 
generated, daily life maintained, and socialization reproduced”. It is an economy 
that is often left out of research models due to its “unpaid” and “non-calculable” 
nature. The descriptions of the subsistence economy of the North exhibit simi-
lar features. Yet, as the local economy is tied to the social sphere, it is defined as 
economically non-profitable and in need of additional income from the market 
economy to provide “consumption possibilities” (e.g. Econor , ).
  For the development of the North and the Barents Region, the discourse 
of the local subsistence economy promises social and cultural sustainability and 
continuity. The question of gender is raised in that development, both as a 
challenge and an opportunity. Gendered and gendering practices are discussed 
in the context of reindeer husbandry in particular (e.g. RHHE 4, see also 
Sloan et al. 4 about fisheries). The reports analysed note how the number 
of female reindeer owners has declined and women´s participation in nomadic 
herding has decreased. On the other hand, women provide economic income 
to herding – thus making it viable – by working outside the livelihood. (e.g. 
RHHE 4, , 4) As Griffin (, ) aptly suggests, women are “con-
figured as a problem in, but also a solution to, economic development”. The 
report on reindeer herding and hunting economies (RHHE 4) describes 
the gendered – and the fading – role of women in herding:  
Women still play a prominent role, but we can see that a lack of women 
in the camps forces men to do some of this work [indoor work, heating, 
fishing, maternal tasks] as well. In addition, the introduction of technol-
ogy has on the one hand eased the male labour. On the other hand, it has 
given them new types of work tasks; the technical instruments need to be 
serviced and repaired. In this way, we see that female labour decreases while 
male labour steadily increases. (RHHE 4, 4)
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As the above excerpt illustrates, questions of gender are not wholly silenced 
in the discourses of the northern economy. It is recognised that the econo-
mies of the North and the Barents Region are gendered; that is, they have 
different implications, roles and spaces of action for women and men. It can 
be critically observed, however, that it is still within the traditional “private” 
sphere and the family where the gendered nature of economy is made vis-
ible (e.g. Peterson , -). Taking questions of gender into account 
only in the context of the social sphere and cultural “activities”, such as 
reindeer herding, is a way of excluding the broader ‘informal’ and repro-
ductive economy that women contribute to in order “to keep the ‘formal’ 
economy sustainable” (Griffin , ). This reinforces the impression of 
gender being a relevant issue only in certain sectors of the economy of the 
North.
    
the economy of energy and communities of consumption
The third understanding of northern economy and development is also tied to 
the natural resources of the area. In this discourse, the economy of the North 
is described with the reference to energy production. Here, however, northern 
communities are depicted as economic actors in the company of states and 
global markets. The economy and economic aspirations of the North are rep-
resented as an expression of the needs of the region’s local communities. The 
SDWG Report on Arctic Energy () observes:   
A significant first step in relation to Arctic energy is the need to confirm 
the existence of commerically-feasible [sic] resources, for example oil and 
gas reserves, but at the same time to consider the energy options for local 
communities which are dependent on access to sustainable, affordable energy. 
(AE , )
  
The question of consumption combines local stakeholders and global invest-
ments. The report emphasises, how energy consumption and costs are “an im-
mediate concern” for northern communities (AE , ). Hence, it is due 
to the needs of local peoples and communities that the economy of the North 
is interlinked with the energy industry. Simultaneously, the perceived needs 
of local communities argue for and validate the existence and necessity of the 
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energy industry. The report describes energy availability, costs and geographic 
distances as influencing the living conditions of northern communities:    
The quality of life for Arctic residents is directly dependant on the availabil-
ity and the cost of energy. Energy is a critical issue for Arctic residents given 
the sparse populations, long distances between many settlements, lack of 
transportation infrastructure in some parts of the Arctic and energy require-
ments for sustaining their communities in the climatic extremes created by 
long periods of cold and darkness. (AE , )
In this understanding, the economy is defined as an activity framed by local 
needs and promises of development that will lead to better “quality of life”, 
“sustainability” and “affordable” living. Development is thus described as eco-
nomic opportunity that not only emerges within but also positively influences 
northern communities. It is here that the discourses urging individuals and 
communities to seize their “opportunity” (Griffin , ) intertwine with 
the globalist demands for economic efficiency. In the North and the Barents 
Region, energy production is portrayed as the “opportunity”. 
  In this regard, the ‘economy of energy’ can be viewed as part of a neo-
liberal governmentality that obligates individuals to assume active citizenship 
and thus constructs the Barents Region. (e.g. Larner and Walters ; Larner 
) The people and communities of the region are defined as economic 
subjects and encouraged “to conform to the norms of the market”. Hence, 
northern communities are required to take responsibility for “enhancing their 
own well-being” (Larner , ,). At the same time, the North and the 
Barents Region emerge as an “instrument of government” (Larner and Walters 
, 4). The region is constructed in the name of “market participation”, 
“growth” and “prosperity”, which are provided through the energy production. 
  What are the gendered codes of the opportunities which individuals and 
communities are to seize as economically responsible actors? The discourse of 
opportunities embraces the idea(l) of survival. However, as Peterson (b, 
) argues, the global economy has only favoured a small group of people 
“while deepening the structural vulnerability of all workers and thus exacer-
bating old and generating new inequalities”. From a gender perspective, it has 
also meant a “feminization of survival” (Sassen ). Women are left to seize 
their “opportunities” within the triple burden of domestic, informal and formal 
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labour. That this is the case in the Barents Region can be seen, for example, in a 
study on Russian market women in Norway (Mobile Kultur Byrå ).  It de-
scribes a group of women who travel once a month from Murmansk (Russia) 
to Kirkenes (Norway) to sell their goods (e.g. handicrafts) in the town square 
in order to supplement their low income (salary or pension) and to provide 
economic security for their families.     
  Once again, the descriptions of the northern economy remain silent about 
the questions of gender. As Griffin (, ) observes, in the vocabulary of 
economic efficiency society has become “an accessory” to the economy “rather 
than the other way around”.  In a similar vein, the discourse of the ‘economy of 
energy’ relies on the socialised bodies (of women and men) –
for reproduction and social capital – without really addressing the questions of 
society and its role, for example, in economic productivity. 
Broadening economy, recognising gender: 
implications for further research in and on 
the Barents region
As the analysis reveals, understandings of the northern economy are construct-
ed within and through the dichotomies of global and traditional/local: on the 
one hand, the economy of the North is described as a component of the global 
“flow” of natural resources extracted and exploited by the wider world and, on 
the other, as resting on traditional and local family-based economies recognised 
as having a vital role in sustaining societies and cultural values. Local econo-
mies and people are, however, enticed to join the global economy of natural 
resources for its promise of a “better” future, that is, affordable living and an 
improved quality of life. The underlying images and expectations associated 
with the development of the North are thus entangled with the promises of the 
global economy. In this context, as this chapter has also shown, the economy of 
the North is depicted as genderless. Questions of gender are raised only in the 
spheres of domestic and local economies.
  The current emphasis on a global and large-scale natural resource economy 
can render other important ‘economies’ of the North and the Barents Region – 
and questions of gender – invisible. Historically, household and informal econ-
omies have been viewed as remnants of old and underdeveloped economies 
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and have been expected to cease in the process of economic modernisation. 
However, as time and research have revealed, the formal economy is depend-
ent on the informal economy and the latter is far from vanishing. (Peterson 
a) Indeed, Peterson (a) argues that the globalised economy has even 
increased informalisation. An essential part of the global economy takes place 
in the informal flows of goods, services and people – both licit and illicit. The 
unpaid and gendered work of reproduction, which involves domestic, caring 
and informal labour, is also an intrinsic part of the global economy. This is very 
much the case in the Barents Region.
  In the midst of global economic processes, it becomes even more pertinent 
to study the phenomenon that Peterson (a, 5) terms “housewifization”. 
The term refers not only to the “devaluation of feminized labour”, but also to 
the features of global economics that leave both male and female workers “in the 
situation of housewives: atomized, unorganized and economically insecure” (Pe-
terson a, 5). We should critically reflect on whether the global economy 
that takes place in the North and the Barents Region might, in addition to the 
economic opportunities that it provides, “atomize” the existing, local and cultural 
economies of the region. Does the global economy eventually render the people 
of the region economically insecure and informal economies devaluated? 
  Future studies on the economies of the North and the Barents Region should 
thus not overlook informal and household economies. As feminists, among other 
researchers, have argued, the “hidden” work matters (Peterson b, ). In-
formal and household economies have both economic and political significance. 
Broadening the perceptions of the northern economy will make it possible to 
challenge and even break the gender stereotypes and hierarchies of that economy. 
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c h a p t e r   5
Monica Tennberg, Aileen Espiritu,  Larissa Riabova and Julian Reid
ConCLusions and soMe suggestions
for further researCh 
the regional dilemma of sustainable development
This book is relevant to the understanding of sustainability issues and con-
cerns in the Barents Region, which is seen mostly as a resource region for the 
European and global markets. Much of the current research on the Barents 
Region has been and is still carried out within the geopolitical tradition of 
international relations studies. In the geopolitical approach, natural resources-
based development in the Barents Region is analyzed by focusing on states 
and international cooperation. From this perspective, sustainable development 
is mostly a question of natural resource management and issues related to it. A 
more critical strand of geopolitics focuses on spatial politics on various scales by 
studying discourses and practices of political space-making. From this perspec-
tive, the Barents Region is a constellation of competing spatial discourses and 
practices, including those concerning sustainable development (see Aalto et al. 
; Brunstad et al. 4; Lehtinen ).
  This book uses an approach called International Political Economy (IPE) 
to study the development of governance practices in the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region. IPE aims at studying the co-creation of wealth, power and well-being 
(Dickins ; Leiteritz 5). The main advantage of this approach is that it 
problematizes the relationship between the political and the economic. Ac-
cording to Susan Strange (4, ), IPE extends the conventional limits of 
the study of politics by investigating how and by whom power is exercised to 
influence politics beyond the traditional, state-centred sphere of international 
relations. Most importantly, the IPE approach emphasises the social dimension 
of sustainable development: what kind of social relations lead to social and 
environmental problems possible and how these relations influence efforts to 
solve them (Newell ).
  The first chapter of this book introduced some ideas by Larner and Walters 
() about regional governmentality as a particular mode of governance 
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that is connected to developments in global economy and governance. Neo-
liberal regionalism is a widespread mode of governance which emphasises the 
use of market-based techniques to govern state-society relations and build 
public-private partnerships (Underhill ; Larner ; Marshall ). This 
concluding chapter will return to some of the ideas presented in the introduc-
tion and the findings from the individual chapters. Two main conclusions can 
be drawn from the book and its various chapters. The first is that there are 
“neoliberal” approaches to regional governance based, for example, on “hybrid 
soft-law instruments” that increase private regulation and corporate social re-
sponsibility. These practices produce competing political, economic and legal 
rationalities for regional governance (Larner and Williams , 4), working 
“at distance” through freedom and self-help. The second conclusion is that this 
neoliberal approach raises some concerns about the social and environmental 
sustainability of development in the region. The “biopolitical” logic of neolib-
eral regionalism emphasises the capacity of people and local communities to 
take advantage of economic opportunities and their responsibility to use their 
regional assets effectively (Painter , 5). Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen sug-
gests in her chapter that local economies and people are enticed to join the 
global economy of natural resources by its promise of a better future: that is, 
affordable living and improved quality of life. This is not always the case in the 
Barents Region, as Sinevaara-Niskanen and some of the other authors show 
in their contributions.
neoliberal governance in the Barents region 
Neoliberal regional governmentality is based on the idea of governing through 
freedom (Larner ; Larner and Walters ). Accordingly, regions such as 
the Barents Region govern themselves by interaction, communication and re-
form within and between authorities, companies and non-governmental or-
ganizations. An example of “governance at distance” is the double structure 
of governance in the Barents Region. Md. Waliul Hasanat concludes in his 
chapter that the double structure of Barents governance creates two forms of 
“soft” international law practices. He suggests that ministerial Barents Coun-
cil is a “soft-law” body under modern international law, while the Regional 
Council appears to be a “softer than soft-law” body. The author argues that this 
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type of approach to regional governance adapts to new situations and changes 
in the region and responds to local needs.
  Another example of governance at distance is given by Anna-Maija Mat-
ilainen. In the forest sector in Northwest Russia, several regulatory systems run 
by the state and companies co-exist. The large forest companies in Northwest 
Russia have adopted various regulatory instruments such as Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) standards to govern their behavior, while the smaller companies 
have developed their own Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices. 
Because of the participation of non-governmental organizations, the CSR of 
the forest companies is not solely in the hands of the companies themselves. 
The companies have to learn how to cooperate with various stakeholders and 
find ways to navigate in multiple regulatory regimes.
  Regional governmentality constructs the region as a site for competing 
rationalities of governing. Through competing rationalities of governing the 
region is “governmentalized”. The Barents Region is made up of fragment-
ed peoples and territories linked by asymmetrical relations of political and 
economic power, as suggested by Larner and Williams (, 4). Karolina 
Banul argues that the Barents Region is an example of a territory covered by 
a network of complicated political relationships. Different interests of regional, 
national and international political powers come together and compete in 
the search for renewable energy policies. Stefan Walter describes conflicting 
governmentalities in the current climate and energy policies of the region 
and suggests that current governance efforts do not mitigate the acceleration 
of energy use in order to curb emissions that lead to climate change. Rath-
er, the efforts may, in fact, only redistribute the burden and risk of climate 
change impact in the North. Another example of competing rationalities in 
regional governance comes from Russia. Larissa Riabova’s analysis of Rus-
sian Northern policy concludes that the federal policy treats the North and the 
Arctic as a resource base for the rest of the country, while the northern regions 
themselves put more emphasis on the need for their sustainable development. 
Riabova suggests that there is a need to balance these two extremes and aim at 
a more sustainable and socially oriented approach in the state Northern policy, 
as well as the development of new, more equitable policies of resource man-
agement and resource rent distribution in the North based on co-management 
models and the redirection of revenue flows towards the northern regions of 
the Russian Federation.
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  The neoliberal self-help system of regional governance is based on trust 
among individuals, organizations and institutions. However, building and main-
taining it across borders, institutions and individuals is not easy. Eini Laak-
sonen discusses successes and failures in business activities by Norwegian and 
Finnish companies in the Murmansk region on the basis of research literature 
review. The Norwegian companies operating in the Murmansk region have 
trustworthy contacts with Russian partners, and they have suitable negotiating 
strategies, as well as sufficient knowledge of the Russian culture and language, 
to succeed in these negotiations. This does not seem to be the case for Finnish 
companies, Laaksonen concludes. Maria Tysiachniouk, for her part, in a case 
study focusing on different stages in the production, manufacturing and sell-
ing of forestry products, studies the importance and understanding of trust in 
Finnish-Russian business relations. The analysis shows clear national differences 
in the ways managers construct trust in their business activities at various stages 
in the chain of custody.
Biopolitics of development in the Barents region
Some critical writers, such as Julian Reid (), have suggested that sustain-
able development has been, or is currently being, appropriated by economic 
rationalities, and specifically those of neoliberal doctrines of governance. This 
may mean that local communities and populations are becoming “adaptive op-
portunists” to changing environmental, social and economic conditions. The 
theme of economic well-being and happiness is at the focus of the chapter 
by Nils-Gustav Lundgren. The author studies the connection between eco-
nomic growth and happiness, presenting some interesting empirical results 
from the northern Swedish part of the Barents Region. Contrary to some 
results in international research on happiness, people belonging to a national 
minority can experience greater happiness, at any rate if they are Sami or in-
habitants of the Torne Valley, than other groups of inhabitants in the region. 
Geographical location can also influence happiness, according to Lundgren: 
people in Skellefteå and Piteå are definitely happier than the average Nor-
rlander. Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen concludes that the current emphasis on 
global and large-scale natural resource economy in the region can render other 
important ‘economies’ of the North invisible, along with questions of gender. 
382
The informal flow of goods, services and people, both licit and illicit, is an es-
sential part of the global and regional economy. The unpaid and gendered work 
of reproduction, which involves domestic, caring and informal labour, is also an 
intrinsic part of the global and regional economy.
  There are also some local tragedies to report from the Barents Region. Soili 
Nysten-Haarala and Antonina Kulyasova describe the situation among the 
Pomors as “rapidly leading to the human socio-economic tragedy of a group of 
people who are dependent on natural resources, the governance of which they 
have been forced to relinquish”. The competition between state legislation and 
traditional rights is leading to the same sad result as that suggested by the theory 
of the tragedy of the commons – not to the regulated protection of biological 
resources, as the Federal Law on Fishery claims. The authors suggest that “[w]
hether they are considered to be an indigenous people or not, it is clear that 
the Pomors are a group of people who are dependent on traditional fishery.” 
Instead of demanding recognition for the Pomors as an indigenous people, 
the writers’ view is that the Pomor Movement should emphasize the special 
economic, social and cultural conditions of the Pomors and demand special 
legislation, examples of which can be found in the history of Pomorie as well 
as in recent legislation of the neighbouring countries.
  The importance of public participation in promoting socially sustainable 
development is stressed by many authors in the book. In some cases, civil so-
ciety can become a counter force to “neoliberal sustainability”: for example, 
non-governmental organizations cooperate with companies and try to include 
social and environmental factors in the relationship with the local communities 
(Aarsaether et al. 4; Hønneland and Blakkisrud ; Heleniak ; Ri-
abova ). Luc Ampleman stresses the importance of planning and public 
participation for effective regional governance of transportation. In a region 
like the one covered by the Barents Euro-Arctic Transport Area (BEATA), 
Ampleman concludes that the challenge of transport planning is even more 
complex than in many other cases. The regional planning process of sustainable 
transport established links between planners several years ago. Many common 
projects are still under development, and the common interest in going further 
with a general vision for the region still seems to have general support. The 
author suggests some measures to facilitate the next steps, such as the elabora-
tion of indicators that are adapted to Arctic conditions, the use of simplified 
tools to facilitate the general participation and understanding of all stakehold-
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ers concerned by transportation, and the inclusion of all transport dimensions 
in order to make better use of the actual infrastructural capital of the Barents 
Transport systems.
  Vladimir Didyk, for his part, highlights the importance of local institu-
tions in promoting sustainable development since the establishment of Bar-
ents cooperation in the early s. Although the role of local government in 
achieving sustainable development at the local level is potentially high, its actual 
implementation in the Russian regions in general, including the areas that are 
part of the BEAR, is weak. This weakness is due to recent development factors, 
the absence of a national development strategy, and weak civil society in Rus-
sia. However, some international projects and programs in the region have had 
a positive impact on strengthening local self-government and advancing the 
sustainable development of local communities.
  In Nafisa Yeasmin’s view, cultural mediation can play an effective role in 
promoting a better understanding of cultures, as well as improving attitudes 
among local peoples, based on a case study of immigrants and their problems. 
In Rovaniemi, Finland, there are many governmental and non-governmental 
organizations and projects aiming at enhancing multiculturalism. The author 
argues that local attitudes towards immigrants are a complex phenomenon that 
cannot be generalized. Those attitudes vary from one person to the next. Proper 
initiatives to promote mutual knowledge and understanding among immigrants 
and the local population may improve the overall situation and contribute to 
the development of Finnish society, according to the author.
future research needs
The political economy of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region has several special 
features: there is greater diversification of economic activities than in the Arctic 
as a whole; the role of the EU is important in regional policies, trade relation-
ships and various development projects; and there is extensive political coop-
eration in the region by various political bodies, participants and programs. All 
these characteristics make the region an interesting case study for the explora-
tion of the connections between economic development, local communities 
and practices of governance (Duhaime et al. 4; Political economy of north-
ern regional development ; Megatrends ). Many of the current na-
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tional policies towards the North, whether we are speaking of the Barents Re-
gion or the Arctic in general, are motivated by a spirit of colonialism. The states 
in the region aim to become leaders in Northern and Arctic development. 
Because of such ambitions, it behooves researchers and other stakeholders to 
analyze regional and national agendas and actions critically and to examine 
what implications they will have for local Northern and Arctic communities 
that are dependent on the use of non-renewable resources.
  Our suggestion is to develop a joint, long-term Barents research program 
that mobilizes research institutes, researchers and local stakeholders to study, 
document and critically evaluate regional dynamics towards sustainable devel-
opment, focusing in particular on various governance practices that either en-
able or hinder socially sustainable development in the region. There is a need to 
) produce multidisciplinary knowledge about challenges and threats to, as well 
as opportunities for, sustainable development across the Barents Region; ) syn-
thesise macro- and micro-level knowledge about current neoliberal and other 
governance practices as a catalyst for sustainable development through joint 
research, workshops and publications; ) disseminate information concerning 
the research process and its results through social media, websites and travelling 
exhibitions; and 4) develop a long-term Nordic-Russian research partnership 
to document and critically evaluate the Barents Region’s evolution towards 
sustainable development.
  The overall aim of this research strategy should be to denaturalise sustain-
able development as a neoliberal technique of governance and question the 
existing ways of understanding “unsustainability” as a problem for local, na-
tional and regional governance. Future research should challenge the domi-
nant neoliberal, economically driven conceptions of sustainable development 
and transform their current limitations by studying local, national and regional 
discourses and governance practices. Such discourses and practices cannot be 
studied by focusing only on local communities and populations; there is a need 
for broader analysis of changing historical, social, political and economic gov-
ernance at different levels across the Barents Region. Moreover, serious and 
thoughtful analysis of the place of the Barents Region within the wider global 
context of international political economy in its diverse forms would afford a 
more holistic assessment of the position of this region vis-à-vis the EU and the 
Circumpolar North as a whole.
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